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ABSTRACT 
Parliamentary government based on the British tradition may be viewed . 
in many ways. One of the most often discussed aspects of this system 
of government, frequently referred to as the 'Westminster model', has 
been the position of the minister. Individual and collective responsibility 
Of ministers is regarded as the core of the model. The constitutional 
expression of ministerial responsibility is contained in the conventions 
surrounding. Cabinet, Executive offices, and the minister's membership of 
Parliament. 
Much has been written about these conventions, especially from an 
institutional perspective. The major concern of this literature has been 
with the politics/administration dichotomy as a manifestation of these 
conventions. The classical concept of the dichotomy has been stated in a 
number of ways, but is best known as a description of the respective roles 
of the political minister and the public service administrator. The 
Westminstel.model has this element as a central feature, and much of the 
structural framework of the model depends on separation of these roles. 
In the 1930s there was .a trickle of literature critical of the actions 
of politicians and public servants. This has since turned into a flood. 
Some observers perceived inconsistencies when the model was used to explain 
the operation of the system. Parliament was thought to be increasingly 
dominated by the Executive and ministers by their public servants; rather than 
controlling the bureaucracy, politicians were under their domination. 
The aim of this thesis is to ascertain whether the changes suggested 
in the critical literature have actually occurred. The relationship between 
ministers and their senior public servants is crucial to understanding 
whether the strict boundary is maintained between their roles as defined 
• in the Westminster model. Some writers have doubted whether such boundary 
ever existed. 
The purpose of the thesis cannot easily be attained without some attention 
to methodology, and a suitable framework for analysis has been adapted from 
a similar study in the Washington State Executive. This framework provides 
criteria by which to compare the statements and actions of the participants: 
Without a set of conceptually derived benchmarks, statements and actions of 
participants in the processes can only be recorded in an impressionistic way 
which is not amenable to evaluation. 
In the empirical part of this study, three departments in the Tasmanian 
State Executive were selected. Interviews were conducted with ministers and 
senior officers. Chapters III,IV and V contain the result of these interviews 
and some hisorical research in secondary material. Through these studies 
it becomes quite obvious that the politics/administration dichotomy as expvessed 
in the classical form is inadequate. Rather than a dichotomy there is a 
threefold division of activity between ministers and senior public servants. 
Ministers must exercise political leadership and some executive authority if 
they are to maintain their political credibility. Public servants are expected 
to contribute administrative capacity in addition to undertaking some executive 
authority. It is in the field of executive authority, that overlap occurs 
between ministers and public servants. For historical reasons, this is especially 
prevalent in the Australian States and close scrutiny is required to explain 
the balance of their relationships. 
As adapted to Australian State government, the Westminster model has to 
be interpreted in the light of this trifurcated, rather than bifurcated, 
explanation. Once this has been done, previous discussion of the operation 
of that system of parliamentary government is shown to be inadequate. The 
work of Reid on Australian Federal government and Self and Brown on British 
government are considered in the context of this altered appreciation. No 
• attempt is made to derive generalisations for the Westminster model as a whole 
from this relatively limited study, but some further avenues for study are opened. 
POLITICS ADMINISTRATION AND THE WESTMINSTER MODEL 
Governing, as Rose stresses, is a relational activity and government 
a descriptive term for the set of institutions in which those operations 
are carried out)  
Studies of the latter have featured prominently in academic and popular 
literature, which has ranged widely among the various institutions. Recent 
emphasis on processes and the informal as they occur within and between 
institutions has led to different interpretations about the relations 
referred to by Rose. Factors previously glossed over have(emerged with 
greater significance, e.g. the limitations on deeisionmaking in conditions 
of bounded rationality, which results in a 'satisficing' or 'incremental' 
decision. 2 One of the consequences of these new insights has been a critical 
literature on parliamentary government a - id, more recently, on the roles of 
politicians and administrators within that system. 
It is now conventional wisdom that policy-making in a parliamentary 
system is no longer the sole preserve of the politicians, and that administra-
tors have significant influence in that field. Governing is dependent on 
a proper balance in relationship between the various elements, and especially, 
between the two critical actors within the system, politicians and administra-
tors. If this balance is to be maintained in such a way as to support the 
1 R. Rose, "Models of Governing", Comparative Politics, 5(4),July 
1973, pp 465-496. 
2 H.A. Simon; . Adtinistrative Behaviour, (2nd ed. New York: Macmillan, 
19.581 C.E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy:decisiOn making through  
'Mutual adjustment, (New York: Free Press, 1965); D.Braybrooke and 
C.E. Lindblom; Strategy of Decision:Policy Evaluation and Social Process, 
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); see also: J. Bray, Decision in  
Government, (London: Gollancz, 1969). 
basic framework of representative and responsible parliamentary government, 
a deeper understanding of the processes and the interdependence of insti-
tutional form with these processes, is needed. As Vickers has noted: 
"The art of governing - and of being governed - is to 
shape the institutions and so to regulate the working 
of society that it can contain the criticism that it 
generates."3 
The appropriate balance will depend on the complementary display of political 
leadership and administrative capacity within those institutions. There 
will be little support for a system of parliamentary government which does 
not provide some constraints for political leadership through demands for 
accountability in the parliamentary processes or denies the dependence 
upon the administrative capacity of the public officials of those same 
politicians. 
This network of relationships - between politicians and administrators; 
between governors and governed; between minister and senior official - is 
not simply one of identifying two distinct elements and tracing their be-
haviour. In many ways it is an artificial distinction, sometimes seen as 
a dividing line between ends and means, where 'political ends' are trans-
lated into reality through 'administrative means'. There may be some benefit 
in using this artificial distinction for analytical purposes, but its con-
tinual use tends to create confusion as to the reality it is supposed to 
reveal. As a consequence that which relates to ends, or 'policy' is assumed 
to be political; that which concerns means, or implementation, is seen as 
administrative. The relationships are far more complex than this simple 
dichotomy conveys and in using it for analytical purposes the observers of 
government have misled themselves and their readers as to the realities, 
3 Sir G. Vickers.;TreedOM - in'a'ROcking Boat, (London: Allan Lane 
The Penguin Press, 1970); see also F. Riggs, "Administrative Reform as a 
Problem of Dynamic Balancing"; - PhillippinesJournal'ofTublic Administration, 
April 19701 p 106, where he states: "...the effectiveness of any government depends, not only on how well its machinery for implementing decisions - 
operates, but also on its ability to command the continuing loyalty and 
Support of its population." 
resulting in confusion and uncertainty about the form of parliamentary 
government. 
The fundamental premiss of the British version of parliamentary 
government is the integration of the execu-tive tasks of government with 
the legislative. This form of balancing between the political and administra-
tive was first identified by Bagehot, whose impressionistic account of the 
English constitution formed the staple diet of most writers on parliamentary 
government in the early part of this century. 4  The interlocking pieces were 
Cabinet, the departments controlled by the ministers, and Parliament, in 
which the ministers also played out their roles as politicians. His refer-, 
ence to the cabinet as the 'buckle', binding together the legislative and 
the executive, the political and the administrative, holds the key to the 
interpretation of the relationship between these pieces. The reason, they 
so successfully performed as one whole, acting in unison and maintaining 
the appropriate balance, lay in the responsibility and person of the minister. 
In Bagehot's time the element of responsibility was not clearly spelled 
out since there was an inbuilt expectation that was hardly ever disappointed. 
As Daalder points out: 
"It (the social background) gave a special flavour 
to the ideal of a good minister. It united seemingly 
conflicting beliefs, such as a feeling of superiority 
and a readiness to subordinate oneself to hierarchical 
structures; a preference for the amateur in politics 
with a readiness to specialise; play and seriousness; 
fighting spirit and esprit de corps; individualism and 
group activity - qualities that all public schools 
cultivate and Britons extol traditionally." 5 . 
This, combined with the small number of ministers: five in 1783; 10-11 
between 1800 and 1820; 14-15 in the period during which Bagehot was writing, 
4 W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: Fontana Books, 1963). 
s H. Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain 1914 - 1963 (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1963) p 10. 
4 
gradually increasing to around 20 subsequent to 1914-1918, provides 
evidence of a feeling of 'tightness of the aristocratic hold on these 
positions. 6  However, the characteristics, the integration of the legis-
lative and executive in caW.net , the relatively small ruling group from. 
whose ranks the members of Cabinet were drawn, and the comparatively narrow 
range of functions, all came under great stress as the functions of govern-
ment became more complex and the legislature more representative. The 
greater range and complexity of functions has caused specialisation and 
departmentation.on a scale not previously envisaged. Consequential changes 
have occurred in relations between the minister and his department, causing 
problems in the maintenance of the special relationship between the political 
and administrative inherent in the previous arrangements. On the one hand 
the division of tasks between politicians and administrators increased 
in both a practical and professional sense. On the other hand, the line 
between policy-making and execution became more evident as administrative 
theorists prescribed in order to achieve better policy decisions and more 
efficient - execution. This demarcation has been expressed in the 'instru-
mental theory' of public service administration 7 yet, in practice it became 
more blurred in certain parts of the hierarchy as ministers were forced to 
allow their departmental officers a greater degree of discretion. 8 
6Daalder, op. cit., 27 et. seq., where he supports this view in 
providing the following information about Cabinet meetings at this time: 
"Originally a Cabinet meeting was little but an occasion for 
high-ranking persons to deliberate in private. ... Sir Robert Peel 
could still control the field of administration in great detail 
in the middle of the nineteenth century. Peel's successor... 
Lord Derby, carried out his duties between July and February 
(when Parliament was not sitting) almost entirely from his 
country estate. ...Even under Rosebery at the end of the 
century, a large part of a Cabinet session could be spent. discussing 
the exact text of one of Juvenal's satires." 
7See R.S. Parker and V. Subramaniam, "Public and Private Administration", 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 30, 1964, p 355. 
8 This vital point is taken up later in this chapter after a discussion 
of the Westminster model in reference to Self's 'Political-administrative 
arch'. P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1972) p 150. 
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The concept of Cabinet as the 'buckle' uniting the political and 
administrative has remained at the core of the institutions of representa-
tive parliamentary government, but adaptation has been difficult. 9 It is 
said the ministerial group, in Bagehot's day, were men of sensibility in 
a world where, even if everybody did not accept their right to make de-
cisions, those of standing and who were articulate, did. What subsequent 
writers have taken as the classic ministerial department was not a depart-
ment as now understood. Rather, it was the organisational representation of 
a type of person - an example of a particular elite - in which was combined 
the qualities of education and upbringing and the representative capacity to 
believe the decisions they made were expressions of the general will - of the 
greatest good for the greatest number. They were motivated by an unselfish, 
yet traditional desire to be of benefit to their country, to serve it as 
10 they had been led to believe was their birthright. 	The aspirations of those 
who look for the return of the golden age of ministerial departments are 
constrained by an understanding of this basic reality of Bagehot's description - 
that what he saw was the expression of an aristocratic tradition: what the 
'right' man owes to his country. 11 Seeking to return to this 'golden age' by 
using the sophistry of Bagehot 12 and the utilitarian philosophy of Mill as criteria 
9Richard Crossman points out that, Bagehot "saw the weakness and 
instability of multi-party government based on proportional representation. 
He assumed that a firm two-party system based on single member constituencies 
with strong personal leadership is the desirable form of parliamentary 
government." R. Crossman, Inside View (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) p 32. 
-- 
 
10S. Encel, Equality and Authority (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1970) p 4. 
11Gerald Caiden uses such words as "comforting mythology" and 
"folklore" to describe theories which grew up around the idea of the 
ministerial department and the position of the civil servant in the 
nineteenth century. G. Caiden, "The Political Role of the Commonwealth 
bureaucracy" Public Administration (Sydney), 24 (4), December 1965,.p 311. 
12See C. Sisson, The Case against Walter Bagehot (London: Faber & Faber, 
1972) pp 65-70. 
against which to measure current government performance, is still the 
practice of some writers. 13 
The criteria for the structure of the ministerial departments that 
were an integral part of the Parliamentary system are easily defined: 
"...a government agency headed by a single and 
exclusively responsible politician, with a 
permanent head as chief adviser and general 
manager of the department." 14 
11 ... 1. Headed by a single political person, at 
once exclusively responsible - most powerful and 
yet the most temporary element of the organisation. 
2. A permanent head to whom senior officers 
report, to be appointed by the Prime Minister, 
Minister and Permanent Head of the Treasury. 
3. The Permanent Head to be senior adviser 
and general mahager. 
4. Hierarchical structure within the 
organisation with top grades of civil servant at 
the top of the pyramid." 15 
The Westminster Model is an extension of the above criteria, taking into 
account the complexities of the situation today, and the expected role of 
Parliament. 
The Westminster Model - English version 
The use of this term is really shorthand for a system of interacting 
groups and individuals formed into organisational units, which function 
according to regularised patterns of interaction and interdependence. 16  
13 For a very interesting example of the Westminster model as seen 
from crosscultural boundaries see: Dharma Vira, "The services in Parliamentary 
Democracy" Indian Journal of Public Administration, XVI (3), July/Sept., 1970, 
pp 316-320. 
14 R.NSpann, "Bagehot on Public Administration" Public Administration  
(Sydney),26(4), Dec. 1967, p 312. 
15 B.B.Schaffer, "The idea of the Ministerial Department" Australian  
Journal of Politics and History, 3(1), 1957, p 60. The fourth criterion was 
not one with which Bagehot was concerned, as has been pointed out. 
16 For a further discussion of this statement see R.H. Simmons, 
"American State Executive Systems: An Heuristic model" Western Political  
Quarterly, 18(1), March 1965, pp 19-26. . 
From these representatives a number were selected to undertake the 
.responsibility of the specialised functions of government and to supervise 
the work of the public servants employed to carry out that function. These 
members, or Ministers, were accountable to the Parliament for their depart-
mental activities, and any mismanagement on their part would meet with 
appropriate retribution at the hands of Parliament. Thus existed a circular 
linkage between the citizens, the institutions of government and those who 
were employed to administer - the public service. Two views of the same 
model characteristics are set out hereunder: 
Ministers 
House of Commons 
it Citizens Civil servants 
FIG. I 19 
Prime Minister 0 Cabinet V 
R Ministers in 
N Departments 
Civil Service 
rliament 
eople (electors) 
FIG. II20 
 
  
18 (contd.) 
"Accountability and proportional representation:The Tasmanian Case", 
Politics, X(2), Nov. 1975, pp 216-220. See also H.F.Pitkin, The Concept  
of Representation(Berkeley; Los Angeles: Uni. of California Press, 1967) and 
A.H. Birch, The Nature and Function of Representation (Exeter: Exeter 
University, 1971). 
19 A.H. Birch, The British System of Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1970). 
20 P.J. Madgwick, Introduction to British Politics (London: Hutchinson 
Educational, 1970) p 32. 
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The first diagram represents the nearest to the Bagehotian model - the 
liberal view of democracy - except that it places no emphasis on the vital 
Cabinet. In the second, rather more sophisticated diagram, there is a 
clearer distinction drawn between the institutions of government and 
Parliament, and also within government. This may result from more rigorous 
analysis of the structural side of government rather than of the ideological 
- underpinnings which are Birch's concern. 21  
Both perspectives place the administrator in the role of implementor 
and the department as the 'instrument' of the minister. The ministerial 
department thus becomes the appropriate administrative vehicle by which 
functions may be performed and the above political conventions upheld. 22 
Even here the main structures are Parliament, Ministers, Cabinet and the 
Public Service as they were in Bagehot's time, although in this later 
analysis the principal institutions are more widely identified as: (a) the 
Crown; (b) Parliament; (c) Cabinet; . (d) the judicial system; (e) the civil . 
service; (f) the electoral system; (g) political parties; (h) pressure 
groups; and (i) the communication system. 23 
21 Although Madgwick's diagram may only be another diagrammatic 
representation of Birch's other 'Whitehall' model, see A.H.Birch, British  
system of Government, p 34. 
22 Questions about the term 'ministerial department' have been raised, 
particularly by Wettenhall; see R.L.Wettenhall, The Guide to Tasmanian  
Government Administration (Hobart: Platypus Books, 1968) pp 6-13; 
Evolution of a Departmental System (Hobart: University of Tasmania, 1967); 
"Concepts of Ministry", Public Administration (Sydney),29(4), Dec. 1970, 
pp 319-329; 
"The ministerial department", Public Administration (Sydney) 32, September 1 
1973, pp 233-250. It is to his guidance and writings in this field that I 
owe my interest. Other relevant studies are: Schaffer,loc. cit. 
and F.M.G.Willson, "Ministries and Boards:Some aspects of administrative 
development since 1832", Public Administration (London),33, Spring 1955, 
pp 43-58. 
23 Oneof the current areas of research following K.Deutsch,.The Nerves  
of Government (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), is that of communication 
and information systems. This also involves questions of values and 
identification of the 'public interest', see for example: B.Barry, Political  
Argument (New York: Humanities Press, '1965) 
10 
From the interaction between these interdependent groups and 
individuals would emanate the decisions and activity which may be simpli-
fied by the description 'public policy derived from public interest'. 
The heavier emphasis in this more complex model on the institutions (f) 
to (i) indicates the changing context of description from Bagehot's time. 
Reform of the electoral laws have indeed widened the gap between the 
governors and the governed, as he foresaw. 24- The 'tightness' of the system 
and the community of interest between the governors and the governed that 
existed in the time of Bagehot has disintegrated. In the 1860s the 
government and that articulate and small voting minority of governed, whose 
views had to be taken into account, were, for the purposes of his model, 
identical. This view is suggested in the following comment on Bagehot's view of 
Cabinet: 
"...the cabinet was a flexible instrument for bringing 
to the seats cf power, what might now be called a 
'politico-administrative elite' - a group of men 
sensitive to parliamentary and public feeling, at 
the same time possessed of enough initiative and 
close contact with the day to day administration 
of the country to provide for coherent government." 25 
Differentiation has taken place on a dramatic scale in the inter-
vening period with the resultant increase in the number of variable 
factors in the model. However, the main ideological infrastructure - the 
inherent values expressed by the model - remain very similar. But Brown 
suggests that Parliament now provides the vital link, placing greater 
emphasis there than on the Cabinet. 
23 . (contd.) 
P. Partridge, Consent and Consensus 	(London: Pall Mall Press, 1971); 
D.J. Devine, The Attentive Public: Polyarchal Democracy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1970); D. Schon, Beyond the Stable State (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1971); 
G. Schubert, The Public Interest (Glencoe 	Free Press, 1961 and 1960); 
R.E. Flathman, The Public Interest (New York: Wiley, 1966). 
24Discussed by Madgwick, 22: cit., especially pp 23-38. 
25 Spann, op: cit., p 312. 
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"Parliament links public departments to the political 
interests of the public at large and parliamentary 
accountability obliges ministers and their civil 
servants to keep in mind how their policies will look 
if they are challenged from that point of viere 26 
Note, however, that the goals of responsibility and prevention of arbitrar-
iness are the same. 
"...In a democracy the ultimate criteria for decisions 
about integration and allocation are supplied through 
the channels of political representation. The organi- 
sational problem is to ensure that the administrator pays 
attention to these criteria." 27 
One or two examples of this interaction, would indicate the 
fundamental similarity between the values sought to be expressed - govern-
ment by discussion and persuasion, and a restriction on the use of arbitrary 
power. A system, in other words, in which the values and interests of the 
majority of electors, citizens, people, should dominate. 
EXAMPLES (1) Parliament and the cabinet - the interdependence of 
these two bodies is aimed at maximising efficiency and benefits to the 
people. Where Cabinet makes decisions which accord with the majority 
wishes as reflected in Parliament it receives strong support from that body. 
Parliament could take Cabinet to task or even dismiss it, should it ignore 
28 majority wishes. 
(ii) Ministers and Cabinet - Ministers have a collective 
responsibility to participate. actively in all matters before Cabinet since 
its decisions must be supported by all. 29 Yet each minister has his own 
26 R.G.Brown, The Administrative Process in Britain London: Methuen, 
1970) p 166. 
27 Op, cit., p 158. 
28 Not the same view that Bagehot takes of Cabinet: 
"Either the Cabinet legislates and acts or else it can dissolve. 
...the chief committee of the legislature has the power of 
dissolving the predominant part of that legislature.-. . It is 
a creature, but it has the power of destroying its creator.". 
Eagehot, op. cit., p 69. This difference of views is implicit in the 
Australian writings of Reid and Emy (post, p 21 et seq). 
29 For instance Hugh Dalton in his memoirSiligh'Tide'and After: 
12 
separate administrative responsibilities in the form of a department to 
supervise, being answerable not only for all present actions, but also for 
all past ones, even whilst he may not have been in control. 30 In this 
way individual Ministers are prevented from exercising too much influence 
over government polhies either at departmental level or at overall govern-
ment level. Even the office of Prime Minister is bound by conventions which 
do not release him from the need to bow to the consensus of the majority. 31 
In summary, the true role of the Minister is now seen as based in his 
politico-administrative status and his responsibility, both individual and 
collective. These in turn are supported by an infrastructure of administra-
tive devices which ensure that the Minister remains an amateur relying on 
professional advice; that he provides the only formal link between the 
executive and legislature; and that he is open to question on all his 
activities, thus preventing arbitrary legislation and promoting consistency 
with social demands. 
At any one point in time ends and means may come together in an 
appropriate organisational and administrative structure. Means and ends 
merge in institutional forms - ends become indistinguishable from means. 
29 (contd.) 
Memoirs 1945-50 (London: Muller, 1962) pp 17-18,-points out that ministers 
were dismissed from their jobs because they made no positive contribution 
to general policy matters. 
"For a Cabinet should not be a band of specialists, 
each with no thoughts outside his own paddock." 
30 For a full treatment of this subject, see R.W.Ennis, ed., 
Accountability in Government Departments, Public Corporations and Public  
Companies (London: Lyon Grant and Green, 1967) especially p 45; and for 
a critical review of the operation of ministerial responsibility see 
S.E.Finer, "The Individual Responsibility of Ministers", Public Administration  
(London)1 34, Winter 1956, pp 377-396. 
31 See P. Gordon Walker, The'Cabinet (London: Jonathan Cape,-1970) 
for a.discussion of the current thought on Cabinet; see also J.P.Mackintosh, 
— The'British - Cabinet„2nd ed., (London: Methuen, 1968); and Daaider, op. - cit., 
for an historical treatment. 
13 
So BagehOt and subsequent commentators all appeared to cohere in the means 
- the Ministerial department and Cabinet structure, 32 which would consist-
ently support the ends of representative parliamentary government. 
The stress is on the "es3ential simplicity of most practical affairs, 
which goes along with the considerable inability of most people involved in 
them to keep them simple". 33 Scholars such as D.N.Chester and F.M.G.Willson, 34 
W.J. Mackenzie, 35 B.B.Schaffer, 36 R.S. Parker and R.L. Wettenhall, 37 have 
identified some problems that exist and have suggested remedies. All have 
been concerned, however, to maintain the constitutional fiction of accountability 
and responsibility through the central institution of the Cabinet. 38 
32W.J.M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science (London: Penguin Books, 
1967), p 
33Spann, op. cit., p 313: See also H.V.Emy, The Politics of Australian  
Democracy (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1974) p 253, where he describes the Westminster 
Model as "a deceptively simple system of government which involves a series 
of overlapping relationships". 
34D.N.Chester and F.M.G.Willson,'The organisation of the British Central
Government 1914-1964, ed. by D.N.Chester and written by F.M.G.Willson, 2nd 
edition written by F.M.G.Willson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968), - where stated: 
...the dominant theme.. .since 1914 in Britain.. .is the struggle between two 
powerful forces - 
1. the continual increase of functions has created problems of size and 
heterogeneity generating pressures for more ministers; and 
2. the needs of coordination and advantages of government by a small 
well-knit body of ministers." p 397. 
35W.J.M.Mackenzie, "Structure of Central Administration" in Lord G.Campion, 
British Government since 1918 (London: Allen & Unwini 1960) ., where he supports 
increasing politicisation of what should be a purely administrative situation . : 
...the machinery of government cannot be studied apart from the politics of 
government. Some administrative changes have come through causes partly for-
tuitous, partly political, but on the whole outside the area of administrative . 
planning:" 
36B.B.Schaffer, - "The distinction between Executive and Administrative work". 
Public Administration (Sydney), 17(2), June 1958, pp 112-118, in which he argues 
for maintaining a. clear distinction between the part of administration concerned 
with policy and the executive part. 
37Both Parker and Wettenhall maintain the essential distinction between 
the 'political role' of the minister and the 'administrative role' of the 
department. For examples see R.S.Parker, "The structure and functions of 
government" in Public Administration, edited by R.N.Spann (Sydney: N.S.W. 
Government Printer, 1958) esp. pp 67 & 68; Wettenhall, The Guide lOc.cit. 
p 6 et seq. 	• . 
38Since Fulton these attitudes may. be changing, especially in Britain. 
See R.Wilding i "The Post-Fulton Programme: Strategy and Tactics", Public  
Administration (London), 48, Winter 1970, 391-404; Sir R. Clarke, New Trends  
14 
This 'traditional' or 'classical' approach has led to reform 
movements concentrating on the civil service, which is to be streamlined 
for greater economy of services and efficiency in operation. 39 The intention 
was to produce an expert, efficient, but impartial public administration 
to perform the tasks imposed by the politicians. The diagnosis of the 
problem stopped short at symptoms, the internal functioning of the structure, 
and it was constrained because of the assumption that political activity was 
distinguishable from administrative activity and could be dealt with separately. 
The dissatisfaction with these diagnoses, which resulted in an increase in the 
application of 0 & M and organisation theory, 40 has surfaced in some 
questioning of the study of public administration. The explanatory potential 
of the existing research and teaching is in doubt and the demand is that the 
focus of attention should once more be the whole, now termed the political s 
system, rather than merely the parts. 41 There is now more interest in 
processes than institutions. 
  
   
38 (contd.) 
in Government (London: H.M.S.O., 1971) and British Parliament, 
'Reorganisation of Central Government Cmnd. 4506 (London: H.M.S.O., 1970). 
39Examples of this trend in recent years includes such government 
sponsored investigations as: Fulton (Britain)-Report of the Committee on 
Civil service 1966-68, Cmnd. 3638 (London:H.M.S.O., 1968); Glassco'(Canada)- 
Royal Commission on Government Organisation Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer 
for Royal Commission and Government Organisation, 1962). There have been 
others in the American jurisdiction, such as the well-known series of reports 
by the Hoover Commission and Brownlow Report on American Government Administration 
Senate Document 8,75th Congress First Session, 1937; Brookings Institute: 
Report on Government Administration, Washington, June 1937. 
40For examples of applications of organisation theory to public 
administration see R.J.S. Baker, Administrative Theory and Public Administration 
(London: Hutchinson University Library, 1972); R.G.S.Brown, The Administrative 
Process in Britain, loc. cit.,- and some of the essays in P. Self, 
Administrative Theory and POlitics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973). 
41Gen eral dissatisfaction of this kind was the basis of the Minnowbrook 
,Conference, papers from which may be found in P. Marini, ed., Towards a New  
Public Administration (Scranton;Chandler Publishing Co., 1971); similarly, 
in Britain; calls for a new attitude came from F.F.Ridley, "Public 
Administration: Cause Rix. Discontent", Public Administration (London), 
50(1), Spring 1972, pp 65-78; P. Self, op. cit., pp 149-150; and 
R.A.Chapman, Teaching Public Administration (London: RIPA, 1974). 
15 
Parliamentary government-processes 
The processes which form the patterns of action within and between the 
various components in the parliamentary government system are the concern of 
R.G.S.Brown and P.Self, whose work reflects changing British attitudes towards 
their institutions. 42 
(a) Brown's system within a  system 
The prime consideration for Brown was the way individuals and groups 
contributed to the process which operates in the institutional framework. 
The individuals and institutions become vehicles for the process to function. 
At once they mould and are themselves moulded by the process, providing 
constraints inhibiting the way in which the process could operate, or being 
supportive of, or used by, those who were promoting their activities through 
the institutional forms. The process was identified as a system within a 
system by Brown, who emphasised its dynamic multilevel nature. (Described 
in diagrammatic form, Fig. III). 43 The model avoids the hierarchical 
arrangements by focusing on the interaction and interrelationships by which some 
individuals have authority, others have power, or expertise, and others have 
influence. Distinctions between politicians and officials on this basis 
indicate the role expectations and parameters Of action that the actors them-
selves have or the observer anticipates they may have.. The model implicitly 
accepts the validity of retaining the distinctive position of politician and 
official, yet throws doubt on their existence in practice. 44 
.Brown describes the model as "an analytic representation of what actually 
42R.G.S.Brown, op. cit.; P.Self, op. cit. 
43The diagram was prepared by the author from Brown's written description. 
It has been discussed with Brown, who expressed surprise, not having conceived 
his narrative in quite this way. He felt no diagram could do justice to the 
dynamic nature of the processes involved. 
44Brown, op. cit., p 158, where he notes that the "concept of 'control' 
is far too narrow for analysing the complex relationship that now exists..." 
- but still . maintains the discussion on the basis of the . dichotomy 
officialVviews on what should be done,-complement rather than compete with 
. those of-politicians." 
PAHL IAMENTAAY 
POLITICAL 
PAR nu 
POLITICIANS PARLIAMENTARY 
FEELINGS . PARLIAMENTARY POLITICAL PARTIES 
CITIZEN 
DEMANDS 
CITIZEN 
DEMANDS 
• 
0111k R DEPARTMENTS 	 •• 	.1 7 Ur ASURY  •••••*••••a••••••— 
A r I ; C / t D. 10. 	
L 	 ...] 	,J.0:3,—,c, T REA SUFIY 	 DEPARTMENTS 
/- 
PROFESSIONALS WITHIN 	
••••••••appwr.• 
FUNCTIONAL 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE DEPARTMENT 
111T1 	(MIL 	!WHIM! 	HF !H UH  
SIMPLIFICATION ? LECITIMTION 	EINORIATIN  / 
1111111III 	
CONSULTATIVE BODIES 	 IMIINIISTFERIS lEt IC IAB IN IET 
1  
1HH1HH H HHHHH 	 
EXTERNAL PARTY 
• SUPPORT 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENT 
, .•••■•■•■■•7•LIM 
FEEDBACK 
.1.•••■•■• 
       
1 
C 
  
Influential system 17:1 Government system 
    
Systems that are primarily involved in 
specific element of decision process. 
        
        
17 
happens", 45  and its basis are the contributions to the decision making 
process by many "specialised channels through which ideas, information and 
pressures are legitimately applied to the development of social policy." 46 
• Parliament is only one of these specialised channels, and while it is 
of "distinctive importance in public administration", the contribution of 
any specific issue "may be small and overshadowed by professional expertise, 
material from surveys and so on." 47 However, Brown points out that 
"in our system of government no change of substance 
can be made without the agreement of the responsible 
Minister and often of a Cabinet committee." 48 
There are certainly occasions when a Minister can make a final decision 
without Cabinet approval, but there are not many important decisions that 
can be made without some kind of authorisation at the:political level. 
The diagram shows various stages in the process and indicates those 
groups, individuals and agencies who are likely to be closely involved at 
each stage. Much overlapping is bound to take place and certain groups and 
individuals are likely to recur in dominant positions throughout, .e.g. when 
they are 'promoting' a policy line. As can be seen this is difficult to 
show on a two-dimensional drawing, as is the continual feedback process which is 
operating within the process between all participants and at each stage. 
Appraisal after the authorisation stage and at the point of implementation is 
another form of feedback because many group individuals and agencies are not 
only concerned With policy making but also with policy programming and imple-
mentation. All this Brown tries to convey by his phrase "system within a 
system" and his discussion of the operation of a department as a 'self-sus-
taining machine" with "elaborate adaptive mechanisms" which fall within 
similar generic terms used by systems analysts. 49 
45 	 46 ibid Brown, 22. . cit., p 160. 
47 Brown, loc. cit., as noted previously Fn 28, his view of parliament 
is significantly different from that of Reid to whom reference is made later. 
48 Brown, a: cit., pp 160-167, 
49 a• cit., p 161, 
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The contributions to which Brown refers may be ranged along a spectrum 
derived from the perspectives of the contributors. 
...experts and pressure groups near the specific- 
technical-fact end and politicians and journalists 
near the general-political-value end." 50 
Once again reinforcing the dichotomy which he sees as fundamental to the 
balances inherent in the Westminster model, but which other writers, like 
Self, wish to reinterpret. 
(b) Self's political-administrative arch  
Another view of this same concern about the contributions of various 
individuals, groups and agencies to the processes is expressed in Self's 
discussion of "Politicians and Administrators". 51 He points out that 
"The enormous staffs of modern government are very 
largely engaged upon the direct provision of public 
services, or the operation of fairly routinised 
regulations, or the provision of supporting. services 
for the top echelons of administration." 52 
This administrative area is clearly concerned with activities carried 
out as a result of policies made outside and beyond their environment. 
Administrators at these levels are "concerned with getting policies or rules 
.effectively applied" and the "great bulk of Lihese7 administrative operations 
continue in politiCal obscurity.' ,53 The important area for a study of the 
kind undertaken in this thesis is the "relatively tiny top echelons" of 
government institutions'. At these upper levels, among ministers and their 
senior officers in and around Cabinet "there come into play all the multi-
farious modern facets of the basic powers of the State: the power to coerce, 
to tax, to aid, to provide." 54 There is little argument about the distinction 
between the kinds of functions performed by administrators in the lower levels 
of the hierarchy and those higher up; just as there is a similar distinction 
50 Brown, op. cit., p 160. 
in this description it has to 
often narrow and specific and 
51Self, op. cit., pp 149- 
53Self, op. cit., p 151. 
Self argues that "while there is some truth 
be remembered that political viewpoints are 
administrative viewpoints are sometimes broad." 
181. 	52Self, op. cit., p 162, 
54 Self, op. cit., p 162. 
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in the political hierarchy. At the lower levels of each the difference 
between the political and administrative is relatively evident. However, at 
the upper levels there is no similar clarity. 
"In modern Britain, still more in France, the top 
professional administrators certainly wield more 
influence in policy-making than do the average 
members of Parliament."55 
Consequently any attempt to explain and interpret activities of the 
Executive must take into account that this term must include senior public 
servants as well as ministers. Self suggests that if policy-making is viewed 
as a process operating in these top echelons, then there is a "fusion of 
political and administrative influences". He describes it as follows: 
"We can envisage an arch with the left arc representing 
the political process and the right arc the administrative 
process. The junction at the top represents the critical 
point at which political will flows into and energises the 
administrative system: and it is also the point at which 
influences that have been generated within the administrative 
processes flow back into the higher levels of the political 
processes. "56 
Self's analysis has been interpreted in Figure IV. 57 
The distinction between an elected representative, owing his position to 
political power, and an appointed official, owing his position to promotion by 
merit through a career service, is not removed by this explanation. Nor is 
there any doubt about their respective roles within a parliamentary system in 
which ministers in Cabinet, parliament and the public service have their 
appropriate constitutional or conventional boundaries. However, by combining 
evidence on processes with institutional knowledge, certain informal and 
highly important aspects of these relationships are uncovered. 58 
55Self, op. cit., p 150. There is no shortage of evidence to support 
this statement in the Australian context, much of it suggesting an even 
greater concentration of influence due to specifically cultural factors. 
See S. Encel, Equality and Authority (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1970) and 
J. Wilkes (ed.), Who Runs Australia? (Melbourne: AIPS, 1970). 
56ibid. 
57B. Chubb, Cabinet Government in Ireland (Dublin: Institute of Public 
Administration, 1974) p 69. 
58 This is suggested p 	32, where Fig. IX combines Figs IV and VIII. 
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Westminster Model - Australian Federal version - 
Much of what has been written about the parliamentary system in Australia 
has been related to parties, elections, pressure groups and their relation-
ship within parliament. These latter considerations have been reflected in 
what some writers see as bureaucratic domination, or the powerless situation 
of backbenchers, or the role of the Senate. 59 Little has been specifically 
written about parliament, ministers and departments in terms of their crucial 
position within a parliamentary democracy until relatively recently. 60 Three 
articles stand out in this literature representing a continuously unfolding 
perception of the Australian-Federal Parliamentary model. 61 However, Emy's 
later work has challenged aspects of this perception. 62 
In the articles which will be dealt with first, Reid's perspective is 
slightly different from that previously discussed under the head 'Westminster 
Model'. There, focus was upon the minister operating within a parliamentary 
59Any or all of these matters are dealt with in articles and essays 
to be found collected, for example, in any of the three editions of H. Mayer, 
(ed.),Australian Politics: A Reader (Sydney: Cheshire); or C. Hughes L ed.), 
-Readings in Australian Government (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
1968). 
60 An early and important work which has not been followed up other than 
in a second edition was : S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, First edition 1962, Second edition 1974). Other 
recent works are: H.V.Emy, The politics of Australian Democracy (Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1974); David Solomon, Australia's Government and Parliament  
(Melbourne: Thomas Nelson (Australia) Ltd., 1973). . 
61GS,Reid, "Australia's Commonwealth Parliament and the 'Westminster 
model" in Readings in Australian Government', edited by C. Hughes, op. cit., 
p 109 (written . first and published in Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 
II, 1963-64); G.SReid, "Parliamentary-Executive Relations: the Suppression 
of Politics", in Australian Politics: A Reader, edited by H. Mayer, op. cit., 
. 1st edition 1966, and subsequently in 2nd edition, 1967, and Second Reader; 
1969; G.SReid, "The Trinitarian Struggle: Parliamentary-Executive Relationships" 
in Australian Politics: A Third Reader, edited by H. Mayer and H. Nelson, 
(Sydney: Cheshire, 1973). These Are referred to hereafter as Reid 1; Reid 2; 
Reid 3. Reid 2 contains Fig.V 	, p 501; Reid 3 FigsVI &VII pp 514 & 516. 
62Especially the work done by.Emy as a Consultant for the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration. "The Public Service and 
Political Control", Report (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 
1976) Appendix B, Volume 1, pp 16-63, 
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system and his relation with the administration, assuming a dominance of the 
Cabinet over parliament, but accountability and responsibility curbing that 
dominance. Reid's view- is of the relations between the Executive (Cabinet) 
and the parliamentary system, and he is directing less of his attention to 
the administration, assuming that it is supportive of the Executive. Despite 
: these different perspectives the crucial element in both is the behaviour of 
the group of elected representatives who attain office as an Executive - 
ministers, and for this reason his discussion of the Australian version of the 
Westminster model is most pertinent. 
Reid claims that some important qualifications must be made to statements 
that the Commonwealth Constitution is based on the Westminster model. He 
lists these as : the fact that, in Australia, Parliament has become a symbol 
of national unity as well as representative government and democracy; the 
unique nature of the Senate; and the procedural adaptations within the 
Australian Parliament which lead to Executive control. 
"The parliamentary symbol is lan.instrument of government', 
and it is the instrument as well as the trappings, that 
Australian governments have copied from Westminster."63 
"The mysteries of Westminster have frequently been 
invoked to provide a technical smokescreen behind which 
governments have escaped the rigours of political battle.“ 64  
"The difference from Westminster in this /strength of the ,65 Executive's control of ParliamentY is simply one of degree.”  
At the same time he complains that Australian parliaments have not introduced 
some of the procedural reforms already applied in the British Parliament in 
an attempt to reduce this executive domination in practice, e.g. 'allotted 
supply days' at the disposal of the Opposition; 66 an Estimates Committee; 67 
68 House committees rather than Committee of the Whole; 	and question time. 69 
One persistent theme throughout has been "the strength of the Executive's 
control of Parliament tav the principal characteristic of the Australian 
 
63Reid 1, p 112 , 64Reid 1, p 113. 	65Reid 1-, p 121- - 
66 
	
Reid 1, p 117. 	67Reid 1, p 117 	68Reid 1, p 1184 
69Reid 1, p 119- 
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scene." 70 This theme has emerged from a studof"some - 
of the functioning parts of the Westminster model: 
."It is necessau, somehow, to penetrate the outward 
appearances and to measure the contribution to the process 
of government made by the human materials working within 
it." 71 
The use of the term 'process' appears again, 
• "/This chapter/ argues tha 2 if_we analyse the 
parliamentary process..." 
and, subsequently. , 
"The central thesis is that politics goes on within  
parliament as an institution, not merely between  
political parties." -73 
Reid is therefore taking the position that there are institutions which have 
formally been created to appear like the 'Mother Parliament', but that in 
order to ascertain whether these institutions are the same, their operations, 
have to be examined. 
In his second article Reid takes up and elaborates the three important 
qualifications he identified as differentiating the Australian situation . 
from the Westminster frame of reference, paying particular attention to the 
Senate and its dominant position. But his main thrust is to support his 
argument that open politics (which he defines as the activity, in which 
diverse interests conflict, contend and are reconciled or are managed and 
comprised through party leaders managing tensions among their supporters) 
is suppressed by the Executive'. 
"...it could be said that the party oligarchies in  
parliament find a wide area of agreement in  
suppressing politics. They seek to minimise the 
unpredictable elements of parliamentary behaviour. 
Or to put it another way, unpredictable elements 
are acceptable to them so long as they are not . ..in 
. likely to bring their leadership into jeopardy.'"' 
7°Reid 1 '  p 120. 71 Reid 1, p 110. 73 ibid. 
   
72 Reid 2, p 499. 	74- Reid 2, p 506. 
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With this in mind he again takes up the procedural adaptations, 
which he sees as using "the myth of faithfully preserving the 'Westminster 
model'.. .to overlay suppressive actions with a cloak of legitimacy." The 
Senate in this situation is envisaged as a "prize that political parties 
aspire to win" 75 because of its independent power. Thus Reid advances 
reasons for the difference he identified in the first article between the 
Westminster model and its Australian counterpart. From making the suggestion 
that "...as a result of the influence of party, the strength of the Executive's 
control of Parliament is the principal characteristic of the Australian 
scene", he moves to the position that parties suppress politics in parliament 
to allow the Executive to control that body. Thus, he argues, all party 
political resources are concentrated on the struggle to control the legis-
lative machinery. 
"To maximise its strength as a government it needs to control, 
by disciplined voting majorities, both Houses of the 
Commonwealth Parliament." 76 
His third article endeavours to elucidate this struggle by identi-
fying elements within the parliamentary part of the Australian government 
which are deeply committed to obtaining power. 
"We see politics as a struggle for power. The top prize 
in this trinitarian struggle is the Executive government 
and the power associated with its control.' 77. 
The trinity among which this struggle takes place are the "...Crown 
(i.e. the Executive), the Senate, and the House of Representatives." 78 
The use of the term 'executive' is meant to delineate that part of the 
parliamentary system in which representatives, elected by the people, become 
ministers, and therefore "wear two hats, have a dual role: in some respects 
they are part of the representative Parliament, in others, part of the 
75 	 77 
	
, Reid 2, p 511. 	 Reid 3, p 516. 
76 78 Reid 2, p 502. Reid 3, p 515. 
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Executive government." 79 This Executive, or Cabinet has control of the 
legislative power through its domination of parliamentary business, as 
well as capacity to utilise all the existing legislative authority already 
on the statute book. But, significantly, it also has 
"...access to the accumulated experience, the files, and 
the comprehensive facilities of the Commonwealth Public 
Service for gathering information. This brings access 
to the advisory services and the working potential of 
all the employees of the Commonwealth, from the highest 
to the lowest. The collective power is enormous, the 
prize vested in the control of the Executive is rich 
indeed."8° 
Power, or in Reid's terms, the politics of parliamentary control, 
is the concern of the third article, and Reid manipulates the three variables 
identified in the first article: national unity, Senate control and proce-
dural adaptations, to support his argument. 
The relevance of this perspective is that it intervenes in a process, 
rather than stops short at the structure represented by the institutions. 
Seeing these structures as patterns of action which are changed and moulded 
according to the interests of the actors, provides a basis for analysis of 
the institutions themselves. Whilst Reid does not explicitly make this 
point it is this perspective that he adopts and in doing so concentrates 
his attention on the relationships between those elements in the process 
81 "which, whilst not confined to Australia, have a special form here." 
Although process is important these elements have to be identified 
in a formal relationship first, and in both the second and third article 
82 	 83 he starts from the Constitution - and looks for the "executive parliament'; 
. 	: 	. 	... 	. 
79 Reid 3, p 515. Reid 3, p •514  
8Q 	 82 Reid 3, p 516. 	Reid 2, p 500; and Reid 3, 
p 513 . 
83 A term he derives from W.H.Moore, The Constitution of the  
Commonwealth of Australia (Melbourne: Charles F. Maxwell, 2nd edition, 
1910),pp 105-6, 168. 
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which according to Section 1, Chapter 1 of the Constitution is vested in 
"a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a 
House of Representatives, and which is hereinafter called 'The Parliament'..." 
So, from this description Reid provides two diagrammatic representations of 
the Australian version of the Westminster model. (Figs. V and VI hereunder). 
The first differs quite significantly from the second, although Reid appears 
to deny any such significance when he comments in relation to the second 
diagram: 
"You may not like Figure (17, showing the formal structure 
of the Commonwealth Parliament. Never mind - draw it 
your own way. Whichever way it comes out, two things will 
not change: power flows both within and between the " institutional components. 84  
His main concern, he indicates, is to ascertain what goes on within 
and between, and since "none of the components is a cohesive monolith" 85 
their identification is merely a necessary first step to formulate what 
patterns of action are relevant. It will be noticed that they are both 
considerably more sophisticated than those of the Westminster model. This 
may be explained by the pains Reid takes to look at process, whereas Birch 
and Madgwick deal largely with the institutional form which shapes the 
infrastructure for an ideology. (Madgwi -ck seems to take process . 
into account more than Birch.) However, it is apparent that the basis of 
Figure V is nearer to Birch's (Figure I) than Figure VI. It sees the 
"static representation of executive-parliamentary-electorate relationships" 
as derived from a flow of power from the electorate "continually, through 
representative chambers to the executive government", 86 i.e. Cabinet. The 
result of this is that Figures I and V 	"presume representative democracy" 
although Figure V attempts to show that there is also a flow of power the 
other way, "from Ministers of State, through the representative chambers, 
to the electorate."87 It is this latter flow of 
84 Reid 3, p 515 	 86, Reid 2, p 501 
85ibid. 
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power that is important to Figure VI and the reason, presumably why the 
electorate and the elected component is separated from the official component. 
The complexity of the relations is indicated by the various arrows and the 
Jotted portions which are further detailed in Figure VII (below) identifying 
the three elements of the legislative trinity. The way in which the Australian 
version of parliamentary government differs from the Westminster model is 
indicated by comparing Figure VIII (derived from the idea of interaction and 
processes, referred to earlier in the discussion of Brown and Self) with 
Figure VII. An even more useful and informative view may be obtained by the 
combination of Self's arch (Figure IV) with Figure VIII. The notions of 
power and policymaking processes are thus combined to reveal the extent of 
the overlapping which concerns Reid in his defence of parliamentary supremacy 88 
(Figure IX below). They are also the concern of Emy, but for other reasons. 
In his outline of the Westminster model, Emy notes the essential features 
but his commentary is evidence of his dissatisfaction. 89 As previously 
mentioned he sees it as a "deceptively simple system", but one in which the 
balance between the elements of the system must be satisfactorily achieved 
if it is to work. 90 He recognises that different cultures will produce 
slightly different balances and that changing environmental demands may have 
the same effect. 91 The central importance of Cabinet in the model, has, for 
him, increased the dominance of the prime minister, so that 
"Undoubtedly the prime minister is the central ,92 figure, indeed the lynchpin, in any administration."  
There has been a similar change in the balances in respect of individual and 
collective responsibility of ministers. The force of these doctrines is 
diminished when the lower house of parliament is no longer significant. Both 
Emy and Reid agree that this has occurred through the party system. Emy points 
88Birch does make some attempt to do this in his 'Whitehall' model, 
British System of Government,op. cit., p 34 , but it is not so carefully 
constructed as Reid's, being only based on an intuitive feel for the civil 
servants' understanding of the system. 	- 
9 89 . 0  loc. cit., Chapter 11 	0 Emy, 2112 cit., p 254 
91 Emy, a: cit., p 259 	92Emy, 2.2. cit., p 255 
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to the essential tasks of the legislature today as being "to make and 
support a government." 93 Heodoes not, as Reid appears to, think that it was 
ever much different. 
"Backward looking commentators may be wrong when i;hey 
want to retain for parliament both an initiatory role 
in legislating and a role in directly controlling the 
executive." 94 
It is not surprising to find this diirergence of opinion about the role 
of parliament and therefore of the balances within the Westminster model 
leading Emy to espouse the idea of 'accountable management'. This he does 
very effectively in an important contribution to the debate about the proper 
version of the model for Australia. 95  As summarised by the Commission, the 
essence of his consultants report is 
...ministerial responsibility as a system for 
ensuring that accountability of both the executive 
and administrative arms of government is defunct. 
A new system of managing the administrative arm and 
of ensuring its and the executive's accountability 
is required. 
The new system is to be found in institutionalising 
a set of measures to be called accountable management." 96 
Reid takes both Emy and the Coombs Commission, which was strongly 
influenced by the above considerations, to task for their "half hearted 
treatment of the reference 'Parliamentary Scrutiny and Control'". 97 He 
points out, quite rightly, that, despite the "apparent radicalism" of the 
approach, there is only likely to be an apparent, rather than a real, change 
resulting from the proposals. The final authority of parliament to control 
the activities of the public service will remain. 
As the debate now stands it seems to reinforce the need for more 
empirical work to unravel the balances as they actually operate in Australia. 
93 Emy, 22., cit., p . 257 	94ibid. 
95 H.V. Emy, "The Public Service and Political Control" in Royal Commission  
on Australian Government Administration: Report, (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1976). Appendix One, pp 16-63. 
9622: cit., p 15 !, 
97G.S.Reid, "Responsibility and Accountability and the Coombs Inquiry" 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, 35(4), December 1976, p 327. 
_ 
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Any reforms such as proposed by the Coombs Commission depend for their validity 
on an interpretation of this reality. Whether Emy's view or Reid's is the 
most appropriate cannot be judged in default of this evidence. It may be 
that the differences between the writers in Britain and Australia cited above 
is nothing more than an analytical perspective. 
An added difference in the Australian context is the fact that it is a 
federal system and that most of the discussion about processes has been directly 
concerned with the national parliament and bureaucracy. 98 None of the empirical 
study has been at state level, nor has any effort been made to distinguish 
between each of the state parliamentary system -S. It is not surprising that the 
Australian state government systems have been neglected, the relative newness 
of the central system and the problems of adaptation it.posed, especially for 
constitutionalists, provided more than sufficient to study. Yet the decisions 
which are taken by State governments are highly significant for the ordinary 
citizen. This important aspect of Australian government has, however, been 
largely ignored in the apparently more fruitful analysis of Federal government 
and Federal-Statc relations. Matters of concern have included 'cooperative 
100 federalism' 99 , financial dominance 	, and foreign affairs 101 . Apart from 
98Even then it is not possible to make more than impressionistic 
.statements of the kind made by Butler, e.g. that the tops of the Australian 
Departments seem flatter than the British; or that Australian ministers are on 
an average appreciably less interested in administration than the British ones. 
D. Butler, The Canberra Model (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1973) pp 29 & 34. But also 
see M. Kogan, The Politics of Education (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971)pp31-34, 
where he expresses a view of British ministers that seems to indicate Butler's 
idea of British ministers may also be somewhat impressionistic. 
99L.F.Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia  
(London: Longmans in association with Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 1957). 
10 
0R.J. May, Federalism & Fiscal Adjustment (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1969) 
• see also: J.A. Maxwell, Commonwealth State Financial Relations in Australia  
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967) and: R.L. Mathews & W.R.C.Jay, 
Federal Finance: Intergovernmental Financial relations in Australia since  
Federation (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson Australia, 1972). 
101J.D.B.Miller & B.Jinks, Australian Government & Politics, 4th edition 
(London: Duckworth & Co., 1971). 
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some compendiums 102 , these scholarly writings and one major work on New 
South Wales, State government systems have been mostly treated in journal 
articles. 103 All this may provide a useful background, historical and 
descriptive, against which to deal with explanation, but it is no substitute 
for that systematic analysis without which understanding is impossible. 104 
This thesis is an attempt to fill a small part of the gap by using 
empirical material from state government level, not previously assembled. 
Its concentration on the relations between minister and his senior-public 
servants is intended to deal with questions central to the Westminster form of 
government, such as have been outlined above. Its major focus is therefore . 
on the extent to which the role of minister reflects the expectations of the 
Westminster model and thus the politics/administration dichotomy. 
By taking empirical evidence from the Tasmanian State government 
system about the activities of ministers and their senior officials, the 
relationship between political leadership and administrative action may be 
clarified. As the essence of the Westminster model in either Britain or 
Australia is the control of the official by the politician, it is useful 
to look behind their institutional positions to ascertain their actions. 
102 C. Hughes, ed., Readings in Australian Government (loc.cit..); 
S.R. Davis, ed., The Government of Australian States (Melbourne: Longmans, 
1960); J. Rorke, ed., Politics at State level Australia (Sydney: Department 
of Adult Education for the University of Sydney, 1970). 
103For comments on the literature about the states see R.H. Simmons et al., 
"Australian State Administration: A need for new perspectives" Public  
Administration (Sydney) March 1974 and H.V. Emy, The Politics of Australian  
Democracy (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1974) p300. There are some bibliographical 
works, relating to South Australia: F.K. Crowley, "South Australian Political - 
Bibliography" Politics 1 (1) 1966, 43-55; relating to New South Wales: 
G.N.Hawker and R.A.Grahame, "New South Wales Political Bibliography:1856-1966" 
Part 1 Politics III (1) 1968, 66-87; Part 2 Politics IV (1).1969, 57-66; 
to Queensland: K.W.Knight & J.Adams, Politics & Administration in Queensland: 
'A Selected Bibliography (St Lucia: University of Queensland Department of 
Government, 1974); to Tasmania: D.Heard and R:J.K.Chapman, "A Bibliography of 
literature on Tasmanian Politics and Government" Supplement to Politics  
• VIII (1) 1974. The major work on New South Wale's is : G.N. Hawker, The Parliament  
of NSW, 1856-1965 (Ultimo: NSW Government Printer, 1971). 
104Cf. the introduction to the slim volume edited by Rorke, 22• tit., 
for example, where he claims "there can be no real grasp of national politics 
until the politics at state level are known." 
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Only actions can show how individuals, occupying such positions, interpret 
their obligations, and how those actions form regular patterns, indicating 
their contributions to the processes. It is therefore necessary at this 
point to identify what is reurded as the essential contributicn of the 
politician and the public servant. 
Three types of action are implicit in the positions of politician and 
administrator operating within the conventions of the system: political 
leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity. Discussing the 
processes based on these three types of action, rather than the classical 
dichotomy, assists explanation. It also avoids evaluation of those processes 
derived from simplistic stereotypes and reduces the risk of unreliable solutions 
for inaccurately defined problems. 105 The three activities are crucial to  
an understanding of how interactions between the politician and official 
maintain the boundaries between policy making and administration as required 
by the conventions, and at the same time preserving the necessary control of 
one over the other. 
1. Political leadership - is indicated by the extent to which the 
politician makes and directs policy. 106  One measure of this is the officials' 
awareness of a minister's views in the advice they tender. His status as 
minister will ensure that he is always listened to, and the structures support 
him in this expectation. But it is the extent to which his intentions are 
anticipated by his officials through their actions, that a minister's political 
leadership is shown. On these actions the minister will be judged through 
105Some examples of these may be found in J.Wilkes (ed.), Who Runs  
Australia? (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972); J. Spigelman, Secrecy  
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972); H. Thomas (ed.), Crisis in the Civil Service  
(London: A.Blond, 1968); H. Thomas, The Establishment: a Symposium (London: 
A. Blond, 1959); Max Nicholson; The System! The Misgovernment of Modern Britain 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1967). 
106 Headey uses this term in his analysis and fivefold typology of 
Cabinet Ministers, but as 'executive political leadership', noting his debt 
to R. Neustadt's Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1960) and attempts 
"to discover the conditions under which different types of political leaders 
contribute, positively or negatively, to the performance of government tasks." 
B. Headey, British Cabinet Ministers - The Roles of Politicians in Executive  
Office (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), p 19. 
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parliamentary accountability, electoral choice and political party constraints. 
In Headey's terms, the strongest political leader would be the 'policy 
initiator' - that is to say one who defines and sets his own objectives, 
leading the department to re-interpret its own functions. A weak political 
leader would be the 'minimalist' who merely reflected the departmental view, 
allowing the inertia of the historical legacy 107 to carry him forward. He 
would perform his parliamentary and Cabinet tasks satisfactorily but without 
creativity. 108 
Alternatively, ministers may be policy selectors rather than initiators, 
showing limited political leadership. 109 This significant relationship of 
the policymaking function to political leadership is clearly demonstrated, 
it is of central concern to the Westminster system. 110 
But not all ministers become involved in policy matters. Heady identifies 
the 'executive minister' as a further type who takes a managerial role within 
the department. Such a minister may be a strong personality but his activities 
are self-limited, and more often than not he does no more than ensure that the 
departmental organisation is appropriate. These ministers would be regardei 
as being most effective in maintaining executive authority rather than political 
leadership. 
107Anthony Crosland refers to the "legacy of history - the material 
legacy of thousands of buildings and institutions of particular types and 
sizes"; as a major limitation on his actions as Secretary of State for 
Education. Kogan, op. cit., pp 159-160. 
108 It is as:;umed that officials would rather have a strong minister, who 
can give them leadership, but this is not always politically feasible as 
Farrell points out: "The need for leadership and the exercise of power is 
moderated by the demand that the leader should not deviate from accepted values 
and that the impersonality of executive action be tempered by the needs of 
known individual cases." B. Farrell, Chairman or Chief? The Role of the  
Taoiseach in Irish Government (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan (c. 1971))p 85. 
109Headey, op. cit., p 60, where he shows that twenty-one of the ministers 
interviewed regarded themselves as policy selectors in contrast to the twenty-
three who saw themselves as initiators. 
110J. Bray,  Decision in Government, op. cit., p 66; G. Paige, Political  
Readership, op. cit., p 69 suggests that "task is an important variable 
combined with values in interaction with personality, role, organisation and 
setting, as expressed in the behaviour of salient individuals who contribute 
to variance in the political system." 
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2. Executive authority - is the formal legal arrangement, in the 
constitutional sense, which provides a minister with legitimate authority 
to act. This authority is a potent foundation for the minister and is 
balanced by the awesome responsibility for its exercise.' 11 His formal 
authority is subject only to the constraints imposed by Cabinet or the Crown, 
and sometimes Parliament. The ministerial commission may not be removed other 
than by the hand which gave it, although it is well established that the Prime 
Minister's advice on these matters is always taken. 
The exercise of this formal authority is closely linked with political 
leadership, indeed the former is inhibited without the latter. However, it 
frequently occurs that a power vacuum is created by lack of exercise of 
political leadership. Headey's minimalist type is an example of this situation, 
the minister makes no attempt to do more than he formally has to, in consequence 
the importance of the official is increased. Because a minister is vested 
legally with the executive authority, the official must always work through 
the minister. Such situation gives rise to enormous tensions where ministers 
do not involve themselves in policy issues. The temptation is for the strong 
official to act in the name of the minister, or for a kind of policy inertia 
to dominate the department which leads to a lowering of departmental morale. 112 
However, it is true to say that, weakening the links between the minister and 
his department by removing to any degree his executive authority could consti-
tute an erosion of ministerial responsibility and control. 
It is not possible, however, to coerce the minister to exercise political 
leadership, because it depends on his own character and aptitude. However, 
a reduction of the legally given executive authority may provide an appropriate 
incentive. 113 
"In Mill's words, it is the minister who received "the whole praise of 
what is well done, the whole blame of what is ill". J.S. Mill, Considerations  
on Representative Government, People's edition (London: Longmans Green, 1900) 
See fa&ote 3 Ch. VI for Sir Edward Boyle's comment supporting- this view. 
S. Brittan, Steering the Economy: - The Role of the Treasury . (London: Secker and 
Warburg, 1969) p 44; or Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1956) p 126. 13 26 Devlin Report in Eire made suggestions along these lines, but met 
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Where the reduction is intentional, there must be some alternative means 
by which the traditional accountability to the electorate through parliament 
may be maintained. If an unintentional reduction occurs, the degree to 
which the official moves into the area of executive authority is directly 
related to the extent to which the official's administrative capacity inhibits 
the minister's political leadership. 
3. Administrative capacity - is 
(a)competence to assess evidence, to comprehend and harmonise 
conflicting view, to integrate the demands of expertise 
with the pressures of political reality; 
(b)control of information and information sources and the 
ability to communicate such information in times of need; 
(c)continuity of office, in the sense of permanent, full-time 
presence of an individual, also of the accumulation of 
precedent and tradition in the office itself. 
The official is appointed to maintain the existence of an ubiquitous system, 
and promotion by merit through a life-time career supports that system. The 
inherent nat...re of the forces generated in this way demand very stringent 
controls if they are not to become too dominant. As Dunsire points out, 
"The official's training and experience, and career 
development gives him a longer time perspective, and 
places him in a more cause-and-effect universe, where one 
can recognise the reasons for success and failure and 
devise corrective measures for error; in contrast, 
the world inhabited by the politician may seem to 
the official arbitrary, random, dependent on swings 
and wheels of fortune, where because of the perpetually 
myopic scale of vision good men and good works are 
unrewarded. 1,114 
Frustration with short-term considerations, dismay over misuse of knowledge 
and advice, even a belief in what officials see as the 'public interest', 
may lead to significant inroads by officials into the politicians' preserve. 
Sometimes a misguided desire for efficiency may persuade the official to 
113 (contd.) 
with strong political opposition from 
control over the executive would be weakened. 
Services Organisation Review Group 1966-1969  
792 of 1969) pAras 10.1.3 - 10.1.5 pp 121-122 
contained in the Report, paras 10.12.8, 10.13 
Appendix 1, pp 447462. 
114 - - 	unsire,' 22. cit., p 160. 
parliamentarians who felt their 
See Report of The Public  
(Dublin: Stationery Office Prl 
. The major proposals are 
.1 and 10.13.3, p 133, and also 
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overstep the boundary that must be maintained for the preservation of the 
Westminster system. The boundary has no specific demarcation lines, as has 
been suggested above, it relies on the appreciation of all actors concerned 
that it exists. 
Officials in senior positions are most subject to the temptation to 
allow their administrative capacity to overwhelm the political leadership of 
the politician. Their self control and understanding of the consequences of 
allowing themselves this freedom set the limits for others in the system, 
both politicians and officials. Ridley, writing of the distinction between 
generalist and specialists, noted that the general administrator must "bring 
to bear on the work of the department the same type of consideration that 
the minister would himself bring." 115 For any official in this position, having 
quite frequently more knowledge, more experience in the particular field 
and often wider awareness of the problems, it requires a sympathetic and 
deep acceptance of the limitations placed upon him by the need to uphol:i 
the formal processes. 
The onus of perpetuating the 'rituals' that provide the signpost to 
those who themselves aspire to senior positions is upon this group, whom 
Self describes as 'general administrators'. These senior officials have tasks 
which revolve around policy advising and 'high affairs of State', whereas 
others who may be quite as senior in hierarchical terms are mainly concerned 
with management. 116 The distinction is not the same as that of specialist 
and generalist since it is a differentiation on the basis of tasks and not 
education or qualification. It is not, as Self suggests, 
"the distinction between policy and finance as the 
concern of the generalists and technical and scientific 
matters as belonging to the appropriate specialists." 117 
115 
F. Ridley, Specialists and Generalists: A Comparative study of the , 
Professional Civil Servant at Home and Abroad (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1968) p 18, 
116Self, op: cit., pp 163-164. 
1172.a. cit., p 1954 
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Predisposition through education and qualification to one field of activity 
or another may well occur, but it is not that on which differentiation rests. 
"The diversities of intellectual knowledge and 
institutional experience, which are relevant to their 
Cadministrators7 work are so numerous and complex, 
that, even setting aside cultural differences, no 118 universal prescription can reasonably be offered." - 
Whatever description may be given to these tasks and with whatever prescriptive 
connotation, either as 'executive' or 'administrative', 119 'generalist' or 
specialist', 120 'managerial' or 'technological', 121  lay or expert, or 
'general administrative' or 'managerial', 122 , they are all related to activities 
subsumed under administrative capacity. Through them an official may influence 
others to act according to his wishes. 123 The official who fails to control 
this potential may inadvertently find himself exercising executive authority 
or even political leadership. It is only by being politically sensitive - 
knowing the mind of the minister - that he remains aware of his limitations. 124 
118Self, op. cit., p 215 
119B. Schaffer, "The Distinction between Executive and Administrative 
Work" Public Administration (Sydney) 17(2) 1958, pp 112-118. 
120Ridley, loc. cit. 
121J. Meynaud, Technocracy (New York: Free Press, 1969). 
122Self, loc. cit. 
12 3This is one definition of power and is used here to indicate that 
administrative capacity is the power base which an official may use. P.E.Mott 
and M. Aiken, The Structure of Community Power (New York: Random House, 1970). 
124Sir John Crawford, 'Relations between Civil Servants and Ministers 
in Policy making' in R.N. Spann & G.R. Curnow (eds.), Public Policy and  
Administration in Australia: A Reader (Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, Australia, 
1975) pp 165-175; R.N. Spann, 'Bureaucracy and the Public Service' in 
H. Mayer and H. Nelson, Australian Politics: A Third Reader (Melbourne: 
Cheshire, 1973), esp. pp 588-597; Sir Edward Bridges, 'Portrait of a 
Profession' in R.A.Chapman & A. Dunsire (eds.), Style in Administration  
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1971). 
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Summary. 
The Westminster model of parliamentary government has been an 
extraordinarily adaptive mechanism for governing. 125 In this chapter 
various expectations have been traced from a description of its 'vintage' 
years in the 1860s, when its central feature - the welding of the legislative 
and the executive functions of governing in a ministerial department, with 
coordination being achieved in Cabinet, was at its peak, to current British 
and Australian practice. Current attempts at explanation have concentrated 
on process, especially the interaction between the two main elements in these 
processes - the political and the administrative. The balance maintained 
between them, or, as Self points out, "the ways in which this elusive dividing-
line is drawn' 	has profound effects upon the institutional forms of 
government. This is the main argument in Emy and in Reid's three articles 
and the basis of Reid's concern for the reduction of parliamentary prestige. 
Because Parliament is the fount of authority, ministers must act in a 
responsible way, accountable for their activities to parliament. As soon 
as that link is weakened, for example if the Executive dominates Parliament, 
activities will be no less legitimate, since they are performed under the 
cloak of parliamentary authority, but the way is open to change the appropriate 
balance. In similar ways the administrative element of the Executive may 
come to gain control over the political element, especially where their 
expertise gives them power, e.g. over information. 127 Previous contributing 
factors to the maintenance of this balance, such as the common background of 
the political minister and the administrator; the traditional class based 
discussion of political matters; the education system; the party system; and 
the unitary system of government in which parliament is the final legislative 
body, have been modified or are under threat of extinction. The "search for 
125The term 'governing' is used in the same sense as Rose "The study Of 
governing is concerned with relationships, whether between people and 
institutions in government or between governors and those they seek to govern". 
R. Rose, "Models of Governing", 22 .• Cit., p 466 (see supra, p 1). 
126Self, op. cit., p 149. 	127A.F.Pavis, "Politics in a Knowledgeable - 
Society" Public Adiarilstration (Sydney),29 (2),June 1970, 85-108v 
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a more realistic perspective" becomes more essential than ever to provide 
a better understanding of the nature of the parliamentary system today. 
If the strength of the Westminster model lay, as most commentators have 
suggested, in the integration of the legislative and the executive, its 
corollary is the importance of political leadership. By creating a situation 
in which the same group of individuals - ministers - could traverse both the 
political and the administrative it allowed the possibility for political 
leadership to overwhelm both parliament and administration. Checks against 
this were inherent in the accountability of that leadership to Parliament 
for executive authority and responsiveness to electoral demands. The increasing 
capacity of the administrator was also a check to an over zealous ministry, 
provided that capacity was exercised with self control._ 
The nature of these inter-relationships, •the influence of one part over 
the other must be investigated to ascertain whether the two elements operate 
as a partnership or in conflict; together in harmony or separated along 
distinct paths. 
This thesis is a study of the relationships between ministers and their 
senior departmental staff in Tasmanian state government. By using the 
conceptual background referred to in this chapter, it is possible to extract 
some generalisations from even such a small sample as is discussed here. 
A combination of these concepts derived from institution and process, allow 
for more interpretation of the individual expression of opinion by the actors 
themselves. All ministers and senior public servants have some common 
appreciation of the parliamentary system of government in which they operate, 
but this merely gives them an intuitive set of guidelines within which their 
daily pressure of business must be performed. It is the grossest framework 
and it is their interaction that fills in the fine detail, hopefully main-
taining the framework and the basic assumptions on which it is founded. The 
key to understanding whether the boundaries are maintained is the balance 
between political leadership and administrative capacity. The thesis will 
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therefore attempt to unravel the extent to which political leadership is 
still exercised and the limitations under which it is exercised. It is not 
surprising perhaps that, as Headey pointed out, officials would rather have 
the intelligent layman type minis:-.er, 128 but it may have deleterious effects 
for parliamentary government to promote that trend. The balance may demand 
a more active and expert minister, whose capacity equals that of his expert 
advisers. Hopefully, this thesis may indicate some answers to these problems 
by focusing on the extent to which the activities of senior officials and 
the work of the department within •its operating environment enhances or detracts 
from the political leadership of the minister. The next chapter turns to a 
consideration of the empirical base and how the data may be ordered to achieve 
this aim. 
128 Heady, 22: cit., p 103 "...they (civil servants), favour a Minister 
who is a policy selector and possesses the -qualities associated with the 
intelligent layman, who can win cabinet battles and conduct himself with 
aplomb at the parliamentary despatch box." 
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II 
A CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR THE STUDY OF THREE TASMANIAN DEPARTMENTS 
INTRODUCTION  
The apex of the 'political administrative arch' is central to any 
consideration of the relationship between political leadership with its 
corresponding executive authority, and administrative capacity. The existence 
of what Butler identifies as "two of the key constitutional principles - 
individual ministerial responsibility and collective ministerial responsibility" 
will dictate the balance of these relationships) He He argues strongly that 
these principles are "rules of general practice which permit orderly and 
efficient government" and "government subject to democratic control". 2 They 
are observed "sometimes more sometimes less faithfully" and are not to be 
regarded as "iron laws of political behaviour". 3 Although he does not find the 
degree of change in the observation of these principles significant enough, 
he does agree that the real question is whether there are changes in current 
practice which require a fundamental redefinition of the concept. 4 
Reid repudiated Butler's analysis of the Australian context and 
forcefully suggested that 
"It is.,. .incautious to take an ideal which has been 
bandied about in a political setting based on a unitary 
form of government and, with minimal empirical study, 
espouse that ideal prescriptively in a federal polity 
without apparent regard for the consequences." 5 
D. Butler, "Ministerial Responsibility in Australia and Britain", 
Parliamentary Affairs, 26 (1972-73) 403-414; also in his The Canberra Model  
(Melbourne: Cheshire, 1973), esp. Chapter 7. 
2Butler, Parliamentary Affairs, p 413. 
3ibid. 
4 ibid.; see also H.V.Emy, The Politics of Australian Democracy, 22 2 cit., 
p 272, where he quotes Butler with approval. 
5G.SReid',Tavid Butler's ministerial responsibility", unpublished 
Seminar Paper Australian National University, November 1972. 
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He argues that there are a number of singular features in the Australian 
context, such as "the blending of a federal organisation of government with 
the 'Westminster-type' fusion of parliamentary and executive powers"; or the 
"existence of an elected Senate with a power of veto over all legislation"; 
as well as the "six State Parliaments and State bureaucracies. .."6 These all 
demand that such constitutional principles as individual and collective 
responsibility be defined specifically for the Australian context, rather 
than assuming that they operate in Australia, if perhaps in a lesser degree 
than in Britain. Reid's earlier essays (referred to in the last chapter) 
provide some evidence that such redefinition would be substantially different 
from that proposed by Butler. He asserts very clear distinctions in the 
relations between ministers and parliament; in between the two houses of 
Federal Parliament and between ministers and their bureaucracy which precludes 
some of the assumptions about the functioning of the Westminster model in 
Australia. He suggested that "bland assertions about ministerial responsibility 
simply obscure our perceptions of the problem." 7 
The reality or otherwise of these two key elements of the Westminster 
model, the political and the administrative, therefore demands a more rigorous 
clarification in the Australian context than it so far has received. Both the 
empirical evidence and its interpretation require to be related specifically 
to Australian institutions and history. Analysis by methodologies that are 
more subtle and sensitive to phenomena than mere description may provide some 
indication of this reality. It would be but a short step from studies of 
this kind to redefinition which would be of value for political institutions 
in this country. 8 
6G.S.Reid, loc. cit. See also Emy, a, cit., pp 270-280, where he 
discusses the concept of ministerial responsibility in the Australian 
Federal context, and the discussion in the last chapter. 
7Reid, loc. cit. 
8Reid supports Stretton in the latter's advocacy of prescriptive roles 
for the scientist, only so long as the pre-requisite is discovering and 
understanding. Reid, loc. cit.;H. Stretton, The Political Sciences (London: 
Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1969) p 71 . 
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Greater understanding of both public and private organisations has been 
possible through the study of inter- and intra-group and inter- and intra-
organisation relationships. Concepts derived from these studies may assist • 
in describing and explaining individual activities within public institutions 
by ministers and public servants. 9 R.G.S.Brown observed: 
...academic students of public administration... 
have used the methods of the historian and the 
constitutional lawyer and...rather neglected 
the less formal aspects of administration."10 
A feature of current trends away from this 'orthodox or traditional 
description of institutional arrangements has been a proliferation of methodo-
logies. Too often empirical studies create their own methodological framework 
without reference to similar studies elsewhere or, alternatively, they 
distinguish the particular technique adopted from others. Over time, it is 
possible that an accumulation of such techniques may by adaptation and 
evolution find some common ground and produce an acceptable alternative to 
narrative and descriptive methods. Comparative studies wherever possible 
would reduce the potential ethnocentricity of methodologies derived from 
particular situations; these could be across national as well as organisational 
boundaries. 11 
9Some early American examples in the field of public administration occur 
in H. Simon, Administrative BehaViOur (New York: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1957); 
F. Morstein Marx, The Administrative State (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1957); P. Selznick, TVA and the grassroots (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1949). Two British authors using the same view are 
R.G.S.Brown, The Administrative Process in Britain (London: Methuen, 1970) and 
R.J.S.Baker, Administrative Theory & Public Administration .(London: Hutchison 
University Library, 1972). For a discussion of the various approaches to the 
study of Public Administration see A. Dunsire, Administration: The Word and  
the Science (London: Martin Robertson, 1973). 
10R.G.S.Brown, 	cit.,.p 120. 
11FOr examples see A. Webb, "Social Service Administration: A Typology 
for Research", Public Administration (London), Autumn 1971, 49, 321-339; where 
he uses Blau & Scott as the basis for his work. See also G.Smith, Social  
Work and the Sociology of 'Organisations (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1970). 
This has been advocated for some time by Dwight Waldo through his editorship 
of Public Administration Review and his writings, for example: Comparative  
Public Administration: Prologue, Problems and Promise (Chicago: Comparative 
Administration Group. American Society for Public Administration, 1964) and D. 
WaldoNomparative Public Administration" in P.LeBretan (ed.), Comparative  
Administrative Theory (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), 
pp 92-138. 	 • 
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With more self-conscious application of methodological techniques, what 
was previously accepted as an 'empirical truth' (for example the existence 
of a particular balance between political leadership, execut ive authority 
aid administrative capacity, called ministerial responsibility) may be seen 
to be perhaps a. normative interpretation. The traditional expectations of 
the patterns of action in the government system and the relationships between 
the political and administrative elements within that systemmay, as Emy, 
Reid and Self suggest, be nothing more than a series of myths supportive of 
the ideological framework of social norms. This may be the reason the model, 
as outlined previously, 13 has been critically analysed in Britain and Australia 
over recent years. 14 The familiar politics/administration dichotomy has been 
re-interpreted by these new conceptual approaches to take account of the more 
complex nature of the governmental processes. Two aspects of this dichotomy, 
which were seldom identified or differentiated, are now being recognised. The 
dichotomy can refer to the necessary difference in the positions of poli!:ician 
and official - one elected, the other appointed - and the organisational 
consequences of this, which has been the traditional view. It can also be 
an indication of activity, what politics or administration involves in terms 
of processes. By differentiating activities in this way, three crucial inherent 
qualities emerge as suggested in the last chapter: political leadership, 
executive authority and administrative capacity. Relating these qualities to 
Self's administrative arch and the analytical techniques subsequently discussed 
in this chapter, the above assertions may be tested to reveal alternative 
ways of assessing the support given to the basic assumptions about the West-
minster system of government. 
2. 	As previously noted, the classical version of the Westminster model 
relies on maintaining a clear distinction between the positions of politicians 
13The Westminster model, see Chapter I, p 6 et seq. 
14 See previous discussion, Chapter I, p 10 et seq. 
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and officials, because the politician must always be seen to be responsible 
for the actions of the officials. The simple and fundamental concept of 
ministerial responsibility, which implies accountability to parliament through 
control of a department, demands compliance with the stark distinction 
between politicians and officials. Once this breaks down, the whole validity 
of the Westminster system of parliamentary - government begins to crumble. To 
this extent there may be agreement with Dunsire that 
"...Common sense, or the plain man's point of view, 
says that there must be some dividing line, if only 
to make it sensible that some people in government 
are elected and others appointed." 15 
But it is impossible in the complexities of government activities in the 
'administrative state' 16 to maintain the purity of this difference in action. 
Attempts have been made to allow for these changes through reinterpretation 
and yet still maintain the virtues of the classical version, and these have 
been discussed in Chapter I. Although these terms have often been used as if 
they were synonymous, policy is best seen as the activity of the elected 
politician; administration as the activity of the appointed official. The 
Maud Committee Report expresses this understanding of the dichotomy in the 
clearest of language: 
"...to distinguish between policy and administration, 
this is a constantly recurring theme in the written 
evidence....if only policy could be separated from 
administration; the former to be exercised by members 
and the latter by officers, this would be a solution - 
to problems and a step towards reform." 17 
In discussing the Fulton Committee's report, Brown notes the difficulty 
imposed by this imperfect distinction, because the "Committee had to keep 
reminding itself and its readers of the constitutional limitations which would 
15A. Dunsire, Administration,  p.  cit., p 158.. 16 	- F. Morstein Marx,*The*Administrative - State (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1957) . 
17 " Report of the Committee on the Management of Local Government (The Maud 
Committee), Ministry of Housing and Local Government. (London: HMSO, 1967) para 
109. 'Similar expressions of this view may be found, in many reports of inquiries 
into government during the 1960s. 
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have to be modified if its recommendations were implemented." 18 By this 
Brown meant that it is the official who has most to lose from any removal of 
the division. So long as he . Can show the distinction exists he can maintain 
his jurisdictional boundaries and incur no direct responsibility. He has an 
indirect responsibility through the minister for acts within his jurisdiction 
and none at all for those which are called 'policy'. In the latter case the 
minister is solely answerable and directly responsible, whereas in the former 
situation only vicariously so. Dunsire makes the important point that the 
politician is able to exclud e the official from action which may be normally 
regarded as administrative. The official cannot do the same in return, unless 
he overtly assumes the role of expert in some professional or technical capacity 
beyond the normally adMinistrative. 19  In using this authority' against the 
politician, the official strays out of his administrative role and must clash 
with the strong presumption of legitimacy of the politician exercising his 
political judgement. 
However, influences may also operate in the opposite direction. Officials 
performing clerical, or more especially, managerial, tasks find they are no 
longer within their jurisdiction, they are political because they impinge on a 
sensitive constituency issue. Jurisdictions of the official are suddenly 
transferred to the politician, as will be seen in the case of the provision or 
-withdrawal of school bus services by the Education Department, or the even more 
formal procedure for exempting A student from attendance at school. Members of 
the public directly affected by decisions of denartmental officers may challenge 
their validity, and in doing so transfer_ them to the politicians. In consequence, 
the minister becomes very involved in decisions, removing the previously admin-
istrative jurisdiction into the political arena. 
The jurisdiction of the official is taken along the 'arc' into the 
18Brown, 22. cit•, p 93, 
19Dunsire, 22.. cit., p 160. 
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junction where "the influences that have been generated within the administrative 
process flow back into the higher levels of the political process." 20 Politi- 
cians and administrators are thus actors in a single process in which dynamic 
forces produce "fusion of political and administrative influances which have 
been generated lower down the arcs". 21 The narrow view that politicians are 
hierarchically superior to officials and therefore their tasks are in some way 
divided on the basis of that authority relationship, must be invalidated on 
this argument. 
Aim of Thesis  
The purpose of this thesis is to test the validity of the concept of 
Ministerial responsibility derived from the Westminster model of government 
in the context of the State government of Tasmania. If it has been adapted, 
in what way has it changed and what are the consequences of this change for 
the parliamentary form of government as a lhole? This information will also 
indirectly support or refute the different view of the politics/administration 
dichotomy put forviard by Self, providing a means of explaining the reality 
of government in a way which leads to greater understanding. The methodology 
used is interaction analysis, as applied by Simmons in the Washington State 
Executive. 22 This technique provides a framework for ordering the otherwise 
formless information obtained in such analysis. It has no purpose other than 
as a means by which the material can be objectively assessed in terms of already 
identified variables which have general application. Although this technique 
was applied in the United States to the relatively unique phenomena in one 
state, it does seem appropriate for use in this context. In adopting this 
technique the potential for comparative analysis is also enhanced as suggested 
by Waldo, since both studies are concerned with government at the state level 
20Self, 22. .. cit., p 150. 	2122. cit., p 151; see also Brown, 211_. cit•, 
pp 161-162. 
22 R.H.Simmons, "A Brief Survey of American State Executive Studies",, 
Western Political Quarterly, 17 (December 1964) 777-783;.R.H. Simmons, 
"American State Executive Systems: An Heuristic Model",'WeStetnTolitical  
Quarterly, 18 (March 1965) 19-26 . ; R.H.Simmons, "The Washington State Plural 
(contd.) 
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in a Federal system. 23 Waldo's advice about studying middle range phenomena 
as the most beneficial basis for comparative study is also heeded. Middle 
range phenomena can be encompassed in a theoretical framework more readily 
since generalities are not abstracted that are valid for more than the study 
undertaken. This does not lessen the usefulness of such studies, however, 
because an accumulation of these generalities may well be the basis of the 
'imaginative leap' to abstraction or general theory. 24 
In the remainder of this Chapter the methodology as used in relation 
to the Washington State Executive will be described and discussed, then its 
adaptation to the Tasmanian State Executive. Some of the problems of such 
transposition will be raised and answered and the parameters of the study out-
lined. In subsequent chapters the empirical study will be detailed and the 
hypothesis outlined above will be tested. 
Summary of the Interaction Analysis in Washington State 25 
The model falls into two parts, first the parameters of the model briefly 
stated, second the characteristics of the system within which and through which 
the interaction model operates. This summary is necessarily merely a statement 
of the model as it appears in Simmons' works and no attempt has been made to 
comment other than in elucidation. 
I) 	The Interaction Model - 
(a) the State Executive contains the properties of a system; 
(b) it can be seen as a subsystem of the greater political system 
which involves both other States and a Federal level; 
(c) the Executive is an assemblage of Organisation units, it is 
22 (contd.) Executive: An Initial Effort in Interaction Analysis", 
Western Political Quarterly, 18 (June 1965) . .363-381. 
23State government is well researched in the U.S. system but sadly 
neglected in Australia. See R. Simmons, B. Davis, R.J.K. Chapman and M.Wood, 
"Australian State Administration", Public Administration (Sydney) 33, 
(March 1974) 60-75, and D. Heard and R.J,K.Chapman, "A Bibliography of Tasmanian 
Government and Politics", Supplement to'Politics, 9 (1) (May 1974). Note also 
Emy, 22.. cit., p 400, where he too indicates the lack of systematic material 
available on the Westminster model in the States. 
24Meawar uses this Phrase as descriptive of the way many theories are 
conceived in his discussion on hypothesis and imagination in P. Medawar; 
The Art of the Soluble (London: Methuen & Co., 1967) esp. pp 147-155. 
25Simmons; loc. cit., footnote 22 supra. Throughout this summary no 
direct references will be cited. The basic conceptual material is found in 
the Western Political.QUarterly March 1965 article and this has been incorpo-
rated with some modification. Where this modification is regarded as vital 
appropriate reference has been made to the text. For convenience the texts are 
referred to in subsequent footnotes as: - WPQ December 1964;:WPQ Match 1965 and 
WPQ June 1965. 
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like a close confederation of functional states; 26 
(d) these units operate according to regularised patterns of 
interaction and interdependence; 
(e) they also develop patterned responses to the inputs and feedbacks 
from the socio-cultural environment in which they exist, these 
patterns are seen as forming closely knit interest clusters; 
(f) such patterned responses to the incoming stimuli occur through 
decisions and activity of the individual units; 27 
(g) the decision, activity or inactivity is calculated to make a 
difference in the unit environment and social relationships; 
(h) these patterned responses may perform the function of maintaining 
or altering institutional and system processes and relationships 
for the unit; 
(i) the patterns of interaction and interdependence described above 
are assumed to be capable of identification and demarcation; 
(j) their identification and demarcation does not mean that they 
necessarily remain stable, but the basic characteristics are 
ever-present in changing, dynamic interaction and as such they 
may be delineated and described as a plural executive; 
(k) th:.: term 'plural executive' implies that these units are 
independently powerful, acting on their own initiative and 
largely self governing. 
The use of the term 'regularised patterns' is of vital importance in this 
scheme, since only those kind of interactions can most readily be identified 
and demarcated by research. It may seem that this term is at odds with the 
disclaimer in (j) above, indicating the dynamic qualities of these interactions. 
The words 'regularised' and 'stable' are not intended to be synonymous, 'stable' 
inferring a propensity to avoid change, to remain static. The word 'regularised', 
• 26For the British oriented the use of the term 'Executive' must be 
clarified, since :there is a sharp distinction in its usage. Here the term 
is used of those persons involved in the political level of the administrative 
side of government. It is as if the separation of powers between legislative 
and executive involved the latter in another split between that part of the 
executive involved in an administrative process - in which the professional 
core operates, and an executive process - in which political implications 
play a much more important role and those involved are markedly different. • 
27In subsequent discussions it was felt that decisions to do nothing 
were equally important as a unit response in terms of inputs into the environ-
ment. The term 'agency' in the American literature has been changed to 
organisational 'unit' as being more appropriate, but is used interchangeably - 
hereafter. 
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on the other hand, implies a pattern of activities which, although capable 
of changing over time, are internalised by the agency in some legitimated 
form. Such adaptation to change is, of course, supposed to be a sign of 
organisational vitality,althouLh not all such government agencies meet this 
expectation. 
II) Fundamental characteristics of the system in which the interaction 
model operates: 
(a) there are certain variables and forces assumed to occur within 
the system; 
(b) the system is composed of demarcated organisational units and 
their subsystems which form part of the State Executive system; 
(c) there are a number of important dimensions of such agency subsystems. 
Explication  
In more detail these characteristics are described as follows: 
(a) a variable is a force which has a specific effect on the role 
and functions of an agency; as input causing stimulus to the 
decisive activity of the agency, e.g. the budgetary process. 
It is any aspect of the processes of interaction which can be shown 
to provide such inputs to or feedbacks from the agency environment 
resulting in that stimulus. The particular form the variable takes 
is identified through the force causing a particular effect within 
the organisational system. 
Such variable as the budgetary prccess can operate with considerable 
force and provide evidence for significant power relationships in 
the. 	or within the agency itself. The use of the term 'power' 
here is related to the idea of the force or stimulus of a particular 
variable, being thought of as the capacity for action or being 
acted upon, or the capability of producing an effect. Therefore, 
variables that are identified as active forces within the agency 
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system may be modified. Such modification would result in 
significant readjustments among the units .of the agency subsystems. 
It is because of the dynamic nature of these variables and 
their stimulus within the agency and its subsystems that there is a 
continual interaction involving changing relationships. Nonetheless, 
as previously indicated, certain patterns may be identified which 
- are crucial in formulating the role and functions of the agency. 
For the American State Executive one of these variables which has 
for long been recognised as of considerable force within the system 
is that of gubernatorial leadership. As such it becomes one of 
the central themes of the analysis, identifying those forces which 
are centrepetal, i.e. which encourage more integrated relationships 
with the governor, and those which are centrifugal, i.e. which 
impede, diminish or prevent gubernatorial leadership. 
(b) The State Executive system boundaries are defined as comprising 
all those agencies performing executive functions within the State 
including the Governor. Each agency involves actors who; as individuals, 
or as members of a group, perform the business of the executive. 
The main characteristic of this business is to make decisions and 
carry out activities calculated to effect change in the environment 
the agency serves, promoting agency interests. In addition such 
decisions and activities are constrained by the need to reduce 
conflict and tension with other agencies and thus promote survival 
potential. The agency subsystems are incorporated through the unit's 
own specialised environment - the agency itself, constituent groups, 
legislative, state and federal governmental organs. The components 
of this subsystem may be of greater significance in determining agency 
role and function than the gubernatorial relationship. 
The State executive is seen as a number of loosely knit units, 
each one of which is interdependent with the other. At the same 
State Executive System 
Fig.I.3 
56 
time each one gathers into its own subsystem units on which it 
can rely for support when it becomes involved in decisions or 
activity. Analysis thus centres on the relations between these 
component parts of the State Executive system, taking each frag-
mented part as dynamic systems themselves. Each of these fragmented 
parts is also a system, having its own subsystem of interacting 
units with varying degrees of autonomy. The diagram below endeavours 
to elucidate the complexity of this problem which is not clear from 
the Simmons' articles but is simply one of focus. 28 In Fig.Ilthe 
focus is on A unit which sees B and C as its subsystems and interacting 
with it. 
Fig.I.2is focussed on unit B and sees A and C as its subsystems, 
so that it is possible for unit A to be both system and subsystem 
and C to be subsystem of both A and B at one and the same time. 
Concurrently all these units may be viewed as in Fig. 1.3, part of 
the State Executive system, each a component part of that system's 
subsystem. 
- 28The diagram is adapted from the discussion in N.Gross, W.S.Mason 
and A.W.McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: School Superintendency  
Role  (New York: John Wiley Inc., 1958) esp pp 48-57 
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Naturally, for analytical purposes the focus has to be clearly 
stated and the boundaries of the system and its subsystems defined. 
Ultimately however, the interaction analysis provides a complete 
picture of the way each of these systems functions for the other 
and the manner of its influence. 
(c) The manner of the influence or the differentiation of the forces 
which the agency subsystem exerts within the system are seen as 
the third characteristic - the dimensions of the subsystem. These 
are the variables referred to in the first part of this section. 
The forces which operated within the subsystem have extension 
and magnitude throughout its processes to affect changes on the 
various interacting units. Of these forces, four are suggested 
as the most potent for analytical purposes: Power configuration; 
program activity; role of Governor; and circumjacent relationships. 
In addition to these, although not regarded as so crucial, are 
the quality of executive leadership in the agency; fiscal and 
budgetary relations; federal, legislative and clientele relation-
ships; traditional historical patterns of interaction; the social 
system or environment in which the agency subsystem operates and 
personnel patterns. The detailed description of the primary forces 
below indicates that some attempt has been made to take account 
of these lesser factors. 
Power configuration - i.e. the agency's capacity for action, 
being acted upon or for producing an effect in its environment. 
This capacity appears to be derived from a number of forces 
(these may be termed 'power resources' of a unit in the 
subsystem): 
Legal characteristics; 
essential character of the budget process; 
nature of its operating funds; 
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subsistence of federal, legislative and 
clientele relationships; 
characteristics and quality of leadership, 
patterns of tenure and succession ; 
role and structure of agency social system; 
effectiveness of professional staff; 
traditional patterns of dependence and autonomy. 
Program activity - i.e. the repetitive patterns of interaction 
among habitually participating groups (in-groups within the 
agency subsystem and a complex of more or less interested out-
groups which are not part of the agency sub-system but are 
affected by or affect that subsystem). The effectiveness 
of the governor in supervising a particular agency resides in 
his ability to exercise the option of initiating action. This 
capacity for initiative may be derived from: 
his position in authority as constitutional officer; 
his quality of authority as party leader; 
his personal qualities of leadership and effectiveness. 
The distance of the agency from gubernatorial supervision 
may range from that of close dependency to almost complete 
independence. However,independence from the governor's 
supervision within the system may not preclude dependence on 
one of the other units within the subsystem. 
Circumjacent relationships - i.e. those ties an agency has with 
groups external to its formal institutional structure, such as 
clientele or constituent groups; 
legislative committees; 
state or federal governmental organisations. 
Such relations may be co-operative, accommodative, competitive 
or conflictive, 
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Evaluation of the Simmons model 
The model, and therefore the interpretative elements, are based on an 
Eastonian analysis of political systems. 29  Two of the assumptions implied 
in Eastonian analysis - equilibrium and persistence - produce specific 
consequences for the analytical model described above. As previously noted 
(Loss ) the State Executive is treated as a system with the governor and 
agencies as subsystems. Because of the need for systems maintenance, implicit 
in the model used through the concept of equilibrium, all these subsystems 
are anticipated to aim for maximum effect and minimum conflict. Yet, at the 
same time, again implicit in the model through the concept of persistence, 
each subsystem - governor and agencies - will be endeavouring to maximise 
its own survival, i.e., function as autonomously as possible. For this reason 
the term 'plural' has been used to designate the executive system. The 
Eastonian analytical base also involves connotations of a particular explana-
tory kind, e.g., that power is of central significance to the system. In 
order to maximise effect and maximise potential survival capacities the 
exercise of pOwer and the control of sufficient support in its exercise are 
essential. The Simmons analysis, therefore, is forced to use as its crucial 
focus the role of the governor, rather than just explicating the interaction 
between the subsystems. Institutionalised centralisation of the executive 
function and the separation of policy making from administration is combined 
in the office of the governor. It was the tenet of all early administrative 
reform in the U.S. to aim for the implementation of such principles. 30 
To a large degree, therefore, the Simmons analysis was dominated by a 
search for the validity of this orthodox view. The centrality of the 
29WPQ, (June 1965) p 364, Fn.6. Assumptions implicit in the use of 
this analytical conceptual framework are discussed in Appendix II and 
their limitations are canvassed there. 
. 30For a general discussion on the literature in respect of state 
governments and governors see WPQ (December 1964), and for Simmons' view of 
the role of the governor WPQ (March 1965). Other texts directly concerned with 
the governor's role are: C.B.Ransone, The office of Governor in the United  
States (University of Alabama Press, 1956); L.Lipson, The American Governor: 
from figurehead to leader (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) and for a 
more recent survey: C.B. Ransone (ed.), Symposium: "The American Governor in 
(contd.) 
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governor's position and his role in any interaction between other subsystems 
was consequently regarded as a vital focus of the analysis. The persistence 
of the theme of centripetal forces (those which encouraged a more integrated 
relationship with the governor) and centrifugal forces (those which were 
found to impede, or prevent gubernatorial leadership) is evidence of this. 31 
Consequently the analysis does not so much "tenter attention on the relations 
between the component parts of the fragmented state executives", 32  as centre 
attention on the "dilemma of the governor". 33 His situation is that •"he is 
theoretically and often actually held publicly responsible for the exercise 
of effective leadership, yet he is often without adequate tools to exercise 
34 such leadership." 	If he is to be regarded as the policy maker and developer 
of policy initiative as political leader then all elements of the state 
executive should be integrated under his leadership. The fact is that many 
of these elements are diffused and fragmented, some agencies playing important 
and often cri7.cia1 roles in determining programmes and expenditures necessary 
to. satisfy policy decisions. 35 The extent to which the orthodox role of the 
governor is eroded through this growing fragmentation and increasing autonomy 
of the subunits is the crux of analysis. Because of the implicit assumptions 
mentioned previously, the subunits were assumed to be in a conflict situation. 36 
30 (contd.) 
in the 1970s", Public Administration Review 30 (1) (Jan./Feb. 1970). 
31 WPQ (June 1965)- 	32WPQ, (June 1965) p 364- 
33WPQ (June 1965) p 373. 	34 ibid. 
35 WPQ  (June 1965) p 364. This view is essentially similar to the 
idea that presidents of the United States have to rely principally on their 
'power to persuade' to achieve their objectives. A view which has been 
strongly argued in R.E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 
1960); see also an essay by P.W. Sperlich, "Bargaining and overload: An 
Essay on Presidential Power" in A. Wildavsky (ed.) The Presidency (Boston: 
Little Brown, 1969). 
36 The Eastonian -analysis assumes that the inputs intothe political 
system - demands & support - are conflictive. The pluralist view of society, 
in which the government is the allocator of authoritative values and acts • 
as arbitrator, underlies most of the writings on American Government. See for 
example: T.H. Eliot, 'Governing America:. Politics of a Free People (New York: 
Dodd Ricards & Co., 1962); J.M. Burns & J.W. Peltason, Government by the  
People, 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966). 
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The governor battles to maintain his control over policy making against 
agencies who were anxious to erode it; concurrently agencies as between them-
selves, engaged in promoting their own survival; neither exceeding the limit 
beyond which such conflict would upset the equilibrium of the system as a 
whole. 
In this way it appears that 'explanation' derived from the analysis 
was to some degree normative in character. The interpretation of the data 
was directed to an assessment of the validity of orthodox theory rather than 
a construction of reality. The explanations themselves were epistemologically 
grounded in that orthodoxy thus detracting from the potential benefits of a 
"systematic-empirical methodology" - hopefully to yield "a deeper understanding 
of state administration." 37 
Adaptation of the Simmons interaction analysis model  
to the Tasmanian State Executive System 
The context of the state executive systems must be clearly defined as 
well as its constitutionally prescribed framework. In both U.S. and Australia, 
the constitution has existed for a considerable time prior to any analysis of 
interaction within the system. The institutional and social expectations must 
therefore be fairly strongly entrenched in both the system and the environment. 
In a governmental setting of the Westminster model type, as in the Tasmanian 
State system, there has been a continuous accumulation of normative demands 
over time. Some demands were formulated within that system, but many were 
externally imposed. For example, the fact that the Tasmanian State Executive 
has grown out of the colonial government, controlled from Westminster until 1856, 
must have some conditioning effect. 38 When an individual enters a role within 
that institutional framework he is initially governed by strong pressures to 
37WPQ (March 1965) p 26. 
38See R.LWettenhall, Evolution - Of'a'Department (University of Tasmania, 
1970) and W. A. Townsley; The Struggle . fOr'Self - goVernment'in Tasmania (Hobart: 
Government Printer, 1951). See also the discussion in Chapter I: L. Hartz, 
The Founding - Of'New'SoCieties (New York: Harcourt Brace & Worls Inc. 1964). 
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conform. Precedent plays a highly important part in constraining his 
activities and defining their boundaries. Activities beyond the expected 
will bear the burden of disapproval, not only of the present but of the past 
as well. In similar ways new agencies are subjected to the same constraints. 
The outcome must be accommodated within the analysis if it is to be valid 
across cultural and governmental boundaries. 
The constitutional context in which the two state executive systems 
function, i.e. the American and the Australian, will be initially distinguished 
and then the term 'executive' clarified. In the U.S. the Presidential formula 
is perpetuated at State level, and in Australia it is the parliamentary, 
representative formula. Both countries have a Federal system, although there 
are differences in the relationships between Federal and State governments 
derived from constitutional form as well as practical expediency. These 
factors will only be of relevance in the analysis in discussions about autonomy 
and the extcAt to which an agency is able to gain support outside the State 
executive system. Since the analysis is concerned solely with the internal 
interaction, there is little need to comment on the Federal/State relationships 
other than to note specifically where they impinge on that interaction. 
Of more importance is the structural nature of each system and the 
differences consequent upon that. It is here too that the use of the term 
'executive' is significant. The American - Presidential system is formally 
structured on the distinction between legislative, executive and judicial 
powers. A separate structure is created to operate in each sphere with the 
personnel of each structure remaining within its boundaries. Each of the 
structures provided checks and balances against the others to prevent anyone 
gaining complete ascendancy and thereby governing in an arbitrary manner. 
The Executive element of this system is the implementing arm, the structure 
which performs the day to day tasks ofgovernment under the control of 
directly elected men. At the State level the Governor and senior officers 
in charge of departments are elected members. 
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Often, the senior officers are mixed, some elected, others appointed; 
for example: of the five agency heads in the Washington study three were 
elected and two gubernatorial appointees. 39 At the same time the tasks they 
perform are provided for them by the legislature, which is comprised of 
elected members, although none of them involved in the Executive. This 
infusion of electees rather than appointees in the two structures provides 
for responsiveness to the public interest. However, as with the Presidency 
at the Federal level, the central constitutional importance of the Governor 
in the State system cannot be ignored. He is in some ways the topmost point 
of the political hierarchy, but certainly the topmost point of the Executive 
authority hierarchy. The way in which any one governor chooses to exercise 
this position of leadership and in what particular way he amalgamates his 
apparent dual role is a matter of research. Simmons suggests for the 
Washington case that "he is unable to manage the executive branch with any 
degree of effectiveness or comprehensiveneJs", although, whether this occurs 
because he is placing too much emphasis on his political leadership to the 
detriment of his executive authority Simmons does not say. 40 
In the Westminster parliamentary system the separation of powers is not 
fundamental, in fact it is deliberately blurred, although the three elements 
of state - legislative, executive and judicial are present. Only the judicial 
is absolutely separated in a way much more certain than the American. Checks 
and balances between the three elements depend on this judicial structure 
in a much less formal sense, there being no constitutional appeal to a Court .41 
39WPQ (June 1965) p 365. 
40wp Q (June 1965) p 381. The study of political leadership in this 
context has only recently emerged again with the publication of G.Paige, 
Political Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1972)._ As he says in his Preface - 
it is an attempt "to combine old concerns into -a distinctively new pattern." 
Reference to the relationship between his conceptual pattern and this study 
is made in Chapter I. 
41As there is to the Supreme Court in the U.S. or in the Australian 
context to the High Court. There are, however, severe limitations to the 
capacity of the Australian High Court to intervene in other than direct 
challenges to constitutional validity of government activity. See for 
example" M. Neumann, The High Court of Australia: . a Collective Portrait 1903-1970 
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In the Westminster system convention, custom and the Rule of Law dominate its 
functioning. The legislative is supreme - the legal fiction that sovereign 
power is vested in the Queen in Parliament perpetuates the concept that the 
legislative andexecutive powers are merged in this body. Only in Parliament 
do we find elected representatives. However, in order to maintain the link, 
and through this to control the Executive, personnel from the legislature 
are appointed to executive positions. Members of the legislature are appointed 
to be Ministers of State responsible to the Crown, and thereby to Parliament, 
for the performance of the executive functions. 42 They are thus at the same 
time in a position to control that performance. These ministers, by convention, 
now derive their positions from belonging to the majority party group in the 
Lower House of Parliament and are usually leading members of that group. The 
Crown no longer exercises any power of appointment to this position, although 
the authority remains. The responsibility for formulating the policies, which 
must be endorsed by the legislature, is with the ministers who collectively 
form a Cabinet, with one of their number appointed as 'prime minister', (at 
state level in Australia he is called 'Premier'). It is the job of the Premier 
to lead, but remain only primus inter pares constrained by the need for 
collective agreement with all his colleagues in Cabinet. 43 
The Executive in this system is the structure of departments and 
statutory authorities which perform the day to day duties of government, 
implementing those policies decided upon outside the structure. However, 
unlike the American system, there are direct political links to the authority 
structure, through these ministers in Cabinet. This group is the policy making 
41 (contd.) 
(Sydney: Department of Government and Public Administration, University of 
. Sydney, 1971); G. Sawer,.Australian - FederalisM'in'the'CoUrts (Melbourne: • 
Melbourne University Press, 1968). 	- 
42The's e matters are more specifically dealt within Chapter I, where the 
Westminster Model is discussed in detail - . 
43While this may be the formal relationship there is considerable debate 
especially in the U.K. about whether the more recent trends have been to 
Prime ministerial dominance. See references in footnotes - 45 & 46 post. 
Encel thinks otherwise about - Australia 	p 107). 
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political leadership and at the same time has executive responsibility for 
supervising the activities consequent upon those policy decisions. In this 
situation therefore, there is a collective, rather than a single, centre for 
both political and authority leadership within the institutional structure 
- cabinet rather than governor. In the Westminster system there is a greater 
diffuseness, and although it may be possible to reconcile for some purposes, 
Simmons' analytical model must be distinguished from his conclusions if the 
model is to be applied to the parliamentary system. 
There are, however, more similarities in the two State systems than 
dissimilarities. It is largely in the practical application of a responsible 
and responsive ideal that the two differ. Yet, for analytical purposes, 
understanding these distinctions is important, it prevents false assumptions 
being transposed across cultural boundaries. So it is necessary to be aware 
that the interaction taking place between the agencies in the Washington 
State Executive is constrained by the dominant constitutional position uf the 
governor. All executive acts are to be supervised by him and are his 
responsibility. It is his task to energise the government - for this his 
leadership must be clothed with sufficient authority. Yet he has to be 
surrounded by sufficient safeguards to make arbitrary decisions unlikely, for 
example: 
(a) the possibility that the political party of which he may be state leader 
may not have the majority in the legislature; or 
(b) the other elected senior officers in the state may not belong to his 
political party or accept his leadership in all matters. 
In these ways the ideal of the 'plural executive' is enhanced and to some 
degree interaction between agencies in this environment will be influenced 
by the capacity of the Governor to marry his political leadership with 
institutional authority. Agencies may well feel encouraged to exhibit 
independence in such a climate, especially where there is an elected head. 
The Department of Public Instruction in Washington, headed by an elected 
§uperintendent, for instance, exhibited autonomous tendencies. The centrifugal 
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forces at work here, derived from the legal separation of the executive from 
the legislature, combined with an effective assertion of independence by the 
agency head through their administrative capacity. 44 
Within the Tasmanian State Executive System interaction occurs in a 
different context of interplay between political leadership, executive  
authority and administrative capacity. Here the focus of attention must be 
upon the Cabinet in which the first two factors merge. This central body 
comprises all those ministers/leaders and especially the premier. It is the 
initiating body for policy discussion and dictates the guidelines for government 
action which departmental officers should follow. 45 
In this situation it is tempting to equate the position of Cabinet in the 
Tasmanian system with that of the Governor in the Washington system, using the 
idea of centripetal and centrifugal forces in analysis. The Governor is 
head of an hierarchical apex with no single person below him capable of making 
decisions or of being accountable in quite the same way as a minister. The 
Governor is rather like all ministers rolled into one, i.e. the Cabinet; but 
not like the Cabinet itself, which is an amalgam or collegial decision unit. 
Comparative study must not uncautiously transfer analytical techniques between 
systems, glossing over the very real differences that arise. For reasons made 
clear by Encel, it is more appropriate to see each minister as the top of an 
apex similar to that of the Governor. The Cabinet operates through conventions 
which do not place it at the top of any hierarchy of authority, within the 
executive structure, unless in practice this arises through the competence of 
a premier or defect of a minister. There can be little doubt that, given the 
appropriate circumstances a premier could become dominant despite Cabinet, or 
44WPQ (June 1965) p 373. An interesting comparison with a similar 
potential for autonomy through administrative capacity in the Tasmanian 
Education Department is provided here. See Chapter IV. 
45 Haldane referred to the Cabinet as being the mainspring of all 
mechanisms of government, Great Britain. :Machinery'of'GOverntent'Committee  
(Haldane) Cmd. 9230 (London: HMSO, 1918). This has been the view of most 
commentators since then - see J.P.MackintoshiThe BritiSh - Cabinet (2nd ed. 
London: Stevens, 1968); Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge: 
C.U.P., 1961)a 
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through it. The discussion does not pre-empt this possibility. On the other 
hand it is not based on the dubious expectation that it will always operate 
like that. In Australia Encel's verdict is that the collective responsibility 
of Cabinet is used by prime ministers and premiers only when they feel the 
need to protect their authority. He points out that 
"In Australia the basic convention is not collective 
responsibility within Cabinet but the individual 
responsibility of each minister to his party." 4° 
An attempt is made to represent these differences in Fig. II and III below. 
By convention the executive authority stops at the minister himself for 
every functional area. It is not carried through into Cabinet because the 
minister is himself directly responsible and accountable to Parliament for the 
functions of his department. The Cabinet, in this sense, is merely an 
organisational mechanism by which - activities can be coordinated at the highest 
political decision level between the ministers. 47  While there can be no 
gainsaying the fact that ministers, whether British or Australian, do not 
resign as expected by the convention of ministerial responsibility, it is still 
assumed that ministerial responsibility is the central doctrine underlying 
the Westminster system of government. If these expectations are unfulfilled 
then explanations must be sought through empirical analysis rather than by the 
assertion that since it has not occurred it •is not part of the system. Similarly, 
any suggestion that an Australian state premier could be equated in any way 
with a U.S. state governor would be invalid. Whilst some premiers operate in 
personal styles like strong governors this is not their substantive constitu-
tional position. 48 That constitutional position is being evaluated in this thesis. 
46S.Encel, loc. cit. 
47Any attempt to detract from thisposition of the minister and supplant 
his authority with that of Cabinet has been strongly resisted, according to 
some writers. P. Gordon Walker, The Cabinet (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970); 
B. Headey, 22: cit.,esp. pp 42-43; see also H. Daalder, loc. cit.; 
H. -Morrison, .Government and Parliament (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). 
"This impression is supported particularly in respect of the Victorian 
Premier Sir Henry Bolte in P. Blazey, - Bolte: A political biography (Melbourne: 
Jacaranda Press, 1972); N. Blewett & D. Jaensch,'Playford  to Dunstan  
(Melbourne: Cheshire, 1971) provide similar comment on Playford's 27 years in 
South Australia. 
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The minister, then, is the central focus of the Westminster system, having 
both responsibility to account for his actions and control over his department. 
This statement must not be taken to exclude the very real possibility in 
Australia that ministers may be subordinate to the collecti7e entity, Cabinet. 
Party political solidarity seems often stronger in Australian politics as Reid 
shows in the earlier discussion about the suppression of politics in parliament. 
However, these possibilities must remain in the realm of speculation at the 
state level of politics until empirical evidence is provided. 49 Since the 
minister is accountable and is also an elected representative the dual role of 
political leadership and executive authority is incorporated in his position. 
This combination of leadership and authority in both minister and governor, 
while operating in different contexts, allows the transfer of Simmons' tech-
niques of analysis: 
The significance of the term 'executive' in the Simmons analysis is 
that it refers to the uppermost layer of pvernment in which the elected 
leadership and appointed leadership arecombined as executive authority. At 
the second and subservient level are the remaining personnel within the agencies, 
the permanent officials, who may have some delegated executive authority but no 
leadership. Through their administrative capacity they provide the support 
for the first level and may play a significant role in any interaction between 
the agencies. This is little different from the version of the interaction in 
the 'grey area' of Self's arch. 50  Distinctions of a conventional and con-
stitutional kind must have consequences that are significant in the processes 
within the two systems, but the similarities should provide a reasonable ground 
for cautiously adapting the analytical techniques use&by Simmons. This 
argument must also be strengthened by the fact that the focus of this research 
is also commonly based on the apex of Self's arch where the broader political 
and administrative implications of activity are markedly different from the 
49Encel certainly does not support those views in respect of the Federal 
government, as noted footnote 43. Neither are they supported by the study 
undertaken in this thesis as may be seen Chapter VI. 
50 See Chapter I, pp. 18-20 for a discussion of Self's political administrative arch. 
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rest of the system of government in both countries. 
So, in this analysis of the Tasmanian State Executive System, a major 
concern will be the accountability and control of the minister, his political 
leadership and the constraints on his exercise of executive authority, 
especially those derived from administrative capacity. Cabinet and Parliament 
will be regarded as variable forces influencing these aspects of the minister's 
activity, bearing in mind that he is a member of both. There will, as mentioned 
above, be consequential differences in the influences these forces exert from 
the American situation, where the governor and senior officers are not members 
of the legislature, nor of asimilar body to Cabinet. Centripetal and centri-
fugal forces such as were conceptualised by Simmons in his analysis will be as 
evident in the Tasmanian system as in Washington. Obviously, ministers as 
members of a Cabinet could be placed in a significantly less autonomous posi- 
- tion than their constitutional status may allow. The minister can be overruled 
by his peers, or at least supervised in a way not likely with the Governor. 
However, these differences emerge in practise, it must not be assumed that the 
use of the conceptual and analytical techniques imply any transfer of American 
doctrines to supplant or support those of the Westminster system. All that 
is intended,as has previously been noted, is to utilise those concepts and 
techniques by adaptation for the better understanding they may provide of the 
empirical data collected. 
The subsystems of the Tasmanian Executive system will be described as 
bounded by the minister, as executive authority, and those units which are 
directly under his control and supervision. The system will comprise all such 
units of government and these will be the organisational units for the purpose 
of analysis. 51 In Tasmania separation of these organisational Units becomes 
51Earlier discussion about the assumptions underlying the politics-
administration dichotomy, Chapter I, p 49, provides a basis for including the 
minister in the executive system. The attempt to draw a line between the 
• permanent staff of a department and the temporaryminister and call one executive 
the other political, is challenged, see A. Dunsire, 22: cit., p 153 et seq. 
Different individuals may behave differently in office, but the role of 
minister qua minister does not change. 
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complicated by the fact that only ten ministers are responsible for them all. 
It may therefore easily occur that one minister is Supervising two or more 
clearly distinct organisational units, each vying with the other for support 
from various sources, including the minister. These arrangements remain by 
no means static, agencies may be moved between ministers without too much 
concern for their consanguinity. At the elections (of May 1972), there was 
a change of government from a Liberal Party majority to a Labour Party majority. 
At the previous election (fty 1969) the Liberal Centre Party coalition gained 
a majority for the first time for some thirty-five years-and thus:changes of 
portfolio have been more frequent in the last few years than- for much of the 
past. The list below shows some of the radical changes that took place in 
the allocation of the main departments over the period from 1968-1973. 52 
1972/3  
(Based on research and Directory 
of Government Departments and 
Authorities, Premier's and Chief 
Secretary's Department, Hobart, 
1972) 
Premier, Treasurer and - 
Minister for Mines. 
Attorney General, Minister 
for Environment and Minister 
Administering Racing and 
Gaming Act 
1968* 	1970/2** 
(*Taken from Wettenhall 	(**Taken from Tas- 
The Guide, pp 18/19 	manian Year Book, 
Govt. Printer, 
Hobart 1972) 
Premier, Treasurer, 	Premier, Treasurer 
Minister for Mines and 	and Minister in 
Minister in charge of charge of the Hydro- 
Hydro-Electric Comm- 	Electric Commission. 
ission. 
Attorney General 	Attorney General, 
Minister for Police 
and Licensing 
Minister for Education 	Minister for Educa- Minister for Education 
tion 
52A full and comprehensive list of these organisational units for the 
Tasmanian Executive system will be found in Appendix II together with the 
changes taking place since 1968 utilising the classification scheme in 
Wettenhall, The Guide, on which much of the following discussion about 
selection for research purposes is based. The main criteria for the 
classification scheme in the Guide were constitutional (legal or statutory) 
and descriptive. The formal requirements of enabling legislation (described 
as the Charter) were taken together with the detailed descriptions of 
functions, organisation and finance. The written record was used with a 
comprehensiveness that made the book a definitive source for the Tasmanian 
Government Administration in 1968. 
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1968 	1970/2 
Minister for Lands and Minister for Lands and 
Works 	Works and Local 
Government 
- 
Minister for Agricul- 	Minister for Agriculture 
ture and Tourism. 	and Forests 
1972/3  
Minister for Lands and Works 
and Local Government 
Minister for Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
Chief Secretary, 
Minister of Labour 
and Industry 
and Social Welfare 
Minister for Housing 
and Police 
Minister for Health 
Chief Secretary, Minister of 
Labour and Industry and 
Minister for Transport 
Minister for Police and 
Licensing and Minister 
for Tourism and Immigration 
Minister for Health, 
Social Welfare and Road 
Safety 
Minister for Industrial 
Development, Forests, 
Minister administering the 
Hydro-Electricity Act 1944 
and Minister assisting the 
Treasurer 
Deputy Premier, Chief 
Secretary, Minister 
of Labour and Industry 
and Social Welfare 
and Minister for 
Tourism 
Minister for Housing, 
Racing and Gaming and 
Mines 
Minister for Health and 
Road Safety 
It will be noted that a number of these departments have remained as primary 
organisational units throughout, Treasurer, Health, Education, Housing, Chief 
Secretary, Attorney General, Lands and Works and Agriculture. Reasons for 
changes in other units are difficult to assess but would certainly relate 
to their comparative freedom from direct ministerial control since they are 
set up as Commissions, e.g. Forestry, Hydro-Electricity or Transport; or that 
they wax and wane in importance dependent on the political climate of the 
time, e.g. Tourism was given a boost during the Liberal Centre Party 
Coalition because of the interest of the Deputy Premier; equally, the 
Environment is currently in political vogue. 
Selection of subsystem units for research  
In order to ensure that changing portfolios would only be a variable 
of the most minor kind in the analysis, it became necessary to select those 
departments which seemed to remain whole as a primary organisational unit 
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within the System. Such selection is an important factor in relation to 
the question of control and capacity to supervise, since a multiplicity of. 
functions would of itself create problems for a Minister. 53 Those depart-
ments seen as primary organisation units were selected: Health, Housing,. 
Education, Lands and Works, Attorney General, Agriculture, Treasurer and 
• Chief Secretary. 54 However, this sample would have been too large to analyse 
in a comprehensive survey and a further selection had to take place. 
One of the fundamental assumptions of the Westminster model, as stressed 
in Chapter I, is the responsibility and control of the minister in charge of 
a department. Insofar as departmental matters are concerned the minister is 
both responsible for actions taking place within the structure to Cabinet 
and Parliament and at the same time sets the guidelines for those actions. 
It is therefore possible to hypothesise about relative autonomy. For example - 
that in an ideal ministerial department the minister is wholly responsible for 
and wholly accountable for its activities, with the sanction of resignation 
in the event of failure. However, such a situation may no longer pertain 
because of the increasing influences of Cabinet and collective responsibility; 
party loyalties and the growing technological complexities of departmental 
tasks. Yet there linger certain distinctive qualities inherent in the 
creation.of a ministerial department, Which lead one to expect something 
different if a public corporation is created instead. The relationship of 
a minister to a public corporation is intended to be different from that of a 
minister with his department. 55 An apparent continuum can therefore be drawn 
53This did become obvious when interviewing the Liberal Centre Party 
Coalition Minister for Housing, Industrial Development and Fisheries; see 
Chapter IlL 
54For a discussion of this concept of primary organisational units 
and the use of the term "Ministry" see R.L. Wettenhall, "Concepts of Ministry", 
Public Administration (Sydney) 29(3) (December 1970) pp 319-329. 
55For discussions about this see W.A.Robson, Nationalised Industry and  
Public Ownership (2nd. ed. London: Allen and Unwin, 1962) pp 160-162, which 
summarises much of the early discussion which took place in the literature on 
this question. For an example of this literature see D.N.Chester, "Public 
Corporations and the Classification of AdMinistrative bodies", Political  
Studies Vol. 1 (1953). For a discussion of the differentiation see R.L.Wettenhall, 
The Guide 22: cit., .esp. pp. 5-15. 
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between the two virtually impossible poles, complete dependence and absolute 
autonomy. This argument was underlying Wettenhall's classification system 
into ministerial departments, departmental offices, departmental corporations, 
public corporations and regulatory bodies. Ministerial departments are 
nearest to complete dependence and regulatory bodies nearest to autonomy. 
This classification could therefore provide the second criterion for selection. 
If the focus of the investigation was to be on the accountability and control 
of the minister and the constraints placed on his authority, then an examination 
of a cross section of departmental types would complement it. 
Selection was made on the potential for meaningful and useful conclusions 
bearing these matters in mind. The need for a cross section of the continuum 
necessitated the avoidance of extremes. Therefore, a clearly defined cor-
poration operation, a public enterprise, should not be included because the 
only complexities here relate to whether or not it should have been created 
in the way it was - a matter outside this thesis. A good example of this type 
would be the Hydro-Electric Commission, about whose autonomy much discussion has 
taken place, although no one doubts that it exists. On the other hand, a 
ministerial department, such as the Treasury, so clearly under the control of 
the minister and for whose tasks he is so clearly accountable, should also be 
avoided. The real test of the classification would be in the middle areas of 
the continuum, the departmental offices and corporations. On this basis a 
selection was made of the following: 
(a) Health; 
(b) Education; and 
(c) Housing. 
(a) Health and Education - with certain reservations the Guide suggests 
these two departments are ministerial departments. Of the Education 
Department Wettenhall states: 
"Some way removed from the pure (or ideal) type are the 
departments whose permanent heads - , and possibly other 
officials as well - are vested with statutory powers 
and responsibilities in their own right ... If these 
"quasi-ministerial" departments conform in other respects 
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to the ideal pattern, and if their minister is generally 
understood to exercise important and over-riding powers, 
especially in the relevant policy making areas, then I have 
included them in the category of ministerial departments. 
Among those so treated are Education...."56 
This uncertainty about the true position and the fact that the majority 
of its officers are professional teachers, not appointed under the provisions 
of the Public Service Act 1973, make this department worth including. In 
_ 
addition, the most senior officers including the Director General have always 
been promoted from the teaching staff not the administrative "staff. 
A similar basis for inclusion exists for the Health Department, although 
there are other more complex . factors involved. Until 1960 it was very much 
controlled through the statutory powers of the permanent head. In that year 
however, the Health Services Act was passed with the apparent intention of 
divesting the permanent head of much of his power and placing it in the hands 
of the minister. At the same time this department is also strongly profession-
ally oriented, with a large number of its employees outside the control of the 
Public Service Act 1973. Added to this is the fact that its permanent head, 
most deputy heads and, since 1959, the minister himself, have been from the 
medical profession. 
(b) Housing - this department provides a different kind of problem, being 
represented in the Guide as departmental corporation: 
"...offices or agencies whose staffs formally 
constitute departments for Public Service Act 
purposes, but whose governing organs are given 
the status of corporate bodies separate from 
the collective legal personality of the Crown. 
In some cases a single nominated official at 
the head of the office is so incorporated. (This) group 
includes agencies like ... the HousingDepartment 
It will usually be found that the conferring 
of this distinct legal personality indicates involve-
ment in operations of a commercial character, and that 
ministerial control is limited and somewhat remote, 
in keeping with the general rationale of public 
enterprise organisations." 57 
56 Wettenhall, Guide, p 
571
1R.cit., p 11. 
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Since it implies a differing potential relationship between minister and 
department the inclusion of the Housing Department was seen as providing an 
alternative source of information. 
In summary, this study attempts to apply a methodological technique 
developed in another jurisdiction, namely interaction analysis. In applying 
this methodology the central concern will be questions about the political 
leadership and executive authority, and thus the responsibility, of Ministers 
within the Tasmanian State Executive, and the balance maintained with ad-
ministrative capacity. 
A conceptual design for the study of the subsystems  
of the Tasmanian State Executive  
The component subsystems of the Tasmanian State Executive function 
according to established patterns of action, interaction and interdependence. 
As noted previously they differ in kind from those described in Simmons 58 
as they form part of a larger political system based on the Westminster model. 
Such organisational units do not operate in isolation; internally they comprise 
consistently related positions and patterned inputs and feedbacks from their 
environment. At the same time the personnel filling these positions develop 
responses to the incoming stimuli which may provide precedents for future 
patterns, acting to maintain or change institutional or system processes 
and relationships. 
These processes and relationships operate at a number of levels inside 
the organisational subsystem, in regard to both the formal relationships and 
informal substructure. However, both of these are overlaid 59 by the external 
environmental influences directly impinging on the unit's activities, through 
e.g. clientele, pressure groups, professional association, legislatures or 
58WPQ (June 1965) p 364. The boundaries of the State System are the 
minister and those elements over which he exercises nominal or statutory 
control, differing from the American 'executive' equivalent.. 
59 .For an example of the concept of 'overlays' see J.M.Pfiffner and 
F.P.Sherwood, Administrative organisation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1960) Chapter 2. 
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other units. At the same time there are other indirect stimuli operating 
through the subsystem, e.g. personnel matters, the social system values. 
All these interactions and processes in some way affect the operations of 
the unit and it is assumed that they can be identified and their influences 
demarcated. In this way the subsystem form and boundaries begin to emerge 
from the mass of formal and informal interrelationships which are the total 
system activities. It is only when these subsystems are identified that 
analysis of the system proper may become possible. The potentially innumerable 
and intermeshing complex relationships which must necessarily occur in any 
such system need not deter the analyst, since it is reasonable to assume that 
certain variables are of greater importance than others. 
As previously stated, Simmons uses the term 'variable' to mean any 
aspect of the processes of interaction which may have varying effects on the 
organisational unit; added to which certain of them seem crucial to the way in 
which a unit may operate. Simmons identifies the following: 
1. Executive leadership; 
2. fiscal and budgeting relations; 
3. programme activity; 
4. federal, legislative and clientele relations; 
5. traditional historical patterns; 
6. the social system; and 
7. personnel patterns. 
Each of these variables exerts a different stimulus to activity within the 
unit and may be then regarded as a 'force'. Such forces can be shown to 
support or diminish, increase or detract from the accountability and control 
of the minister. Simmons uses the terms centrifugal and centripetal to 
delineate these forces which may discourage or encourage more integrated 
relationships with the Governor. As has been previously argued, the use of 
such terms for the ministerial position would be inappropriate, the most useful 
adaptation is to concentrate on those forces described as centrifugal, i.e. 
those which seem to impair gubernatorial leadership. For any minister the most 
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vital element of his role is political leadership. 60  Any activity which 
inhibits his political flexibility reduces his leadership capacity. It is 
suggested that this is clearly shown when a minister is listened to because he 
has the authority to make decisions which affect organisational behaviour. 61 
However, the load on a minister renders it impossible for him to "adequately 
scan, let alone control more than a small portion of the policies for which 
he is accountable." It therefore becomes 
...government by exception. Most activities continue 
without ministerial scrutiny and ministers select for 
attention those which make special demands on resources 
or have a sharp political impact or politically strong 
ideological appeal .1/62 
If the minister is to fulfil his responsibilities in terms of 
parliamentary accountability he must not only maintain political leadership 
but also executive authority. Any force, such as administrative capacity, 
which detracts from that leadership or authority is analytically vital. 
Nonetheless, it appears that certain forces may be more significant then 
others, in the sense that they appear more frequently, may be institutionalised, 
or become strong precedents for future action. Such forces do not depend 
for their existence on the individual personality of the actor who happens to 
be in the role of minister at any one time (although there may be weak and 
strong leaders amongst ministers as there are amongst any group of individuals). 
The analysis has to be directed at those forces which have been identified 
as having a persistent or cumulative effect on the subsystem, no matter who 
the ministerial incumbent happens to be. 
60For a discussion of the concept of political leadership see L. Dion, 
"The Concepts of Political Leadership: An Analysis", Canadian Journal of  
. Political Science 1 (1)(March 1968) pp 2-17, in which he makes the point that 
it is important to see leadership as a pattern, as part of an interaction 
process, as does G.D.Paide (ed.), Political Leadership, loc. 'Cit. For a 
discussion. of these roles of politicians as perceived by themselves see 
B. Headey, British Cabinet Ministers, loc. cit. The entire subject is 
discussed in Chapter I and further in Chapter VI. 
61 Kogan, The Politics of Education, 22: cit., p33, 
62 loc. cit., p 48. Further support for this statement may be obtained 
from B. Castle, "Mandarin Power"extract from Sunday Times (June 10, 1973), 
mentioned in B. Headey,'British Cabinet Ministers,  22: cit., p 33. 
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Simmons has covered much of the groundwork from which such analysis can 
proceed; the forces he has identified, he suggests, were found in every 
subsystem studied and in each case "had a determinative effect upon the 
agency's role, function and &stance from gubernatorial control." 63 Set 
out below is an adaptation of Table 2 64  which generalises the forces and 
their effects in terms of the Westminster model. It will be seen that in 
the original seven forces were mentioned: two of these have been omitted 
since there is no equivalent situation in the Tasmanian parliamentary system. 
These are: 
"(4) The existence of statutory exceptions from the 
governor's quarterly budget review and his 
overall budgetary controls; 
(5) The 'existence of informally acknowledged and 
practiced exceptions from the governor's 
budgetary control, biennial and quarterly 
reviews (in the absence of statutory exceptions):" 65 
Crucial centrifugal forces involved in the processes of subsystem activity: 
Centrifugal Force  
(a) Strong affiliations with circum-
jacent groups; clientele, co-
optive activity, parliamentary 
oversight of actions, lack of 
participation by minister - 
(b) The extent to which the legis-
lature has created substantive 
laws providing formal executive 
separation, e.g. appointment of 
personnel outside the Public 
Service Act; budgeting proce-
dures; formal statements about 
the mission of the unit; formalised 
precedents which assist permanent 
head to assert independence 
without ministerial support. 
63WPQ 
 
Potential Effect 
a tendency for the department to 
rely for support on the circum-
jacent affiliation rather than 
ministerial support for action, 
thus increasing administrative 
capacity at the expense of poli-
tical leadership 
provides a restraint on a 
minister attempting to increase 
his influence against that of the 
department; also provides right 
climate for permanent head or 
departmental officers to promote 
autonomy. Thus impeding the 
executive authority of the minister. 
(June 1965),p 373. 
64 Contained in Simmons, WPQ (June 1965), p 374. Certain forces such as 
legislative relations would have a more . spetialisedpeaning in the American 
.context where there is a separation of legislative l&ecutive. The greater 
dependence on individual representative support and the committee system 
would make these relations significantly different forces for a governor. 
This force has been.adapted to the more integrated Westminster system 
see (b) Table 2. 
65 • WPQ . (June 1965), p 373. 
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Centrifugal Force (contd.) 
(c) The existence in the department 
of a core of professiotal - staff, 
which may include the permanent 
head, and the extent of control 
over such staff by the minister - 
(d) Financial arrangements for 
funding departmental policies; 
e.g. dedicated funding, freedom 
from close Treasury control, the 
ability of the department to make 
long term plans without fear of 
change, the extent to which there 
is dependence on Federal funds - 
• Potential Effect (contd.) 
creation of relations of a 
supportive nature between head 
and staff where there is conflict 
with the minister; makes for greater 
executive independence and higher 
external status, reducing the 
minister's capacity to exercise 
political leadership. 
dependence on annual appropria-
tions without a tradition of 
support from parliament places 
the minister in a strong position 
to exercise political leadership; 
where funding is derived from 
internal sources or from Federal 
sources there is less likely to be 
dependence on the minister for 
support and greater independence 
as survival is more guaranteed, 
increasing administrative capacity. 
(e) A tradition within the department 	this would strengthen external ties 
of autonomy, derived from past and sustain independence even 
accepted behaviour; the creation 	against strong leadership of a 
of an 'aristocratic agency' - minister; it would produce the 
most conflictive situatio7. as 
between the political leadership 
and the executive authority of the 
minister and the administrative 
capacity of the Department. 
It is not claimed that this list is exhaustive of the possibilities, but 
these do seem to have been dominant in Simmons' analysis and for that reason 
are used here. They may be summarised as: circumjacent groups, legislative 
provisions, professional staffing, finance, and departmental traditions. 
These are the components of the analytical framework within which the 
examination of selected departments in the Tasmanian State Executive will 
take place. The following Chapters will take each department: Housing, 
Education and Health, and analyse them through use of the five forces' and 
endeavour to establish the relationships between their elements, noting the 
interaction, the interdependence and identifying those variables which 
dominate the particular system in terms of their effect on the political 
leadership and executive - authority of the minister. 
III 
THE HOUSING DEPARTMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Before undertaking a more detailed analysis of the forces and 
interrelationships discussed in the last chapter, it is necessary to provide 
some introductory background: 
The Department was formed as a result of the separation of the 
Housing Division of the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania into a department 
of the Public Service, in 1953. 1 The Agricultural Bank had to this date 
been the operating authority for the Homes Act 1919 as amended. Under 
the original Act the purposes were 'to provide for homes and advances for 
Homes for Persons of Limited Means'. 2 Such persons were defined as 
'eligible persons' in the Act: 
"...a person who satisfies the Trustees - 
1. That his income at the time of his application for 
an advance under this Act does not exceed Three 
hundred pounds a year; ... 
2. That he is 
(a)married; or 
(b)has dependents for whom it is necessary 
for him to maintain a home." 3 
The main provisions of the Act indicated that it was the intention 
of the Government to encourage home ownership by means of advances to 
such persons rather than to provide housing at low rental. 
1Homes Act 1935, s. 6B, as amended by Homes Act 1953. 
2preamble to Homes Act 1919. 
3Homes Act 1919, s. 2. 
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The amended Homes Act 1973, under which the Department operates, 
has hardly reflected the changing emphasis of its functions .. - There are 
significant- differences from 1919, when the first- Act was passed, but 
the brad outline of the authority has been fairly constant despite 
amendments from time to time. 4  
The newly appointed Director of Housing in his first Report described 
the functions of the new Department as: 
"....administering (a) that portion of the Homes Act 
which relates to the acquisition and development of 
land for housing purposes and the erection of houses 
for rental and ultimate sale;.. .Those portions of the 
Homes Act which relate to the making of advances to 
individual home builders and the provision of finance 
to purchase homes erected by the Housing Department  
are administered by the Agricultural Bank." 5 
However, even at this time other factors were at work which stimulated 
a changed role for the Department. Prior to 1946 the extent of its 
operations had been relatively slight, with the provision of houses for 
home owners its main concern, as indicated by the extract from the 
Director's Report for the year ended 30 June 1945: 
41t has been subject to amendments but mainly of a minor nature. 
- The Homes Act 1935-53 has been amended in the years 1954, 1955, 1956, 
1958, 1959, 1961, 1965 and 1966 and was under review for major changes. 
This review culminated in the Homes Act No. 1 of 1973, which also 
incorporated the new Commonwealth State Housing Agreement. (See also 
later footnote 22). Of the 47 sections of the Act, some 12 may be regarded 
as mechanical, i.e. concerned with administrative matters; six as defining 
Treasury requirements; 10 are concerned with the Director's dealing with 
land, erection of dwellings and powers to lease and sell; the remaining 
19 are related to advances, conditions of sale and remedies for the 
recovery of instalments. 
5Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 75 of 1954, Report for the 
year ended 30 June 1954. The phrases underlined by the author indicate 
the prevalent perceptions of the Department's future at that time. 
(Footnotes 6, 7, 8, 9 omitted) 
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"The following is a summary of activities under the various 
statutes since 1934 - 
Homes Act - individual homes 	 365 
Group homes (occupied on rent purchase terms) 156 
Old Age persons homes (for rental) 	6 
Homes for casual workers (for rent purpo:.;es) 	12 
Homes for Burnie Paper Mill employees 
(occupied on rent purchase terms) 	22 
Housing improvement loans 	81 
Commonwealth - State Housing Agreement 
(complete or under construction) 	331*
10 973- 
(*This item relates wholly to houses built under the Agreement signed 
earlier that year by which the Commonwealth funded house building for 
rental and sale purposes. It represents, as can be seen, one third of 
all houses built by the Department in 10 years and demonstrates the 
sudden pressures placed upon the then Agricultural Bank.) 
At this time the Commonwealth entered the housing field with a 
massive stimulus in the provisions of the Commonwealth State Housing 
Agreement. Such interest was partly due to demand factors, but also 
because of the Chifley Labour Government policies and the State response, 
especially through the Cosgrove Labour Ministry. As an indication of the 
changing patterns of thought which were to alter the State's approach, the 
principles on which a State could participate in the scheme of Commonwealth 
assistance are worth noting: 
"(1) The Commonwealth will lend money for approved housing 
schemes to State Housing Authorities at Commonwealth 
long term bond rates. 
(2) Housing Authorities will build homes and administer 
schemes as principals. 
.(3)- Homes erected under the schemes to be let at economic 
rental or one fifth of the family income, whichever 
is the less. 
(4) The Commonwealth will contribute three fifths of any 
loss under the scheme. 
(5) As a condition to obtain assistance from the Commonwealth 
the States 
10Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 29 of 1945 
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(a) should have adequate machinery to deal with: 
1. Erection and administration of homes for rental; 
2. Assistance for home purchasers; 
3. Slum clearance; 
4. -Town planning; 
(b) should agree with the Commonwealth upon common minimum 
standards for accommodation, construction, etc.; 
(c) that allotment of homes should be on the basis of 
need." 11 
The immediate reaction within the State was to reorganise the Agricultural 
Bank as from 1 March 1946; three divisions were created - Land Settlement, 
Rural Credit and Housing. 12 At the same time moves were afoot to provide 
•a political head for the Housing Division, leaving the rest of the Bank 
under the portfolio of Agriculture. On 10 December 1946, by a Proclamation 
under Ministers of the Crown Act 1923, the Governor 
...committed to the Honourable Eric Elliott Reece 
Minister, the duties of the office of Minister for 
including the Administration of the following Acts 
The Homes Act 1935; Commonwealth and State Housing 
Act 1 .946;..." 13 
, Honorary 
Housing, 
:- 
Agreement 
This appointment did not, however, remove the Housing Division, now with 
its own Minister, from the Agricultural Bank Department. Nor did the 
Housing Division have its own Divisional Head until the position of Director 
was created in 1949. 14 
A further development in 1947 was the appointment of a Joint Committee 
"Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 29 of 1945, Report of the 
Board of Management of the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania for the year 
ended 30 June 1945. Some further details of the Commonwealth-State 
Housing Agreement can be found in M.A.Jones, Housing and Poverty in  
Australia, (Melbourne: University Press, 1972), esp. pp 3-7; and 
Department of National Development, The Housing Situation (Canberra A.C.T.: 
Commonwealth of Australia, December 1956). 
12Plan of Organisation of the Agricultural Bank Department, 
Tasmanian Government Gazette 1946, Vol. CLXXXVII (1), Government Printer 
Hobart, 1947, p 378 
13Tasmanian Government Gazette 1946, Vol. CLXXXVII (2), Government 
Printer Hobart, 1947, p 2896. It is interesting to record this first 
portfolio of the recently retired Premier, The Hon. Eric Reece. 
14Agricultural Bank (Administration) Act 1949. 
of the Houses of Parliament to "inquire into and report upon all aspects 
of home-building, both State and private... "u . This Committee, after 
reviewing the evidence noted the contribution of the Agricultural Bank 
Housing Division 
"...(it) has made a valuable contribution to the problem of 
housing the people, especially on those in low income groups. 16 
In spite of hampering effects of the Public Service Act, the 
Bank has succeeded in building up a Housing Division, carrying 
on building under both private and day labour schemes."17 
The results of its investigations suggested other alternatives: 
" Your Committee considers that the nature of the existing 
administration of the State Housing Authority is not ideally 
suited to the task allotted •to it." 18 
The Report then goes on to suggest a State Housing Commission with a 
Commissioner and two Associate Commissioners assisted by four technical 
advisers. The officers of the Housing Division would transfer where 
appropriate. 
"...slich administration would not mean upsetting the present work 
of the Agricultural Bank or any of its Departments, but would 
enable the Bank to apply most of its attention to tasks more 
appropriate to its organisation and normal functions. 19 
Moreover, it should be provided that the hampering effects of 
being subject to the Public Service Act be absent from the 
suggested Commission." 20 
These recommendations were never acted upon and no further attempts have 
been made to form a Commission. It is possible that these suggestions 
15Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 18 of 1947; Joint Committee 
appointed 13 March 1947 
16Joint Committee, para. 68 
17Joint Committee, para. 69 
18 Joint Committee, para. 85 
19Joint Committee, para. 95 
2()Joint Committee, para. 96 
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were present in the minds of those responsible for the subsequent changes 
under the 1953 Act. 
As previously noted, the Homes Act, 1973, 	remains the charter 
of the Housing Department, provfl.ding a fairly specific and technical 
function on the one hand - that of building houses and planning sub-
divisions - and an administrative function Of estate management on the 
other. In order to accomplish these functions certain expertise was found 
to be necessary and required a relaxation from the controls exercised 
(a) by the Public Service Commissioner, under the Public Service Act in 
relation to staffing and (b) -by the Treasury in relation to costing, 
budgeting and accounting. The amendments to the Act passed in 1953 were 
to a degree successful in this intention. The role of the Director was 
strengthened by statutory powers which are significantly different to 
those of other Permanent Heads. Wettenhall suggests that this was done 
in order to "minimise political intervention in housing allocations, etc., 
and to maximise the possibilities of commercial management." 21 These 
powers are contained in many sections throughout the Act, but some more 
important examples are: 
s. 6A 
s. 6B 
(1) Governor to appoint Director of Housing 
(2) Directors shall not be subject to Bublic Service 
Act 1925 
(3) Terms and conditions of Director's appointment 
determined by Governor 
(4) Director to retire at 65 years 
(5) For the purpose of acquiring, holding, disposing of 
and otherwise dealing with land, the Director shall 
be a corporation sole, by name, Director of Housing, 
and that name shall have perpetual succession and 
a seal of office. 
(5) The Director may, with the approval of the Minister, 
engage and dismiss casual employees for work, other 
than clerical work, in the Department. 
(6) For the purposes of the Public Service Act the 
Director shall have the same powers as if an officer 
under that Act. 
21Wettenhall, Guide, p 247. 
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s.7A-D 	Directors borrowing powers. 
s.11 	The Director May acquire land under the Public Authorities 
Land Acquisitions Act (providing for compulsory purchase) 
s.17 	Director has power to let or to sell without deposit, on 
such terms zAs he shall think fit. 
s.27A 	Director may refuse to enter into a contract for sale of 
land with an eligible person and his decision shall be 
final. 
s.43 	Director may sell land not required by the Department 
s.43A 	Director may, with approval of Minister, sell or hire 
plant on such terms and conditions as he thinks fit. 
s.46 (2) Director shall cause to be prepared in respect of his 
operations.under the Act during the financial year, 
a profit and loss account and a balance sheet. 
In sum, they allow greater operational flexibility in the day to day work 
of the Department and in control of building staff and costs. At the 
same time, since the Director is constituted "a corporation sole for the 
purpose of holding,.. .,land" and the Department operates as a trading 
enterprise with its own funds, there are potentially strong forces operating 
to reduce ministerial control and responsibility. 22 
Despite these provisions in the statute which lead to this conclusion, 
and which persuaded Wettenhall to place this Department in the classification 
of'departmental' corporation' rather than ministerial department, 23 there 
has been a Minister for Housing since 1946. It is true that over these 
26 years the portfolio itself has been subject to much juggling between 
Ministers and has only been held as a single portfolio, i.e. not in con-
junction with one or more additional portfolios, for a non-consecutive 
period of ten years: 
22These forces have been increased by the passing of the Homes 
Act 1973, which substantially increases the functions and powers of the 
Director 
"The Minister made it clear that it is no longer sufficient 
to have a state housing authority whose major task is merely 
to erect standard houses on standard blocks of land.., it is 
necessary...to concern itself with a much brOader outlook..- 
Accordingly the Homes Act No. 1 of 1973 greatly . expands the 
- Director's powers in relation to land development and land 
utilisation.,." Director's Report for year ended 30 June 1973 
P.P. No 93 of.1973. 
23Cuide. n 248.. 
88 
December 1946 
November 1947 
December 1947 
TABLE I 
*This period was 
) the shortlived 
Brooker Ministry. 
- November 1947 
- December 1947 
- February 1948 
Housing only 
Housing and Mines) 
Housing only 
February 1948 - August 1958 Housing only ) *This was the 
) second Cosgrove 
) Minis try 
August 1958 May 1959 Housing only ) *This was the first May 1959 September 1961 Housing, Police ) Reece Ministry 
September 1961- May 1969 
May 1969 
April 1972 
April 1974 
- April 1972 
- April 1974 
- April 1975 
Housing, Indust-
rial Development 
and Sea Fisher-
ies 
Housing only 
Housing Chief 
Secretary 
) *The Bethune 
) Ministry 
) *The second 
) Reece Ministry 
24 
The longest period of continuous primary responsibility was during 
1949-1956, when one man was Minister for Housing. Whether there is any 
significant correlation between the latter and the fact that this period, 
especially 1952-1954, saw the most fundamental changes in the Department, 
is difficult to say with certainty. 
The number of houses constructed during this period may also have 
some bearing on this question. In his Report for the Year ended 30 June 
195425 the following figures were given by the Minister: 
"Houses completed since 1944 (includes all 
kinds of houses under all Acts) 
and Licensing 
Housing and 
Forests 
1944-46 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
1949-50 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
285 
81 
212 
201 
312) 
620) 
752) Period of Mr. Ward's incumbency 
566) 
476) 
24 '- Sources: Walch's Tasmanian Almanac Ole Red Book); 
Tasmanian Year Book 
25Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 75 of 1954, Appendix III. 
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In the Report for the year ended 30 June 1969 to the Minister, the 
Director made the following statement: 
"The Housing Department plays an important part 
• in the economy of this State, and in fact is a 
necessary part of the machinery of government. 
Its importance cannot be underestimated - 
It provides 20% of all new accommodation erected in 
Tasmania each year;* 
It houses over 1,300 families each year; 
It has constructed 11,464 homes in all parts of the 
State since 1944; 
It employs over 200 technical and administrative 
officers, and 357 day labour personnel to carry out 
construction and development programmes, and to manage 
its homes with over 50,000 occupants; 
As the biggest landlord and homebuilder in the State, 
it is an important part of many aspects of the State's 
economy. ”26 
*(This claim bears comparison with the statement made by the Joint 
Committee on Housing in its Report, 1947, p 8, para. 66, in which it 
refers to the evidence that the total number of houses completed by the 
State in the three years since 1944 make up 17% of all houses in the 
State. Obviously, there are many possible interpretations of this fact, 
but one that stands out in view of the way in which it was made in the 
Director's Report is that private home ownership is, and always has been, 
the dominant aim of successive governmeiTts, no matter what their political 
persuasion.) 
The importance of the Department's contribution was stressed by the 
Director in October 1972, when he referred once more to the 20% contribution 
and went on to discuss the Department's potentially new role. 27 Amongst 
his proposals one was dominant - that some 40% of land on Department 
subdivisions would in future be set aside for private sale. The purpose 
of this proposal was two-fold: 
"It will make sure that the sort of land price spiral, 
which has caused fantastic problems in cities such as 
Sydney and Perth, does not occur in Tasmania ... Secondly, 
26 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969, p 3 
27 L.F.Allwinton, Director of Housing, "Fitting into the Broad 
Spectrum". Papers given to Seminar, Housing for People Hobart, Tasmania, 
-25 October 1972. The same viewalso received strong support from the 
Legislative Council in their debate on the Homes Act 1973. In this Act - 
provision was made for allocation of 85% of housing built for people 
with sub standard incomes to comply with the Federal Government conditions 
to the new Housing Agreement Mercury,Debates.5 October 1973, p 29. 
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it will introduce architectural and social variety 
into new Housing Department subdivisions...This is 
seen to be the key to a balanced and happy community..." 28 
Once again, therefore, there appears to be a move to increase the promotion 
of home ownership, although there is no suggestion that it will decrease 
the rate of building for rental. The provision of homes at low rental 
to those who cannot afford to rent or buy in the open market must remain 
at the core of the Department operations. 
There are fluctuations in demand from year to year, but over time 
there is a consistent demand which forces applicants to be placed on a 
waiting list. Currently, the waiting period averages between 18 and 
24 months, depending on the type of accommodation required. Those with 
large families, for instance, must wait longer because the 'normal' type 
of accommodation provided is a two or three bedroom house. As at 30 June 
1971 84.5% of the applicants for rental housing earned $70 or less; of 
these some 18% had $25 or less and 66% had $60 or less. 29 These figures 
appear to indicate an important demand which needs to be met by the Department 
in its role as the largest landlord in the State. Yet, once again, there are 
signs that the duality of its role is recurring. The justification for 
this policy is new, the circumstances are changed, and local criticism of 
the barren and unsympathetic environment of some Housing Department estates 
may play a part in shaping the aims. However, none of this can hide 
the fact that to provide low cost 
28Allwinton,loc. cit. There has now been considerable criticism 
of the integrationist ideas propounded by Mr. Allwinton here, for the 
literature see further J. Frieden and R. Morris (editors), Urban Planning  
and Social Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1968); H. Stretton, Ideas for  
Cities (Adelaide: Orphan Books, 1970); F, Thompson aliLBryson, Australian  
New Town (Melbourne: Penguin, 1971). 
29Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 62 of 1971, Director's Report 
for the year ended 30 June 1971, Appendix G. For a comparative analysis 
of the formal requirements of State Housing Authorities and a 'profile' of 
socio-economic characteristics of public housing occupants see M.A.Jones, 
22.. cit., especially Ch. 3. 
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homes for rental to people on low incomes and to sell land and houses 
as any developer in the private market (even though the sale price of 
the land is held at a non-competitive level and the houses sold over a 
53 year period at an instalmont rate which is equal to a reasonable rent) 
are not similar tasks and must create an ambivalent attitude in the 
Department. Such an attitude must become especially evident in the field 
of estate management, where houses cheek by jowl are occupied by owners 
who, having bought the block of land, had their house privately built; 
owners who are buying a Housing Department house on the long term purchase 
agreement, and those who occupy a Housing Department house on rental. This 
juxtaposition will be reduced by judicious placement of the 'better' 
tenants near the owner occupied houses, and perhaps the creation of separated 
communities of occupants having similar life styles. Such circumstances, 
perhaps, were not envisaged by an Act empowering the Government to provide 
homes for eligible persons. 
Garden competitions, tree planting ceremonies, the encouragement 
of community centres and Department involvement in such public relations 
exercises as the Hobart Trade Fair, may all be seen as part of the same 
purpose. It may be that these policy decisions are an attempt to provide 
realistic alternative accommodation in community terms. Rather than just 
build houses at the lowest cost to meet the needs of a minority and be 
forced continuously to attempt to balance the books, a more 'socially 
responsible approach' is being tried. Whatever the reason behind it, the 
example of the perennial problem of Rent Rebates points to departmental 
difficulties where political leadership is ambivalent. 
Since 1960 it has been the practice of the Department to provide 
rebates of weekly rent to those who are in need and to certain other 
specified classes of tenant - aged pensioners, widows and deserted wives, 
invalid and war pensioners, T.B. pensioners and those on unemployment 
and medical benefits. In the year to 30 June 1972 the total cost of such 
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rebate was $405,087, or approximately 16% of the total rent collected. 
Periodically, the Auditor General draws attention to this Rebate, either 
because it is contrary to s. 16 (2) (which provides for a minimum rent 
based on cost to the Department, i.e. an economic rent) or because more 
has been allowed than permitted in the Estimates. Such a situation 
occurred in 1972 when the Auditor General drew attention to an expenditure 
of "$30,087 more than the funds authorised by the Treasurer to be available 
from both sources."30 He also pointed out that there had been an increase 
in the number of persons receiving rebates, 1452 as at 30 June 1972, compared 
with 1,100 at 30 June 1971. - In commenting on this increase the Director 
stated: 
. "A further indication of the relative severity with which 
economic fluctuations affect Tasmania is the rapidly rising 
number of and cost of cases where it is necessary for this 
Department to grant relief from weekly payments of rental 
or purchase instalments.. .The cost of these subsidies has 
more than doubled in five years and looks like continuing 
tne upward spiral." 31 
In application to the Grants Commission for a Special Grant for 
Tasmania for the year 1970-71, one of the points made was the unprofitable 
nature of the Housing Department. But it was made clear that it was only 
because of the burden of rent rebates which had to be recouped from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund. Thus the uncertainty of the Departmental 
position over its policies and the possible conflict with Treasury must 
be resolved. The Director is hopeful that the rent averaging scheme 
proposed in his Report for 1972 will clarify the situation: 
30Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1972. Auditor General's 
Report to 30 June 1972, p 76. The two sources referred to are the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund and a Commonwealth Rental Assistance Grant 
of $75,000. 
31Tasmania Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, p 3 
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"Should some system of rent averaging eventually be 
introduced it will be necessary to carefully consider 
the provision in the legislation which now requires the 
Director to pay annual operating surpluses to the 
Consolidated Revenae Fund. This provision will haw_ to 
be eliminated if the Department is ever to stand on its 
own feet financially. At the same time it will be 
necessary for the costs of rental subsidies to be kept in 
the right perspective. These are purely a social service 
cost and, as such, should continue to be met by Consolidated 
Revenue Fund, thus avoiding the anomalous situation of being 
paid by the lower income sector of the community which 
occupies departmental accommodation." 32 
The ambivalence of the current policies in the Department are nowhere 
better displayed than in this problem. The rebate system is indeed a 
social service, but it is a 'hidden' cost in the sense that it appears as 
cost of housing. So long as housing includes the provision of land for 
private builiding and homes for purchase this aspect of the Department's 
activities will not be properly assessed. 
Analysis  
With this background material it is now possible to take the factual 
material from Annual Reports and interviews with Ministers and senior 
officers in the Department and relate it all under the headings specified 
32Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, p 4. A discussion 
of the concept of rent averaging is contained in M.A.Jones, 2E. cit., 
pp 156-60, and in a subsequent discussion of rent policy generally places 
the onus of meeting the 'social service cost' on the Commonwealth (p 170). 
Also see, for example, F. Thompson and L. Bryson, loc. cit. For a general 
discussion of the entire topic of the tasks of government housing 
authorities see M.A.Jones, loc. cit.; see also J. Colman, Housing Authorities  
in-Urban Renewal, Australian Institute of Urban Studies, in Association with 
The Planning Research Institute within the University of Sydney, July 1970. 
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within the close of the last chapter. These headings provide the frame-
work to discover in particular circumstances the relationship between 
the minister and his department in terms of political leadership, executive 
authority and administrative capacity. The analysis therf-,fore will be 
limited to interactions and activities indicative of these factors within 
the department. The forces used as criteria by which to evaluate such 
interactions and activity are: circumjacent groups; legislative provisions;. 
professional staff; financial arrangements, and departmental tradition. 
Each of these matters will be treated separately and a final summary given. 
A. 	Circumjacent groups  
The primary groups which have ties with the agency outside its 
formal institutional structure may be listed as its clientele - the 
tenants and purchasers, and other authorities and agencies affected by 
and affecting the development plans of the agency. In some cases these 
ties may be characterised as almost institutionalised since they are 
persistent and ongoing, but the important point is that there remains no 
formal machinery for deliberate and specific intervention by these groups 
in departmental structures. For example, there has existed from time to 
time an Interdepartmental Committee for coordinating estate developments, 
but it is only called together at the instigation of the Housing Department 
without specific membership or defined jurisdiction. 
On the other hand there .are those, which may be called secondary 
groups, who have some institutional relationshipwith the agency. However, 
this formal arrangement is not suchas to provide the right to engage 
actively Within the departmental decision making structure. An example 
is provided by the Commonwealth, which regularly calls together the State 
Housing Ministers for a conference to discuss matters of common interest. 
Such procedure is quite outside any formal arrangement that might exist 
regarding .financial assistance a matter dealt with under heading D later). 
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In this category, therefore, may be found the State Cabinet and sometimes 
a particular member, more especially the Premier, the Commonwealth Government 
and Parliament. 
These groups will now be dealt with seriatim: 
(i) Those who derive benefit from its services - tenants or prospective 
tenants and purchasers of houses are most likely to have a consistent 
and dominant affiliation with the agency. There are conflicting views 
about this as. between officers and Ministers, although it is possible 
the conflict is more imaginary than real. It may be based on a 
different interpretation of what is meant by influence. The Deputy 
Director was very certain that the goals of the department are dictated 
by client demand. But he was viewing goals in an unspecific way, i.e. 
• in terms of the purposes of the Department as a whole - the building of 
houses. Therefore he regarded client demand as an indicator of the 
pace at which the department operated - low demand, less houses built. 
He stated, that external bodies and individuals influence housing 
policy. Need was the primary criterion for the location and quantiti 
of housing. 34 However, he was quite emphatic that in relation to 
quality the department and its technical staff were the final arbiter. 
One Labor Party minister did not accept this rather compliant role for 
the department, which apparently his Liberal predecessor had adopted. 
He thought that in his predecessor's time there had been too many 
advisory and other subcommittees, rather than keeping the decisions 
under direct control. He saw.his task as coordinating and initiating; 
taking over control of priorities and economies. Although he acknowledged 
the client orientation within the department, he did not feel that the 
34 Interestingly 'enough, there is not, nor ever has been, any active 
tenants' association. Even for individual estates such bodies have had a 
very short life. One of the officers in the department deplored this 
situation; he indicated that even the officers in the department had failed 
to stimulate growth of such associations.... 
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function was merely to react to demand. On the question of evictions 
he appeared to take a strong line, refusing to tole -rate large accumu-
lated arrears where the tenant concerned was not under any disability. 
Evictions increased rapidly within a short time after his taking office, 
but he claimed no hardship accrued because those who were really in 
need, e.g. welfare recipients, were excepted. 
Relationship with the tenants may be termed 'paternal', in the 
sense that is reflected in this extract from the Director's Annual 
Report: 
"The problem of developing a sense of community in 
large housing estates, where people of differing 
backgrounds, environment and living standards are 
brought together in a comparatively short space of 
time, is one which is difficult to solve. Frictions 
occur and families are frequently involved with sickness, 
unemployment and bereavements. Unless sympathetic and, 
occasionally, firm action is taken by authority, social 
problems occur which can reflect on the community as a 
whole. "35 
The Director stated that tenant relations with the department were a matter 
for the Welfare Officers and Reserves Officers in the Estates Branch, the 
Minister or the Chief Officers rarely became involved. The Liberal Minister 
supported this view; he indicated he never had any real contact with the 
tenants during his term of office. Any complaints were dealt with at counter 
level or at the next higher level, although a senior officer indicated that 
there may be some feedback from this level by referring to 'informal contacts' 
with tenants. The dominance of this attitude within the department may 
be gauged from the following extracts: 
"During the year more than 3,000 visits were made 
by Welfare Officers. These included the usual calls 
made shortly after the tenants or purchasers have 
moved in; investigations following complaints; calls 
in connection with applications for rental rebates; 
and the'usual f011ow up of problem cases. Welfare 
Officers also insisted on a general survey of certain 
'sub-divisions. While on the whole the condition of 
the properties was of reasonable standard it was found 
-35Tasmania Parliamentary Paper No. 67 of 1968 
97 
necessary to conduct an intensive campaign in 
some cases to compel occupiers to clean up their 
dwelling and grounds."36 
"With 12,336 houses now under the control of the 
Department, the increased number of deserted wives 
and widows with families, and elderly people being 
assisted, together with the low income and unemployed 
families, the work of the Welfare Officers is becoming 
increasingly important ."37 
It was not possible to find evidence in Director's Annual Reports 
of any mention of a strong and viable tenants association, or a group 
formed from tenants of a particular estate. Nor was there any mention 
of their existence in interviews. However, it does appear that some 
exist, although how active they are is difficult to say. For example, 
in answer to a question in the House of Assembly about recreation 
areas reserved in Housing Department subdivisions Mr.D.Clark, then 
Minister, replied that one such area had been developed by a progress 
association. 38 
(ii) The work of the agency impinges on the activities of numerous groups 
external to it. Such bodies as the local authorities, in whose areas 
estates are built, have to be consulted and brought into the planning 
process. (However, the Housing Department does not have to obtain 
planning approval under the Town and Country Planning regulations.) 
Similarly, in planning for an estate of several hundred houses, services 
not under the control of the department have to be alerted and coordi-
nated. Such services would include electricity, roadworks, transport 
facilities, telephones, water, education and so on. 
The location of large estates to meet housing demand may involve 
the development of industries in areas where little employment is 
available to meet the needs of an increased work force. In these 
situations liaison with interested enterprises takes place, quite often 
36Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 42 of 1964 
37 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972 
38Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, Vol. 182, 
Part I, 1970, p 106. 
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through the Department of Industrial Development. Sometimes the 
decision to develop industrial potential is dependent on the Housing 
Department's ability to provide cheap accommodation for the potential 
work force. This has boen particularly evident in Tnsmania, where 
such development has often been related to natural resources found 
well outside existing settlement areas. Examples of this occur in 
George Town for the aluminium smelters of Comalco; in Savage River 
for iron ore mining; and in Triabunna for the woodchip plant and the 
fishmeal plant. 
There are also forces at work from associations, - employers and unions of 
employees. The latter are the more important, due to the agency 
being the largest employer of skilled building tradesmen in the State. 
The existence of a 'day labour force' will be dealt with in more detail 
under heading E, but it must be noted here as causing the unions 
concerned to have considerable interaction with the department. The 
Director indicated; that the unions do not like the use of private 
contractors by the Department. It has been the practice over the years 
for a proportion of house building to be let on tender to private 
contractors, although the bulk has always been constructed by the day 
labour force. The Master Builders Association has favoured this action, 
since it permits their members to maintain an even flow of work throughout 
the year, especially in areas where the demand for building is limited. 
As may be expected, the ministers differed over their attitudes 
to this situation. The Liberal Party promised in their election 
statements to maintain the day labour force and did so. However, there 
was some personal preference expressed in Cabinet for allowing a 
greater proportion to go to tender with private enterprise. This 
situation does not seem to have occurred, although the Labor Minister 
indicated that, when he came to office, he lifted restrictions on the 
replacement of those day labour force men who left. His view was, that 
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the day labour force provided a very important source of employment 
within the State, and that conditions of pay and employment in private 
firms could be strongly influenced by pay and conditions of the State-
employed tradesmen. There was ajso the apprenticeship system which was 
implemented properly in the departmental work force, providing an example 
to private industry which had lagged behind. 9 
The local government councils seem to be the other important group 
with whom the department has some interaction. Most of the deputations seen 
by ministers were connected in some way with municipalities. They either 
wanted the department to build an estate in their municipality to generate 
financial resources and development or had some problem about an existing 
development. Deputations from the municipalities of Kingborough, Green Ponds 
and Brighton were given as examples whose main problem areas were the 
provision of sewer and drainage facilities for housing estates. Under the 
Commonwealth State Housing Agreement. (which terminated on 30 June 1971) no 
funds were received from the Commonwealth to provide initial services, and 
the Department had to rely on councils to provide some of these facilities 
out of their own funds. This often caused embarrassment to them and led from 
time to time to serious disagreements between councils and the department. 40 
Despite these setbacks, or perhaps because of them, the Department 
does make an effort to maintain liaison with such bodies as: Hydro Electric 
Commission; Education Department; Transport Commission, Metropolitan 
Transport Trust; the Metropolitan Water Board and the 
39 In most of the Director's Annual Reports the following sentence 
appears as an introduction to the section on Apprenticeship:"The Department 
accepts a responsibility to encourage and train apprentices in the building 
and associated trades to ensure the provision of trained craftsmen in the 
future." Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969, p 11 
40 See for.example_the reports on Springfield Estate and the Glenorchy 
Council. - Mercury Debates 1967 p 35, where-the Glenorchy Council were criticised 
for repudiating aa , agreement on subdivisional costs between the Municipal 
Association and Housing Department and thereby losing $30,000 in rates 
annually: 
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P.M.G. Department, 41 
However, there is little evidence that these bodies have. ever 
initiated moves which have influenced the agency to any great degree: 
Any discussions are largely ad hoc for a specific estate development. 
During the Liberal government's period in office, 1969-1972, there 
existed a Housing Advisory Committee, whose aim was to avoid some of 
the earlier difficulties about siting and housing costs. The Director, 
however, felt that the departmental officers would be well aware of 
most of the matters brought up by such a body. Generally such a 
committee does nothing more than emphasise areas of importance, areas 
about which the department itself is already preparing plan's. 
(iii) Cabinet at the State level does have undoubted influence on the 
activities of the agency. as it does on all government departments. 
However, it is quite clear that in this area there is no formal re-
quirement about submission of mattes to Cabinet. The next section 
on legislative provisions shows that the department does have juris-
dictional certainty through comparatively clear legislative authority 
Most matters are under the Minister's control, even where 'specific 
authority to act has been given to the Director. 42 Certainly, different 
Ministers see their task as including private as well as public housing. 
This does not yet mean that they endeavour to impose regulations on 
the private building sector. It is largely done through direct action 
within the terms of the existing authority, for example, selling land 
on estates at discounted prices; leading the way in housing estate 
planning and management; housing standards; and in employing apprentices 
with its day labour force or demanding, that those private contractors 
who wish to build departmental housing employ the appropriate number of 
-41Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969 
42Homes Act 1935, s. 4 (a) 
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apprentices. There has been no point of conflict with Cabinet as 
yet on such policies, especially since it is unlikely that direct 
Cabinet Sanction has been required by any of these moves. However, 
two examples of conflict ale known. One, given by Mr.L.F.Allwinton, 
Director of Housing, occurred prior to the last election, when a 
Liberal Government was in office. The Director, in pursuance of an 
already declared policy, was selling land "on such terms and conditions 
as he thought fit". 43  The Cabinet decided against selling on the 
terms he had agreed and he was required to comply despite his protests. 
In this case his minister did not support him in Cabinet. As mentioned 
above, the current minister has reversed this trend and is pursuing 
an active policy of land sales at discounted prices. The most obvious 
inference to draw from this example is that the influence of Cabinet 
very largely depends on the minister's approach. 
The second example is rather difforent since it occurred in a. 
Parliamentary debate, but it does show the pressures that operate 
on departmental policies. The Minister was guiding the Substandard 
Housing Control Bill through the House of Assembly, and he was asked 
by the Opposition why there was no mention of its application to 
Government housing. The Minister replied immediately that, of course,. 
it did apply to government housing. The Premier speaking to the Bill 
later denied that it applied to government housing such as that provided 
by the Housing Department and for government employees such as teachers 
and members of the police force. Despite subsequent attempts to . 
extricate himself from this impossible position, the Minister had to suffer 
the ignominy of 4 non-confidence motion in the Lower House, and the 
Bill still contains no reference to its application to government 
43These words are taken from the statute, Homes Act 1935, s. 43 
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housing. 44 
The other Cabinet influence most frequently referred to was that 
of Ministers of other departments, endeavouring to change the allocation 
of priorities of development to meet their own departmental requirements. 
This has already been mentioned in relation to industrial developments. 
(iv) The dominance of the Australian Government over all financial . 
aspects of State agencies which provide services with a capital 
dependence is well known. (Further discussion of this aspect occurs in 
heading D subsequently.) However, there are also a number of other 
non financial activities that take place on that level of government. 
In particular the State Housing Ministers Conference,at which matters 
of common interest and concern are discussed, is an important source of 
stimulus. Ministers and senior public servants sit round the table as 
equals discussing the agenda, providing an important forum of inter-
change in which personalities will'play a part. The relationship 
between the minister and his chief officer Could well be affected in 
such a forum. The results of these meetings are not to change policy 
direction in the agency. Rather, they act sometimes as a stimulus for 
an exchange of ideas on common problems. The Director could recall 
no major policy changes required because of the Minister's attendance 
at such conferences. 
(v) Finally, as in any system of parliamentary government, the members of 
Parliament will have some interaction with the agency usually in 4 less 
structured way. Question'time is an important and persistent method of 
attempting to influence the policies of an agency. For a variety of 
reasons, including the lack of a Hansard, and the inability to ask 
44For details see The Mercury Debates, 15 November 1973, p 30, which 
reported a censure motion moved by the opposition against Mr. Lowe for his 
misleading Parliament. It was defeated 18-12 on a party vote. 
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questions without notice, 45 this means of inquiry into the day to day 
responsibilities of ministers is not very adequate for the ordinary 
member. Generally, his main approach is to the Minister by deputation 
or interview. 
Ministers usually spend a high proportion of their time, estimated 
to be about 30%, in meetings with deputations and on committees. These 
committees are not usually derived from parliament, as there are no 
specific select or joint committees whose task it is to keep abreast of 
affairs in the field of housing administration. The committees referred 
to are those ad hoc advisory or non-executive committees created with or 
on the initiative of the Department, which are largely information centres 
for its members and provide a useful forum for the Minister to explain his 
policies. Complaints and demands for investigation are mainly dealt with 
by departmental officers who almost invariably attend such meetings with 
the Minister. 
The greatest single source of intervention in departmental affairs 
by parliamentarians appears to be the budget debate. This is especially 
so since the estimates are no longer a single line item. Previously, 
with funds largely coming from Commonwealth sources, no details had to be 
provided for the minor amount spent from State funds, and a single line 
item in the estimates was all that was required. When the Common- 
wealth State Housing Agreement terminated in 1971, Commonwealth funds 
were made available as part of a general grant. A full estimate of 
departmental spending became necessary, and it had to be justified in 
the context of other State expenditure and resource allocation. It was 
45See particularly P. Boyce, 'Tasmania' in J. Rorke (editor), Politics  
at State Level in Australia, Department of Adult Education, University of 
Sydney N.S.W. (N.d.) pp 89/96. For a discussion of question time in the 
Federal Parliament see J. Howard, "Question Time: Myth or Reality", Public  
Administration (Sydney) December 1972, 363-375. See also list of questions 
asked in Sessions I and II. of the 35th Parliament in Appendix IV and note that 
of the average 420 questions only 31 were about Housing, and then mostly 
particular questions. See K.G.Haines, Questions asked in the House of Assembly  
(Tasmania) 1952-1966: An Analysis (Unpublished Diploma of Public Administration 
Dissertation, University of Tasmania, 1968, p 88, especially as to supplementary 
questions. 
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suggested that, because of such requirement, the department could be 
subject to more criticism. The likelihood that some expenditure 
could be trimmed would exert a strong pressure during the preparation. 
of such estimates. 
Another potential source of external pressure is the parliamentary 
officer known as the Auditor General. His task is to scrutinise 
expenditure of a department and any aspects of administration which impinge 
on that expenditure to ensure proper use of departmental resources. 
Even when there was only a single line item this applied and there have 
been occasions on which criticism has been directed against departmental 
procedures. For example, he commented on the practice of the department 
to extend existing contracts to cover further works not included in the 
tender on which the contract was based, 46  which had occurred at 
Mornington Subdivision for water reticulation and Warrane No. 2 
Subdivision for development works. The Auditor General reported that 
the Director "stated considerations affecting the decisions to extend 
existing contracts were the achievement of a maximum level of cash 
expenditure prior to 30/6/68, because in previous periods cash expenditure 
had fallen short of loan allocation and this had contributed towards 
an adverse loan allocation for housing in 1967-68." The Auditor General's 
opinion was that "the department's desire to accelerate its building 
programme and its anxiety to expend all funds by the end of the financial. 
year are Still not satisfactory excuses for not inviting competitive 
tenders in such instances." 47  Such trenchant public criticisms must 
46Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 31 of 1968. Auditor General's Report 
to 30 June 1967, p 165, where he pointed to the extension of a contract for 
water reticulation at Mornington Subdivision and development works at Warrane 
No. 2 Sub Division. 
47 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 31 of 1968, p 165; other examples 
occur at p 163 in the same Report or Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 
1972, p 76 
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make the agency more than wary of overstepping its authority. The 
Departmental Officers did not think this too onerous, however; since 
- there were within the department two full-time audit clerks and 
an auditor from the Aulitor-General's office together with the 
department's own internal audit team. These officers were 
considered to provide good coordination and made most unlikely 
any activity which would cause a repetition of the above criticisms. 
The department had always been subject to the same kind of scrutiny 
as others, which would not be altered, even if the changes in 
funding would be made more severe. 
(vi) 
	Apart from the above relations with circumjacent bodies either 
external to or internal within the State System, one group was 
particularly mentioned. This is a group of committees centred 
on the Public Service Commissioner's Office (now Board), dealing 
with the administrative side of the agency. The Commissioner's 
office is not only the service agency for staffing on the Public 
Service side, as mentioned more particularly under Professional 
Staff - heading C later, but also for equipment and office accommo-
dation. Four Committees have been set up by the Board to fulfil 
these tasks, the Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids; Photo- 
. graphic Equipment Committee; the Public Offices Committee, and the 
Public Offices Sub-Committee. The. composition and function of 
these committees is set out below: 
TABLE 2 
Publit - Offices'Committee 
"Composition: The Chairman, Public Service Board (Chairman) 
Director of Lands 
Director of Public Works 
Under Treasurer 
Function:. 	to carry out investigations and advise the Treasurer on 
(a) 	The purchase of properties required for office accommodation 
and the sale of property Surplus to requirements. 
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(b) Erection of new office buildings. 
(c) Leasing of premises. 
(d) Modification, partitioning etc. of Government owned 
and leased premises. 
(e) Standards for furnishing and refurnishing of Departments 
or sections of Departments. 
(f) Accommodation needs of the Service and to initiate services 
etc. and to advise the Government on additional needs. 
(g) Allocation of funds to Departments for office accommodation 
purposes. 
Public Offices Sub-Committee 
Composition: Chief Inspector, Public Service Board (Chairman) 
Valuer-General, Lands Department 
Chief Architect, Public Works Department 
Manager, Supply & Tender Department. 
	
:Functions: 	As for the Public Offices Committee but within certain limits. 
Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids  
Composition: A Public Service Inspector 
Manager, A.D.P. Section of the Public Service Board 
An officer of the Supply and Tender Department 
An officer of the Treasury Department 
Functions: 	To examine and recommend applications and proposals 
by Departments for the provision of mechanical aids. 
Photographic Equipment Committee  
Composition: Manager, Department of Film Production 
A Public Service Inspector 
An officer of the Supply and Tender Department 
Functions: 	As for the Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids 
•but in respect of photographic equipment. 
(Source: Personal communication Secretary, Public Offices Committee, 
Public Service Board Hobart, 14 May 1974.) 
Senior officers were especially perturbed about the invasion of these 
committees into the normal control the Director exercises over his department. 
One example cited was the desire to change the departmental accounting and 
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record keeping procedures through the use of data processing 
machines. A proposal had been put forward as early . as 1961, when 
IBM had been consulted about whether the Department should have its 
own machines or transfer to the proposed central dat. bank for all 
government business. A decision Was still awaited despite repeated 
requests. At a lower level of importance was thereplacement of 
typewriters, which had to be approved by the Committee. Similar 
problems had been experienced with the Public Offices Committee, 
which had .taken five years to be persuaded of the wisdom of allowing 
the department to be left at its Lampton Avenue offices and to 
expend money.on their repair and renovation, rather than moved into 
the city to new accommodation. 
Summation  
The existence of circumjacent groups which operate either 
to support or reduce the capacity of the minister to control the 
agency is doubtful on the evidence. One assumption would be that 
strong involvement of, e g. client organisations, would strengthen 
the minister's position. There is little evidence of this happening 
in practice. 
The existing tenant groups voicing their needs, do so through the 
departmental Welfare Officers. Rarely does there seem to be any 
spontaneous initiative from the tenants as a group. Similarly strong 
action by a minister seems to be acceptable to the department without 
any need for external support, either from Parliament- or Cabinet. 
It was noticeable that differing ministerial styles did have some 
effect on the relationship. The use of advisory committees by one 
Minister tended to cause some deferring of decisions, since he 
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preferred to make his moves as a result of this advice ra .Lher than 
make decisions himself. This could be interpreted as being a 
cooperative situation tending to reduce the executive authority of 
the agency and thus increasing the potential for political leadership. 
However, there appears to be some evidence that the Advisory Committees 
generally approached the solution of problems from the same professional
viewpoint as the agency, thus potential conflict did not eventuate. 
The only other influence which strengthened the minister as 
against the agency was the tendency of successive governments to 
reorder 'priorities to suit the needs of industrial development, 
e.g. building at Triabunna for a workforce to meet the needs of 
woodchips and fishmeal plants. Such occurrences are not frequent 
enough nor on a large enough scale to reduce seriously the executive 
authority of the minister against administrative capacity in the 
agency. In most cases the agency can accommodate the demand without 
upsetting their overall planned construction. 
One of the more interesting influences from circumjacent groups 
derives from an internal administrative source, also outside the 
control of the minister. The Committees set up for the purpose of 
rationalising use of resources within the Service may well, in 
the long run, more effectively reduce administrative capacity to act 
than the other external forces. This would happen if the agency 
were unable to obtain sufficient back up services for its field 
operations which are self supporting. The possibility of direct 
ministerial influence on such committees is slight, but since all 
matters would have to be referred through Cabinet, his potential 
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political leadership and executive authority would be increased. 
B. 	Legislative provisions 
Legislation is the authoritative source of any agency's activities - 
it is from statute that the formal substantive purpose is determined. 
One criterion of the extent to which an agency may be found to have 
satisfied this stated purpose is the way -in which the legislature 
becomes involved. For example, dissatisfaction with operations in 
terms of the original goals will often result in changes of a major 
nature to the Act, the department concerned being alerted to the need for 
change through parliamentary debate and questions. Alternatively more 
serious evidence of failure to achieve its formal goals may result in some . 
parliamentary enquiry or select committee. In the case of the Housing 
Department the original statute has been amended seventeen times since 1935. 
Apart from the rewriting of the statute in 1953, when there was a changing 
emphasis from ownership to rental and ownership, there have been no 
occasions on which substantive changes have been made. The majority of 
changes have been of an operational kind, e.g. those made under the 
agricultural Bank (Administration) Act 1949, or Homes Act 1953. (Both 
referred to in the Introduction to this Chapter in more detail.) Others 
reflect changing functional needs as the agency increased its activities, 
particularly after the injection of funds from the Commonwealth in 1946. 
In the Director's Report in 1972, 48 it was indicated that changes 
were about to be sought in thelegislative provisions, but in answer to a 
questicin about this the minister said that it was "merely to update the 
existing statute and allow for some autonomy from irksome external Controls 
of an organisational nature, such as that imposed by having to obtain valua- 
tions through the Valuation Branch." Any suggestion of the need to alter the Act 
48Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, p 4 (see also p 121, 
Footnote 22 supra for reference to the Homes Act 1973). 
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itself radically was rejected by all concerned. 49 
There has been one major inquiry into housing provision in the State50 - 
the Joint Committee of the Houses which reported in 1947. Recommendations 
of this Committee related maialy to administrative matters because the main 
concera which led to its foiration was lack of performance of the Housing 
Division in the Agricultural Bank. Despite funds provided by the 1946 
Commonwealth State Housing Agreement, house building had not reached even the 
prewar level. 51 
The Joint Committee was anxious that Tasmania follow the other States 
by setting up a Housing Commission thus separating the tasks of house building 
for rental purposes and the provision of loan money for purchase. (These 
matters are more specifically dealt with in the Introduction.) This change 
was resisted, although more effort was put into rental accommodation as the 
figures show; from 81 in 1947 to 620 in 1951. (1948: 212; 1949: 201; 1950: 312; 
1951: 620). 52 Eventually the Committee's recommendations led to the creation 
of the Housing Department as a separate agency, removing it from the Agricul-
tural Bank. This change in 1953 merely formalised what had occurred in 
practice over the years since 1946, when a portfolio for Housing was created 
and a Housing Division with its own Director formed within the Agricultural 
Bank. The activities for which the Homes Act proyided were little changed 
by these administrative alterations and the involvement of the legislature 
was minimal. It was mainly done by ministerial fiat without statutory 
approval. 
49This did not prevent the Director from pointing out that, despite 
what appeared to be great autonomy given by the Act, his range of activities 
was extremely limited. These matters are referred to under heading E. 
S°Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 18 of 1947 
51Figure's given in Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper . No. / of 1952 
indicate the situation and the boost resulting from this Committee's con-
sideration s as well, as being a reflection.of the attempt to overcome the 
post war shortage of building materials. Dwelling houses built in Tasmania 
(i.e. not only DepartMental houses) 	-- 
1938: 700;_1939: 700;_1946: 279; 1947:. 1091;- 1248: 1547; 1949:2312 
5 2Tasmania, Parliamentary Papers No 73 of 1950 and No 7 of 1952. 
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The continuity of a riatively simple aim - the provision of housing 
accommodation for those in economic need, whether by way of no deposit 
purchase agreement, or weekly rental - has allowed the agency to pursue 
its goal relatively unmolested. 
Two other factors relevant to this aspect of evaluation, are lack 
of any parliamentary tradition in the State to form Standing Committees to 
investigate specific functional areas and the strong financial support 
obtained from external funds. The parliamentary procedures in Tasmania have 
been severely limited by a number of factors, 53 one of which has been a 
reliance on the open forum of Parliament to exercise control over Departments. 
Only the Legislative Council Public Accounts Committee has existed spasmodically 
and thus the only detailed scrutiny by the legislature has been at the time 
when appropriations are considered. For the Housing Department such scrutiny 
has been relatively rare, with the exception of one area - rent rebates. The 
reason was that little State money from Consolidated Revenue Funds ha: been 
involved in the capital cost of house construction; the only debit has been 
the cost of allowing specific groups of tenants to pay less rent than the 
normal amount. Rent Rebates have been subject of debate with increasing 
frequency in recent years as the amounts involved have increased quite 
considerably. 54 Other debates which involve the legislature are mainly 
concerned with questions of allocation of housing resources as between 
various areas of the State. With by far the largest proportion of demand 
coming from the South of the State, most houses are built around Hobart.. 
This situation provides politicians, especially from the North, with opportunity 
for vociferous support for their constitutents' rights. 
53For detail see W. Townsley, The Government of Tasmania  OD. cit., 
and P. Boyce, 'Tasmania' in J. Rorke (editor), 22.. cit., p 91 
54For example in 1949/50 rebates amounted to 4.!1,456; in 1960/61 . 
- to S-39,035 and in 1971/72 to $405;086.. Further details and sources under 
heading D. 
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. Summation - 
Because there is little argument about the formal mission of the 
agency, and because it is one which no Australian State legislature could 
refuse to accommodate, there has been no fundamental change in legislation 
since 1935. Similarly, since there are no legislative committees continuously 
evaluating the fulfilment of its goals, the agency operates fairly autono-
mously from legislative interference. Some minor operational matters come 
within the purview of the legislature from time to time but they have little 
effect on the overall relationship between the Department and Parliament. 
As a result the position of the minister is little affected in terms of his 
control over the Department. There is no question of any legislative body 
reducing his authority or usurping his role. On the other hand, there is 
little to provide him with support in any direct way, more often than not 
his role in Parliament is a defensive one, defending his departmental activi-
ties as for example in the case of the allocation of home building resources 
between various centres. In this way it may be said that the minister is 
pressed into taking on an agency identification which could well constrain 
his executive authority within the agency itself. This trend may be supported 
by the legislative provisions in the Homes Act which deliberately provide 
the Director of Housing strong authority to act. 55 Nonetheless, s.4(1) of 
the Act does make it clear that "In the exercise of his functions under 
this Act the Director shall be subject to the directions of the Minister." 
This is viewed seriously and the operations of the agency are regarded as a 
cooperative venture between the minister and his officials. 
The legislature therefore was not deeply involved in agency affairs, 
other than to redirect in marginal areas its energies and resources. Most 
matters of conflict were resolved within the department and policies evolved 
without the need for legislative provisions. One important reason for this 
SThese are more specifically listed in the Homes Act, referred to 
on p 87 supra. 
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is the strong legislation which formulated the original agency mission and 
the subsequent administrative changes which allowed it to perform that mission 
properly. 
C. 	Professional Staff  
In 1946 the Board of Management of the Agricultural Bank reorganised 
the structure of their Department into three functional divisions to 
correspond with their main tasks. Two were Land Settlement and Rural Finance 
Divisions which were concerned, as their nomenclature implies, with rural areas, 
the other was the Housing Division, which evolved into the Housing Department. 
In the Reorganisation Plan the establishment of the Division is shown as 
TABLE 3 
Housing Division  
Executive Officer 
Assistant to Executive Officer 
Administration Officer 
Publ.: Relations Section - Clerk 
Inspector ) 
) Applications 
• Clerks (3)) 
Welfare Officer 
Tenancies Clerk 
Estates Section - 	Senior Clerk 
Contracts Clerk 
• Materials and Supply Officer 
Clerks (4) 
Architectural Section - 	Architect in charge 
Senior Architect 
Architects (3) 
Draughtsmen •(3) 
Junior Draughtsmen (2) 
Construction 	Works Superintendant 
Works Supervisor 
Clerks (2) 
Records Clerk 
Junior Clerks (2) 
Clerk (Launceston Office) 
Typist/stenographers (2) 
56 Typists (4) 
56Tasmanian Government Gazette 1946; p . 378  
Accountant 
Accounts Section 
Estates Manager 
General Estates Section 
Factory WelfareI Maintenance 
General 	Public Relations 
Stores (Purchases & 
Tenancies) 
Cost control 
Financial 
Standards 
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By 1956, after the administrative changes in 1949 and 1953, the Department 
had grown and was formalised to provide for the more complex elements. 
The following organisation chart is indicative of this framework: TABLE 4  
Director of Housing 
Asst. Director 
Administr tive Officer 
Principal Architect 
Technical Section 
Development Architects 
Construction 
Materials Supply 
-- General 	—.Arrears 
General Administration 
Section 
Legal 	Staff Records 
Office Accommodation 
-Ledgers 
-Revenue 
-Pay . 
Expenditure 
Land and Purchase Contracts. 57 
The current organization chart is given on following page. 
• Some changes have taken place which are found in Director's Reports 
from time to time. One important step was taken in 1968, soon after the 
present Director had taken up his appointment, with the creation of a 
Planning Board composed of senior officers of the Department. Its purpose 
• was "to coordinate land acquisition, planning and liaison activities, 
and to conduct research and collate departmental statistics." 58 In addition 
branch offices were extended to all parts of the State where departmental homes 
were constructed, supplementing the already existing branch in Launceston 
7Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 61 of 1956, Appendix I, p 10 
58 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 67 of 1968 
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with others at Burnie, Georgetown and later Devonport. This decentralisation 
policy was taken a stage further in1972 with the creation of Regional 
Housing Officers for the North (Launceston), the North West (Devonport) 
and South (Hobart). They are regarded as regional representatives of the 
Director and have responsibilities for day to day decisions within the 
scope of policy laid down by the Parliament. 59 
The term 'professional' in this context of agency staffing is not 
meant to refer solely tothose whose qualifications may fall within the 
recognised professions. Rather, it is meant to Convey a commitment to the 
agency mission, either through long tenure with the agency or because the 
individual is career oriented within the housing field. Examples of the 
former may well be accountants who are professionals but scarcely necessarily 
committed to the housing field, unless they identify with the agency by 
virtue of their long service5.9a An example of the latter 	may be 
architects, committed to housing by the nature of their training and selection. - 
Many other non professional technical and clerical officers could also be so . 
described, for example Welfare Officers, storemen, draughtsmen and tenancy 
officers. The current (April 1974) establishment of the agency is composed 
of the following: 
Technical: 76; Administrative: 169; Accounting: 59; 
of these a number transferred to the department from the Agricultural Bank 
in 1953. The latter group occupy senior positions as follows: 
Director; Deputy Director; Chief Technical Officer; 
Senior Draftsman; Project Manager; Production Manager; 
Coordinator Officer (Buildings), and Chief Financial Officer. 
The only section head to join the department after 1953 is the Chief 
Administrative Officer. Amongst the most senior professional and technical 
officers other than these, eight joined the department before 1960; ten 
59Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, 
59a 
This concept of 'professional' is different to that of Education- 
and Health Services, where a person's training leads him in a professional 
sense to work in the field either as teacher or doctor. There is really no 
parallel in the Housing field. 
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between 1960 and 1965; seven from 1965-70; from 1970 onwards 21 have 
joined. 
A group of employees of the Housing department which may be said to 
identify very strongly with the Department, although not the professional 
of the same type as mentioned above, is the "day labour" group. These men 
are tradesmen - carpenters, plumbers, electricians, builders, labourers - 
whose employment is controlled by the Director, being outside the provisions 
of the Public Service Act 1973. In one sense their name - day labour force - 
is a misnomer since they are employed for long periods, some 200 of the 350 
have been employed for more than five years. The use of this directly 
employed work force was started in 1946 
"The adoption of this method of construction represents the 
most radical change in the administration of Government home 
building in this State. Since the inception of housing 
legislation it has been the practice to construct all homes by 
contract.. .Difficulties in obtaining contractors, particularly 
in the southern part of the State, indicated that unless a 
change was made the number of homes erected...would be 
seriously reduced. Day labour operations were commenced. in 
May on the Lawson subdivision, Moonah and within ten weeks the 
first home was completed, while an additional 20 were under 
construction. The scheme has since been extended to other 
subdivisions. .." 6° 
By 1949 there were 453 men employed in the day labour organisation 
and of these 115 were permanently in a factory set up by the Housing 
Division (as it was then) to prefabricate building materials, e.g. window 
frames. Whilst the numbers have fluctuated over time, the dependence on 
day labour for the major share of building has continued, although there are 
some substantial contracts let, especially along the North West coast. The 
factory at Prince of Wales Bay has been extended and mechanised and now 
employs 58, turning out much of the material required for southern estates. 61 
A more common usage of the term professional related to the Department 
is that of expertise or specialism,_ which would be used by most of the 
senior officers and the Minister. The field of home building and estate 
. 	6 °Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 40 of 1946. 61Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972, p 13. 
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development calls for a number of differing specialisations, but all 
concerned with the same goal. It is this commitment to a particular goal 
which allows the Housing Department Director to call for and receive a 
degree of autonomy even while admitting that ministerial control exists. 
The belief 'that the kind of tasks performed by the agency would be carried 
out better by a semi-autonomous body, such as a Commission, is often expressed, 
with Housing Commissions of South Australia and Victoria as models. The 
1947 Joint Parliamentary Committee on home building made the same point, 
proposing a State Housing Commission to replace the Housing Division. However, 
the reasons for any such move at the present time would not be to avoid 
interference from ministerial control,but rather to avoid the constraints 
of the Public Service Act and the Commissioner's Office (now the Board) 
with its Committees. (See p105 for examples of these). The Director 
made it clear,that he found great difficulty in matching the agency desire 
to fulfil its functions efficiently,with the constraints resulting from 
having to meet the demands of an administrative nature from the Board and 
the Public Offices Committee and Advisory Committee on Mechanical Aids. 
They make it difficult to obtain the best staff for the jobs available in 
the agency, because those within the Public Service Act have to be filled 
through the Board and are subject to relativities and classification problems. 
Delays in appointment - are also common, and since much of the planning and 
design work has to be prepared well in advance of actual building, lack of 
appropriate staff can hamper a proper flow of work. The Joint Committee 
made a similar comment in 1947, when the agency was part of the Agricultural 
Bank, and no doubt their remarks were taken into consideration when the 1949 
changes were made. 62 
62The whole question of control of public service personnel by a 
central agency, such as the Public Service Commissioner, or Board, as it is 
now in Tasmania, is a matter outside the terms of this thesis. The fact of 
its existence is, however, important for the Housing Department, in that it 
does limit a totally , professional approach. See also Chapter V on Health 
Services and the reasons for the creation of a Mental Health Services 
Commission in the 1960s. 
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A latent professional approach to the task was very evident here, 
as indicated by the Director's statement to - an audience directly concerned 
with both public and private housing: 
” ...I can see Government housing authorities generally 
(and the Housing Department in Tasmania in particular) 
'assuming a far more active role in establishing this . 
the community] environment. We can talk to, and cajole 
Government Departments and instrumentalities into doing 
things that we want done, when we want them done. We 
can cause private enterprise to create shopping centres. 
If they don't we can create them ourselves. We hope to 
be able to influence industrial development, to a degree 
necessary to ensure jobs for our occupants, within reasonable 
proximity to our subdivisions.."63 
The Minister generally expects a professional approach from staff. The 
highly technical nature of the work within the Department makes it necessary 
to depend on expert advice in order to make decisions. Major policy 
decisions or priority decisions are the ministers' field of competence, and 
the basis for such decisions must be a comprehensive report of professional 
men. Ministers, therefore, demand from their staff high professional quality, 
thoroughness and ability to take in many points of view. Ministers recognise 
that there could be conflicting points of view even between professionals 
in the field and they want all the evidence before them when they make final 
judgement. This atmosphere created by both Director and Minister must enhance 
the already implicit professional expectation: of the agency staff. 
Summation  
The common assumption about the professional employed in an organisation 
is, that he will tend to create a tension between organisational goals and 
his own. In relation to the public service it is assumed that, where a 
department is performing a professionally based function, the strength of 
, 63LJEAllwinton, Seminar: Housing for people ., op: cit., pp 4 and 6 
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the minister's executive authority will be significantly weakened. The 
presence of professionals within the agency and the dominance of a parti-
cular expertise should, in the case of the Housing Department, support that 
assumption. 
The relatively diffuse professional groups within the agency, 
engineers, accountants, architects and planners, would seem to militate 
against this. On the other hand, it is true that the relatively longer 
service with the Department of some professional and technical officers 
promotes a kind of organisational solidarity which is similar to that 
suggested by a professional orientation. The presence of a numerically 
large group employed outside the direct control of anyone other than the 
Director must weigh heavily against the minister's executive authority. 
However, there was a very strong emphasis from both officers and ministers 
on the cooperative nature of the agency. Directors rarely exercised any 
powers without consulting the minister first, and it was emphasized that the 
operations of the department are based on cooperation. This view was 
supported by one minister, who commented that any decisions about departmental 
policy had to be based on balanced judgements. He pointed out, that the 
reports of professionals were vital as a basis for decisions, but the final 
result depended on a team effort. He did indicate, however, that on a 
number of occasions in the past initiatives from officers had been stifled 
. with the result that these officers had ceased to use their initiative. The 
senior officers and the Minister were in constant communication about 
general and specific matters, and that the minister and the Director together 
made policy. It appears therefore that, although there are potentially 
divisive forces operating, the Director's style of leadership is cooperative. 
Potential conflicts over jurisdiction are reduced and, since most difficulties 
occur over. means rather than ends, ministerial leadership is seldom challenged. _•- 
D. Finance 
The source of the funds at the disposal of an agency must cause 
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significant differences in its response to its environment. For example, 
the single line item estimate is regarded as grossest freedom from control 
by an agency subject to itemised appropriations and the restriction of 
virement. So too the availability of earmarked funds 64 mu3t allow appreciably 
greater freedom from control. There will be much greater reliance on the 
support of the Minister, when the funds of the agency depend entirely on his 
ability to'battle it out' with Treasury and Cabinet and then protect the 
allocation through the appropriation debate in Parliament. 
As has been mentioned previously, the Department was substantially 
reorganised in 1946, largely to be able to use the funds offered by the 
Commonwealth Government under the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement 1945. 
The agreement provided for capital funds to be loaned to State Governments 
for the specific purpose of building homes, the State paying a low interest 
rate on the funds, thus being enabled to keep rentals low. The period of 
agreement was for an initial five years, :renewable for a further period by 
negotiation, although the amount of funds available was negotiated annually. 
Tasmania did not renew the agreement after the first five years, 
complaining that 
"Although some benefits have been derived through its 
participation in the Scheme those benefits have not been 
'as great as was originally anticipated.. The Commonwealth 
Government has therefore been advised that the State no 
longer desires to continue as a party to the Agreement." 65 
"...the benefits which the State expected to receive under 
the Agreement were largely illusory and ... the manner in which 
the Agreement had been operated had not enabled it to provide 
dwelling accommodation on terms and conditions favourable to 
the tenant; nor was it receiving from the Commonwealth the 
degree of assistance which it expected to receive. • , t66 
64What Simmons calls 'dedicatedrevenue sources'. Simmons, 92. cit. 
WPQ (June 1965) p 38 
65 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 73 of 1950 
66Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 7 of 1952 
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The next round of negotiations before the 1956 renewal period brought 
Tasmania into the agreement again, but not before State Government had 
attempted to obtain conditions more to its liking. 
"The inflexible nature of the Commonwealth and State 
financial arrangements which provide for allocation of 
loan funds on an annual basis has had the effect of 
limiting forward planning of housing projects and 
the organisation of continuous programmes. If assured 
finance could be provided for triennial periods 
planning would be facilitated and efficiency improved." 
From this point in time Tasmania remained in the Scheme until the Agreement 
was terminated by withdrawal of the Commonwealth in 1971. 67 
The consequence of this situation has been that dedicated revenue 
sources have been available for the Housing Department for nearly 20 years 
• of its existence. There have been some limitations and restrictions placed 
upon the funds by the Commonwealth, but these have been minimal: no shop 
building, only specific site works and provision for rent rebates. The 
State has therefore had no call on its resources to meet the cost of housing 
and Consolidated Revenue has been paid a small surplus each year from the 
balance of agency income - over expenditure. For example: in 1967/8: $127,277; 
1968/9: $115,523; 1970/1: $12,223; 1971/2: $46,101. 
Even in the case of rental rebates, which were a reduction of potential 
profit, the Commonwealth Government makes a payment to the States to allow 
assistance in cases of need. Previously, the special capital funds for 
housing under the Agreement were at a rate of interest lower than that now 
paid for loans through the Loan Council allocation. Since that rate is 
current market rate, the Commonwealth made two allocations to the States 
to allow them to provide homes at rentals lower than the economic cost to 
the State. These arrangements are carried out under the State Grants 
(Housing) Act 1971; both Commonwealth Statutes themselves changed by 
subsequent executive action. 68 
67Further detail 
Agreement can be found 
Development, op. . cit. 
68 This change is 
s of the saga of the Commonwealth-State Housing 
in M.A.Jones, 22? cit. and Department of National 
(see footnote 11) 
referred to in the Tasmania Treasurer's Budget Speech 
(contd.) 
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After the termination of the Housing Agreement on 30 June 1971, the 
latter Act provides (inter alia) that $2.75 million should be made available 
for five years cumulative in each year for the purpose of providing low 
rental homes. In addition, 1 rental assistance grant is made to the States 
totalling $1.25million annually for five years, in order to meet the rental 
rebates that may be granted. Under these arrangements, which replaced the 
— 
agreement, Tasmania received $109,725 in 1971/2, which enabled the rent 
charged and repayments on purchase agreements to be held one per cent lower 
than the economic cost. The sum of $75,000 was also received as rental 
assistance grant towards a rental rebate cost of $405,086 for 1971/2. 69 
The pressures on the State to continue the same rate of home building 
and provision of low rent accommodation are still maintained by this external 
funding which is not derived from contested resources within the State. In 
the case of capital funds, the following extract indicates the complex 
nature of the arrangements, indicating the way in which the funds were not 
necessarily directly requested without State involvement: , 
"Under the earlier Agreements, each state was free to 
determine for itself the amount it wished to borrow 
for Housing. This choice was made after the Loan Council 
had made its decision on the total Works and Housing 
programme, and on the total amount to be allowed to each 
state. Thus in deciding the amount to be taken up under 
the then Housing Agreement, a State was able to take into 
account the relative priority of -Housing as compared with 
other capital requirements."" 
At the same time the availability of capital funds from sources outside 
those controlled by the State directly, must have had , a,great effect on 
the consideration given to decisions about priorities as between State 
68 (contd.) 
to which reference is made later in this Section. The changes in - 
this area of financial assistance have been so rapid that it must be noted 
the discussion only takes into account activity prior to 1974. 
69 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972 
70Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 25 of 1973, Budget Speech and 
Financial Statement of the Treasurer for 1973/74, p 15 
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capital expenditures. This is highlighted by the changes which occurred . 
during 1973 affecting the 1973/74 Budget: These alterations in procedure, 
implemented by the Australian Government, were intended to provide a 
significant financial input to state housing construction. The Australian 
Government was to make $16million available to the states, apart from their 
borrowings through the Loan Council. This constituted an increase of 88% 
in possible expenditure, which was to be used during the two years 1973/74 
and 1974/75. The actual amount to be used by each state was a matter of 
decision by the Federal minister in consultation with the State Housing 
minister. In this way the State would be forced to give higher priority 
to Housing if it were to take up a larger share of the money. 
"An increase of this order would have been completely 
beyond the State's capacity under previous agreements 
and to this extent the new Agreement can be seen as a 
means of obtaining substantially more funds for Housing 
than otherwise would, have been possible." 71 
It appears that, although the previous arrangements for capital funding 
might have left some measure of flexibility with the State, the new arrange-
ments certainly do not. To this extent therefore, it may be that the new 
arrangements will provide a dedicated funding source for the Department in 
a way the previous capital programme did not. 
A comparison of the Receipts and Expenditure Account for 1968/69 and 72/73 
in Table6indicated only a marginal change in the capacity of the Department 
to operate outside the direct financial structures of the State. 72 It is 
true that the large income component represented by rent allows considerable 
flexibility which is not present in other agencies. 	But it does not mean 
that the current changes have altered the feeling of autonomy within the 
agency. Having to obtain funds from the Australian Government must make 
ministerial leadership more difficult in the future, and the Director will 
lose flexibility because of the need to prepare estimates for approval by the 
71. 
72 Source: Parliamentary Paper 38- of 1969; Parliamentary Paper. 44 
of 1973. 
TABLE 6 
Comparisons of Profit and Loss Statement for 1968/9 (prior to the 
State Grants (Housing) Act 1971) and that Of 1971/2 (subsequent to that 
Act) 
1968/9 	Earnings for the year: 
Rent receivable (including $184,859 for 
rebates from Consolidated Revenue) 	 1,901,898 
Amount receivable from purchase of dwellings . . • .3,623,120 
Income from Sundry loans 	 67,550 
Miscellaneous income 49,527  
Total Income earned 	5,642,095 
Less Operating Expenses 
Principal repayments . . • 526,900 
Interest on State Treasury 
loans and C/S Housing 
Agreement loans 2,676,650 
less capitalised 	67,484 2,609,166 
Maintenance of Estates 	360,643 
Insurance, Municipal 
rates and taxes 	1,354,348 
Salaries and adminis- 
trative costs 644,550 
Provisions: 
Depreciation of plant, 
vehicles, office buildings 
and equipment 	10,855 
Bad and doubtful debts 	20,110  
Total operating expenses 	5,526,572  
leaving a net profit of 115,523  
• 1971/2 	Earnings for the year 
Rent receivable (including $329,083 for rebates 
from Consolidated Revenue and $75,000 Rental 
Assistance Grant from Commonwealth Government) 2,314,818 
Amount receivable from purchase of dwellings 4,875,937 
State Grants (Housing) Act 1971 Commonwealth 
funds 109,725 
Miscellaneous income and income from sundry loans 149,698 
Total income earned 7,470,178 
(contd.) 
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Total income earned 	7,470,178 
Less Operating expenses 
Principal Repayments 
Interest on State Treasury 
loans and C/S Housing 
Agreement loans 
$3,479,354 
less 
capitalised 81,444  
Maintenance of Estates 
Insurance, Municipal rates 
and Land tax 
Salaries and administra-
tion costs 
Provisions: 
678,493 
3,397,910 
512,719 
1,804,422 
930,923 
Depreciation of plant, 
vehicles, office buildings 
and equipment 
Bad and doubtful debts 
Repayment of Loan 
15,112 
29,746 
.47,617 
 
Total operating expenses 	7,424,077  
leaving a net profit of 	 46,101  
Source: Parliamentary Paper 38 of 1969; 
Parliamentary Paper 44 of 1973 
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Minister and Cabinet. It is perhaps in this area that the change will be 
most noticeable rather than in the actual funding. When the Agreement was 
in force the State Treasury had little reason to be involved in - the agency 
affairs. The only call on State funds was for rebate payments and there 
was no other estimate called for from the agency, but any major proposal to 
average rents or to change bases of rent rebates would involve discussions 
with the Treasury. The funds the State received from the Commonwealth were 
paid through the Treasury but, apart from keeping a receipts- and payments 
account and a balance sheet which had to be verified and audited, the usual 
Treasury control through accounting procedures was not exercised. With the 
changed circumstances the Department now has to comply with usual procedures 
which apply to other Departments, and its affairs become subject to much 
greater access and thus to criticism and control. In both, Treasury and 
parliamentary terms, it means that, despite some dedicated revenue still 
being paid by Commonwealth, the Department loses some of its previously 
held initiatives. The senior officers favour the system operating in other 
states, where the Housing Commissions had a single line item rather than 
items and detailed votes. 
The previous funding, direct through the Housing Agreement, had meant 
that large capital funds were available to the agency without controls being 
imposed through the State Treasury. Nonetheless, this did not mean the 
funds were without any conditions at all. The Commonwealth Government 
exercised some financial and technical control over the expenditure. Indeed, 
one of the common complaints had been that this control had reduced State 
decision making capacity in this important area. The arrangements tended 
to be inflexible as between the Commonwealth and State. 73  Of course,.it was 
this very inflexibility which allowed the Department to be relatively auto-
nomous from the State Government point of view. Thus, in the relationship 
73TasMania, Parliamentary Paper No. 7 of 1952. This situation was 
emphasized, considerably as a consequence of the 1973 changes by the 
Australian Government. 
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between the Director and Minister, the operational control of the Director 
was considerably strengthened. It appears,therefore, that in the changed 
arrangements after 1971/2 for these reasons the Director and agency may 
become more dependent on the (3fforts of the minister to ob .:7,ain funding and 
support for priorities within the State Cabinet and in discussions with the 
Australian Government. The corollary of this would seem to be an increase 
in the executive authority of the minister. 
Summation  
With the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement in force the agency 
operated in a relatively autonomous position. The funds under the Agreement 
were at the disposal of the agency and had to be accounted for to the 
Commonwealth as a Trust Fund. The State Treasury were therefore not involved 
in internal allocation or accounting, other than normal audit procedures. 
The availability of such dedicated revenue sources led to a restriction of 
the potential control of the minister, although it is clear that the minister 
may have had to fight for priority in terms of loan fund allocation as 
between other Departments and Housing. 
From 1971 the funding procedures changed and the situation became 
fluid and uncertain. Some revenue appears to be 'dedicated' in the sense 
that it is derived directly from the Commonwealth and not subject to 
negotiation within the State sphere. The result of the put-1971 arrangements 
appeared to reduce the autonomy of the agency and to make it more reliant 
on the support of the minister to justify expenditure and fight for priority 
within the State Cabinet. This seems to imply some increase in ministerial 
control, with a correspondingly decreased capacity of the agency to protect 
programme activity, thus increasing the scope for political leadership and 
executive authority. 
E. 	Departmental tradition  
It is not often realised that the same kind of organisational loyalty 
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can exist in government departments as in private enterprise. The 
assumption is that, since the Public Service as a whole is an organisation, 
with staff being largely transferrable across departmental boundaries, 
little of the feeling of identification with the organisation - that is 
so demanded in private enterprise - can exist. For many departments with 
largely clerical or 'administrative' functions this could well be the case. 
But for those departments which rely on specific expertise and have .a 
relatively defined objective, there would appear, in principle, little to . 
differentiate them from private enterprise. Within the department there 
may grow a promotion structure which is in . a sense 'closed', e.g. within the 
various specialist sections. So for example, it was seen that a majority 
of the 55 most senior professional and technical staff, had been with the 
Department for 10 years or more - 13 . of them over 25 years. 
In addition, the day labour organisation of the Department, which is 
outside the control of the Public Service, is no different from any other 
group of private enterprise employees. These skilled tradesmen, numerically 
almost two. thirds of the work force of the Department as a whole, depend 
upon the agency for their employment and look to the Director and his 
officers as their employer, not the 'minister. Indeed, it is felt sometimes, 
that the Director stands between them and the politician, who is .not always 
in favour of their retention. This was especially so when there was a 
Liberal Government, some of whose Cabinet members expressed a preference 
for letting tenders to private enterprise and reducing the day labour force. 
As a result, the Liberal Government, during their term in office, banned 
replacements for resignations or retirements in the day force. The Labor 
Government were concerned as it was an important element of the Government's 
control over employment* in the State as a whole that it should have this group. 
Not only did. it Provide the opportunity to influence the rate of, unemployment, 
• but also other matters, such as apprenticeship policy and wage levels. However, 
the minister did not directly interfere with the general employment conditions 
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of the day labour force, leaving this matter to the Director and his officers. 
There is a high stability rate within this group too, for example as at 
30/6/1969 the length of service cf its 358 day labour employees was 
illustrated by the followinE figures: 
20 years or more service 	 24• 
15 	" 	 30 
10 	" 	 61 
5 	H 	  81 
196 74 
Organisational identity could well flourish in these circumstances. 
Staff loyalty and identification is, in fact, strongly encouraged within 
the Department. Such encouragement was given even when the agency was within' 
the Agricultural Bank. The first Executive Officer appointed by the Board 
of Management to administer the Division was Mr. Basil Plummer, who became 
the Director in 1949. The same person remained as Director until after 
4 January 1959, having been continuously associated with this area, since 
he became Board member of the Agricultural Bank concerned with Housing in 
1948. His successor was Mr. H.L. Duke, who had previously been with the 
Agricultural Bank as a clerk and then, from 1946, Executive Officer of the 
Housing Division until 1953, when he became Assistant Director, on the 
Department being created, under Mr. Plummer's Directorship. Mr. Duke retired 
from the Public Service on 31 August 1967 and the present Director,NfrL.F.Allwinton, 
took his place. The newly appointed Director,Mr.T.LLockhart, appointed in 
_1975 on Mr. Allwinton's resignation, had been Deputy Director since.1970 
and was previously Secretary with the Department'. Other senior officers 
have been there for similar periods of time as was shown (p116 ).- In such 
circumstances it is not unexpected that a tradition of departmental loyalty 
should emerge. 
Due to length of service there is a feeling of personal involvement 
74 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969. 
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with the department and the achievements of the agency are promoted.. It 
was not without a certain pride that the Director made the point, that the 
department is the largest landlord in the State and the, biggest single home 
builder, although its activity cnly constitutes 20% of the total construction 
of accommodation in the State. 75 
There is also the fact, that the agency is meeting a specifically 
identifiable need of the community. The demand for Department housing is 
increasing especially in the Hobart area, where the major housing demand 
in the State as a whole exists. Director's Reports exemplify recognition 
of this situation, for example: 
“ ...the demand in 1968-9 increased markedly. This is 
revealed not only in the 19% increase in applications 
received, but in the fact that the number of cases still 
awaiting assistance at the end of the period rose by 106 
despite the housing of 1,327 families." 76 
"Demand for assistance is steadily increasing, and the 
Department continues to assist Government and industry 
by providing homes for key employees, including migrants." 77 
Departmental activities in initiating new standards for housing, 
landscaping, gardens and general estate layout have all been enthusiastically 
promoted by its officers. Much of the innovation has come from their ideas 
in the first place, although a great deal more attention has been paid to 
these matters since 1971. 
A recent Minister for Housing lived in a departmental house himself and 
had always been keenly interested in the Housing function, being shadow 
minister whilst in opposition. Some of his proposals were strongly in line 
with much that the Director and department have been endeavouring to do in 
the past, although, without ministerial support irrespective of party.- 
75.I.,F.Allwinton, 'Fitting into the Broad Spectrum' Seminar: Housing 
for People (22• cit.), 
76 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 38 of 1969 , 
77 ibid. 
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• In consequence, there was a much closer working relationship between that 
minister and the Director. This, coupled with the fact that the portfolio 
was not a joint one, involves the Minister much more in the everyday 
activities of the department When questioned on this matter, the Minister 
talked of 'discussions', 'memoranda', 'orders', and 'delegation' in connection 
with his relations through the Director to the Department. Other ministers 
have not been so directly involved, indicating that they would only have 
conferences with senior officers as particular matters demanded. One minister 
said that when he first took office 	he started to have regular meetings, 
but found it was not worth continuing. However, he did make .a point of 
attending all social functions of the departmental officers to which he was 
invited. 
One reason given for not continuing regular weekly meetings was that 
his ministerial office and the departmental offices were too far apart. 
This fact i relevant in any consideration of an agency's autonomy, since it 
may be assumed that there will be less direct involvement of a minister, who 
cannot have his senior officers immediately on call. Equally, there would 
be a tendency of such officers to operate in many situations without involving 
their minister; just because of the need to make decisions when he was not 
readily available. Another minor problem for a minister in such circumstances 
is the feeling of being an intruder, where he has no regular office base 
within the building. All these factors have had a definite part in the 
evolution of the autonomy of the agency and do tend to reduce executive autho-
rity of the minister and his chance to exercise leadership. 
When the Minister had joint portfolios, whether or not he was particularly 
interested :in them, he tended to become more deeply engrossed in the affairs 
of the one physically accessible. Since the'Housing Department's separation 
from the Agricultural Bank in 1953, offices have been located at Lampton 
Avenue, Derwent Park, • about 20 minutes by car from the State Offices in Hobart 
central city. The state of the premises was relatively poor for many years, 
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but the agency have resisted moves into premises closer to the State Offices. 
For many years they have been fighting for funds to improve their premises 
and over the past five years have made great improvements, which have 
consolidated their position :'or some time to come. 78 
There are no other State Offices in the same area and no other public 
servants, Derwent Park being the industrial estate of Hobart. Communication 
between minister and officer is formalised in such circumstances to a 
greater degree than occurs where the minister has his office within the 
department. 79 The use of the telephone increases and this, in turn, partially 
defines the relationships in a different way to continual face to face 
conversation. 
An important aspect of the department functions is the provision of 
information to the minister. Since most of the data on which a minister 
must make decisions is in the hands of the officers, there is a common belief 
that officers are able to manipulate the minister. There can be little doubt 
that by various methods - filtration, sifting, withholding or deluging, 
minister can be at the mercy of his officers. This is especially so in an 
agency whose tasks demand expertise and knowledge outside the capacity of 
the lay politician. However, such a view can be overstated and too much 
reliance cannot be placed on it where the officers are career public servants, 
whose promotion and tenure rely on integrity within their roles. Nonetheless, 
a strong point was made by the Director about what he termed the 'information 
lag'. When any new minister comes into the portfolio there is a huge know-
ledge gap to be filled. Whether or not the minister has been previously 
involved or interested in the function concerned, he will only have a. fraction 
of the necessary detailed knowledge, Anything he knows will seldom relate 
78An interesting result of this relative isolation is that the 
agency operated a staggered working hour system to allow its officers, 
especially female, time for travelling to the city centre for shopping. 
This system was used by the Public Service Board as an experiment on 
which to base their proposals for Flexitime for the whole.of the Service. 
79 Note the difference in the Education Department (see Chapter IV). 
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to newly formulated plans 'in the pipeline' or to the more detailed reasoning 
for decisions made in the past, which to some degree constrain, by precedent, 
future decisions a minister may have to make. The way in which the minister
can absorb this information can also affect the information lag. The Director 
indicated that quite distinct differences in relations between_the minister 
and his senior officers can result from this situation. 80 
A minister, who may take as;long as 12 months to become familiar 
with the departmental activities and plans, will become engrossed in detail 
and pay little attention to long term proposals. Such a person is more 
likely to leave long term planning to officers without making much effort 
to initiate any projects himself. Another minister, who has a particular 
interest in the functions of the department and has 'ideas' he wishes to 
put into practice, may find that many of these are already in train or have 
been previously rejected. A learning period for both parties is needed, but 
the relationship created during that period will to some degree dictate 
the extent of the minister's control. After this period is completed, 
preferably in a fairly short time for an interested minister, there will be 
a set pattern of priorities produced by the minister and clarity of instructions 
will result. If the period of absorption is too long, detail will take over 
and an adequate ministerial leadership will be the outcome. In this connection 
it is also to be noted that personal characteristics will play an important 
• part. 
While the senior officers of the agency may approach their task in the 
traditional public service manner, they cannot avoid the consequences of their 
own character. A strong leader will inevitably emerge dominant, whether 
public servant or minister, and, however much the officer would want to act 
out his role as public servant, there are bound to be inevitable tensions. 
But where the minister and the senior officer are both strong characters, 
80For similar points of view see the discussion in Kogan, 92. cit. 
p 155, where Crosland says: "I reckon it takes you six months to get your 
head properly above water, a year to get the general drift of most of the 
field and two years to really master the whole of the Department." 
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there is little doubt that by the nature of their particular roles the 
minister will dominate. 
Under this head of.department tradition two other matters require 
mention. The first is by reference to some changes taking place in fields 
whichinvolve the autonomy of an agency, such as financial control, office 
accommodation, staffing, equipment purchase, and housing policy. Prior to 
1960 all these matters had been very firmly under the control of the Director 
(thus implying at least that the ministerial control had been limited) and 
the department was considered autonomous to a very significant degree. Since 
that date a decline in that autonomy had been taking place gradually: 
1) Financial control, which has already been discussed in terms of 
changing conditions in rebate matters and expiry of the Housing Agreement: 
2) Office accommodation, staffing and equipment purchases have also been 
alluded to,.noting the increasing intrusion of the Public Service 
Commissioner and Treasury through committees such as the Mechanical 
Aids and Public Offices. 
3) The problem of consistent housing policies becomes increasingly difficult 
when annual budgeting is required and when the chances of changing 
priorities are increased. 
The budgeting situation has been aggravated recently with the need to 
compete for funds in the annual application to Loan Council with other 
departments. Changing priorities becomes much more likely when Parliament 
has greater possibilities to debate the detailed estimates for the Department. 
These factors led the Director to promote the proposals of the 1947 
Joint Committee to set up a Housing Commission. It was essential that a 
professional body perform tasks without interference, although his support 
was not to circumvent executive authority. Rather, it was to avoid the 
demands made upon the department brother agencies within the system, such 
as Treasury, Public Service Commissioner (now the Public Service Board)-as 
well as Parliament and Cabinet. This suggestion may be interpreted as having 
its roots in 'professionalism', but it is noteworthy that the Director saw 
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no clash between his support for a Housing Commission and retaining 
ministerial control. He referred to a "degree of autonomy with the 
possibility of tight ministerial control." This view seems to indicate 
the way he saw the autonomy of the agency in the past, i.e. its past 
tradition. 
The second matter is related to Advisory Committees, i.e. cooptation 
mechanisms, which some regard as having significant legitimation functions 
for an agency. 81 Neither the Director nor the current minister regarded 
these committees as of much value. As previously mentioned, the Director 
thought of them as merely emphasising areas of increasing sensitivity, but 
producing nothing concrete. He said "the Department is usually better 
informed, most of the ideas from these committees are already known to the 
departmental officers". Such committees may also diffuse decision making 
to a great extent and provide a means of avoiding decisions. The minister's 
task is to control the advise he receives by appointing those best suited 
to give expert advice. Then he makes decisions on that advice himself, 
rather than allowing a committee to recommend decisions. In this way the 
officers of the department are used to a much greater degree, which allows 
them to exercise their expertise. 
Both these examples indicate that the Director and some ministers 
tended to support a more professional approach within the department which 
would certainly fit in with a tradition which seems to have been on the 
wane since the early 'sixties. 
Summation 
The emphasis has been on a departmental tradition of 'separateness' 
81See Brown's discussion of the legitimation phase in his model, 
212? cit., Chapter I, p 15. 
137 
due to such factors as 1) organisation loyalty through long service. 
2) A work group, comprising over half of the total agency employees, 
directly employed by the agency; 3) the stated desire to foster pride of 
achievement in the agency employees; 4) the encouragement for staff to 
innovate in their own areas, and 5) the isolation of the agency offices 
from the functional mainstream of government offices generally. This strongly 
— 
suggests that the agency would operate with relatively high autonomy not 
only in its day to day functions, but also in many areas of policy making. 
However, this is not entirely an accurate assessment. It is true 
that these factors predispose officers in the agency to operate autonomously - 
all other things being equal. But the personal attitudes of senior officers 
and of the minister concerned must dictate the extent to which this pre-
disposition dominates their relationship. There is little doubt that all 
the ingredients are present for an organisational operation with the minimum 
of interference, however, neither the Directcr nor the then Deputy Director 
conceded that the agency operated in this way. Both, and particularly the then . 
Deputy Director, stated, that operationally day to day functions were under 
the officers' control, but subject to the overriding right of the Minister 
to interfere. The Director never exercised any of his extensive authority 
under the Act without consultation. Constant telephone contact, informal 
meetings and formal discussions continually took place between the two 
senior officers and the Minister. (Although some ministers found the 
offices too far away for convenient involvement.) 
It was in the contrast between the 'style' of the ministers, however, that 
the departmental 	tradition showed through most clearly. When a minister 
does not wish to become deeply engrossed in the portfolio and has no great 
desire to pursue strong policies through the department, i.e. where there 
is no political leadership, it is the departmental tradition that allows it 
to proceed towards an objective which has been setdown in the past with 
unimpaired vigour. Where there is no such tradition, the agency would 
flounder in default of political direction and the exercise of executive 
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authority. 
The stated desire for a more professional approach to the task of 
providing homes contrasts sharply with the realisation that in present 
circumstances this desire has to be played down. The recalling of a 
tradition of autonomy 'before 1960' by a Director who only took up office 
in 1968, would imply that he has absorbed that tradition from officers still 
in the agency who remember what it was like. This could be the desire to 
get on with the job, characterising the professional approach referred to 
in discussing this aspect of the department. There was also a certain 
ambivalence about autonomy through professionalism, since little concern 
was expressed at maintaining tight ministerial control even though the 
agency were to become a commission. 
Conclusion  
The parameters of this analysis, it may be recalled, are to identify 
those forces which have a "persistent or cumulative effect on the subsystem" 
(supra, p 78). 	It was assumed that these would indicate activity inhibiting 
or promoting a minister's capacity for political leadership, irrespective 
of his personality. Any such constraint would prove detrimental to his 
control and accountability and increase the centrifugal tendency of an 
agency. This tendency, given sufficient persistence, results in a reduction 
of executive authority and distancing from parliamentary control, thus 
impeding the effectiveness of the Westminster model. Indeed, over a number 
of agencies the same tendencies could completely undermine the basis of 
parliamentary government. 
A significant feature of the analysis of circumjacent groups is that 
no cooptative mechanisms are apparent. Neither the agency nor the minister 
make any attempt to obtain the support of external groups. There are 
occasionally ad hoc committees created, but most of these are directly 
concerned with specific estate development and have little to do with agency 
interrelationships. The leading role played by the Housing Department is 
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indicated by the fact that the committees most often come into being on 
the initiative of the Department. When planning has advanced sufficiently 
the Department moves for the creation of such a committee within the Tasmanian 
Executive System. The Minister is not concerned directly or indirectly with 
the committees as they are usually comprised - of middle level officers. This 
appears to be evidence of a centrifugal force of a kind, certainly one 
situation which emphasises the agency leadership potential, in their field 
of expertise. It may be this feeling of being the initiator which reduces 
the desire to promote cooptation. The support from outside, , which agencies 
often feel is necessary to continue with their programmes, is not sought in 
this case. Another interesting feature is that those ., for whom the agency 
provides a Service, are rarely overtly involved in any way. It could 
properly be assumed that either the Minister or the Department would cultivate 
some support from the client group, the tenants, especially since they are so 
clearly identifiable. There was no evidence that such a situation had 
occurredand it was difficult to find any satisfactory explanation.. One 
suggestion was that for the tenants both the agency and the minister were 
regarded as the 'landlord'; 'they'. Nor do ministers feel client orientation 
within the department makes it incumbent upon them merely to react to demand. 
They had made a strong stand on the question of eviction for arrears of rent 
for the same reason. 
There are some indications that the agency is not entirely free of 
some circumjacent groups. Those derived out of the need to account to 
Parliament for funds received or where funds are required for particular 
purposes, actively reduce the autonomy of the agency and place it in a 
dependent role in relation to the minister. The minister is the only direct 
access the agency has to that subsystem and it depends on his understanding 
and capacity to put their case to the extent to which their needs are met. 
However, this does not make the agency wholly dependent since, as explained, 
there are funds available to it which do not require the minister's support. 
The only other time in which Parliament places the minister in the dominant 
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position is when he has either to deal with grievance debates on the 
estimates or to answer questions in question time. For the reasons examined 
earlier and because of the financial situation in the past, the minister, 
has not gained greatly in support of his position from this. It is worth 
noting that there could be a change in parliamentary relations with the 
Department because of the removal of dedicated revenue sources. This practice 
has not been current for long enough yet to draw any conclusions. 
Indirectly, however, there have been forces operating within the 
Parliamentary sphere which do place some demands upon the agency and tend 
to provide a source of potential dominance for the minister. Earlier, in 
discussing the influence of the Auditor General on the agency, it was pointed 
out that there had been trenchant criticisms of the departmental policy in 
certain areas. These, relating to rent rebates and tendering, had been 
presented to Parliament in Annual Reports and thus provided grounds for 
comment about agency activities in that forum. This possibility must 1ways 
inhibit decisions made within the department and increase the need to confer 
with and gain the support of a minister. 
The one circumjacent group which most directly encroached on the 
autoRomy of the agency, did not do so in order to support executive authority. 
The internal administration and support services of an agency are vital to 
its capacity to function effectively. Office staffing, accommodation and 
equipment must all be appropriate in quality and quantity to the tasks to 
be performed. It was especially noticeable that the Director was more con-
cerned with the reduction of agency autonomy by the Public Service Board 
and the several Committees set up by them, than by executive authority or 
political leadership. The provision of inadequate establishments and divergent 
ideas about proper classification•for tasks within the department make it 
difficult for the Director to administer his Department to his satisfaction. 
The increasing professionalism within the field of estate development and 
management is not reflected in the hiring and promotion policies of the Board. 
His main complaint about them was that they cannot have the proper knowledge , 
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and yet do not take his advice sufficiently often. Another minor complaint - 
.although.real enough - is delays in filling positions. All these factors 
have a tendency to make the agency less able to operate autonomously, yet 
they do little to make the ninister's position any stronger. A minister 
may have some chance to make representations to the Board supporting his 
departmental proposals, but there is no institutional means of forcing them 
to take any More notice of him than anyone else. Equally, in the case of 
the accommodation and equipment, there are interdepartmental committees set 
up for rationalising the most efficient use of these resources. It is 
impossible, as was shown in the case of the proposals for data processing, 
for anyone to interfere with such committee decisions. It appears that 
their main concern is to centralise large equipment, such as data banks, and, 
rather than move quickly, they let demand build up until pressure is so great 
that centralizing decisions are the most economic solution. 
This is a situation which has been institutionalised as part of the 
Executive System and is operating as an inhibiting factor for both agency 
autonomy and ministerial control. Both of these areas are dominated by 
the operations of the Public Service Board and Treasury whose officers make 
up the bulk of the Committee members. 
The provision of housing at low rental or on purchase agreements with 
no deposit and low repayment, is a goal that has not been challenged in the 
Tasmanian context since the first Act in 1935. Legitimacy for the agency 
mission is thus extremely strong and results in relatively little alteration 
of the legislation under which the agency functions. There has been no 
period of persistent questioning of the means by which this goal has been 
achieved. The immediate post-1945 period produced the search for some 
alternative methods, but the agency survived any'dethand for radical change 
by hiving off the Housing Division. The recommendation of the Joint Committee 
for a commission was never acted upon and the Housing Division, within the 
Agricultural Bank,.was made a full department under a minister instead. 
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The only legislative change of any great note was the 1953 Act which gave 
retrospective legislative authority to the creation of the department. The 
powers of the Director included in this Act are very great and more in 
keeping with those of a Commissioner than the permanent head of a public 
service department. 82 
There is no doubt that this has led to an attitude within the agency, 
emphasising their 'separateness' from the rest of the Executive System. This 
initial feeling may well have had its roots in the reorganisation of 1949, 
when it was made a separate Division within the Bank. It would have been 
confirmed by the 1953 legislation, making it much less like a Department 
subject to ministerial and parliamentary control. Again, this feeling would 
have been enhanced through the dedicated funding to which reference will be 
made below. There is no indication that the legislative provisions have 
done anything other than support the autonomous climate within the department 
and reduced their dependence on ministerial support within Parliament. 
The programmes operated by the Department for the provision of housing 
has been generally very successful, although- there is always a greater 
demand than housing available. - The satisfactory record has protected the 
reputation of the department, providing no cause to demand legislative change. 
It is also true to say,. that there has been no need for the department to 
require additional authority to perform its tasks in a changing world, as is 
often the case with other areas, e.g. Education and Health. The minister is 
also given protection by these same means, especially from parliamentary 
attention in matters of detail. The questions and grievances brought to his 
attention are relatively minor, more often than not specific to a prospective 
• tenant or constituent:. Sometimes claims are made about regional differences, 
but the most telling legislative interference arises from rental rebate 
..matters. •t.is.here.that the minister.has.to make the departmental case. 
82 It was this difference that led Wettenhall to distinguish the 
Housing Department from a 'pure' ministerial department in his classification 
The Guide, op: - cit. p 11. This analysis does - indicate the possibility that 
such classification may be incorrect - especially in the eyes of the personnel. 
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Neither the department nor the minister suffers greatly from this discussion 
in parliament because the Commonwealth funds were made subject to rebates 
being granted and they can always hide behind this fast. 
The strong legislative provisions in the original statute have been 
a restraint on parliamentary involvement in the department and at the same 
time reduced the need for ministerial leadership. Substantive changes to 
the statute have been rare and departmental autonomy is increased as against 
a minister, when its dependence on his support for new powers is unnecessary. 
Such strong legislative provisions will also enhance the position of the 
departmental senior staff in situations where they wish to promote their 
own deparmental interests. However, as noted, challenges may come from 
external sources to the exercise of legal powers and in situations such as this 
Cabinet becomes the arbiter. Without ministerial support at this level, such 
challenges may be successful despite the legislation, and this will enhance 
executive authority at the expense of administrative capacity. 
The Housing Department seems to attract a staff who find satisfaction 
in the tasks they perform withinthe Department, which in turn promotes an 
organisational loyalty. The actual qualifications of the staff withinthe 
department May not be very strong, in that many had not worked in the field 
of estate management before they joined the agency, but they seem to obtain 
a commitment once they join the department. The attraction of more qualified 
staff for the architectural, technical and building operations, has been 
general over the years, but there has also been a tendency for staff to 
remain with the department. The generation of pride in their work and the 
promotion of 'professional' attitudes seems to have been a deliberate objective 
of at least one Director. The Structuring of the department into specialist 
areas: Technical, Accounts, and.Geheral Estates,. provides a basis for 
individuals to become expert in their particular work and thus provide feedback 
to the agency on its performance. 
Apart from those employed in administrative and technical positions, 
the department has a large construction staff which is directly under the 
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Director's control. The existence of this group must enhance departmental 
autonomy, although it does appear that in disputes with unions in respect 
of this group the Director involves the minister in negotiations. 
The creation of professional attitudes and commitment to the agency 
mission, coupled with the continuity of service of many of the staff, must 
increase the potential autonomy of the agency. The word 'potential' is used 
deliberately, since it was stressed by all concerned that at no stage was 
this potential realised. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the permanent 
head is in a strong position compared with the minister and the rest of the 
Executive System. Information and knowledge of a specialised kind contained only 
within the department with the need to 'educate' ministers and others implies a 
distancing of the agency from the rest of the System. 
The strongest single centrifugal force which promotes agency autonomy 
is that of dedicated revenue sources. The Housing Department has received 
from the Commonwealth funding in the vicinity of $61 million up to 30/6/1972, 83 
whereas it has provided no capital funding for housing itself, other than 
through ordinary loan allocations from the Loans Council. The significance of 
this figure is not that it is so much larger than other departments' grants from 
ordinary loan funds (for example see the funds provided for capital works in 
Education or Hospitals, chapters Iv and V), but that there is no competiti6n 
in the State System regarding its allocation. Ordinary loan funds are allocated 
after discussion at Cabinet level has produced the Grants Commission submission 
each year. There has to be a limitation on the total amount claimed, therefore 
each department has to compete for an allocation of these scarce resources. 
This procedure differs from that of the Housing Department, who negotiated 
directly with the Australian Government for the necessary funds for their 
building programme in the following year. These estimates were discussed within 
the Department, by the Director and Minister, but apart from providing the 
Estimates for rental rebate refund from State 
. 	83Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 44 of 1972. The system of funding 
changed after 1972 (see p 124). 
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Consolidated Revenue Fund, no restrictions were placed by Cabinet over the 
Departmental demands. When it is considered that this situation existed 
for a.period of 20 years with only one short break, it is only to be 
expected that some sense of auturiomy should pervade the agcncy. This source 
of funding also demanded officer to officer level contact between State and - 
Federal departments, providing another element likely to support a feeling 
of self sufficiency within the agency. 
As noted, this situation has now changed since 1971, and there is no 
difference between the capital resources of the Housing Department and other 
departments, they all come from fund allocations agreed at State Cabinet 
level. This will undoubtedly subject the agency to more control from the 
State Executive system and may in the long run alter the past relationships. 
The new arrangements have not been operating long enough for any impact to 
have been obvious, although the allocated capital funds in 1974 were not 
significantly different from those requested by the department in 1972. 
One other point of importance is, that where funds have to be obtained 
from the common allocation, there is more likelihood of Treasury interference 
in departments. Whilst dedicated funding was available, Treasury had little 
to control other than the usual audit demands for all government expenditure. 
The new arrangements may not significantly increase demands from Treasury, 
but this could be an optimistic assessment. Prior consultation with the 
minister and the provision of estimates to the Treasury have in the past 
been matters which the Director had within his control. It may well be, that 
this state of affairs will no longer exist, reducing administrative capacity 
• through its dependence on external support, particularly political leadership. 
Previous independence from the usual annual appropriations for carrying on 
the tasks of the department, both by capital funding. and by revenue funding 
from rental receipts, has provided a foundation for departmental autonomy. 
Any agency which has internal sources of revenueindependent to a large 
degree from the Consolidated Revenue Fund can proceed with its planning on 
a longer term basis. It certainly will not be looking to its minister for 
146 
support at Estimates time, nor in the Appropriation debates. In fact, the 
minister may well be endeavouring to obtain assistance from the department 
with information and answers for questioners. With this position operating 
for such a long period, the department must have built up a tradition of 
autonomy. 
Institutionalised forms of activity to deal with particular demands 
-- 
placed upon the agency have emerged and the Director does not have quite the 
same organisational role as other permanent heads of departments. In many 
areas of activity he makes decisions or delegates the decision making 
authority to others, not considering the necessity of involving the minister 
first. There is no doubt that the Director and Deputy Director do involve 
the minister, because the administrative style is 'cooperative', but the 
impression given was, that this was the only reason. For example, the 
department functioned without significant alteration during the period needed 
for some minis -cers to 'learn the job' - about twelve months. It was also 
quite clear that a new minister could seldom take up the portfolio and 
immediately set about changing already existing plans, because of the 
inherently greater knowledge and expertise of the officers over that of the 
minister. The possibility of this internal solidarity is increased by 
external forces, which support this expertise, e.g. through the Commonwealth 
Housing Department and their expert bodies, and through overseas contacts 
and equipment and materials firms' representatives. The minister may have 
final decision on a variety of matters, but that decision quite often appears 
to be only 'yes' or 'no', not a choice between a number of alternatives. 
These have already been eliminated by the agency before placing the recommen-
dation before the minister. Such course appears to be proper in a quasi 
• professional department such as this, which employs experts in specific 
fields to advise and offer recommendations. Whatever the reason, there is 
no doubt that it increases the potential for administrative capacity and 
reduces the areas in which a minister can exercise political leadership and 
executive authority. 
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To summarise; 
Centrifugal Force  
(a) circumjacent groups 
(b) legislative provisions 
(c) professional staffing 
(d) finance 
Effect 
There appears to be no significant 
reliance on such groups for support 
nor any cooptative activity; the 
relations with other groups such as 
Cabinet and Parliament have not been 
such as to promote or reduce political 
leadership at the expense of adminis-
trative capacity, although such groups 
as the Auditor General, Public Service 
Board and some Interdepartmental 
Committees have the effect of limiting 
the flexibility of the agency in certain 
areas; this is not, however, supportive 
of ministerial control and political 
leadership. 
A strong substantive statute in Homes 
Act 1935, to which Director's powers 
were added in 1975, has produced definite 
basis for agency autonomy and reduction 
of ministerial control, despite S.4. 
Restraints are imposed upon the extent 
to which the minister has the right to 
interfere and thus allow the initiative 
to be with agency, this provides the 
right climate for the permanent head or 
departmental officers to promote their 
autonomy, reducing the scope for poli-
tical leadership. 
Limited numbers of professional staff in 
accepted sense of term offset by the 
mission oriented approach to service 
of home building and estate management 
for low renters. Expertise in these 
areas produces a quasi professional 
outlook which increases supportive 
relations within agency and promotes 
external status. These factors will 
work to inhibit political leadership in 
situations of conflict between agency 
and minister. 
Dedicated revenue sources of the past 
have eliminated reliance on annual 
appropriations, thus reducing the need 
for ministerial support. The survival 
of the agency is not threatened by 
sources within the influence of the 
minister and thus he is not needed to 
provide funds to promote agency interests. 
Use of the rents received for current 
expenses without need tocall on State 
Revenues has an important effect on 
agency autonomy. The presence of a 
small profit which is paid into Consoli-
dated Revenue Fund enhances agency 
external status irrespective of political 
leadership. 
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(e) departmental traditions consistent growth of demand and 
satisfactory supply has given status 
and increased internal pride of 
achievement. Long service with 
department of many senior officers 
promotes agency loyalty and strengthens 
internal ties. Day labour organisation 
provides base for agency independence 
and freedom from normal System controls. 
Whilst the level of professionalism 
does not promote an aristocratic agency 
it does provide an acceptable internal 
status to support an independent line 
and constrain a minister in his dealings 
with the Director and senior officers. 
The combined effect of these forces would indicate that the minister 
would find it difficult to pursue political leadership or exercise executive 
authority in the face of determined agency autonomy. Clearly, the test 
of this hypothesis would only eventuate where there was a conflictive 
situation which does not yet appear to have arisen. From the evidence it 
seems that all activities are carried out in a cooperative spirit and agency 
operations are seldom challenged after extensive consultation with the 
agency officers. Nonetheless, there can belittle doubt that a fundamental 
change in objectives imposed by a political decision would be subjected 
to strong adaptation measures within the agency, either frustrating or 
reducing the value of the objective. 
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IV 
THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT 
Introduction 
Prior to 1885 education for the children of Tasmanian families 
was provided for a fee through local boards cf education, subject from 
time to time to oversight by a regional or central inspection imposed 
by the Executive. There was little direction or control from the State 
and the level of involvement through subsidy was minimal. The Public 
Schools Act 1868 incorporated a single board with an inspectorate and 
local advisory school boards were encouraged. There was no public 
education beyond primary school and access to many of the schools in 
country districts was difficult, indicating the relative lack of attention 
given to education during this period. 
"Poor communications, shortage 	trained teachers, and 
lack of buildings and finance confined government interest 
initially to granting subsidies to those schools run by 
private individuals who were willing to educate poor 
children in return for such aid." 1 
Other educational establishments were of course available to those able to 
pay their higher fees, usually church schools, although some were non-
denominational. Such schools provided education beyond the primary level 
but were not subject to any kind of control or inspection, since they 
received no assistance from government funds. 
In 1882 a Select Committee on Education reported and - amongst other 
recommendations - proposed "such a redistribution of authority as shall 
place the whole system fcif educatiori7 under one paid head official who would 
be directly responsible to a Minister of the Crown". 2 'Other proposals 
1Wettenhall, Guide p 110 
2Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 106 of 1882 
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were for more autonomy for the local advisory boards and the need for a 
training scheme for teachers. The Report reveals the poor quality of 
public education provided at that time, despite the 1868 Act which had 
maee attendance at school compulsory for children between 7 and 14 years 
of age, provided they lived within a two mile radius of the school. But 
the Report revealed a number of problems in enforcing the law, especially 
.when parents of such children were supposed to pay fees. 
"At present the responsibility of deciding what constitutes 
minimum attendance rests with the Magistrate. In each 
district a Magistrate might declare the minimum as four days 
a week, in another it might be fixed at three days a month. 
Your Committee recommend a standard of 30 days a quarter." 
More importantly, the Report proposed that education should be made free 
as well as setting the standard of compulsory attendance. The problem was 
how to pay for it, because the two alternatives it saw as available - local 
education rates or subsidy from government taxes - were not likely to be 
popular. As the Committee argued: 
"As regards the former, (local education rates) your Committee 
considers that while it would be more certain in its operation, 
it would be calculated to make education unpopular and 
therefore should not be resorted to save as a last expediency.... 
Having this in view, and seeing how desirable it is to make 
education popular, your Committee suggest that enforced public 
aid of schools should be levied in the shape of fines for non-
attendance." 
As a consequence of this Report reforms were proposed which became legis-
lation in the form of the Education Act 1885 which provided for a system 
of public education. Schools which had been previously established and 
maintained by the Board of Education or Chief Secretary were declared 
State Schools by the Act. Boards of Advice were created by the Act which 
endeavoured to legislate for matters raised by the 1882 Commission. 
A Report of a Select Committee of Parliament provided a comprehensive 
list of schools, teachers and pupils for the month of March, 1907. 3 
3Tasmania Parliamentary Paper No. 40 of 1907 
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This showed that there were 711 schools under the control of the 
Department of Education and its minister. The Board of Education had 
almost gone out of existence, its functions having been taken over by a 
Department comprised of an Inspectorate and a Director with minimal clerical 
assistance. The portfolio of Minister for Education was not, however, 
immediately allocated after the 1885 Act and it was not until 1904 that 
the then Premier took charge of the portfolio. 4  All the 711 schools were 
controlled by the Education Department and all matters relating to their 
management and support were Department responsibility, subject to some schools 
remaining under local Boards of Advice for day to day management. Of these 
711 schools 230 were 'one teacher schools' and 43 more only had the Head 
Teacher and a 'monitor', i.e. a pupil over 14 years of age who had stayed 
on to help and perhaps later become a pupil teacher. The majority of . 
schools had an attendance of between 10 and 100 pupils, while 36 had less 
than 10 (Fentonbury had only two!). There were 12 with 200 pupils or more, 
of which 10 were in Launceston and Hobart, the other two being in Zeehan and 
Queenstown (both mining towns on the West Coast).. The Department employed 
a total of 851 teachers - 711 head teachers, 38 Assistant Teachers, 89 
Temporary assistants and 13 pupil teachers. 
Teacher recruitment, classification and examination for promotion were 
the responsibility of the Inspectorate within the Department, under the 
control of the Director of Education. Since 'there were only four Inspectors, 
it is not surprising that matters such as classification got out of hand. 
There was also a.difference of opinion between the teachers and the Director 
about the appointment and promotion of South Australian teachers. (The 
Director himself was recruited from South Australia). Such was the ill-feeling 
4As Wettenhall points out:"Titular recognition came with the formation 
of the Evans government in 1904: J.W. Evans took personal charge of the 
Education Department, and is quaintly styled in the records as 'Premier 
and Minister of Education .without portfolio'. - Guide, op: cit., p 110 
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that the teachers forced the government to set up a Royal Commission on the 
Administration of the Education Department of Tasmania and the system of 
State School Education. 5 
The Interim Report of t.le Commission made a number of recommendations 
to overcome the immediate difficulties of teachers. It was indicated that 
a number of factors were involved. For example, many teachers had no 
knowledge of the regulations under which the Department operated; salary 
scales and classification criteria were not easily understood, were often 
impossible to apply and promotion was slow. One teacher giving evidence 
to the 1882 Select Committee, had been at New Norfolk for 12 years without 
any change. He said, "I have been 18 years under the Board of Education, 
have passed all their examinations and am now only receiving 200 per annum." 
However, the Royal Commission in 1909 found that the Director was the 
main cause of the problems, 
"1.-!-. is, Your Commissioners think, certain that the education 
of the state has suffered partly from the circumstances that 
the Director has done work that should have been done by others, 
and partly because his staff of inspectors has, until quite 
recently been too small to do efficiently and quickly the work 
involved in training the teachers in new work and methods." 
The Commission found that 
"Tasmania has provided Only the first grade and the last of a 
system of education, namely, the primary and the University, 
leaving the gulf between the two to be bridged by private 
secondary schools, between which and the primary schools there 
is no coordination, and the doors of which are practically 
closed to parents whose children cannot afford to pay' the 
fees." 0 
Its recommendations subsequently found legislative form in the Free Education 
Act 1908; which abolished all fees for state schools, and in the Education 
. Act 1912 which gave the Education Department its present structure and 
extended state education beyond the primary school. High schools were 
5Ta smania, Parliamentary Paper No. 49 of 1907 and No. 	of 1909 
6 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 1 of 1909 p viii 
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•opened in Hobart and. Launceston in 1913 and what were termed "intermediate 
high schools" in Burnie and Devonport in 1916. 
The next major step was the consolidation of the various Education 
Acts, including the 1912 Act, into the Education Act 1932 under which major 
legislation the Department still operates, although it has been amended 
many times since 1932. The preamble of the Act statesthat it is 
"...to consolidate and amend the law relating to 
education and to provide for and regulate the granting 
of . bursaries and the registration of teachers and schools." 
By s. 4(1) the "Governor may appoint a Director-General of Education, 
a. Deputy Director-General of Education and Directors of Primary Education, 
Secondary Education and Technical Education, and such other officers as 
he may think fit for the purposes of this Act." Therefore, none of the 
senior officials in the Department are under the control of the Public 
Service Board and are appointed, in fact, by the Minister in consultation 
with the Director-General, in all cases other than his own appointment. 
Only the clerical staff in the Department are made subject to the Board, 
•leaving all teachers to be appointed by the Director-General outside the 
control of the Board. The Director-General is "head of the Department for 
the purposes of the Public Service Act, as if he were an officer to whom 
the provisions of that Act apply." 7 
All senior departmental officers, mentioned in s. 4(1), have con-
.sistently been drawn from, the teaching service rather than the clerical 
side. The promotion ceiling for teachers is therefore higher than for the 
clerical side of the department and further reference will be made to this 
important factor later, but it must be noted that it was built into the 
legislation from its inception. Other employees of the department which 
7 Education Act, s.4(2A) 
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are outside the Public Service Act are 'such servants and workmen as are 
required for the purposes of the Act' and these may be appointed by the 
minister on the recommendation of the Director-General. 8 He also has the 
duty of classifying and paying salaries and allowances to .chose teachers 
appointed under s.4(1) and s.4(3) in such a way as he may with the minister's 
approval determine. 
The department is therefore an employing authority of some importance. 
The growth of full time teaching staff is indicated in Table I. 
TABLE 1 
Full-time Teachers in Tasmanian Government Schools 
At 1st August . 
Year Male Female Total 
1964 393 586 979 
1951 422 608 1,030 
1956 683 1,478 2,161 
1961 908 1,533 2,441 
1962 963 1,834 2,797 
196.3_ 1,042 1,877 2,919 
1964 1,134 1,881 3,015 
1965 1,216 1,915 3,131 
1966 1,222 1,961 3,183 
1967 1,220 2,085 3,305 
1968 1,240 2,143 3,383 
1969 1,264 2,200 3,464 
1970 1,280 2,284 3,564 
1971 1,338 2,331 3,669 
1972 1,429 2,345 3,774 
1973 1,501 2,365 3,866 
1974 1,521 2,499 4,020 
Its total non-public service staff including teachers as at 1 August 1974 is 
Supervisory, Advisory or administrative duties 	 42 
Full and part time teachers 	 4020 
Others  	232 
4294 
8Education Act, s. 4(3) 
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Teacher training has until recently been the direct responsibility 
of the department and there has - been a Training College in Hobart since 
1911 when the Philip Smith College was opened. A further college was 
opened in LauncestOn in 1952 and these two institutions renained until 1968. 
During this time the University was also involved in teacher training, 
especially for secondary school teachers through the post graduate Diploma. 
ofEducation courses. The creation of the Tasmanian College of Advanced 
Education in 1968 removed departmental responsibility for some Technical 
Education and Teacher Training. 
• The College was given autonomy from departmental control under the 
Advanced Education Act 1968 and placed under- the direction of a Council on 
which the department has representation. The expressed purpose of the 
Council is "to provide a system of advanced education to train persons for 
the professions". 9 The department has withdrawn from training its own 
teachers, although, as an employer, it does retain a considerable degree 
of influence through its specification of qualification for entry into the 
teaching service. A further , influence is exercised through the department's 
administration of the Teachers and Schools' Registration Board, which was 
set up under the 1932 Act for the purpose of regulating the standards of 
teaching in non-state schools. Table 2 indicates the numbers of trainees 
involved: 
(TABLE 2 - please see next page) 
9 
Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 9 of 1969, p 27 
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TABLE 2 
Training of Teachers Students in Training as at 1st August 10 
Year Male Female Total 
1946 32 60 92 
1951 83 152 235 
1956 124 299 423 
1961 183 380 563 
1962 229 414 643 
1963 221 450 671 
1964 225 529 754 
1965 258 600 858 
1966 299 614 913 
1967 321 679 1,000 
1968 344 	' 712 1,056 
1969 355 773 1,128 
1970 405 763 1,168 
1971 460 856 1,316 
1972 487 871 1,358 
1973 488 934 1,422 
1974 466 1,046 1,512 
However, apart from these staffing provisions the Act places the duty and 
responsibility for various departmental functions specifically on the 
minister. 11 
Amendments to the Act in 1963 and 1966 continue this institutionalised 
form of traditional ministerial dominance by providing specific powers for 
the minister in regard to the Board of Technical Education 12 and providing 
that he may establish, maintain and operate an Institution for scientific 
equipment'. 13 It is also noticeable that, unlike for example Housing, the 
Annual Report of the Education Department is made to Parliament by the 
minister and not the Director-General. 
10Education Department Statistics Branch; personal communication 
11  Education Act 1932 ss. 4A, 5, 8, 9, 13 & 16 are examples which 
are more particularly referred to post p 224. 
12Education Act 1932 s.19 amended by Education Act 1963. 
13 Education Act 1932 s.32A-G as amended by Education Act 1966. 
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Growth of the Department  
The services provided by the Department have grown steadily over the 
years since its inception. The introduction of Area Schools for isolated 
rural communities in the period between 1930 and 1940 was an experiment of 
considerable importance for Tasmanian education and led the way in Australia. 
The extension of the school-leaving age to 16 in 1943 and the creation of 
'modern schools' were also growth factors. 
"In the decade after 1938 Tasmania led Australia in a 
series of dramatic educational reforms - the abolition of 
most external examinations, the abolition of homework - 
in the first four grades of primary schools, promotion by 
age rather than examination results, raising theschool 
leaving age to sixteen, the abolition of inspectors, the 
transfer of complete responsibility for teacher training 
to the University. u14 
Just as the early reforms had been the direct consequence of the 1882 and 
1909 Commissions, so these changes had their origins in two Committees 
whose reports were published in 1943 and 1946. 15  As a result secondary 
education in Tasmania by 1955 was organised around the identified needs of 
children in rural and city areas; and in academic and non-academic subjects. 
The situation was as follows: 
a) 	Area Schools - situated in rural areas consolidating adjacent small 
primary schools and providing a post primary education to school leaving 
age based on a rurally oriented curriculum. In most cases such schools 
had access to or actually ran their own farms. They provided six.years 
of primary school and three of secondary, although a few had additional 
fourth year classes for those who wanted to obtain Schools Board 
Certificates. 
Modern Schools - mainly situated in urban areas for children who were 
expected to finish their schooling three years after their primary 
14' A. Barcan, "A transition of Australian Education 1939-1967" in 
J.Cleverly and J. Lawry,-(eds.), Australian Education in the Twntieth Century  
(Melbourne: Longmans, 1972) p 176. 
15Eduation Department of Tasmania, Report of the Committee on Educational 
Extension (Hobart: 1943); Education Department of Tasmania, Report of the  
Committee on Education Aims of the Primary School (Hobart: 1946). 
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education. They were oriented towards technical, manual types of 
subject and the development of citizenship. Initially, as with the 
Area School, attached as the 'top' of larger primary schools, they 
were subsequently made autonomous and allowed to teacli a fourth year. 
Technical High School - there were only two of these in the cities of 
Hobart and Launceston. They were intended to provide an entry point 
for those interested in industrial careers and lead to apprenticeships 
and cadetships in industry. Their base was also broadened with the 
introduction of language courses in the 1950s. 
d) High Schools - were to be found in large urban centres and were 
essentially for the academic child whose expectations were to matriculate. 
They were selective in intake from examinations in the last year of 
the primary school. While the curriculum was basically academic, other 
subjects of a commercial and technical kind were later added. The 
result was a restricted form of comprehensive school, although it was 
not so termed at the time. There were eight such schools in 1955: 
three in Hobart, two in Launceston and the remaining three along the 
more populated North West Coast. 
The pattern remained much the same until the introduction of the 
comprehensive high schools and matriculation colleges in the 1960s. This 
change like many others in the field of education was prefaced by much 
discussion. 16 
The first proposals were made to the Council on Secondary Education, 
set up in 1957 at the request of the Tasmanian Teachers Federation. This 
Council was an advisory body to assist in planning educational development 
in the post primary field. Committees to investigate post primary education 
in Launceston and the development of post primary education in the Hobart 
16For a case study see R.A.Alexander, A Case Study in Decisionmaking:  
The Establishment of Matriculation Colleges in the Tasmanian  Education  
System. (Unpublished Honours Dissertation, University of Tasmania, December 1973). 
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area were set up by the Education Department in 1959 and 1960. These, 
together with the Council, played an important role in arriving at the 
present state of affairs in education. 17 These changes, while physically 
expanding the services to mee .L increasing demands, have at the same time 
been the product of significant differences in educational philosophies. 
Not only have these changes of opinion affected the areas mentioned, but 
their influence has been felt also in the post secondary field. 
The Technical Education Branch was formed within the Education 
Department in 1917 and reorganised into the Board of Technical Education 
in 1963 in recognition of its increased importance. These considerations 
are reflected in the Report on The School in Society, 
"76...the schools should be concerned in both the development 
of individuals as individuals and the preparation of 
individuals to share in andcontribute to society. 
77.. .We must remember that the school is not an isolated 
organisation. Its work is continually affected by outside 
forces. It does not set its own goals nor can it seek to 
implement tlem quite independently of other agencies... 
79.. .While the chool's ultimate goal may be to equip 
children to take their place in society, its ultimate goal 
is to provide conditions where children may behave and 
develop as children rather than as little adults, in the 
belief that childhood lived fully will lead to a capacity 
for full adulthood." 18 
The current position may be seen from the diagram and Table. The diagram 
indicated the general structure of the school system; 19 Table 3 shows 
the number of schools involved in each area over the years 1950-1974. 20 
17 For more detailed analysis of these events see G.L.Johnston, 
Fifty Years of State Secondary Education in Tasmania 1913-1962, (Unpublished 
M.A.thesis, University of Tasmania, 1963); Alexander, 22: cit.; and 
L.N. Vertigan, A Case Study in Decisionmaking: A change to Comprehensive  
Organisation in Tasmanian Secondary Schools,  (Unpublished dissertation for 
Diploma of Public Administration, University of Tasmania, 1967). 
18 . Education Department of Tasmania, Report of the Committee set up  
to investigate the Role of the School in Society (Hobart; 1968) p 23. 
19 	- Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 45 of 1974, p 13. 
20Education Department of Tasmania, School in Society, Appendix A, 
brought up to date with figures supplied by Education Department Research 
Branch. 
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Secondary (Modern)1 /Technical High 	3 
Number. Open 
1956 1961 1966 1971 1974 
51 53 57 44 34 
11 14 12 22 23 
6 12 19 22 25 
10 13 12 19 19 
12 23 34 25 30 
22 29 30 27 23 
38 31 27 26 28 
37 17 4 3 6 
136 139 138 144 154 
29 19 14 7 1 
1 3 1 2 3 
2 2 7 6 10 
11 14 10 8 3 
22 20 15 15 18 
5 2 2 4 2 
41 41 35 35 36 
6 
4 14 19 20 22 
3 2 6 5 7 
-4 5 1 - _ 1 - - 
- - 1 
1 
3 5 
21 30 31 36 
1950 
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School - Type 
and Class 
Pre 
Kindergarten 
Primary 
IA 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
Total Primary 
Primary with 
Secondary Tops • 
Area 
IA 
II 
III 
IV 
Total Area 
District 
High 
IA 
II 
III & IV 
Unclassified 
IA with Matric 
matriMaMil 
Colleges IA 
Total 
31 
2 
5 
6 
7 
20 
50 
104 
47 
1 
3 
16 
7 
27 
2 
3 
1 
1 
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TABLE 3 
APPENDIX A 
Type and Class of Schools Itn Tasmania 1950-1974 : Number of Schools open 
at Census Date (excluding Special) 
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All these changes would not have taken place; however, Without the 
demands made by an increasing school population. Graph I indicates the 
actual enrolments over the years since 1946, showing that the far greater 
proportion of demand has come from the secondary area in which the changes 
discussed above have, been most clearly in evidence. 
Political Leadership and State Aid  
Although the first Minister for Education was also the Premier, the 
portfolio has been one of those frequently joined with other functions 
under one minister. It has most often been conjointly held by the Attorney 
General, either alone (for 21 years) or with other portfolios (for 4 years). 
For 27 years - the longest period by far - it was held by the Premier either 
alone or together with other portfolios. This indicates that the Department 
was regarded as of prime importance by the politicians and parliament. 
Perhaps more significant is the fact that in the years since 1946 it has 
been held as a sole portfolio for a total of some 20 years', Table 4 sets out 
full details. 
:The provision of education by the State has always received support 
within Tasmania, but there were elements of political risk. The reason why 
a minister was not appointed during the period between 1885, when the 
Department of Education was created, and 1904, when Mr. Evans became Premier 
and minister is evidence of this. Despite the moves to compulsory free 
primary school education started in 1868 and continued in 1885 little success 
was achieved until the Act of 1908. The source of this risk is not hard 
to find - religious education. 
"Until 1908 the Catholics struggled to prevent the 
government from introducing free education while their 
schools were still unsubsidised. In view Of the 
attractive power of gratuitous state schools to needy 
Catholic parents this was a natural reaction on the 
part of the clergy. In the end free education was 
provided and general public Opinion showed no signs of 
granting Catholic demands." 21 
21R.P. Davis, A Guide to the State Aid Tangle of Tasmania (Hobart: 
Cat & Fiddle Press, 1974). p7. 
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164 
1904-1905 
1905-1906 
1906-Oct. 1907 
Oct.1909-1912 
1912-1914 
1914-1916 
19161922 
1939-1947 
1947-1948 
1948-1958 
1958-1969 
Holder of Education Portfolio 
Premier, Minister for Education without: portfolio 
Premier, Treasurer and Minister for Education 
Attorney-General and Minister for Education 
Attorney-General, Minister for Education and Minister 
for Mines 
Attorney General and Minister for Education 
Treasurer, Minister for Education and Minister for Railways 
Premier (Chief Secretary & Treasurer) and Minister for 
Education 
Treasurer and Minister for Education 
Attorney General and Minister for Education 
Attorney General and Minister for Education to 1924 
with Mines and Forests to 1925 with Forests only to 1927 
and then reverted to Attorney General and Education to 1928 
Attorney General and Minister for Education 
ditto 
Attorney General, Minister for Education, Minister . for 
Fauna and Game, Minister for Inland and Deep Sea Fisheries 
Premier, Minister for Education, Minister administering 
Hydro-Electric Commission, Minister for Civil Defence, 
Minister for Commerce and Industry and Treasurer to 1946 
with Assistant Minister for Education 1945 then in 
addition Minister for Transport, Minister for Tourism 
and Immigration. 
Minister for Education and Transport 
Premier and Minister for Education 
Minister for Education (Mr W.A. Neilson) also Attorney 
General August-October 1958 
Minister for Education (Mr A. Mather) 
Minister for Education (Mr Neilson) 
1922-1923 
1923-1928 
1928-1934 
1934 
1934-1939 
1969- 197 2 
197271973 
1973 to date -Minister for Education, Recreation and the Arts and 
Minister for National Parks and Wildlife. 
Source: Tasmanian Red Book, Walch's Almanac 
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A number of premiers and Education ministers were, of course, Catholic 
and this increased the tension between the needs of a growing demand 
for state involvement in the field and claims by the Catholic Church 
schools for parity through state aid. Subsequent events have not buried 
the issue so strongly evident in the period at the turn of the century. 
Dr Davis traces the history of these tensions, especially for members' 
of the Labor Party, committed as they were to free secular education. 22  
Indeed, one prominent Labour politician, who was later to become premier, 
Edmund Dwyer Gray, was denounced for his inadequate support of Catholic 
education from the pulpit of his own church. 23 
However, it was not just the Catholics who provided pressure on 
Education Ministers. The interest of non-Catholics lay in the provision 
of secondary schools to provide an alternative to those private schools 
whose fees were too high for the majority of citizens. 
"Unlike the Catholics, Protestants were interested in 
secondary schools which trained an elite, not primary 
schools for the workers. Until 1912 there were no 24 state high schools to compete with private establishments." 
This pressure led to an acceptance of the cohcept that all private', 
as opposed to 'state schools, should receive a return per capita on the 
basis that parents of children attending those schools were paying 'double 
taxation', 
"In 1948 a joint parliamentary committee had discovered that 
Tasmanian private schools saved the state .1500,000 per annum. 
The Liberals, traditionally contemptuous of private primaries 
but solicitous towards the more elitist independent 
secondaries, now began to consider their position with regard 
to State Aid." 25 
22See for the period up to 1920 R.P.Davis State Aid and Tasmanian  
Politics, 1868-1920 (Hobart: 1969) . 
23R.P.Davis, A Guide,22: cit., p 8. 
24. ibid. 
2592. cit., p 51 
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The relaxation of the traditional Liberal hostility to state aid led to 
a long and unsuccessful attempt by Premier Cosgrove, during t1e1950s to. 
introduce legislation for per capita grants to non-state schools. On 
three separate occasions, 1952, 1956 and 1957, he pushed legislation through 
the House of Assembly only to have it rejected by the Legislative Council. 
However, the arguments generated during this time affected the Tasmanian 
political climate for the next decade. Indeed, Dr. Davis claims that there 
is evidence to indicate vascillations over state aid policies led to much 
dissention over Liberal Party leadership, possibly even losing them the 
election of 1959. 26 However, it was left to Premier Reece, the first non-
Catholic Labour premier in Tasmania, to carry through State Aid legislation 
successfully. 
Federal Labor politics, an imminent election and private school 
supporters hoping for additional funds, were all elements in this fascinating 
seed bed, which took until 1967 to germinate. The seedling was not strong: 
"These grants jinder the legislation] bore no relation 
whatever to the.real difficulties of the Catholic school 
system which Archbishop Young was determined to keep at 
full strength and expand to cover the entire Catholic 
school population. The grants then were a species of 
Danegeld which the Reece governmentoptimistically 27 
hoped would keep the Catholics temporarily happy." 
A consequence of this was a prolongation of the dispute until the present, 
the debate becoming more bitter as the Underlying issues and principles 
became less clear. The involvement of the Federal government, through 
direct and selective grants since the science grants in 1964, did not allow 
the issue to remain dormant. The problem was no longer one of whether or 
not to give state aid, but of whether or not to raise the grants already 
made. Much of this aspect of the fight, or the "Hundred Years War for 
26R.P.Davis, p. cit., pp 60 et seq. 
2722: cit , p 74 
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State Aid" as D 	i r Davis called t 28  was carried on by two groups - the DOGS 
(defence of government schools) and the Tasmanian Teachers Federation. 
The former, "a relatively small but completely dedicated group of intellectuals, 
many of whom were connected with the University of Tasmania", 29  even selected 
candidates to stand for the state parliament in 1971. They claimed that 
aggregating all grants and aid, including hidden elements.such as tax exemptions, 
showed private schools were supported by the state to almost the same extent 
that state schools were. With rapid inflation the position became worse 
and demands from private schools for further aid only added flames to the 
fire of the debate, especially after the 1971 budget, which produced what 
the Catholic Archbishop of Tasmania called 'an almost contemptuous increase 
of $4•' 30 
"The controversy had now become a verbal free-for-all 
with government, opposition, rival parent bodies, DOGS, 
ecclesiastics, and teachers in the field battling for 
their particular viewpoints. The unfortunate government 
took a battering from every side." 31 
The extremely strong reactions of the Teachers Federation, the 
association which represents the majority of State employed teachers, indicate 
its central position in the Tasmanian education system. In the period of 
the 1950s, while Premier Cosgrove was making his unsuccessful bid for state 
aid, the teachers were articulate in opposition through their Federation. 
...as state school teachers were responsible for the 
education of the vast majority of the community's children 
their practical experience of inadequacies should at least 
be taken seriously. The teachers in 1957 were supported 
by numerous state school parents and friends assodations 	3 
whose influence the Catholics admit .z.ed to be considerable." 
As the arguments about comparative financial assistance between state and 
28Davis, 22• cit., p 97 
2992. 
.E ' 	79 
302k. cit p 86 
312E. cit., p 87 
32 op. cit., p 56 
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and private schools began to dominate, the-voice of the Federation was 
heard more frequently. It was in the term of the Bethune Liberal Government 
that the Federation actively attacked its master, the State Government. In 
consequence of the government's announcement that it would increase aid to 
private schools in 1971, the Federation "denounced it as a 'rude shock' to 
the state parents and teachers." 33 Later that same year the suggestion by 
the premier, that the state should pay salaries of private school teachers, 
was called "rankly stupid' when some presided over classes of less than 
ten children while in the state school teachers struggled with 45". 34 
An indication of the relative student -numbers attending state- and private 
schools in 1966 and 1974 is given in Table 5. 
Even the Education Department Superintendants, who had formed their 
own Institute of Inspectors of Schools, joined in the debate directly in 
1969, issuing a statement of their position. In nailing their colours to the 
non-State aid mast they claim, 
"...Institute policy has consistently been identical with 
that of the two other large organisations directly concerned 
with the welfare of the state education system - the Council of 
Parents and Friends' Organisations and the Tasmanian Teachers' 
Federation. The policy has been to oppose state aid to non- 
State schools until the state system is provided for adequately." 35 
In justification they point to their identification with the State system 
a 
as teachers and subsequently as Inspectors, 
"For the greater part of /ids/ career, each member has 
been all too painfully aware of the needs of the state 
school system." 36 
On no other issue have they found it necessary to go to the length of 
preparing such a public statement, although they indicate that they are a 
professional body and concerned with the professional issues in a non 
political and non sectarian way. 
The State Aid issue dramatises in a most revealing way some of the 
35Davis, 22. cit., p 84. 
342. ti E	t., p85 
3S Printed handout of the Institute, December 1969. 
36ibid. 
TABLE 5 
Primary and Secondary Enrolments 
Government and Non-Government Schools in 1966 & 1974 
(Excludes Pre, Kindergarten and Special) 
,PRIMARY 
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.. 1966 
1974 
Government Non 
Government 
Total % 
Government 
% 	Non 
Government 
Boys 22,907 4,001 26,908 85.1 14.9 
Girls 21,207 4,293 25,500 83.2 16.8 
Total 44,114 8,294 52,408 84.2 15.8 
Boys 21,237 3,068 24,305 87.3 12.7 
Girls 19,846 3,280 23.126 85.9 14.1 
Total 41,083 6,348 47,431 86.6 13.4 
1966 
1974 
1966 
1974 
SECONDARY 
Boys 11,995 2,924 14,919 80.4 19.6 
Girls 10,967 3,178 14,145 77.5 22.5 
Total 22,962 6,102 29,064 79.0 21.0 
Boys 15,040 3,022 18,062 83.5 16.5 
Girls 14,239 3,404 17,643 80.7 19.3 
Total 29,279 6,426 35,705 82.1 17.9 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY 
Boys 34,902 6,925 41,827 83.4 16.6 
Girls 32,174 7,471 39,645 81.2 18.8 
Total 67,076 14,396 81,472 82.3 17.7 
Boys 36,277 6,090 42,367 85.6 14.4 
Girls 34,085 6,684 40,769 83.6 16.4 
Total 70,362 12,774 83,136 84.6 15.4 
Source: Education Department Statistics Branch. Personal Communication, 
providing 1974 figures. 1966 figures in Education Department: 
School in Society (a.. cit.) 
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major institutional factors which are pertinent to the subsequent inter-
pretation of the interactions and activities of this Department, However, 
before proceeding to that stage two other important considerations must be 
discussed, finance and organisation. 
Financial Aspects  
From the time when primary education was made compulsory, then free, 
to its extension to the secondary area - from 1.968, through 1908 to 1912 - 
the cost to the community in taxation terms was relatively light, despite 
the arguments to avoid taxation raised in the Select Committee Report 1882. 
Table 6 details capital and recurrent expenditure for the three periods 
1935/36 - 1939/40; 1949/50 - 1955/56; .1968/69 - 1975/76 
The increases in expenditure as shown have always been met from state funds 
until the sudden Federal Government reversal of 1964. School science block 
grants of approximately 15million were announced after the 1963 Federal 
election which seemed to establish the value of direct grants for education 
as an election winner: From then, on the various specialist forms of federal 
grants gradually increased until by 1970 grants were being made to Science 
Laboratories (still); Technical education; advanced education; secondary 
school libraries and universities (other than through the Australian University 
Council). There is little doubt that to some extent such assistance does 
have a distorting effect on the spending of the state. 37 
After 1972, however, the position radically altered through the report 
of the Karmel Commission. 38 This Commission set up by the Australian 
Government after the Labor victory in the December 1972 elections was 
intended to identify those areas of education in all states which needed 
assistance. It recommended funds for primary and secondary education for 
the period 1974 -75 and foreshadowed further. Federal ;assistance for the 
four year period to 1979. 
• - 37This has been demonstrated by B.W.DaviS, "Fiscal policies in a 
claimant state", unpublished paper given to Third Conference of Economic Society of Australia & New Zealand, Adelaide May 1973. 38Sthools in Australia. Report of the Australian Schools Commission May 1973. 
TABLE 6 
Recurrent and Capital Expenditure 
1935/36 to 1939/40 1949/50 to 1955/56 1969/70 to 1975/76 
Year Recurrent Capital 
i i 
1935/36 273:830 54,139 
1936/37 292,726 62,375 
1937/38 325,862 65,554 
1938/39 341,442 78,770 
1939/40 356,087 70,472 
t _ Jr 
1949/50 2,674,684 485,702 
1950/51 2,857,784 1,089,874 
1951/52 3,949,938 1,302,120 
1952/53 4,913,890 1,237,886 
, 1953/54 5,196,808 1,700,712 
1954/55 5,738,110 2,577,186 
1955/56 6,087,736 2,196,458 
1969/70 27,731,735 4,600,000 
1970/71 29,831,050 6,400,000 
1971/72 35,359,641 8,000,000 
1972/73 37,797,697 10,500,000 
1973/74 45,137,372 13,500,000 
1974/75 61,186,520 17,500,000 
1975/76 80,591,911 27,057,000 
(Source: Education Department Accountant) 
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"The period from July to December 1973 was a period of 
intense planning to implement the recommendations of the 
Karmel Report in Tasmania from the beginning of the 1974 
school year. Committees were set up to plan, manage ard 
implement the six individual programmes for which funds 
had been recommended for primary and secondary education 
in Tasmania." 39 
Additional funds of over $12million were provided during the pericd 1974-75 
to be expended on both capital and recurrent costs of, e.g., special education, 
general buildings, teacher development and disadvantaged schools. These 
areas would certainly not have been dealt with in a state priority list 
without external funding sources, but equally they placed pressures on 
_ 
other areas of departmental expenditure. 
In a similar way State Treasury has a degree of influence over funds 
and internal priorities. Annual budgeting means competing for available 
resources with other departments, the Treasury playing an arbitral role. 
Treasury can also be involved in much more detail, for example by limiting 
the number of teachers to be employed or studentships to be offered in any 
one year. 40 
Organisational Matters 
The Education Department is referred to as a 'social welfare department' 
in the Treasurer's Reports to Parliament and has traditionally had a 
'professional'orientation to this purpose. At no time have those in charge 
of the administration of the Department been other than promoted teachers. 
There are certain clerical officers, whose senior officer is the Chief 
Administrative Officer, concerned mainly with accounting, equipment, record 
keeping and similar support services, but these have never displaced the 
39Report of the Minister for Education for the year to December 1973. 
Tasmania,Parliamentary Paper No. 45 of 1974 p 17. 
40 Some of these matters have been covered in D.A.Jecks, "Major 
Aspects of the Organisation and Administration of Australian Education" 
in A.Maclaine and R.Selby Smith (eds), Fundamental Issues of Australian 
Education (Sydney: Ian Novak, 1971). 
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promoted teacher in senior positions of the department. This situation 
has led to some extent to a centralised education system. Educational 
decisions are made by experts at the head office to whom other teachers 
defer on educational grounds. Perhaps the harshest criticism of the 
'bureaucratic control' of the department comes from the principals of 
schools whose demands are not always met with the expedition they expect. 
It has also led to some administrative problems within the department in 
that many administrative officers find promoted teachers rather unacceptable 
task masters. However, the Chief Administrative Officer did not regard 
any such difficulties as insurmountable in normal day to day affairs. There 
were also a number of interdepartmental committees whose members are both 
clerical and professional, where they worked together very amicably, with 
satisfactory results. No doubt the fact that the Education Act 1932 gives 
no specific functional authority to the Director-General, or his Directors 
and other officers, for departmental administration, accounts to some extent 
for these tensions. 
Analysis  
In the remainder of this chapter the framework specified in Chapter II 
will be used to explore further in an ordered way the information impression-
istically referred to above. The purpose, as in the previous chapter, will 
be to clarify the particular relationship between the minister and his 
department, more especially his senior officers, and its effect on his 
accountability and control. Such interactions and activities regarded as 
important centrefugal forces are dealt with under the following headings: . 
circumjacent groups; legislative provisions; professional staff; 
financial arrangements; and departmental tradition. 
A. 	Circumjacent groups  
Education in the modern world is an activity which affects every person 
_ either directly as a student, or indirectly as, for example, a parent or 
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employer. In this sense everybody is an expert in the education field 
and so the minister and departmental officers may be expected to become 
involved with the world outside the department. The minister is therefore 
in a relatively exposed position, 41 
In fact there appears to be less direct intervention than might be 
expected from persons and bodies outside the government system. Certainly, 
- the minister spends a considerable amount of time dealing with deputations 
of one kind and another. Most of these, however, seem to deal with such 
non-educational matters as the provision of paper towels in toilets; the 
state of repair of school buildings; or school bus problems of groups of 
parents living away from main bus routes. Other than the issue of religious 
teaching in schools and the State aid question, there has not been any 
great controversy recently about education in a professional sense. Most 
of the 'consumers' seem to have accepted the professionalism of the teaching 
staff within the department. 
However, it is appropriate to distinguish between two kinds of circumjacent 
groups who have direct and continuous interaction with the minister and his 
department - those who are concerned with educational matters and the pro-
fessional activities of the department and those whose particular interest 
is the 'administrative' aspect, equipment, buildings, staffing and like 
matters. The distinction is an arbitrary one in the sense that interest in 
one may also mean involvement with the other, but for the purpose of seeing 
the effect and the meaning for the minister and his senior officers it is 
a relevant distinction. This is reinforeed by the interviews which showed 
generally that "professional matters" were left by the minister for the 
professional staff wherever possible. For example, the minister would take 
officers with him to meet a deputation and would expect them to brief him 
41See for example the range of interested persons and bodies giving 
evidence to the Committee to investigate. the Role of School in Society  
Appendix F, pp 77-78. 
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before the meeting, but also be ready to express an opinion should the 
minister ask them. But only professional staff, such as the Director General, 
Deputy Director General and the Directors, were invited to attend meetings 
in this way. The Deputy Director General.said that the minister involved 
him in discussions with deputations "very much", whereas the Chief Administra-
tive Officer said he was hardly ever called in. Occasionally, the officer 
in charge of buildings or bus contracts would be requested to attend where 
the matter to be discussed was their direct concern. 
There are a number, of clearly identifiable professional groups and 
persons who are in continuous interaction with the minister and his department: 
(a)those groups and specialist organisations external to the department 
whose task is directly related to education, for example, the Teachers' 
Federation, the Kindergarten Union, the Tasmanian Technical College 
Staff Society, the Schools Board, Boards of Technical Education; 
(b)those groups within the department. itself' who have some professional 
standing, either through their position., for example, the Tasmanian 
Institute of Inspectors of.Schools, .or the Curriculum Branch; 
(c)individuals within the teaching service who have been recognised for 
specialist areas such as the Supervisors of specialist subjects, or 
Guidance Officers, or even some specialist classroom teachers, e.g. 
remedial. 
The non-professional aspects are the concern of many more bodies - as may 
be expected - with far more varied backgrounds and thus harder to classify. 
They include Parents and Friends Associations in each school with a Council 
operating as a coordinating body at State level and Boards of Advice within 
municipalities, which may be appointed by the minister to keep him informed 
about the educational facilities in their municipality. Both of these bodies 
comprise laymen outside the government system. : The remaining groups and 
individuals are largely within that system and include Cabinet, Parliament,' 
Treasury, and the Public Service Board. 
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In discussing, briefly, each of the interaction groups mentioned, it 
is perhaps appropriate to examine the Parents and Friends Associations first, 
since these are the only Consumer representatives. No student. organisation, 
even where they exist, e.g. Secondary Students Union, appear to interact 
directly with the minister or the department. All contact between the 
Parents and Friends organisations and the department is routed through the 
minister. There are contacts with individual officers in the normal daily 
routine matters, but other than that the minister deals directly with the 
public even though he may have his officers present when so doing. Mr. Neilson, 
who - it will be remembered - had the longest period as Minister since the 
portfolio was commissioned, stated that he was constantly seeing deputations 
of all kinds. Parents and Friends groups, who were concerned with physical 
matters such as buildings, equipment, bus routes and staffing, predominated. 
He also pointed out that he allowed his senior officers complete dis-
cretion in their dealings with the public and that the practice over the 
years had grown that the Director General would be most concerned with 
professional matters. The Director General and his Deputy clearly exercised 
this discretion very cautiously, both stating that they felt somewhat 
sheltered from the external world by the presence of the minister who 
"relieved them of the pressure". Most interviewees noted that ministers 
never attempted to avoid responsibility by 'placing us in the firing line'. 
Mr. Mather (Liberal) who was minister for 2 1/2 years, made the point 
that there were 240 Parents and Friends Associations in Tasmania, and he 
visited 150 of these in their own schools during his period of office. Most 
of the discussions he had were about the needs of the school, what he called 
'bread and butter issues rather than broad policy." He also followed the 
same procedure for meetings that had evolved during his predecessor's office - 
collecting information from the department about the problem to be discussed - 
with the deputation, having an officer present who acts as adviser and 
prepares notes of the meeting and sends a copy of the decisions to the minister, 
deputation and the appropriate officers in the department. 
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Since there is a great deal of stress placed on personal contact with 
the minister in such a sparsely populated State as Tasmania, these 
deputations are regarded as politically important. The minister does 
therefore make himself readily accessible to all manner of persons and groups, 
and it is to be noted that it forms a vital part of the decision processes 
Within the department. This is underlined by the formalising of the procedures 
for such meetings so that the department is kept informed about actions 
expected of them as a consequence. As the Chief Administrative Officer 
made clear, the majority of matters discussed had consequences for the 
administrative side rather than the professional, that is to say they 
involved expenditure of funds, probably already allocated for some other 
purpose. It must be noted, however, that none of the officers felt they 
were inhibited in any way by the methods adopted to deal with such external 
relationships. Only when discussion of professional education matters 
arose were some comments unfavourable. 
Another group of extremely important non-professional interactions 
arise from intra-departmental activities, more particularly with Treasury 
and Public Service Board. 42 Apart from the usual Treasury demand for 
estimates and subsequent audit requirements they have very little direct 
involvement, since the department appears free to utilise funds once granted. 
There are a few externally funded projects, some money coming for libraries 
or science equipment direct from the Australian government, as mentioned 
previously, but the major proportion of funding is derived from State sources. 
The commitment to education as a service by all governments seems to have 
ensured that its resources are much more flexible than in some other depart-
ments. As will be mentioned later under "Finance", whilst the actual amount 
of revenue funding is closely controlled at estimate time, once the funds 
42 It will be noted later in Chapter VI that these two departments 
play a vital role in the relationship between minister and official, but 
more particularly as between official and official. They are representative 
of .'principle' as opposed to 'interest', which is referred to in L.Peres, 
"Principle or Interest? Changing Roles within Australian Government." 
Melbourne Journal of Politics,  3, 	(1970),26. 
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have been approved the department is relatively free to operate. In any 
case, there seemed to be very specific financial procedures within the 
department which were effective in maintaining an internal control system, 
thus requiring less direct Treasury involvement than might otherwise have 
been the case. It appeared that the Chief Administrative Officer was 
extremely conscious of this need, especially on the revenue side of expenditure. 
However, relationships with the Public Service Board were regarded as 
rather frustrating. The Chief Administrative Officer was not so concerned 
about recruitment and promotion matters dealt with by the Board. He was 
disturbed at the seemingly unnecessary coordinating committees created by 
the Board in such areas as mechanical aids and office accommodation. Just 
as was the case in Housing and Health, these two aspects of the Board's work 
seem to represent major interference in the work of departments. The Mechanical 
Aid Committee of the Public Service Board was apparently hindering the pro-
vision of visible recording through computer use within the department. This 
is especially important in a department which pays about $35 million a year 
in salaries. The Committee were endeavouring to centralise all computer 
use with a view to saving on equipment costs, but it seems likely that the 
very different uses required by each department will defeat this aim. The 
departmental frustration comes from not being able to make the Committee 
accept this point. The long lead time necessary for planning such operations 
means that an increasing work load has to be placed on staff handling material 
that could better be dealt with on such a computer, staffing problems arise 
and thus increase the Chief Administrative Officer's difficulties. But this 
can scarcely be regarded as a major problem area over the whole range of 
department functions. 
Finally, in this group of interactions Parliament and Cabinet must be 
considered and some reference made to relations with the Australian Government. 
Ministers, members of parliament representing a constituency and particular 
electors, must always be subject to some tension in their decisions. Some 
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will avoid direct responsibility by claiming they were acting on specialist 
advice, others will try to meet all demands. Neither way will the expectations 
of the electorate and the specialist proposals be reconciled in every situation. 
As was suggested, it can be embarrassing on occasions when decisions have 
to be made on a political basis when it is realised that. advice from the 
professional was against it. The balance between the policy of the department 
and the politically important needs of an individual voter is a very difficult 
one to maintain: One example was given, where a decision had to be made 
as to who should be exempt from attendance at school before reaching school 
leaving age. This matter is initiated at age 15 by parents of children 
wishing to take up employment. They approach the Headmaster of the school 
and the procedures are then entirely based on professional judgement. Often 
parents Of those children,refused permission to leave, take the matter up 
with their member of parliament and thence to the minister. In this situation 
he is often obliged to make a specifically political decision to exempt the 
student against the professional advice of his officers. 
The minister pointed out that sometimes officers themselves favour 
a minister's own electorate in their decisions, not because he asks them, 
but out of a political awareness. However, ministers generally tended to 
accept professional decisions to avoid entanglement in political/educational 
clashes, but they are quite aware of the difficulties. Neither ministers nor 
officers suggested that individual parliamentarians were a worry to them. 
Indeed, such is the apparent disdain ministers have for parliament in general 
that one Labor Cabinet issued instructions that no parliamentarian was to be 
answered directly by an officer, all statements had to be made through a 
Press Officer or through the minister himself. This rule was relaxed if the 
question related to matters of fact under the Act or Regulations. However, 
some senior officers did not feel constrained by these instructions, since 
they made a judgement about what was proper toroute through the minister. 
Many of the questions are of a personal nature and it was felt that few 
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Opposition questions were dangerous for the minister. 
One Director did feel quite strongly that, as professionals, they should 
make public statements, and that the Director-General should be able to make 
policy statements, in public yore often. The Director gave the example of 
a statement he made about the introduction of driver education at Clarence 
High School, which had not been previously announced by the minister or sent 
out as information over the minister's signature. He was "hauled over the 
coals" by his minister as he had acted contrary to established policy. It 
may thus be surmised that Parliament does not figure largely in the minds 
of minister and department as a constraint. This is not to say, however, 
that the Parliamentary Question is ignored. In this department as in others 
questions take up the time of many officers and of the minister. For example, 
in the 35th Parliament Second Session of the House of Assembly from March 
11,1970 to February 17, 1971 Parliamentarians asked 661 questions of which 
.43 120 related solely to Education. 
As in the case of other departments there are no Parliamentary Standing 
Committees which become involved in the department procedures other than 
the Standing Committees on Delegated Legislation, Public Accounts and Public 
Works. The Committee on Public Works has the task of investigating all 
proposals for capital works over the cost of $250,000. This involves all new 
schools and many additions and alterations, thus demanding an explanation from 
departmental officers justifying the expenditure. All building work is done 
under the control and design of the Architects Branch of the Public Works 
Department and they are the main witnesses before the Committee, but since 
the Education Department is the client, they have to give evidence about 
their particular needs. This does cause them some problem when their re-
quirements are unusual or slightly controversial, as in the case of the Rosny 
Matriculation College, or Roseneath Open Plan Primary School. There is, 
however, hardly any argument about the basis 
43See Appendix for details of the 'questions: 
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education philosophy behind the planning, only in relation to specific 
expenditure. 
Parliamentarians also become involved in education matters in the 
supply debates after the budget. There have been no parliameAtary inquiries 
or Royal Commissions into education since the passing of the Education Act 
1932, although the Department itself has set up Departmental Inquiries, the 
last one being in 1968 which produced the Report 'Schools in Society' 
(p 160). 
If parliament fails to arouse much concern in ministers or officials, 
the same cannot be Said of Cabinet, whose decisions could affect departmental 
programs. At estimate time, when all ministers are attempting to promote 
their department's proposals, they are judged by their capacity to carry the 
day for the department. Cabinet decisions about these proposals is intended 
to have an effect. At other times, however, it does appear that much business 
is taken up in Cabinet meetings which may not be anticipated by departments. 
Ministers mention matters 'in passing' for the information of their colleagues 
and the consequence may be a changed decision. For example, the Education 
minister, as a result of a Cabinet meeting, agreed to postpone planning for the 
second stage of Rosny Matriculation College. The Public Works Department 
officers were told of this decision by their minister almost two months before 
officers of the Education Department. 
One of the problems the officers have to contend with is that of 
different time spans on which they, the minister and Cabinet operate. In 
regard to such matters as building and equipment programmes most of the planning 
is done on a three to five year basis. Estimates of student numbers are 
based on statistical evidence and plans made for future needs. The minister 
and Cabinet have to be much more immediately sensitive and ready to switch 
their programmes to give priority to those areas most electOrally advantageous. 
Forward planning becomes very difficult in such circumstances which is 
worrying to the ministers who rely most on department advice. One minister 
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pointed out "We are living in the present, but alsoin the future, for 
example the loan funds campaign starts at Christmas. Policy becomes poli-
tically difficult to achieve, especially since I regard the middle to long 
term as my most important decision area." 
Oa the other hand, the demand for resources at Cabinet level is bound 
to be competitive, and one in which ministers must Choose departmental 
priorities. It is, therefore, a constraint on long term programs, but 
since most ministers are practical persons they would rather select alternatives 
on practical grounds. These may eventually prove the theories on which they 
were based, or may not; for example, the policy to introduce Matriculation 
Colleges was accepted much quicker than had been expected and proved a 
great success. Ministers rarely see much difference between deciding about 
long term and short term proposals, it is the result that counts, and their 
own preference for certain areas of education at any one time can have some 
effect on those priorities. One minister of long standing also indicated that 
normally he would take matters to Cabinet if he felt they were politically 
significant, not necessarily for decision, but more for information. One 
particular matter was the closing of a bus route in another member's electorate. 
He also mentioned that he could not recall any time in Cabinet when the 
opposition was so great that he had not got his way. The Director General 
did note, however, that any major changes in policy, or even those not major 
but politically sensitive, would almost always be presented to Cabinet before 
decision finally taken. Even where professional advice was given as the 
grounds for changing policy the matter would not be finally decided until 
Cabinet had given it consideration. 
Some matters are raised outside Cabinet by other ministers, or even 
by the Premier, direct with the minister. Some Premiers have been more 
dominant than others in this regard. One quoted example is derived from the 
Liberal Government's ministry. Under his authority contained in the Education 
Act, the Director General had appointed two new superintendants, one of whom, 
Mr. K.Axton, was apparently regarded as unsatisfactory by 'a certain group 
183 
of teachers". Obtaining no satisfaction from their meeting with the 
minister, this group had sent a deputation to see the Premier and place 
their grievance before him. As a consequence the Premier presumably 
directed his Minister to re-(xamine the appointment, which the minister 
had caused his Director-General to do. 
"Mr. Mather said he did not consider that appointments within the 
department were a political matter and he had every confidence 
in the judgement, experience and impartiality of Mr .  Gough (the 
Director General)and other senior officers in making the 
appointment. However when a deputation eventually brought the 
matter before the Premier (Mr Bethune) he asked Mr. Gough to 
re-examine the appointment of Mr. Axton. Mr. Gough now had 
thoroughly re-examined all aspects of the appointment and this 
had enabled him to reaffirm his original decision with eyery 
confidence that Mr. Axton was the best man for the job."" 
Such public examples are rare and may not be taken as evidence for strong 
intervention from Premiers in general, when it does occur, it weakens the 
position of the minister. 
A final example of the way in which Cabinet can interfere with 
departmental priorities and decisions is given by the Director-General. He 
pointed out that it has been the policy of all Tasmanian Cabinets to utilise 
all monies available from Australian Government sources. Since this money 
is made available without much reference to state needs, e.g. science 
laboratories, it -does distort departmental decisions on some occasions. Where 
these monies are made available over a period of time they can be built into 
the forward planning', matching grants, however, provide the department with 
a problem when state funds could have been spent more Usefully elsewhere. 
Apart from this financial aspect the Australian Government does not play 
too great a role in departmental decisions. There are regular meetings of 
officers and ministers, state and federal, but these rarely affect matters 
currently under consideration in the department. :Recently created commissions 
at federal level, the Schools Commission, the Karmel Commission, the Technical 
4The'Mercury 19/4/1972, 
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Education Commission and the Children's Commission have all had considerable 
direct involvement in departmental affairs, but, since their main thrust 
has been to providing funds, they will be dealt with in more detail under 
"finance" (heading D ). 
It is also proposed to deal more specifically with the effect the 
professional groups have on the minister and his officers under the heading 
"professional" (heading C ). Nonetheless, stress must be placed in this 
section on the tremendous impact this has on the department. Both ministers 
made it quite clear that they were prepared to allow the professionals to 
make decisions on educational matters. One went so far as to say that he 
avoided making statements about educational matters that were not prefaced 
by the words "advised by", and he instanced the decision to allow sex 
education as part of the social science course. 
Three elements appear in all decisions - the political, the departmental 
and the professional - they overlapped frequently, but they were all relevant 
in any consideration of the problems. Yet this does not make the minister 
any less responsible for those decisions in which he allows professionals to 
dominate. All were engaged in finding means to the ends of education policy. 
In the final analysis, however, the minister must be prepared to overrule 
professional advice if the politics of the situation demanded it. 
Not all ministers are 'so certain, some are more ambivalent about their 
stance. On the one hand one minister stated that it was his practice over 
many years to allow the Director-General an overall say on professional 
matters, and that it was less likely that he would have strong disagreements 
with his officers over those matters than administrative ones. 'Yet in his 
relations with Parliament he expected to argue in support of his departmental 
activities on professional grounds "professional advice conveyed to Parliament 
often sways. parliamentarians." 
In so doing and being in the one portfolio for, so long he felt he might 
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be in danger of becoming a professional himself, particularly as he thought 
his style of administration was "to get much more engaged in professional 
areas, perhaps more than any other Australian education minister." He did not 
like to have power without the understanding, and found it hard to reconcile 
with his particular biases. 
Summation  
One of the most important elements within the circumjacent groups is the 
perceived need by the minister, accepted by. his officers, to be accessible at 
all times to the public. This exposes the department to many external forces, 
which it cannot protect itself against because of the uncertainty. Even 
though the minister is accompanied by departmental officers, often with 
special knowledge of the problem to be discussed, there is little control 
over the minister utilising the occasion for political gain. The wide range 
of groups involved, from Parents and Friends Associations wanting paper towels 
in toilets, to student teachers complaining about the severity of bonding, 
to discussions with the Chamber of Manufacturers about the apprenticeship 
training at the Technical College, provides a political base for the minister 
from which he can dominate the professionals. The general attitudes of the 
professional officers who feel relatively secure . in their expertise and have 
not been specifically challenged to any great extent by the adoption of a 
dominant political line by the minister, supplement this element of ministerial 
control. So long as education is regarded as an area of prime importance for 
the government the minister is likely to benefit. There is also the fact 
that the external professional links which the departmental officers have 
are mainly with those also employed by the department. For example teachers, 
through the Teachers Federation, the Institute of School Inspectors, or those 
who are committed to the educational ends and whose appointment depends on 
the minister, e.g. the Schools Board, the Standing Committee on Teacher 
Education,or the School in Society Committee. 
Education has been a single portfolio or at most joined with one other 
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for a considerable part of its existence, and more particularly has been 
the provinceof a single politician for a long period. Since 1947 there 
have only been five members of parliament in charge of the portfolio, two 
can be largely discounted as they were only encumbents for a year each; 
one other for 2 1/2 years during the only Liberal ministry, leaving two 
members - Mr. Cosgrove as Premier and Minister for Education during the 
period 1948-58; and Mr. Neilson, as Minister for Education only from 1958- 
1973 with the short interregnum of the Liberals 1969-72. There is little 
doubt that the minister does almost become a professional himself in these 
circumstances, which considerably reduces the potential support from outside 
the department for the professional officers. 
Circumjacent groups such as Parliament and the operations of Australian 
Government are to some extent centrifugal forces, but ministers tend to see 
parliament as more of an irritation than an antagonist or threat. There are 
no specific groups in parliament with the task of surveying education policy 
other than the member of the Opposition, whose information sources are 
extremely limited and it is unlikely that this would provide any support for 
officers as against the minister. 
The operations of the Australian Government especially in the recent 
two years, has caused some undermining of the minister's control over 
education decisions. However, this has not increased departmental officers' 
dominance over these decisions at the expense of the minister. Both seem to 
be at an equal disadvantage in the process since there are no apparent links 
between the two groups and their Federal counterparts. It is true that most 
of the Federal decisions about matching grants and funding in the education 
sphere are taken on the advice of experts, and may well accord in general 
terms with the professional opinion of departmental officers. However, there 
is no direct relationship between those decisions and the programmes already 
in the planning stages within the department. As a consequence the tendency 
is to find the minister and his departmental officers together objecting to 
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the distortions caused by such assistance from the Australian Government. 
In general, therefore, it seems the minister is in a very strong 
position within the department, most of the centrifugal forces operating 
from the interactions with circunjacent groups are relatively minor. 
B. 	Legislative provisions  
Any statute making provision for performing specific functions will be 
more concerned with stating the means by which the task is to be undertaken 
than defining the task itself. The Education Act 1932 is no exception in 
that education is taken as a self evident term. In the Act stress is laid 
upon the establishment and maintenance of schools, the responsibility of 
parents of children between the ages of 6 and 16 to enrol their children in 
such schools, acquisition of land for the construction of schools and the 
erection and maintenance of school buildings. The only specific reference 
to the content of education is contained in Section 6, which endorses non-
sectarian teaching and restricts the possibility of religious teaching to 
those who have positively asked for it, and then only for one hour a. week 
by one clergyman. 
The Act gives very clear dominance to the minister in relation to the 
Director-General and other officers so far as duties are defined. The 
minister has the duty to: 
- establish and maintain institutes for training teachers (s. 4A) 
- establish schools (s. 5(1)) 
- close schools (s. 5(4)) 
- take proceedings against parents for not sending children to school (s.8 & s.9) 
- educate blind, deaf and mute children in default of parents (s. 13) 
- sell, lease or otherwise dispose of land vested in the department with 
the consent of the Governor (s. 16(2)) 
- make an Annual Report to Parliament on the condition and progress of the 
school maintained (s. 19) 
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- vest his powers under the Act in respect of Technical Education in a 
Board of Technical Education (s. 19A - D) 
- establish, manage, maintain and operate an institution called the 
"scientific equipment centre" (s. 32A - C). 
In addition to these direct duties contained in the Act, there is provision 
for the Governor to appoint senior personnel, teachers and other officers, 
i.e. outside the Public Service Act, and to make regulations. These latter 
are most importantly related to the terms and conditions of service of the 
non public service staff of the department, the teaching staff. 
These staff are to be "paid such salaries and allowances and classified, 
as the Director-General, with the approval of the Minister, may determine." 
(s.4(4)). But beyond this reference to the duties of the Director-General 
and the provision for recommending to the Minister appointment of "such 
servants, workmen and other employees" (s. 4(3)) there is nothing to indicate 
his major functions. 45 It may be that this is a direct result of the earlier 
history of the department which gave rise to several Royal Commissions and 
Inquiries in the first decade of this century. Whatever the cause, it is 
significant that while the statute has been amended some 22 times nothing 
has been done deliberately to change this situation. Ministers did not : 
feel any radical change was necessary, because the existing statute allowed 
sufficient flexibility and changes to occur if required. One minister went 
so far as to say the "Act positively suited him", and that "it was an 
extremely flexible Act for the minister, although perhaps not for Parliament 
or the public." If any attempts were made to redraft it might be seen as ar 
opportunity to restrain activities in some way not now possible. There did 
not seem  much likelihood of this occurring as no one had ever put pressure on 
45 This Act is very different from either of the major statutes under 
which the Housing Department and Health Department operates, in not giving 
specific authority for certain acts to the Director-General. 
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the minister to redraft the Act. 
The Chief Administrative Officer, whose task is to ensure that a proper 
authority is available for all departmental activities, especially those 
which require expenditure, stressed the importance of the statute, but also 
the regulations made under . it..He noted that most day to day activities of 
the department were covered by regulations or administrative instructions 
under the hand of the minister. These permitted the officers to deal with 
most of the administrative duties specifically given to the minister by the 
Act. He pointed out that the minister has the right to exercise any of 
those duties, but that he rarely does, "incursions into the field by the 
minister are not generally of any importance". The Director-General thought 
that a rewrite was preferable, but unlikely to occur for practical political • 
reasons. He particularly gave as an example of the problems that could be 
encountered, the religious education question. So he was prepared to settle 
for piecemeal change as and when possiblA. 
This is indeed the kind of change that has occurred with 22 amending 
Acts since 1932. Of the 48 sections in the original Act only three have 
never been amended - s.26 (Payment of bursaries); s. 43 (Appropriation of 
fees and penalties to the Registration Board); and s. 44 (Inspections of 
schools by the Registration Board). All of these. sections are relatively 
minor administrative matters which would not change over time. The latest 
amending Act (No. 41 of 1967) gave legislative approval to the organisational 
form the department had evolved to that time and also made more explicit 
arrangements for Technical Education, giving more discretion to the Boards 
of Technical Education. 
None of the changes that have taken place in the legislation have caused 
any particular difficulty in Parliament. Most have been derived from within 
the department as providing legislative Authority for changes that had 
already taken place or that were planned. The fact is that Parliament is 
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not sufficiently expert in the area to understand what may be required in 
matters of detail. There are no special committees to air publically possible 
internal problems or generate interest in broad policy areas. The range of 
activities carried out by the department under the Act and the interpretation 
of priority areas is in no way inhibited by the legislation. 
There are some Australian Government legislative provisions which impinge 
on the decisions made in the department. All are concerned with special 
financial assistance for Science Laboratories (1965); Technical Training 
(1965); Advanced Education (1967); Secondary School Libraries (1968); and 
University financial assistance (1963-66). • Many of these special purpose 
grants have been absorbed into new proposals derived from the Karmel Report. 46 
As a consequence the States Grants (Schools) Act was passed in December 1973 
in Commonwealth Parliament, bringing into being a funding programme for 
six individual areas: disadvantaged schools, special education, libraries, 
teacher development, general recurrent and general buildings. These 
programmes are based on State expectations for the future and this may be 
tied to planning at state level. 
Some necessary readjustment of the organisation of the department 
has occurred and a number of committees have been set up headed by various 
departmental senior officers to administer each programme. As the Annual 
Report of the Minister stated, 
"The Karmel Report is generally viewed as one of the most 
significant educational documents produced in Australia and 
contains many implications, not only for priority programmes 
in education but also for the administration of these 
programmes: 47 
What the consequences are for the position of the minister in respect of 
46Schools in Australia prepared by an Interim Committee of the 
Australian Schools Commission, May 1973. 
47 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 45 of 1974, p 45. 
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his departmental officers is, at this point in time, impossible to predict. 
It could well be, however, that they will undermine his dominance through 
the continual interaction that must occur between professionals, both 
educators and administrators, from his own department and the Federal 
department. At this officer level, it may be imagined, many of the basic 
decisions will be taken, preempting subsequent ministerial control over 
priorities. 
Summation  
Generally speaking there seems little in either the current statute or 
the amendments to alter the original Act. The formal arrangements stated 
then and unchanged since, have been to provide the minister, not the 
departmental head with authority and no means by which the department head 
could use that legislation to inhibit the minister. There are no permanent 
parliamentary committees and have been no recent inquiries to change the 
legislative position. 
Another factor, which militates against the possibility of using the 
legislation as a means of altering the balance between the minister and 
departmental head, is the lack of definition of purpose in the statute. 
There is nothing in the Act which a departmental head could use to identifr 
as a professional as opposed to a political aim. It was quite clear that, 
these two perspectives may be opposed to one another, but clothing the political 
aim with reputed professional advice means that there is no redress, apart 
from publically contradicting the minister. Such an action would not result 
in any benefit where education receives uncontested support from all sources 
of authority of the public in general. 
The only time the parliamentarian is really active is during conflict 
between one or more of their constituents and the department over some 
decision on educational matters or funding. Neither of these problems is 
likely to enhance the position of the departmental officer at the expense 
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of theminister. There is little other opportunity of departmental officers 
building influence networks within the legislature. 
C. 	Professional Staff  
The division of tasks by function directly leads to differentiation. 
by specialisation in the complex activities of government. It is not 
unexpected, therefore, to find that departments have their own particular 
professional group around which the departmental function is built. Education, 
like engineering, is traditionally both a field of specialisation and a 
generalisation for many other specialisms. Unlike engineering it has only 
. recently become acceptable as a profession. 
In the Tasmanian context, the numerical dominance of the primary school 
section has had a significant effect on the rate of change to professionalism. 
It was only in 1958, with the introduction of comprehensive schools, that 
the secondary school system grew beyond the four academic High Schools in 
Hobart, Launceston, Burnie and Devonport, founded between 1913 and 1916. 
The relatively few high school teachers required had been trained at the 
University of Tasmania, where from 1948 the Faculty of Education offered a 
Diploma Of Education in an additional year following a three year under-
graduate degree. Most primary school teachers and some secondary teachers 
were trained in Practice Schools, in conjunction with the Philip Smith 
Teachers College under the control of the Education Department until 1971. 
Since that date the College of Advanced Education has been responsible for 
the training of primary school teachers and some secondary and physical 
Education and Art Teachers, and the University Faculty of Education for most 
secondary and some primary school •teachers. These courses have reflected 
the rapid growth of speci ,alist educationists throughout the world in the 
past ten years, with the consequence, in Tasmania as elsewhere; of the greater 
recognition of teaching, as a profession. 
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During the whole Of this period teachers, whether. primaryor secondary, 
have almost all been members of the Teachers Federation. This body has had 
a continuous existence for over 70 years, and was until 1969 the only 
association which was available to protect teachers' interests. In 1969. 
there was a breakaway movement by those employed at the Technical College, 
because, they claimed, their interests had been subordinated to those of 
teachers in general and primary school teachers in particular. 
Sectional meetings have more recently been held to accommodate the 
differing interests within the Federation. For example, in 1968 the following 
groups met at the Annual Conference: Area School teachers, High School 
teachers, Primary School teachers, Infant School teachers, Technical College 
Instructors and Lecturers, and Supervisors. Of these only the Technical 
College Staff have become a separated body. 
Continuous existence of the professional body has done much to promote 
the identity of the teacher in society and foster in teachers a community of 
interest. If professionals were to be dominant in education decisionmaking 
rather than allow the minister to dictate aims, the Teachers Federation would 
play a major role in - education policy. It could be expected to act as a 
.forut in Which the broader issues of education are discussed and to have an 
extremely influential place in the Tasmanian education context. This has 
not occurred however, although the Federation has played a very important role 
in maintaining a close contact between teachers and the department. The 
extremely good relations, disturbed only rarely, have been directly brought 
about through the way in which the department consult with the Federation. 
There are examples which indicate the strength of these ties with the 
Department. One relates to the introduction of a new classification and 
promotion scheme in 1955; the other concerns the apparent interdependence 
of Federation executive membership and promotion to senior administrative 
positions - within the Department. 
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In 1955 a major reclassification of positions was undertaken and 
consequent changes to the promotion system were made. The work was completed 
and changeover 'effected without the conflict normally associated with such 
internal disturbances. Undoubtedly, this was in large measure due to the 
joint Federation and Department consultations and committees which the 
Director recognised: 
"After considerable planning in cooperation with the 
Tasmanian Teachers Federation a new scheme of classification 
and promotion.was inaugurated as from the beginning of 1955. 
Positive efforts have been made to enable the Tasmanian 
Teachers Federation to participate in the cooperative 
formulation of major policy and the assistance given by the . 
Federation is highly valued." 48 
Other formal linkages, apart from the informal ones maintained through 
senior officers' prior membership of the Federation mentioned later, are 
through committees, such as the Joint Departmental Standing Committee which 
meets regularly and discusses a wide range of matters of mutual interest. 
There are also other committees to which the Federation appointed repre-
sentatives in 1974 such as 
Promotions and Certificates 
Appeals Board 
Regulations and Certificates 
• Teaching Aids Policy 
Building Appraisal 
School Furniture 
In-Service Education 
Interim Committee for C.C.E.T. 
Disciplinary Appeal Board 
Aus. Schools Commission committees - 
Karmel Co-ordinating 
Disadvantaged 
Teacher Development 
• Special 
Recurrent Secondary 
Country Education 
Leave Review 
Primary Libraries 
Director-General's Organisation Enquiry 
Canoeing 
There can be little doubt that the value of the Federation to the Department 
has also been recognised by the number of ex-officio bearers who take up 
48 Tasmania; Parliamentary Paper No. 60 of 1956; Directors Report for 
1955 
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senior positions in the Department. The list below shows recently retired 
officers indicating their position in the Department at retirement,-and the 
office held in the Federation prior to their appointment to the Department 
administrative staff: 
M.A.S.McNeair 	Superintendent of High Schools 	Retired 1965 
President of Federation 1934, 1939, 
1949, 1950 
Australian Teachers' Federation 
President 1949 
L.F.Briggs 	- Superintendent High Schools 	Retired 1965 
President 1941 
P.J. Clifford 
G. Lewis 
C.D. Brown 
K. Lee 
Principal Launceston Technical 	Resigned 1967 
College (superintendent status) 
Executive member 1959-60 
Director of Adult Education. 	Retired 1973 
President 1945-1948 
Director of Secondary Education 	Retired 1973 
President and ATF President 1966 
District Superintendent North West Retired 1972 
Vice President 1966-67, Acting 
President 1967 to April 
T. Jacobs 	Superintendent High Schools 	Retired 1972 
President 1965 
A.T.Brown 	Director of Personnel 	Retired 1974 
Vice-President 1959-61 
(Source: Teachers Federation Records, provided by Deputy Secretary) 
Similarly, of the senior departmental staff in service in 1974 the 
following had been Federation executive members:. 
J.G. Scott 
R.F. Scott 
Director of Secondary Education 
Executive member 1960-63 
Director of Primary Education 
Vice-President 1966-13/1/1967 then 
Acting President until April 1967 
then appointed Superintendent 
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L.F. Billing 	Director, North West Region 
President 1957-1959 
G.E.N. Miller 	Chief Personnel Officer 
Representative on Promotions and 
Certificates Committee 
K.R. Hudspeth 	Staff Superintendent Buildings 
President 1955-1957 
A.T.F. President 1955 
N.H. Campbell 	Coordinator of Planning 
President 1961-1963 
D.R. Hunt 	Superintendent 
President 1970-1973 
A.T.F. President 1962 
P. Rollins 	Superintendent 
Vice-President (North West) 1970-74 
President elect 1974 did not late office 
E.G.A. Morse 	Superintendent 
Executive Member 1972-74 
(Source: Teachers Federation records, provided by Deputy Secretary) 
In another way ties have been strengthened between the teaching service 
and the department, and thus implicitly with the Federation. 
All these links, however, have not resulted in a responsible professional 
organisation in the view of the Director-General: "I would like to be able 
to regard it as a responsible professional organisation, but I cannot say 
it has been anything other than a trade union," Concentration on salaries 
and conditions, individual grievances and matters such as these, combined 
with production of the Tasmanian  Teachers Journal, has been its strength. 
Even in the Journal there is little discussion of the education issues, 
these were left to the Curriculum Branch of the department with its publication 
Tasmanian Journal of Education. 
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There has long been a convention that the permanent head of the 
department should have been a teacher, normally from the Tasmanian service. 
For example, the last six Directors-General (the title was changed in 1967 ) 
have been 
19191945 	G.V. Brooks, who came from intecstate to be a 
teacher in Tasmania before being promoted 
to Director. 
1945-1951 
1951-1952 
1952-1962 
1962-1966 
1966 - to date 
C.E.B. Fletcher, who came from South Australia as 
an Inspector in the Education Department and was 
later promoted to Director. 
P. Hughes - Tasmania 
D.H. Tribolet - Tasmania 
V.R. Long - Tasmania 
A.V. Gough - Tasmania 
It should be noted that all were promoted through the ranks of the service 
from teaching, then inspecting, and administration at senior levels within 
the Tasmanian Education Department, prior to their appointment as Director. 
These 'links have undoubtedly strengthened the professional approach of the 
Department and thus provide a potential challenge to the dominance of the 
minister. This can also be seen from the increasing size of the senior 
professional staff over the two previous decades (Table 7). 
The number of teachers who have now found promotion into the senior 
positions has more than doubled. The effect on the minister of this and 
other changes referred to is quite significant, as some statements discussed 
later in this section reveal. 
For much of the department's existence since1904 its administrative 
element, i.e. that outside the actual teaching and related establishments, 
has been quite small. Its tasks are now oversight of the provision of equipment 
and buildings; servicing and maintenance; salaries and general accountancy. 
Prior to 1945 much of this work was left to local boards and headmasters, but, 
with the sudden growth of education services after that date as with other 
TABLE 7 
EDUCATION 
Personnel engaged in Supervisory, Advisory or  Administrative Duties 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1974 
Director-General (Director) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Deputy (Secretary for Education and 1 1 1 ,1 1 1 
Chief Education Officer) 
Directors - - - - 4 5 
Regional Directors - - - - 2 3 
Superintendents (Education Officer) 10 (na) 18 21 18 15 
Supervisors 9 (na) 10 11 13 17 
*Assistant Directors (Technical) - - 1 
*A Superintendent (Technical) had responsibility for this task before 
1970 when a Director of Technical Education was appointed. 
departments of government the Education Department was reorganised. Many of 
the day to day school matters were still left to headmasters, but much more 
central coordination and decision-making took place. This meant a growth 
of a central administrative office for such matters as equipment, school 
building, salaries, wages and financial controls, school bus contracts, free 
milk and free book services and many other similar matters. Parallel to 
this growth the Director of Education gathered around him professional 
educators to assist him in departmental activities which required particular 
specialisms. There had always existed an Inspectorate, who maintained a 
watch on the standards in teaching, curriculum and school conditions through-
out the State. The Superintendents filled this role later by being both 
inspectors and advisers, and District Superintendents with the subsequent 
assistance of the subject Supervisors. The increasing number of schools to 
be administered, brought about by the rapid growth in building to meet 
increasing pupil numbers, caused organisational changes which automatically 
followed the pattern set in 1904, dividing the tasks of the department into 
administrative and educational. However, the emergence of the professional 
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educator as a kind of 'administrative class' occupying, by lateral 
recruitment, all the senior positions within the departmeat did not naturally 
derive from this pattern. 
As shown previously in the above, table of appointments to supervisory 
positions, this growth has been steady over the last two decades during 
most of which time Mr. Neilson has been minister. There is no direct 
evidence and must therefore remain in the realm of speculation, but it does 
seem likely that his preference for a professional view may have played a 
significant part in this growth. However, it is to be noted that he did 
seem unsure on the wisdom of appointing professionals to senior administrative 
positions. He said, when asked about this, "There is some case for non-
professional influence at the top: we should be looking for proven administra-
tive experience." 
Whatever the cause, there is no doubt that the practice of making such - 
appointments to the senior positions within the department creates tension 
between the two elements. The headmaster in the school has a different 
perspective. He is responsible for an organisation catering for anywhere 
between 50 and 1500 pupils and administrative requirements - form filling 
and documented requests for assistance - are increased by an increasingly 
centralised control. The department is only bearable if he can contact one 
of the senior men on the education side and try a short cut. The senior men 
are likely to be contemporaries of headmasters and therefore know one another 
well. As Mr.B.Mitchell, the Deputy Director General, said: 
"When I took up my first appointment outside the school 
Situation in 'administration', I did ncit feel isolated 
from my colleagues. Perhaps this occurs in Tasmania 
because of its size and partly through the Teachers 
Federation, with whose Committees I still had dealings. 
There are also many personal friendships made through 
the teaching years that remain, for example I personally 
know all the headmasters." 
On the other hand, Mr. Dwight Brown, Director of Secondary Education, found 
his change somewhat less easy because he had been President of both the 
Teachers Federation and the Australian Federation of Teachers for the twelve 
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months prior to his appointment as Superintendent, and was therefore not 
in such daily contact with colleagues. But he also made the point that 
identification of interest with the practising teacher was hard to break, 
"What you have to do is to guard against the feeling that the teachers are 
always right." 
The problem of balancing interests seems to dominate departmental 
activities. The demands of the teachers and headmasters, of educators and 
administrators, and the constraints of a financial and political nature, must 
be mediated within the department. The view of the administrative side, 
expressed by the Chief Administrative Officer, was that a person in a senior. 
position would "hardly ever make a decision by himself." Most of the 
differences which arose were sorted out between the people interested and 
certainly never reached the minister for his adjudication. 
One senior official drew attention to a relatively recent innovation, 
thb Ad-., Hoc Committee, comprised, he said, "of young, but upward mobile 
teachers together with the Director General and deputy". It is advisory only 
but has proved "rather embarrassing in some cases." There were many committees 
within the department through which much of the major decisionmaking was done. 
Most were combined educators' and administrators' meetings, for example there 
is a Senior Officers Committee, meeting fortnightly and a Building Appraisals 
Committee. 
There is also a Finance Committee which significantly comprises the 
Chief Administrative Officer, the Secretary, the Accountant, the Budget 
Officer and 4 Senior Executive Officer (Equipment). There are no educators 
on this Committee and this, combined with the views of the Chief Administrative 
Officer about his role, indicates the basic reasons for conflict between the 
two groups. He sees his role as dealing with the "housekeeping side of the 
department', making sure that expenditure is authorised, in fact playing a 
Treasury role within the department. But his officers are also concerned 
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with the expenditure of funds, on peripheral matters in education terms, 
although directly related tc teaching and very often of consequence to 
teachers' performance in the classroom. Maintenance of buildings, provision 
of equipment, furniture and amenities, payment of salaries and interpretation 
of leave regulations and wages awards, and servicing of the numerous committees 
and meetings that occur. within the department as well as between the minister 
and others, are their basic work and seldom is there a decision made by the 
administrative side that does not have direct consequences for the educators. 
Yet, the adaptability of the public service side of the department allows 
resolution of most Of the problems without recourse to the minister. 
This view is not necessarily shared by the teachers, who do not see 
the public servants as adaptable, rather as domineering, allowing them little 
chance to influence the major decisions about their working conditions. 
Whichever view is correct, it does not appear to affect the minister in any 
direct way. - one minister especially admitted that he did not spend' enough 
time on administrative matters. His inclination was to measure things in 
educational terms, becoming. too engaged in professional areas, which h e  
recognised, was probably the result of his being minister for a long period. 
His own assessment was confirmed by the Director-General, who thought that 
the minister should not act as a member of the staff, a reference to the 
minister's habit of joining committees of staff members in their informal 
discussions or 'popping in' to talk to officers. This style may have grown 
in the period of the previous Director-General, with whom the particular 
minister was not so secure. Much more discretion over professional matters 
was given to senior officers under the present permanent head than before.. 
Nonetheless, the minister was in contact with the professionals more.than 
others. 
"I am most often in contact with the Director-General, 
his deputy, Mr. Fleming (Buildings Officer), Mr. Cox, 
'(Bus contracts Officer) and Personnel Director. I also 
make a practise of going to a school and talking to the 
Headmasters and teachers." 
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A significant omission from this list is the Chief Administrative Officer, 
which is confirmed by that officer, 
"The minister deals directly with him (Buildings Officer) 
not through me. The Officer in charge keeps me informed 
on the more important matters ., e.g: any changes in 
priorities in the building programme." 
Not all ministers are the same, perhaps due to different lengths of 
time in office and the necessary learning time when taking up a new portfolio. 
One such minister noted 
"I would most often be in contact with the Director-General 
and the Chief Administrative Officer, the Directors of 
Primary, Secondary and Matriculation, as well as the 
Director of Personnel.They come at my request or at their 
request, I have an open-door policy with senior officers." 
No minister had any memory of having to settle a dispute between the two 
sides of the department as there was a high degree of cooperation. 
The general picture to emerge so far is that the professional aspects of - 
the department are dominant subject to certain constraints, particularly 
budgetary. The grouping of professional senior officers around the minister; 
his own declared predeliction for the professional perspective; the clear 
relationship between the qualification of educator and the purposes of the 
department - education; all promote the feeling that the department is 
'directed by a puppet politician dancing to the professional tune. This 
is not how the professionals themselves see the situation. Nor is it 
supported by the stance taken by the Teachers Federation on matters related • 
to education policy. 
The Director-General was quite clear about the relationship between 
himself and the minister. As.the professional, he, the Director-General, 
was in a better position to make decisions about educational matters. The 
minister, however, was the person with the political power to approve or 
reject such decisions. It was only sensible, therefore, to avoid conflict 
by creating a cooperative relationship between himself and the minister. Both 
sides had to be prepared to use debate and persuasion rather than arbitrary 
decisions, even where either side had some executive authority to act without 
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reference to the other. There were some matters on which there could be 
no compromise in professional terms, especially through the support from 
the other professionals within the teaching service. In these situations 
the Director-General and his other professional officers are considerably 
strengthened in their debate with and persuasion of the minister by their 
links with teachers. The homogeneity of qualification and objectives helps 
in this regard, but the Director-General was definite that even this did not 
basically change his position in respect of the minister. There was seldom 
a situation in which a decision was taken without the approval of the minister, 
although the minister may decide without any reference to his officers. 
This view was supported by the Deputy Director-General, who agreed that, 
because of the professional basis of advice, the minister may have to Act 
in ways which he disliked. Yet despite this, the minister does have the 
final decision and he may choose to reject such advice. He often has his 
own priorities which have to be absorbed into the general departmenta?. list 
of priorities. When asked what he thought his objectives as minister were 
one interviewee made no attempt to defer to the judgement of professionals, 
he said. 
objectives are to provide the best possible education 
for children of the state. What is 'best' is what I, 
as minister, consider necessary from time to time. 
Sometimes I may clash with my officers, largely because they 
have more sympathy with the people capable of using education 
than those who are less capable. I tend to favour the latter." 
There is a feeling of give and take between the ministers and 
professionals in the Deputy Director-General's view, 
"I do not feel constrained, I am free to act providing 
it is within my own area of authority which is clearly 
defined. If I feel the need I can go to the minister 
any time with ideas for change." 
Placing the minister first as the ultimate decision point, whilst allowing 
for professional influence, does indicate that the potential centrifugal 
forces of professionalism are not allowed to grow by the responsible 
attitude of senior officers. 
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Not all officers are totally committed to this view.. Some senior 
officers thought that they should have at least the opportunity to make 
public policy statements on matters within their competence as professionals, 
even when they were not in agreement with the minister's pclicy. For them 
the vehicle would be the Institute of Inspectors to which they all belonged.. 
As 'public servants' they agreed they could not overtly attack departmental . 
policy even though the policy was adopted against their advice. One example 
of the use of the Institute previously mentioned was their rejection of 
State Aid, another concerned the question of whether Superintendents should 
be appointed on short tenure rather than as promotion in a career structure. 
Summation  
There are three groups of officers within the department: 
1. Those appointed under the Public Service Act, described in the 
Education Act 1932 as 'clerical' whose tasks are administrative 
servicing of the financial, inventory, buildings and the like. 
As at 1/8/1974 they numbered 573; 
2. those appointed by the Governor, i.e. the senior professional staff 
and all teaching staff of schools, together with the staffs of the 
Teaching Aids Centre, Curriculum Branch, Guidance and Welfare Office, 
Physical Education Branch, Schools Library Service, and Technical 
Colleges. The number of these as at 1/8/1974 is 4,294; 
3. those appointed by the Director General as bursars, cleaners, 
teaching aides, groundsmen and others of a casual nature for specific 
schools. There are no numbers available for this group. 
The numerical strength of the professionals and the professional objectives 
of the department place them in a. very strong position, both as regards 
the clerical staff and the minister. The former being expected to act as • 
a service group for the educational tasks and thus only able to exercise 
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expenditure control rather than policy control. The minister, being a 
layman, must take professional advice. Although it has been indicated that, 
in the case of the longer serving Minister, there has been an increasing 
professionalisation of his own perspectives. All this must lead to the 
predominance of centrifugal forces within the department, creating a situation 
of executive independence based on the professional group of senior officers. 
This has not occurred for two reasons on the evidence presented, on the 
one hand the officers themselves have refrained from taking the dominant role, 
and on the other they have received no explicit external support from their 
fellow professionals who are all employed by the department. To erode the 
minister's inherent control through the conventions of ministerial responsi-
bility, departmental officers would have to operate deliberately in conflict 
with their minister. This is especially so when the minister is a strong one, 
but in any case, there appears to be an explicit restraint exercised by the 
officers th ,mselves. Their own sense of what is 'proper for them to do has 
miliftted against using the undoubted opportunities they have for imposing 
their own decisions within the department. They have also probably been 
assisted in this regard by the innate growth factor in Education supported 
by a strongly committed minister. Not many of their desired reforms have been 
blocked either by the minister or Cabinet. The changes that have taken place 
in education policy have undoubtedly been derived from the professional 
advice the minister received, but equally the minister has made his mark in 
terms of the priorities for these changes. The professionals have not received 
much external support from either the clientele or the Teachers Federation 
in regard to educational policy matters. External pressure has been about 
the bread and butter issues which are largely the concern of the administrative 
side of the department. It does seem, therefore, that the propensity in a 
homogeneous and professional department, such as the Education Department, 
to centrifugal force, is counterbalanced by restraint on the part of the 
professional officers and a lack of external support. 
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D. 	Financial arrangements 
An agency, whose function has been so totally accepted within the 
community, is in a privileged position regarding its relations within the 
government system. There is rarely any challenge to its &3clared policy 
directions, as has been previously demonstrated, the main disagreements 
occurring within the agency itself, between its expert staff. In the same. 
way provision of funds is never- in doubt, although not in the sense of ear-
marked funds for specific annual expenditure, rather as a recognition that 
the gross total expenditure of the past year will form the base for the total 
expenditure for the current year and so on. 
The department's need to provide satisfactory estimates with supporting 
case, to justify its expenditure for any one year is not thereby reduced. 
But it does relieve the direct pressure felt in departments which have to 
justify their mere existence by showing the benefits of last year's expenditure 
before they are allowed more. One minister described the situation: 
"We do not really have to justify education expenditure at 
Cabinet because it is well accepted policy for governments 
to spend money in this area." 
There is little debate on the overall benefits of spending money, or on 
the way it had been spent, on education as compared with other government 
functions. , and certainly very rare criticism of the consequences. The 
department was seldom asked to produce evidence of results, especially in 
regard. to educational matters, although sometimes as regards buildings and 
equipment. 
The following Table, showing the funds expended on education in the 
two periods 1949/50 - 1955/56 and 1969/70 - 1975/76 and the percentage of 
education funds to state expenditure as a whole, shows quite clearly a 
difference between capital and recurrent. On. the one hand in respect of 
all funding the actual expenditure has increased but capital expenditurehas 
also steadily utilised a greater percentage of the total state funds. The 
percentage change between the two periods in recurrent expenditure, from an - 
pur 2uTuTra4 aagora4 g4Tm sTq4 go 2uTTTr4-aikop oqj 	SISECI araA aaa44 r 
4sraT 4u uo al.raado o4 luawlardap agl uTg4Tm appw sT ldwa44r uu 'sawura2oad 
2uTpung Tomos 'Xs 'go 4oadsaa uT awT4 prat 2uoT alp go asnuoaq 'aaAamoH 
.aan4Tpuadxa luaaanoaa puu Tr4Tdro tpoq Jog saveurpsa Irnuur go uoT4raud 
-td alp uT paAToAuT sT Imawlardap alp Teg4 stream gaTqm '4a2pnq lu3wua3Ao9 
alu4s aq4 u2noaq; sTsrq Trnutre UE U0 XIaAT4oagga papTAoad axe sAauow 
4uaw4ardaa uoT4v3npg '4ur4uno3oy :aoanos 
00'L1 000'LSS'L8 £86'8O'SIS 9L'17£ 9Z6`SE9`LT66E'ET8'£T6 
9L/SL6T 
SL/17161 
VL/EL6T 
EL/ZL6I 
ZL/TL6I 
IL/0L6I 
OL/696I 
9S/SS6T 
SS/t7S6I 
VS/ES6T 
ES/ZS6I 
ZS/IS6T 
TS/0S61 
OS/6t6T 
EV'9Z 
ZZ'OZ 
S6'LI 
ZV'EI 
ES'SI 
OT -II 
86'8 
000'LSO'LZ 
000'00S'LT 
000'00S'ET 
000'00S'OT 
000'000'8 
000'0017'9 
000'009'17 
000"SL5'ZOI 
8IL'6ZS'98 
80S'SIZ"'IL 
VZL'OZZ'8L 
20t7'108"E9 
000'£99'LS 
0£9'82Z'IS 
88'ZE 
8179£ 
9I'VE 
80'EE 
6£'9£ 
09'S£ 
T9'LE 
IT6'I6S'08 
OZS'98I'I9 
ZLE'LET'SV 
L69'L6L'LE 
IV9'6SE'S£ 
OSO'I28'6Z 
M'IEL'LZ 
8L9'LL6'17VZ 
SES'8EL'L9I 
£6Z'LZI'ZET 
SH'SLZ‘VIT 
E2Z'SLI'L6 
IT8'I6L'E8 
t9S'LZL'£L 
LI'S 86'68S'OI 0EL:1786'170Z ZL'8I 0S6'8WIE tS2'6LeT9I 
ZI'8 
LL . 8 
S'S 
80'2 
Z8'2 
VS *2 
EI'17 
8St'96I'Z 
98I'LLS'Z 
ZIL'OOL'I 
988'LEZ'T 
OZI'ZOE'T 
17L8'680'T 
ZOL'S8t 
098'LVO'LZ 
826'LLE'6Z 
OES'SIeI2 
8ZeIST'017 
9LE'LVO'VE 
866'I08'0E 
00Z'ZI7L'II 
SZ'LI 
Et'81 
V0'6I 
SZ'OZ 
ZZ'6I 
ZZ'8I 
1S'6I 
9EL'L80'9 
()WM.'S 
808'96I'S 
068'2I6'V 
826'6176'2 
V8L'LS8'Z 
1789'17L9'Z 
9£6'LLZ'SS: 
ZWOET'TE 
0S6'L8Z'LZ 
9TV'E9Z'VZ 
17SZ ( 8VS'OZ 
0S6'Z89'ST 
98 .17'889'ET 
% 
'4cIaa 
uoTluonpg 
rel.oi 
al:els c. 0 
•4daci 
uoT4vonpg 
Trloi 
alr4s araA 
aan4Tpuadxg Tr4Tdu3 	 3an4Tpu3dxg luaaanoall 
8 glUVI 
*X4ard 2uTuaaAo2 aq4 paam aoqul sawT4 aatilo TTu lu aTTqm 'aamod uT srm 'Claud 
TriacITI ZUTL6I O OL/6961 woag poTaad aql uI • saTlard TropTiod TIr Aq 
uoT4ronpa 04 3Uaw4Tww0o go aouapTAa 2uo14s Si? papar26a aq 4snw pur . suaaouT 
4ur3TgTOTs AaaA r sT cuT go a2UaaAr ur 04 poTaad 4s1Tg alp uT %s go a2uaaive 
ue woag '2u1I.Ta4s lsow ST 4-eq4 agulmaoaad Tr41dro aAT4rIaa 0q3 ST 4T 4ng 
• 'AoTTod uoTluonpa go 31n4ru ursT4ard-Tq lsowTv i3 saTgTu2Ts pur Imawa4u4s 
anoqr aq4 4ioddns soap csOL6I  0144 UT  96 .17 E 04 sOS6T  alp uT %81 go a2uaaAr 
LOZ 
208 
staffing forecasts based on a five year forward plan, and the recurrent . 
expenditure on an annual basis, provides great difficulties. In particular 
as the whole process is tied to a strict time schedule. Similarly funds 
allocated for the year must be e::pended or committed by the department 
within the twelve months, otherwise it falls back into Consolidated Revenue 
rather than being carried forward to the department's credit in the following 
year. The consequence of these factors is to inhibit the freedom of the 
department to some degree in detailed matters and tends to perpetuate the 
marginal change approach to estimating. So, for example, the Deputy 
Director-General, whose task is to supervise teacher training and staffing 
needs, uses forecasts based on estimated five year periods, refining a 
specific yearly forecast at estimate time. 
The problems of prediction are illustrated in Table 9 and Graph 2 set 
out below. The five year prediction of student numbers from 1968-73, on which 
staffing and training requirements would be based, was considerably out, 
especially in the primary schools. The current estimates are shown from 
1974-1982 and may be more accurate with the relatively recent census figures 
available. 
The Chief Administrative Officer was the person largely concerned 
with the preparation of the estimates for consideration. by the minister. 
His view was limited to an annual perspective. His main concern was that 
the figures were 'spot on' for one year. He was particularly definite about 
•, ■-■ the recurrent expenditure situation 
"...only a marginal increase each year on a percentage 
basis, which does not leave much room for innovation. 
It only allows marginal change on the past year's performance." 
On the other hand, less directly concerned with controlling the expenditure, 
the Director-General had a broader and more relaxed view, "We are able to 
spend the money how we like so long as we do not exceed the vote." Ministers 
also stressed this need for flexibility in the spending of the vote, which 
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TABLE 9 
Prediction of Government School Enrolments 
Year Primary Enrolments Secondary Enrolments 
1946 26,910 5,478 
1951 33,441 9,693 
1956 43,522 13,599 
1961 47,317 19,429 
1962 47,811 20,707 
1963 48,414 21,470 
1964 48,869 21,948 
1965 49,491 22,317 
1966 49,750 22,907 
1967 50,417 23,997 
1968 45,954 25,050 
1969 46,294 26,176 
1970 46,137 27,207 
1971 45,566 28,217 
1972 44,517 28,861 
1973 42,836 29,054 
1974 43,634 29,299 
1975 43,900 29,430 
1976 44,030 29,290 
1977 44,800 28,590 
1978 45,380 27,680 
1979 45,210 26,920 
1980 44,620 26,780 
1981 43,930 27,230 
1982 43,190 27,810 
Source: Education Department Statistics Branch 
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must cause the Chief Administrative Officer some anxiety at times. 
However, even though there are these constraints, - as has been shown 
the department has a reliable and steadily increasing source of funds which 
it obtains without too much difficulty from the State government. The • 
detailed allocation of those funds is largely an internal matter between 
areas of departmental concern, such as primary, secondary, technical or 
pre-school. All officers agreed that such bargaining or negotiation as 
did occur should be kept at an officer level. There were various committees 
within the department which met from time to time to resolve differences, 
but the minister was not involved and was not asked to act as arbitrator in 
such disputes. As one officer said, 
"There is a committee situation for resolving differences 
between ourselves. Purves (CAO) gets all the estimates 
and then prunes them until they come within the expected 
marginal overall figure. He also works out the priorities 
within the estimates with the Director-General beforehand." 
Nonetheless, officers are aware from two iaain sources of developments a 
minister might favour. The Director-General. is the main link between the 
minister and these committees, because he "...consults with the minister 
about the tentative solutions. There is little room for manoeuvre in 
financial matters anyway." The other source is the direct contact the 
minister has with his other officers about specific matters. One such 
example of direct contact was the question of the bond to which teacher 
trainees are held after they finish their training. The Deputy Director 
felt it should be removed, and, although this was a matter in his area, it 
had both financial and political implications; so that he left his proposal 
for the minister's decision. In this way the minister is involved in the 
affairs of the department and his views become known on a range of matters. 
As the Director-General points out, "It would be naive to give the minister 
no power. We would rather go along with the minister if we could." 
Once the estimates have been settled they go to the minister who has a 
final discussion with the Director General before they are passed on to 
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Treasurer and thence to Cabinet. It appears it is up to the Director-General 
to interpret for the committees the priorities that the minister has uppermost 
in his mind, so that they can be incorporated atthe time of preparation 
in committee. Rarely has the Minister changed priorities In estimates, as 
one officer says of his estimate, 
"I normally never see the estimate from the time it 
reaches the CAO until the Cabinet approves it.The 
Minister has never called me in to talk about my 
priority list in the estimates. If I want any changes 
I deal with the Director-General." 
As mentioned previously, there is an intradepartmental Finance Committee 
which meets fortnightly to allow discussion of current expenditure in terms 
of revenue. The CAO is also a member of the Senior Officers Committee which 
meets regularly to discuss matters of general concern, including those having 
financial implications. His membership of these committees does ensure 
coordinative activity in financial terms. As the CAO said, "A person in 
a senior position will hardly ever make a decision by himself." He ga-e 
as examples of the kind of changes that came from these committees the 
decision to phase out double student desks and the decision to provide hard-
wood teachers' desks. In both cases it took about two years to adopt, because 
it had to go through a series of decision points after the suggestions had 
been received by the administration side from teachers in schools. 
Timing plays a very important part in political terms, the capability 
of a minister to decide the reallocation of resources to a politically 
sensitive area may be decisive. There are, however, severe restrictions in 
this regard imposed by the need to begin planning for the following year in 
about December. Ministers newly appointed found this particularly restricting, 
they would be more sensitive to political factors. 
"Policy changes are very difficult in these circumstances 
from a political point of-view. The politician has to live 
in the present as well as the future. He may be able to 
obtain a middle or long term change of direction, but he 
also wants immediate returns." 
This is extremely difficult to achieve when capital programmes for the next 
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financial year have to be planned six months in advance of the beginning 
of that year. 
The actual planning involved is not so difficult as it is already 
based on a three year rolling budget, as previously mentioied. The problem 
is to get an appropriate balance between educational requirements and 
political advantage. Longer serving ministers did not seem to suffer from. 
quite the same problems, perhaps due to the longer term of office which made 
their officers sensitive to their views. 
There does seem, therefore, to be support for the proposition that 
time constraints involved in budgeting are a centrifugal force. The potential, 
hinted at in the statement of the less well entrenched minister, is not 
completely borne out by either a longer serving minister or his officers. 
Nonetheless, the officers do support their own programme priorities in the 
process of negotiation and they have voiced their disapproval of interference 
by the minister. One example of interference by the minister imposed by 
external groups influencing him was the payment of university fees for 
teacher trainees. The minister had accepted proposals from teacher trainees 
against departments' approved allocation of resources which had to be 
reallocated accordingly. 
Another indication that the minister does have a great deal of influence 
is by comparison of expenditure in different areas of education. For example, 
during the years 1968/69 the minister had made a strong commitment to 
Matriculation College development, and there was a significant increase in 
expenditure directed to them. Later, in 1970, the next minister expressed 
some concern over the lack of priority given to pre-school education and 
some high school improvement. Subsequently - in 1973 - the minister felt that 
...there had been pressure during the Liberal Government 
time for high school expenditure. The primary area has been 
less demanding but does need more than it is getting and it 
will be my endeavour to see it gets it." 
As a consequence expenditure in this area rose by 7% in the years 1974/75. 
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TABLE 10 
Percentage of total expenditure allocated by educational field 
Year 	Primary 	SecoLdary 	Technical 	Balance 
incl. Matric,) 
Teacher 
Education 
1960 not available 
1970 36.40 45.42 16.05 2.13 
1972 27.06 64.42 8.44 .08 
1974 34.62 53.48 11.80 NIL 
(Source: Accountant, Education Department) 
Finally, in any consideration of financial arrangements the position of 
the Australian Government must be taken into account. That government 
provides no guaranteed finance for education as occurs in housing. What it 
has done fo many years is to Offer specific grants in certain fields of 
expenditure it wished to have priority within the States. In the main these 
fields have centred on science and technical education, which has resulted, 
according to the Director-General, in "the State having altered some of its 
allocation to obtain the matching grants." Levels of expenditure reached 
in previous years had to be maintained for this purpose in areas which would 
otherwise have been reduced and re-allocated. It also means a continuing 
recurrent commitment to support services for such expenditure, which would 
not otherwise have been so committed. There is a consequent distortion in 
expenditure which is quite significant, for example in the year 1970/71, 
$1,069,000 was received from the Australian Government. 
This activity has increased as a result of the Schools Commission Report 
which provided the following funds for the years 1974 and 1975: 
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TABLE 11 
1974 	($'000) 
Programme 	Recurrent Capital 
1975 ($'000) 	Sub-Totals ($'000) Totals 
Recurrent 	Capital 	Recurrent 	Capital 	($'000) 
Disadvantaged 
schools 156 96 234 144 390 • 240 630 
Special 
education 266 252 394 - 378 660 630 1 290 
Libraries 70 575 70 575 140 1 150 1 290 
Teacher 
development 108 ... 162 ... 270 • • • 270 
General 
recurrent 	1 590 3 390 • • • 4 980 • • • 4 980 
General 
buildings 1 440 • • 2 160 . 	• 3.600 	 3 600 
2 190 2 363 4 250 3 257 	 6 440 	 5620.  12 060 	• 
(Source: Annual Report of Minister of Education: Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper 
of 1975) 
The influx of $6.4m for recurrent expenditure and $5.6m capital works has an 
enormous effect on the resources already planned for allocation from previous 
years. Much of this money must inevitably be absorbed within the existing 
framework of allocation, otherwise it causes problems of reallocation and support 
expenditure not dealt with in existing plans. It is not surprising that in the 
Minister's Annual Report to Parliament it said 
"The Karmel Report ... contains many implications, not only 
for priority programmes in education but also for the 
administration of those programmes." 49 
Summation  
The department obtains its funds from the State, with only a small 
percentage from other sources. It is not apparently hampered in its purposes 
by having to compete for these resources with other agencies. In one sense the 
49Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 45 of 1974, p 16 
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department is certain to receive at least the same gross sum as the previous 
year, with the possibility of a percentage increase overall. As with dedicated 
funding - (knowing that they will be certain of funds) this does allow officers 
to promote their own particuliq. activities. However, the position within the 
department does not favour a uniform approach by all officers because there are 
very different demands placed upon resources by each area. For example, not 
only does the cost of administration have to be met, but also the costs of 
instruction, building operation and maintenance, and fixed charges. There 
are also preschool, primary, secondary, technical and previously teacher 
education, each of these under the control of a Director. This gives rise to 
a matrix of potentially conflicting demands on the available resources. The 
evidence indicates that these are negotiated away internally by the officers of 
the department, but not without bearing in mind the minister's own priorities 
and expectations. A potentially centrifugal force is therefore dissipated 
through inte•nal bargaining and deference to the minister before proposals are 
placed before him for his approval. In this way the minister is strengthened 
since his demands do not compete with a combined officer-only allocation. By 
adopting an accommodatory approach the officers have enhanced the minister's 
position. 
The combination of long term requirements, educational demands and 
political expectations on which the capital and recurrent expenditure estimates 
for the department are based, ensure ministerial control. The fact that the 
department is one of the major expenders of State Government funds also plays 
an important part in reducing the centrifugal forces. The approval of the 
minister to expenditure is vital to make sure he retains his commitment throughout 
the following year. For example, the building programme is always subject to 
some changes of a political nature, the postponement of the second stage of 
Rosny College is one example of this. Another one of a different kind is 
deferring the payment of teachers' holiday pay to overcome a liquidity problem. 50  
5Q 
Metatry, 29 November 1974 
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Once the estimates have been approved, the Director and his officers 
are able to operate within their authority from the Appropriation Act, 
although subject to indirect TreaSury control. Apart from the effect of 
Australian government specific grants, which are becoming iD.creasingly 
important, there is little direct influence of circumjacent groups in 
financial matters. What there is, however, does not support the officers 
as against the minister. Rather, it is the minister who gains from such funds, 
since it is Cabinet who are anxious to obtain grants at whatever cost to the 
planned programme, not the officers. There is some potential for centrifugal 
forces, but the attitude of the officers militates against these forces becoming 
too great. No doubt, a change of attitude on the part of the officers would 
make some difference, but the wide range of activities funded by the department 
would make it difficult to obtain sufficient cohesion between officers to 
present a united front to the minister. 
E. 	Tradition of autonomy 
A professionally based department such as education is expected to be 
autonomous. The balance between the politician and the expert is assumed to 
be weighted in the expert's favour, through the identity of interests between 
those who are in the schools and in the professional side of central adminis- 
tration and support services. These factors should contribute towards reducing 
the political control. There is no doubt that such ties are very strong in 
the Education department, cemented by long years of working in the same field • 
for the same department. The ties are not, however, to the department.as  
such, but rather to education, which may not be the same as departmental 
objectives. 
There are a number of reasons for this situation. In the first place 
the centralised control exercised by the administrative group in Head Office 
has sapped the innovatory energy of the teachers as a whole. The enormous 
difficulty of obtaining change: for example, the two-year long process to 
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obtain single rather than double desks, makes a concerted effort by teachers 
unlikely. There is also the difference between the needs of the various 
sections within education. The requirements of the primary group of teachers 
ore vastly less expensive than thc technical for example, but also less easy 
to control. Large mechanical equipment is easier - though more expensive - 
to obtain and its use easier to control, than the range of minor items of 
paper, plasticine, games and books for the primary school. It is also more 
predictable, perhaps even more respectable educationally. Certainly, technical 
teachers have traditionally regarded their needs as completely different from 
primary teachers, even forming their own breakaway Association because they
felt overwhelmed by the demands of the primary teachers who controlled the 
Teachers Federation. The fragmentation between secondary and primary has not 
reached that stage, but the Federation have heeded the warning and provided 
sectional meetings for all remaining groups. 
There have also been subject groupings formed for the exchange of - 
professional information in the teaching of a particular subject area. These 
have been given departmental support by appointing, in the administrative 
levels of the department, a number of supervisors for the main subject areas, 
English, modern languages, mathematics, sciences, music,and speech education. 
The consequently fragmented group of professionals are really only able to 
find common cause on what may be termed trade union, issues of salaries and 
conditions of employment. They cannot provide a single source of support 
to the professional officers in the department and have not therefore been 
able to promote an autonomy for themselves. 
The senior officers, it is true, feel united to a limited degree, 
although this was more possible when there were fewer of them. Now there 
are many more (43) spread throughout the department and the State at regional 
headquarters, not meeting so regularly as they once did. .Three regional 
offices have been instituted - over the last two years, with Regional Directors 
and senior staff. Their functions are still developing but include placement 
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of teachers in schools, equipment, building operation and maintenance, and 
inspection of teaching. It is possible that this may provide a base from 
which regional staffs see themselves as more autonomous than the central 
staff ever did. If this occurs, however, it will be at the expense of the 
departmeat as against the minister, and may eventually cement an even greater 
control relationship between the minister and his head office. As it is, 
the potential autonomy of the professionals is continually undermined by the 
way in which both cooperate for the same ends. The minister and the depart-
ment are treading the same path, caught up in a growth situation. The accept-
ance of education as a vital function of government, and the consistent 
commitment of large proportions of state funds to it allows both to obtain 
their objectives. In this situation, there is no need to claim, or even 
prepare for, autonomy. 
In one sense it is true that the minister is committed to activities 
within the education field by teachers in schools, in the curriculum branch 
and in head office. The example of sex education was given as one of the 
areas in which the departmental professionals had been left completely alone 
to decide. Other examples are changes in curriculum, like social sciences, 
or mathematics or teaching French in primary schools. Many of these new 
directions for education are initiated by the professionals, teachers in 
schools or those in administrative positions. There is undoubtedly a more 
ready acceptance of these ideas within the department because of the fact 
that those in the top administrative post have risen from the ranks of 
teachers. It could be assumed, all these factors would lead to greater 
autonomy in professional terms, but this is not so. As pointed out earlier, 
growth promotes cooperation so that at least all are obtaining some part of 
their expectations. Since the minister obtains political prestige from the 
resulting educational benefits for the community, this reflects in the in-
creasing legitimacy of the teachers themselves. 
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The relative status of teachers in society is in the process of change, 
but the changes have occurred more in their salary relativity than in public 
image. An Australian survey indicated that doctors, solicitors, dentists 
and engineers were placed at the top of the scale with semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers at the bottom. Teachers came in the middle range along 
with nurses, policemen, farmers and public servants. Primary teachers were 
rated lower than secondary. 51 
There seems to be little difference, whatever country of the Western 
world is surveyed. For example, Stellwag found that in Holland the teachers 
themselves had the same view of their own status: 
"Primary teachers are placed on the lowest level of the 
intellectual professions immediately below them are the 
middle class civil servants. Secondary teachers are 
placed on a higher level but below other intellectuals - 
ministers, engineers, doctors, lawyers and university 
professors." 52 
However, when their relative salary position is considered they have more than 
kept pace. Table 12 shows this especially in relation to the majority of 
teachers, the four-year trained group, and the school principals. It has 
been practice to compare four-year trained teachers with University lecturers 
for salary parity when salary claims have been made by the Teachers Federation. 
The positions oi Senior Master and up have been related to the senior 
administrative officers Of the public service in the department for this 
purpose. 
51R.D.Goodman, "The Education and Professional Status of Teachers 
in Australia" in The Year Book of'Edutation,edited by G.J.Bereday and 
J.A. Lauwerys, (London: Evans Bros., 1963) pp 443-455. This confirms 
a similar survey by I.S. Turner, published in the 1953 Yearbook, pp 250261 
52H. Stellwag, "The attitudes of teachers towards their profession in 
the Netherlands" in The Year Book of Education, pp 425-431; see also 
G.E.Spring, "The Status of the Teacher and his school in the Community", 
LEADER, 3(6) (1966), 47-50 
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TABLE 12 
Comparison  of salary relativity in years 1966 and  1975 
1966 
4 yelrs Trained 
Start 
Finish 
Senior Master 
Infant Mistress 
Vice-Principal 	- 
Primary Principal 
Post Primary Principal 
1975 
3,276 
4,716 
5,124 
5,556 
.5,604 
6,210 
6,492 
8,347 
12,220 
13,518 
14,329 
15,149 
17,485 
18,190 
University Lecturer 
Start 
Finish 
Senior Executive 
-- 	Officer (6) 
Administrative 
Officer 
Secretary 
Deputy Chief 
Admin. Officer 
Senior Superintendent 
University Lecturer 
Start 
Finish 
Senior Executive Officer 
(10)* 
Administrative Officer 
Secretary 
Deputy Chief 
Admin. Officer 
Class 18** 
5,400 
7,300 
5,058 
5,274 
5,952 
7,200 
7,452 
12,063 
16,193 
13,580 
13,899 
15,501 
17,537 
18,250 
4 years Trained 
Start 
Finish 
Senior Master 
Infant Mistress 
Vice-Principal 
Primary Principal 
Post Primary Principal 
* There has been a change of grading for this position and it is not 
therefore strictly comparable. 
** 	The position of Senior Superintendent no longer exists but Class 18 
of the Public Service Award is equivalent, although no one in the 
Education Department is actually on that grade, the Deputy CAO having 
a rating of Class 16. 
Source: Teachers' Federation Deputy Secretary and Public Service Association 
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There is, therefore, a combination of maintenance of public status levels 
and increasing salary levels to professional equality which produces tension. 
Teachers have become somewhat self defensive in order to protect their position 
and are prepared to allow the minister to exercise such control as he has 
without hindrance. 
Given changed circumstances in which the funds for education were cut, 
it was no longer, regarded so highly, and its benefits were judged by its 
costs, it is possible that, as in some other states, e.g. New South Wales, 
there could be a call for the closing of ranks and a greater demand for 
autonomy as against the minister. 
Another factor to note is the identification of the same ministers with 
the professional viewpoint, perhaps because of the tradition of one politician 
having a long spell as minister of this one department. One such minister 
said: 
"My style of administration is to get engaged in 
professional areas, probably more than any other 
Australian Education minister. My bias is that 
way and I have a number of professional contacts 
outside the state." 
This predisposition does lead to some problems, as the Deputy Director-General 
pointed out, 
"Earlier the minister would accept advice, would 
study his brief well and try to understand the aim. 
Latterly, this has not been the case, he has acquired 
more knowledge and as a result is more likely to query 
the advice or use his own judgement." 
Such crossing of the professional boundary has therefore reduced the autonomy 
of the teacher group, in the department. Not so much because the minister is 
'one of them', but because there is an increased awareness of their needs 
which seems to result in their achieving growth in their field. At the same - 
time, the lack of direct links with circumjacent groups, such as clients or 
other educationists, gives them no external support to use against the minister. 
The -Teachers Federation could have been such a link, but as has been shown 
this body.has not proved adequately equipped for this task. 
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There are a number of other external bodies and committees with which 
individual teachers are involved, but this does not provide the continuous 
and professionally oriented linkage necessary to form an 'aristocratic agency' 
which promotes centrifugal forces. Historical events have 'lso made this 
unlikely. The relatively poor standing of teachers in the state until well 
into the 1950s and their minimal educational qualifications did not give them 
the foundation on which to build autonomy. The small, composite class schools 
educating rural children to grade 6 was the dominant type in the education 
system until that time. The growth of Area Schools and use of School buses 
changed the image of education from rural to urban and enormously increased the 
prestige of the teacher. But it was not until salaries and qualifications 
were such as to place teaching on a par with the public service that it became 
possible to use a professional tag. 
Within the Department there is little basis for creating an autonomous 
situation, there being a number of vertical and horizontal hierarchies as 
shown in the diagram: 
Director-General 
Head Office 
Deputy Director  
(SziorrAdmilstATive 
vertical 	Deputy C.A.O. authority 
 
Directors 
 
 
Senior Education 
Officers 
 
   
   
Regional Directors 
Superintendents 
 
Secretary Accountant  
Administration Finance 
 
  
Supervisors 
 
   
Specialist Areas - 
guidance 
curriculum 
research 
horizontal authority 
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This not only prevents the whole department from pulling together to provide 
a united view to the minister on any issue, but it also reduces the possibi-
lity of such a move coming from the head office. 
The teaching service spr(ad across the schools in Tasmania, has its apex 
in the senior officers at head office. However, the great majority of the 
public service staff are located in that office as well as the minister. One 
consequence thereof is that for the teacher out in the school head office is 
seen as 'them', a group against whom battles have to be fought to obtain funds, 
equipment and other resources. In the all inclusive 'them' very often no 
distinction is made between the public service component and the senior 
education officers. It also operates in reverse with senior education officers 
at head office seeing demands from schools in the same light as the public 
service group who have to maintain financial control. One senior education 
officer indicated, when discussing his relationship with the schools, that 
school principals were more inclined to "line up with us" now they were 
responsible for some of the work previously done by administrators at head 
office. 
Summation  
Because there does not seem to be one locus of professional interest with 
which all professionals within the department can identify the possibility of 
a 'departmental autonomy seems remote. There are at least four major and 
two minor divisions within the department as a whole which would reduce such 
centrifugal tendency. The education oriented element, the service element and 
the head office and field (schools) elements have been mentioned as major 
deterrents to accommodating all points of view under one autonomous grouping. 
The. internal divisions within education between pre school, primary, secondary 
and technical, and within services between resource allocation , and resource 
control are the other two minor factors which reduce this possibility. 
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In all these matters the relation between the minister and his senior 
officers is dictated by the need for some direction for policies in the long 
term, say three to five years. No single group can, in these circumstances, 
so dominate the decision making process as to take away the minister's control. 
As one of the administrative officials made quite clear, the senior education 
and administrative officials have a wide discretion in all matters, yet it is 
rare for any one person to make a decision by himself. Most often there are 
committees, or ad hoc meetings for particular problems, or merely routine 
consultation between colleagues. To this extent it may be thought that the 
department does dominate the minister, since none of these meetings includes 
the minister directly. 
However, when asked what he would do in the event of disagreement with 
the minister over some policy, the Director-General pointed to many possible 
courses of action from resignation, executive action without the minister's 
consent, to withdrawal, permitting the minister his way. None of these.. 
situations would be likely to occur, he thought, because they were both human 
beings who had to continue to work together. He went on "It would be naive 
. to give him no power, since in actuality he has control." 
One minister supported this view feeling that he was there to provide 
a balanced view, the lay minister choosing between various - kinds of.advice. 
He admitted this became more difficult after spending a long time as minister 
in one functional area, but he claimed he was always "seeking to be more 
reasonable trying to reconcile power with understanding." 
Perhaps it may be that personalities play a great part in the way 
potential centrifugal forces are utilised. Even in situations, where the 
personalities are less amiable, the internal divisions of the department 
would make it almost impossible for the Director-General to mobilise- sufficient 
support from within the department to reduce the eventual control of the 
minister. 
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Conclusion  
Any forces which could inhibit a minister's capacity for political 
leadership in the subsystem under study, the Education Department, are 
detrimental to control and accbuntability. The evidence does not appear to 
indicatethe existence of such forces in the department, where the minister
appears to have adequate control. 
A highly significant activity is the minister's practice of spending a 
great deal of time on meeting deputations and travelling to schools. The 
openness, practised by both ministers interviewed, increases the potential for 
leadership and initiative at the expense of the professionals who are seen 
in these situations with the minister, acting as advisers, not decisionmakers. 
The circumjacent 'groups with which the department and minister are involved d6 
not therefore look to the departmental officers to solve their problems when 
they can have direct access to the minister. The Parents & Friends Associations, 
from whom thf, professionals may possibly expect support, do not identify so 
directly therefore with the profession of teachers. In the same way, individual 
groups of teachers find it possible to obtain access for their own purposes 
when the minister visits their school, thus circumventing the official.channels 
through senior officials. In one sense both senior officials and the minister 
may be seen as distinct from the teaching staff generally and thus a potential 
centrifugal force is undermined. 
While the purposes of the department are contained within the term 
'education', it is not single centred as a function and there are many competing 
forces. Any conflict within the department, or between the department and its 
environment, seems to be absorbed by the aura of legitimacy of anything 
educationally preferred, because most demands are met to some degree. As has 
been mentioned, neither Parliament nor Cabinet seemed to have much desire to 
change the policy of continuing expansion. There was very little controversy 
over educational policies other than the perennial religious problem of State 
Aid. Occasional challenges have been made but mainly over non educational 
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matters, administrative in content, political in intention. 
Perhaps two factors relating to circumjacent groups require special 
attention, since they do reduce the control of the minister. The first is 
the problem of longterm planing and budgeting which, because of its long 
lead time, does tend to reduce the political options of the minister. The three 
to five year rolling programme, which is related specifically to buildings and 
staffing requirements, is based on projections of student populations and 
demand in various parts of the state This means planning for building, 
purchasing land, and arranging to have appropriate resources available to 
meet these projections. All such decisions are taken within the department on . 
the advise of the senior professional staff, after general approval by the 
minister. It is quite clear, however, that decisions made two or three years ago 
may not be so politically viable once they move to fruition, and this does 
reduce the capacity of the minister to deal with the needs of the moment. 
Although significant changes can occur with the support of Cabinet, as was 
seen in the postponement of the second stage of Rosny College. 
The second factor, which has a similar result, is the increasing inter-
vention of the Australian Government through funding programmes under the 
Schools Commission. The total effects are not yet apparent because the main 
thrust has been too recent, but it can be seen from previous experience with 
provision of special funds for such service as Libraries and Science Laboratories, 
- that some changes will be forced on already prepared plans. The capacity of 
the minister to direct policies and decisions is certainly undermined and the 
changes could be used by the professionals to promote their particular interests; 
because they have access through their common professionalism to the Schools 
Commission andits committees in ways which the minister does not. 
The effect of the legislative position is not cleat, because, while the 
Act. gives the minister very specific authority in most areas the tendency has 
been for the department to rely on change by regulation. In this way legislative 
• authority can be obtained without the open parliamentary debate that would 
occur for statutory change. The flexibility of regulations and the fact that 
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they are usually drafted by, and as a result of the demands of, the depart-
mental officials, would seem to be a clearly centrifugal force. It is true 
that the minister must finally give his approval to such regulations before 
they are tabled in parliament, but it is always possible that he does not 
fully comprehend their significance. -Despite this fact, it was not evident 
that many regulations had had the effect of increasing the effectiveness of 
the departmental officers as against the minister. Rather, the regulations 
had allowed the department to operate with greater internal coordination 
and ultimately permitted the minister, through his officers in head office, 
to have greater centralised control. 
Of the two main groups of officers within the department - teaching 
staff and administrative staff (including senior education officers within 
head office) - the latter have become dominant as a centralising force. The 
need for resource control and allocation has been the basis for most of these 
moves, and it has been these head office pctivities which created another 
divisive force, reducing potential centrifugal forces. The functional 
expertise of the department is in teaching and the teaching staff are numeric-
ally greater, so it could be assumed the centrifugal force would be irresistable. 
Add to this the recently acquired professionalism of the teaching staffs and 
their increasingly important salary status in the community and they would 
seem to be in an irrefutable position. Yet, this has not eventuated as a 
result of a series of fractures in the structure, derived from the fragmented 
nature of the work of the department. The split between schools and head office 
and within head office itself with its vertical and horizontal hierarchies 
has already been noted. A further division arises from the varying demands 
made by the three levels of education - primary, secondary and technical. 
The role of the Teachers Federation is indicative of this divisive 
situation. There does not seem to be any way it can retain its membership 
were it to pursue the aims of a professional association concerned with ethics 
and policies. The close links between the department and the Federation seems 
to indicate that concentration of the Federation on salaries and conditions of 
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service is what the department feels is appropriate. The senior officers 
of the department stress the great benefit of the direct access between the 
department and Federation. For these reasons it does not seem that the 
potential centrifugal force of2 professionalism has been realised. 
The provision of funds on a continually upward spiral, using the previous 
year as a springboard for the next; the fact of strong public acceptance of 
the benefits of education, gives legitimacy to the large expenditure. It 
provides political benefit for the minister, and a strong minister will be 
concerned to use that source of power to his best advantage. In the subsequent 
contest between professional-demands and political benefits there is little 
doubt that the evidence shows the latter to have more weight. The minister, 
because of the single portfolio and the tradition of long incumbency, has 
usually been able to force-his position deliberately on the professionals. 
In part this has also been due to the reluctance of the professionals to 
dictate their own point of view. There does appear to be a continuing commit-
ment to the increased provision of funds for education without much oversight 
in a political sense. In this situation the occasions for conflict are less 
numerous and the centrifugal forces are reduced. 
Overall, therefore, it seems that the forces supporting ministerial 
control are dominant, yet there is a sense in which this judgement may not be 
entirely adequate. The stress on the part of the officers was on 'reasonable= 
ness', on the pointlessness of taking matters to a confrontation with the 
minister. The number of officer committees in which the bargaining and 
negotiation takes place, and the emphasis by the Director General on keeping 
in touch with the ministers' views, so that all may be aware of them in their 
decisionmaking, must weigh heavily in favour of centrifugal tendencies. The 
circumstances which would indicate the reality of these tendencies may occur 
when there is a reduction in the resources available to education. Where the 
legitimacy of particular -policies are challenged, or where they have to be 
justified in competition for funds, some indication would be given as to who 
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really wielded the power. On a rising tide of legitimacy and resources 
education has prospered and there has been little occasion for such confronta-
tions to occur. When there was a conflictive situation in the period under 
discussion, it has been the minister who has prevailed. Three examples have 
been mentioned, the Axton case; the Rosny College case; and the holiday pay 
deferment. 
These are relatively minor matters and cannot be taken to support an 
alternative view; nonetheless, when taken together with other evidence 
presented in this Chapter do reinforce the feeling that the minister is able 
to exercise political leadership freely. Perhaps the areas in which he may 
equally freely exercise executive authority are less clearly defined. 
To summarise: 
Centrifugal Force 
a) circumjacent groups 
b) legislative provisions 
c) professional staffing 
Effect 
Apart from some lobbying of parliament 
and deputations to the minister by 
Parents and Friends groups, there are 
no close affiliations with clientele 
which would enhance centrifugal forces. 
Some cooptative activity creates 
links into the community but not 
sufficient to produce centrifugal 
support. Relations with Parliament 
and Cabinet especially enhance 
ministerial control at the expense of 
agency autonomy and provide means for 
political leadership and executive authority. 
Education Act 1932 has been the substantive 
statute under which the department. 
operates; there have been changes in 
detail but none directly reducing 
ministerial authority. The basic relation 
between powers of minister and officers 
remains the same, providing strong 
support for political leadership and 
executive authority. 
Dominance of professional teaching staff 
both numerically and in senior positions 
in department. This produces strong' 
.centrifugal forces but is ameliorated by 
divisions within professional staffs. 
The division between levels of education 
primary, secondary and technical is cut 
across by the . division between teachers 
in all these areas and the senior 
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0 professional staffing (contd.) 
d) finance 
senior educationists in the Head 
Office. This reduces the force of 
professionalism and at the same 
time provides the minister with more 
opportunities to exercise authority. 
There are no dedicated revenue sources 
although the commitment to education is 
such that annual appropriations have 
been continually increasing. Normally 
this would enhance the centrifugal 
forces, but it does not seem to have 
done so. This may be because of the 
divisive nature of the demands, as 
mentioned in c) above. Each area is 
seeking resources and competes with 
others,thus reducing the solidity of 
the professionals' stance as against 
the minister. At the same time the 
minister has the public service 
personnel as a buffer, since their task 
is resource control and allocation, 
which increases his capacity to exercise 
leadership and control. 
e) departmental traditions 	The legitimacy of education as a 
service has increased the possibility 
of centrifugal forces operating. In 
fact this has not occurred, there does 
not appear to be any loyal feeling in 
the staff towards the department, nor 
is there any attempt made by professional 
staff to 'identify' with the department. 
While the department does employ most 
of its professional staff for their 
entire career, it fails to provide a 
focus for loyalty. There is a deep 
division between those out in the schools 
and those providing support service and 
leadership, even though they may all be 
professional teachers. Equally, there 
is a deep division between the public 
service staff and the professional staff. 
The potential for the exercise of 
executive authority by the minister is 
therefore increased. The possibility 
that centrifugal forces could emerge 
is remote in the current climate and 
given the existing personnel. 
The strength of the political leadership exercised by the minister is shown 
by aggregating the effects mentioned above. Those areas in which it may 
be expected . that the centrifugal forces would be strongest: circumjacent 
groups, professionalism and traditional autonomy, provided no evidence to 
232 
indicate that effect. The potential for the exercise of executive autonomy 
is undoubtedly present in the professional orientation of the department, 
but a number of factors were identified which militated against this 
happening. The general commiment to education, by both the public and 
the government, has not produced any situations when the professionals have 
not been accommodated. In a similar way , so long as activity of an approved 
kind was evident the minister was gaining the credit and found it unnecessary 
to intervene too directly. One other significant feature which affected 
the situation was the length of ministerial incumbency. One minister had 
some 12 years in the portfolio and thus almost became one of his own officers, 
identifying with the professional point of view or even representing such a 
point of view from time to time. In these circumstances it is not surprising 
that the minister was able to retain his opportunities for political leader-
ship and executive authority. 
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V 
THE HEALTH SERVICES DEPARTMENT 
INTRODUCTION  
By 1885 Tasmanians had their first Public Health Act which was intended 
to provide the necessary stimulus for the already existing Local Boards of 
Health to pay more attention to their duties. Prior to this date such Local 
Boards as did exist were scarcely operating satisfactorily. A number of 
statutes affecting the two main tasks of these boards had been passed over 
for years. Some related to the preservation of clean water sources; 1 others 
to the prevention of the spread of infectious disease, either through 
controlling poor Sewage disposal and drainag e2 or increasing hygiene. 3 
However, this legislation was not sufficient by itself to contain the 
residual effects of Tasmania being an isolated convict colony for some fifty 
years. 
Earlier, in 1876, there were three general hospitals: in Hobart, 
Launceston and Campbell Town; four institutions for such people as orphans, 
indigent females and invalids (mainly aged persons and paupers); and a 
hospital for the Insane at New Norfolk. Altogether they provided institu-
tional care for some 1630 in-patients and 8000-9000 out-patients, and more 
than 960 permanent residents from the needy and insane. These were supported 
at a cost of 122,887 - or 7% of the total revenue, by a population of 99,328 
of whom 59,000 had been born in the Colony. 
As may be imagined, the conditions in the institutions were not very 
1Hobart Town Water Act, 1835; New Norfolk Water Supply Act, 1840; 
New Town Rivulet Preservation Act 1941 . 
2 Launceston Drain Act 1863; Rural Municipalities Act 1863 
3Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1881; Quarantine Act 1881; Vaccination 
Act 1881 
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adequate, even for that time, and did not provide other than the minimum 
health care. Evidence giver to the Commission of Inquiry into the General 
Hospital,. Hobart Town provides some indication of the facilities. Women 
nurses were first appointed to replace male nurses in the General Hospital 
in 1875. A Lady Superintendent, Florence Abbot, together with four other 
nurses, came from Sydney on a twelve month contract. By July of that year 
Florence Abbot was writing to the Colonial Secretary that neither she nor 
the other nurses could remain beyond their contracted time. She listed some 
twenty-five deficiencies which led them to take this step; amongst them were 
the following: 
"2. Patients not to be admitted dirty or filthy, unless 
too ill to be cleaned. At present patients often not 
bathed; or if bathed not properly cleaned and vermin 
consequently introduced into the wards either on the person 
or in the clothes. 
4. Present hot and cold water arrangements very defective 
hot water often not to be had - the copper fires lighted 
only once a day, and supplies from the kitchen often the 
only resource and not always to be got there. 
14. The mess room of the male wards on the ground floor 
flagged cold to the feet of patients and difficult to 
keep clean. It should be boarded. 
16. Sinks are wanted on each floor. 
17. A water closet is wanted in the female lock ward 
and another for diphtheria, scarlet fever and erysipelas wards. 
The report also contains complaints of drunkenness among patients and 
some of the male staff, non-removal of insane persons and dead bodies, 
and the use of improper language in front of the female nurses. The 
Commission found "these complaints, twenty-five in number, are well founded". 
The Commission also mentioned the fact that an earlier inquiry by a Select 
Committee of the Legislative Council in 1874 had found similar conditions 
and yet no action had been taken. 5 
Other examples of hospital services may be elicited from annual reports 
of these institutions. The Launceston General Hospital was particularly 
4Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 4 of 1877 
STasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 66 of 1874 
pleased that it had been able to reduce the number of persons using the 
outpatient facilities. This apparently beneficial result had occurred 
"mainly due to refusal to supply many cases applying 
who were well able to pay for advice and medicine 
elsewhere - information as to their means having been 
obtained through thi:: instrumentality of the Superintendant 
of Police." 6 
The cost saving action obviously proved far more attractive than a desire 
to keep the community healthy. A similar quantitative view of health care 
may be seen from another report, although this example does not relate to 
finance, rather to balancing the patient numbers. 
"There is little in the history of the Hospital 
(for the Insane) for the past year requiring special 
notice or comment. An unusually large number of - 
patients have been admitted during the year, but as 
the deaths have also been abnormally numerous ; these 
with the patients discharged during the same period 
left a total number of inmates nearly the same as at the 
date of the last report of the committee." 7 
Such institutions as there were, provided minimal services in order to keep 
the costs within bounds, paying little attention to the patients' needs so 
long as some institutional care was available. 
These institutions were not the only aspect of health care as previously 
mentioned legislation indicates. Local boards of health were there to see 
to these public health matters, such boards probably comprising the same 
individuals who were on hospital committees of management. 8 These local 
health boards were, if anything, less effective than the hospital management 
boards. A description of the conditions may be obtained from the first 
report of the newly appointed Officer of Health for the Hobart Registration 
District: 
"The unsanitary conditions existing in almost every part 
of the Hobart Town Registration District are numerous; but . 
in this Report I am necessitated to confine my observations 
6Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 6 of 1877 
7 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 6 of 1877 
8 A description of these boards is contained in R.L.-Wettenhall, 
"Nineteenth Century Boards"; Public Administration (Sydney) 12(3)1.963, 
255-267. 
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to the three suburban townships. ... (New Town, 
Sandy Bay and Wellington Hamlets) Efficient 
sewerage is much wanted. The greater part of the 
sewerage at New Town soaks into the surface soil or 
evaporates, polluting the air; ... similar also is 
the condition of the sewerage channels in Sandy Bay... 
There is no efficient means for sewerage (from 
Wellington Hamlet) to reach the Hobart Town Rivulet - 
now and for a long time past the filthy and noisesome 
cloaca maxima of Hobart Town. The south side of the 
Cascades Road is usually a ditch of sewerage filth, 
polluted by and poisoning the air by noxious gasses. 
Pig sties abound ... mostly in a condition offensive 
to sight and smell and injurious to public health... 
The greatest nuisance everywhere however are the private 
cess pits where human excrement is often kept for years 
without removal. ... Voluntary efforts upon all sanitary 
matters, however, are not to be relied upon; and it will 
require legal compulsion to make this plan general, so as 
to relieve one of the (naturally by climate and position) 
most healthy places - in the world from its greatest obstacle 
to public health." 9 
The public commitment to the maintenance of health and prevention of 
disease was honoured more in the intention than in the act. Typhoid fever 
and other infectious diseases was rife, as the first Report of the Central 
Board of Health after 1885, noted: 
"This yearly visitation of typhoid fever which is certainly 
a preventable disease ... often connected with the water 
supply or the provision of milk, calls for earnest consi-
deration and continuous action by local Boards of Health. 
It is emphatically the scourge of middle and active life 
and that the ranks containing the bone and sinew of the 
country should be thinned by a disease that proper 
precautions are almost certain to stamp out is. notcredit-
able to any administration." 10 
However, the Board must have had some beneficial effect because in 1900 
it was able to report 
"Fifteen years have now elapsed since the passing and 
putting into operation of the first Public Health Act. 
During the fifteen years preceding, during which no 
special organised sanitary action was taken, the following 
were the death rates from zymotic* diseases: 
5 years ended 1875 - 27.3 per annum per 10,000 persons living 
1880 - 33.2 
1885 - 22.1 
Evidently no controlling influence to prevent rising and 
"Zymotie is a generic term for contagious diseases. 
9Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 23 of 1877 
10Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 92 of 1886 
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falling in the death rate.... 
The next fifteen years: 
5. years to 1890 - 21.7 per annum per 10,000 persons living 
1895 - 15.8 
1900 - 12.5 ... 
These figures show that with the Health Act there was established 
a controlling and highly beneficial influence over these diseases 
and though there still can be noted a yearly variation ... steady 
inforcement of sanitation and unwearying exercise of preventive 
measures against causation and spread of infectious diseases can 
be depended upon to save life and lessen suffering. " 11  
These changes must have been part of the change in attitude of citizens 
as well as Board activity for although there were some 73 Health Districts 
in Tasmania, only 30 had officers of health. At the same time the Central 
Board itself was staffed by the minimum establishment and they complained 
about the fact that 
"Parliament thought fit to make no increased provision for 
the administration of the Health Acts, although the work of , 
the Central Board has increased with regard to all branches." 14 
Other factors must also be weighed in the balance against the rather 
satisfactory picture the Board paints of .its own activities. Two examples 
are offered, one relates to a report of the Royal Commission on municipal 
government of Hobart and suburbs, the other far more serious, the smallpox 
outbreaks of 1897 and 1903. 
The Royal Commission heard much evidence from residents and medical men 
about the conditions then existing in Hobart and reported (inter alia) 
"9. We are led to the conclusion, after heating the 
evidence dealing with the present condition and the 
imperfect and uhhealthy sanitation of Hobart and its 
suburbs that the time has arrived when some uniform 
and effective scheme should without delay be instituted 
for dealing with the sanitation of as large a central area 
as possible." 13 
But it was the effect of the smallpox outbreaks which finally forced the 
Government of the day to remove the Central Board and replace it with a 
Department. 
11Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 51 of 1901 
12ibid.  
13Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 5 of 1901 p xix 
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The Board of five members created by the Public Health Act 1885 has been 
intended to operate as a regulatory body over the local elected boards. There 
were to be officers of health and district inspectors at the local board, 
subject to the approval of tile Central Board. But the payment of the salaries 
of these officers was the responsibility of the local boards and, as will 
be noticed later, not many had the funds with which to do this. The Central 
Board itself was the subject of much dissention within Parliament. The 
expenditure of the Board was disallowed in February 1887 and the then Premier 
placed an amending Bill before Parliament to reconstitute the Board as a 
Department. This Bill was itself amended to allow the Board to continue, but 
for its members to receive no fees, although its officers and in particular 
its executive Inspector, were paid their salaries. The powers of the Board 
were somewhat strengthened in certain areas, especially to isolate those 
persons who had infectious diseases in hospitals. 14 
One pro . i;:osal that did not gain acceptance was to employ two sanitation 
specialists, one for each half of the island - it was rejected as being too 
expensive. The government seems to have deliberately kept funds short, 
expending only.* 995 in 1889, increasing to Ai1889 in 1902, with an additional 
483 for the Medical Department (now the Government Analyst). 
"Attainment of the aims of the Central Board was
hampered by inadequate provision of staff." 15 
Whatever the initial reasons, the sense of urgent need to deal more adequately 
with epidemics arose out of the traumatic outbreak of smallpox in Launceston 
in 1903. 
The outbreak in Launceston was seen as the result Of a number of possible 
14In the smallpox epidemic in 1887 many Launceston residents had been 
removed to Mowbray Isolation camp,even though they were only suspects and 
the complaints had been that a number of these had died as a result of this 
move rather than of their being suspect carriers. 
15Wettenhall, The Guide, p 275 
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causes, depending on the particular antagonisms of the person concerned. 
Amongst these were lack of acceptance of vaccination, with the anti-vaccina-
tors arguing that the needle spread disease; the Tasmanian post-1856 tradition 
of minimal public service and th ,.) reduced facilities as a consequence; the 
death in 1902 of Alfred Mault, whose untiring activity as 'executive Inspector 
to the Central- Board had aborted the 1887 epidemic; or the peculiar mentality 
of the Launcestonians who saw protection of individual citizen rights as 
pre-eminent, even to the extent of doctors diagnosing chickenpox and measles 
to avoid upsetting the patients' family. 16 
The outbreak raged from June to the end of August, resulting in 21 dead; 
66 certain cases, and 156 persons isolated. Differences of opinion about the 
extent and nature of the outbreak and the .need for stringent measures to 
check it made action difficult, especially the feeling in Launceston that 
the 'southerners' were trying to bully them into unnecessary action. 
The role of the Central Board was made less than effective by the . 
activities of its President, the then Chief Secretary, McCall, who was a 
northerner, reacting against southern intolerance, which expressed itself 
in demands that all potential suspects should be isolated in institutions. 
Roe writes: 
"The Central Board met in McCall's absence, its tone 
set by Crowther: 'Dr. McCall had been humbugged, else 
he had been humbugging them'. Motions declared that 
travellers from Launceston must have had successful 
vaccination not more than one year and not less than 
eight days before departure. Mail from the mainland 
should come through Devonport, not Launceston. The 
government should appoint an independent medical 
expert to fight the outbreak, under the Central 
Board's direction .... Propsting (tho Premier) 
announced that he had seen the proposed motions and 
accepted them. They went through (Cabinet) briskly, 
echoing the Central Board. Propsting committed 
the government to finding the best medical man, inside 
or outside Tasmania." 17 
16In these and other details I am indebted to the painstaking historical 
reconstruction of these years byProfessor M. Roe, "Smallpox in Launceston 
1887 and 1903", Tasmanian Historical Research Association; 1976 
17Roe, Ea . cit., mimeo. p 44 
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Thus the government unwittingly .took a decision which led to the new 
Public Health Act 1903 and the creation of the Department of Public Health 
under the control of a Chief Health Officer. 
The man they appointed to clear up the Launceston outly...-eak was 
Dr. J.R.C.Elkington, who had in the preceding year worked in the Plague 
Research Laboratory, Bombay, India, and was on furlough at his home in 
Melbourne at the crucial time. He was extremely well qualified for his task, 
not only through his studies - he had qualified as a doctor in Melbourne and 
Edinburgh, but also gained a Doctorate from Brussels and a Diploma in Public 
Health from Melbourne - but also because of his physical presence. 
"Elkington was a man of physical strength and presence,..., 
pugilism and big-game hunting were his hobbies. He had 
skill as an administrator,.. .He was an intellectual, well 
read and capable of pure, fierce prose. ... If Tasmania 
needed a Superman here he was, able and ready. 1,18 
His success at coping with the still virulent Launceston opposition to 
interference from the south,persuaded the government that they should retain 
his services. 19 
"Notwithstanding its theoretical dislike of bigger government, 
the Propsting Cabinet decided that health services should 
be restructured under Elkington's headship." 20 
At the same time the Central Board, over which there had been so much 
controversy, was removed and a Department under the control of the elected 
Parliament was created. The authority of the Department however, was 
considerably strengthened and local Boards were made more subservient to the 
Chief Health Officer. The statute was also more comprehensive than the 1885 
Act, as amended, providing for regulation over most aspects of preventive 
18Roe, 2E. cit., mimeo p49 
19Just a few days before he arrived citizens of Launceston. had marched 
on road barriers which had been erected on the main road to Hobart, to make 
sure no smallpox suspect carried the disease south. There was talk of setting 
up a separate state and great fear of riots. See Roe's - graphic description. 
20Roe, 22? cit., mimeo.p 52 
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care - noxious trades, food adulteration, drainage, and checking of disease. 
In many ways the 1903 Act was the model for the 1935 Act under which the 
Division of Public Health operated until 1962. 
Despite these auspicious emens, the next six years in which Elkington 
remained in Tasmania as Chief Health Officer was not a time of rapid advance. 
Political obfuscation seems to have been the root cause, those with respon-
sibility soon eliminating the potential benefits of the changed circumstances. 
In his first Report Elkington surveyed the legacy from the Central Board, 
"At the coming into operation of the Public Health 
Act 1903, some 73 local authorities nominally existed 
to administer its provisions in their general districts. 
Upon investigation it was found that only 45, or 62%, 
were Councils or Town Boards possessing rating powers, 
28, or 38%, being local Boards in name only without any 
rating powers or other means of raising funds to carry out the 
important duties with which they were charged under the 
act. In other words 38% of the local administrative 
machinery is inoperative. ... Further investigation produced 
additional results showing serious deficiencies in local 
sanitary administration. Of the Councils and Town Boards 
16, or 35%, possessed the serviceof an Officer of Health. 
Only two of the Town Boards adjoining Hobart had such an 
officer and neither of those adjoining Launceston.... 
54, or 74% of all Local Authorities returned themselves 
as being provided with Sanitary Inspectors, but investigation 
showed that 28 utilised the services of police in this 
connection... 40% of all Councils and 14% of Town Boards 
had no sanitary bylaws, 52% of local Boards pure and simple 
being in the same plight. In but a few cases were the 
sanitary inspectors met with found to have any special 
aptitude for or knowledge of the work and the prevailing 
tendency appears to be to regard this important duty as 
an altogether subsidiary function to be deputed to 
anybody on - whom it can be laid." 21 
His subsequent reports trace the general unwillingness to provide him with the 
resources, both financial and moral, to administer his Department properly. 
He complained in 1905 that "under present conditions effective routine 
measures against endemic disease are impossible .., that the Department 
resources are inadequate to carry out in its entirety the purposes of the 
Public Health Act 1903. "22 Similar indications of the frustrations with 
21T as,mania, Parliamentary Paper No. 48 of 19043 P 3 
22 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 26 of 1905 
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which he must have daily coped appear in his valedictory Report in 1909, for 
example, 
"The annually recurring necessity for pointing out..."; 
or 
"The necessity for taking steps to ... has been dealt 
with at some length in previous annual and other reports. 
It may with propriety be urged again..." 
Some gains had been made, however, particularly in pioneering the school 
health service, but the problem of working through local Boards had restricted 
anticipated progress. 
The subsequent period up to 1945 did not see any dramatic changes, rather 
a steady expansion of services and a more general provision of preventive 
measures in the field of sanitation. The establishment of municipal councils 
throughout the state under the 1907 Act 23 assisted greatly in this regard, 
since they were multipurpose authorities with rating powers. The general 
controls over health services were maintained by the Department, especially 
through their approval of appointments of local officers of health. 
The dominance of preventive activities during this period and the 
extremely large expenditure required to contain the outbreaks of such 
disease as smallpox, 24 meant that the hospitals received little attention. 
What work was done had to be kept to minimum cost and the result was poor 
service facilities. 
Attention to these matters was seen as necessary, and the Hospitals 
Act 1918 was expected to reduce the uneven hospital care through management 
changes, fettering the autonomy of the various hospital Boards of Management. 
These had come under strong criticism from two interconnected Royal Commissions 
23Local Government Act 1907 
24 The cost of the 1887 epidemic was 17800, and of the 1903 epidemic: 
20,046/3/5d.; extremely large sums for that time, especially when measured 
against the Departmental Expenditure of 1 1800 per annum. Roe, a. cit. 
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on General Hospitals in 1914 and 1915. The single Commissioner in 1914 
(he was the Chief Health Officer under whose departmental auspices hospitals 
were supervised, a situation hardly conducive to proper investigation by 
todays standards, but in the light of the extremely casual nature of much 
public administration of that period hardly surprising) concluded that the 
way the Boards were constituted 'leads to cliqueism and may have as a result 
the formation of what may be termed 'A Mutual Admiration Society'." 25 Nor was 
he very satisfied with the results of their activities, 
"I feel somewhat reluctantly compelled to remark that 
the Hobart General Hospital is the worst conducted 
institution of its class I have ever visited." 26 
His recommendations led to the 1918 Act and the firmer control of hospital 
management and finance by the Department of Health. But even then the 
Department still saw its role as preventive as the following statement of 
purpose implies. 
"The ramifications of the public health services are 
innumerable. It begins to concern itself with the 
future citizen before he is born, insisting that his 
passage into the world shall be made easy as trained 
and certified skill can compass. When the time comes 
for him to go to school it medically inspects him. If 
he is found to have adenoids, or diseased glands, or 
decayed teeth; if he has faulty sight or hearing; if he 
is deformed or mentally inform, or inflicted with any 
other kind of disease - it gets the school medical 
officer, the school nurse, and the teacher to work to 
see that the defect is, if possible, corrected. The 
house in which he and his parents dwell is also subject 
to inspection and thus it assists in reducing to a 
minimum the dangers to which his health is subjected. 
It sees to the purity of the water supply and does 
something to ensure that food shall be free from 
adulteration and contamination. It provides isolation 
hospitals for those who contract infectious fevers, 
facilities for the treatment of persons suffering from 
venereal disease, infirmaries for the indigent sick, 
and sanatoria for the tuberculous. In many acute 
infections it not only secures the isolation of the 
patient, but requires to be notified of the disease; 
so that by .disinfection and other means it may be 
prevented from spreading. The results of these 
beneficient activities are easily to be perceived 
without help from mortality tables and also illustrate . 
what a potent factor the public health is in the 
welfare of the people." 27 
25Tasmnia, Parliamentary Paper No, 21 of 1914-15, p i 
26op. cit., p xii* 	27Tasmania,.Parliamentary Paper No. 35 of 1919 
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• With slight alterations to take account of modern technological achievements 
this could be represented as the charter of the Department today. - However, 
there is one major difference and that is the emphasis of hospital care, 
the increasing dominance of clinical service which was to overwhelm all 
other services of the Department after the decade of the 1940s. 
It has been suggested that the numerous organisational changes which 
culminated in the Public Health (Administration) Act 1945 were largely the 
consequence of an integration of the curative and preventive aspects of 
health. The gradually decreasing availability of private hospital accommoda-
tion from the peak years of the 1930s,when there were 76 in Tasmania, placed 
greater demands on the public hospital system. At the same time new medical 
techniques, enhanced methods of treatment and reliance on specialised areas 
of knowledge and equipment, meant a growth in the need for properly equipped 
hospitals, capable of accommodating such services. The training received 
by doctors became increasingly hospital • .•:iented, with medical schools always 
attached to them for research and experience purposes. 28 
The emphasis in the Departmental activities became increasingly regulatory, 
certifying the skills needed to carry out optical, dental, nursing, pharma-
ceutical and medical work. It also had the tasks of licensing private 
hospitals and inspecting public ones; licensing places of public entertainment; 
controlling shops and factories; maintaining high standards of hygiene in 
food. During these years the Department was also intermittently responsible 
for such matters as wages boards, workers compensation and mental health. 
Other, more positive areas of action, were the provision of general consul-
tative services to those rural communities less able to use the facilities 
in cities. 
"As early as 1922 the department assumed control of a bush-
nursing scheme at the request of the Bush-Nursing Association, 
which had been attempting to provide and staff nursing centres 
28The Medical School in the University of Tasmania was created in 1970 
and the Clinical Section located in the Royal Hobart Hospital. 
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in country areas, and after further evidence had accumulated 
of difficulties experienced in obtaining medical aid in 
rural areas a Government Medical Service was created in 1938. 
Under the latter scheme the department provides locally based 
medical practitioners in participating municipalities prepared 
to make a small contribution towards expenses. The School 
Medical Service [Pioneered by Elkington as previously mentioned7 
also came under the public health administration in 1939, 
and this was soon paralleled by the School Dental Health Service." 29 
It was not surprising that this proliferation of services led to a great 
deal of confusion in the organisation of the Department; Mathews suggests 
that it was mainly due to the attempt to bring the two elements together. 
"It was not until the passing of the Hospitals Act 1918 
that the administration of the preventive services had 
become confused with hospital administration and from that 
time on, as the undoubted necessity for the provision of 
more curative services grew, these services were added 
to the responsibilities of a department completely 
preventive in outlook and organisation." 30 
Whatever the reason, the re-organisation that occurred in 1945 was to 
lay the foundations of the structure of the Department as it exists today. 
The changes resulted in a Permanent Head controlling a 
"Medical Directorate,consisting of the Director of Public 
Health (Dr. C.L.Park), Director of Hospital and Medical 
Services (Dr. B.M. arruthers) 4 Director of Tuberculosis 
(Dr. T.H. Goddard) and Director of Mental Hygiene 
(Dr. C.R.D. Brothers), (which) was appointed to direct 
the various activities of the Department; Dr. Park 
combining his office with that of Director of Maternal . 
Welfare and Child Health." 31 
One of the contributing factors to this re-organisation had been the 
changing headship of the Department, significantly from a layman to a 
medical man. The chart below indicates the situation well. 32 
• Tudor had been the lay head until 1936 when he was deposed as head by 
the government of the day in favour of a hospital administrator, Carruthers, 
29Wettenhal1, The Guide, p 278 
30E.H.G. Matthews,"A Review of the Administration of the Health 
Services in Tasmania",(unpublished Diploma of Public Administration 
dissertation, University of Tasmania) Hobart 1959, p 13 
31Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 43 of 1946 
32Wettenhall, The Guide, p 291 . 
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TABLE 1 
Divisional Directorships established in 1945 
Hospital & Medical 	Public Health 
Services 
Tuberculosis Mental Hygiene to 
1956; Mental 
Health to 1963; 
Psychiatric Ser-
vices to 1968; 
then hived off 
to Mental Health 
Commission 
1945-52 B.M. Carruthers 1945-50 C.L.Park 1945-50 T.H. 1945-51 	C.R.D. 
Goddard Brothers 
1951-66 H.M.L. 1951-63 J.H.R. 1951-66 J.R.V. 
Murray Tremayne Foxton 
1966- 	A.D.Ross 1963- 	L.A. 1966-68 T.H.G. 
Young Dick 
Director General of Health Services (plus Medical Services 1952-56) 
1952-68 J. Edis 
1968- J.R. Macintyre 
1969-75 J.S. Lawson 
1975- J.M. Sparrow 
previously the Medical Superintendent at the Mental Hospital, New Norfolk. 
This appointment as Director of Public Health occurred at the same time as 
the rewriting of the Public Health Act in 1935. Matthews comments, 
"In retrospect it seems certain that the appointment of 
a hospital administrator to the position of Director of 
Public Health was part of a long term plan by the government 
of the day to interest itself more and more in the 	. 
socialisation of medicine of the curative variety." 33 
When Carruthers was called to the armed forces at the beginning of the 
Second World War, Tudor stepped in to fill the gap, but on Carruthers' return 
in 1945 he was not given the Directorship of Public Health because it had 
already gone to Dr. Park. Instead he was given the much less prestigious 
task of Hospital and Medical Services, which was mainly a controlling and 
33Mtthews, 222 cit., p 13. 
YEAR HMI-J.11AL ANy 	I 
MEDICAL SERVICES HElq.1.1 ANAL VSJ 	J NEW 	TOWN . 
TO JUNE 
7 
1951 1,00:1,94: 9/2,351 7,180 	1 	97,064 110,419 
1952 1,299,59? 1,320,030 7.774 i 122,601 17,9,119 
1953 1,517,497 1,442,917 11,072 141,031 180,197 
1954 1,611,115 1,531,736 13,498, 155,206 200,983 
1955 1,612,l66 15,046 178,017 189,209 
1961 2,069,205 260,221 19,374 315,709 216,117 
1962 . 2,272,544 176,730 • 18,738 352,226 215,560 
1963 2,349,059 196,171 18,068 358,935 216,709 
1954 2,529,535 203,549 . 22,497 397,666 224,097 
+ 171 
patholsy serv. 
19i5 5,793,056 . 47,490 43,134 847 933 460,254 
HYGIENE 
6,132 
7,554 
8, 29361 
222,353 
279,774 
301,126 
323,925 
349,611 
160,693 569,736 
192,019 620,712 
205,842 646,566 
199,197 707,625 
469,960 1,608,916 
i7 RANTS 
• 
$ $ $ $ $ $ - $ 
1971 11,979,723 908,479 109,834 1,576,604 446,677 66,3,683 3,032.136 
1972 13,650,589 954,022 139,246 1,762,992 454,847 764,228 3,408,452 
1973 • 16,178,135 1.,157,435 163,524 1,925,167 343,161 902,500 4,092,099 
1974 - 20,826,260 1,303,823 188,490. 2,325,585 347,898 ,000,676 4,752,530 
1975 35,647,956 1,693,947 265,114 3,919,616 516,781 1,284,826 7,172,247 
_.( 
1. In CIL years 1950 -1955 this total excludes State grants to Hospitals for the care of the Aged and the Psychopathic 
Home, Milbrook; included in Public Health for 2 belcri but includes Scate government hospital subsidies which are 
also included in Public Health total as it is impossible to identify the separate totals applicable. 
2. In the years 1950-1955 thJs total includes a sum which wes subsidy to all hospitals including Et. Johns Hospital 
Net 	(also shown 3epurnely) the home for invalids, Launceston, sud Psychopathic Howe, Milbrook. The 
expenditure on Mi.:brook al. f• include 	In Mental Lygicne total. 
S5 	I> to.: Hospitals: 	Subsidy for Psychopathic Home: 
1 .951 - 782,464 1951 - 53,065 
1952 - 1,065,682 1952 - 66,773 
1953 - 1,190.933 1953 - 43,071 
954 - 1,240,613 1954 - 95,693 
1955 - 1,335,962 1935 - 
3. Administration costs are not shown separately in the yearn 1950-1955. These figures are only for miscellaneous 
expenditure and grants In aid to the Home for Invalids, Launceston (known as Cosgrove Park from 10.3.54.) 
(Source: Annual Reports of Health Services Departitent and Accountant, Health Services.) 
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inspecting task. This situation remained in uneasy balance, even after the 
death of Tudor in 1946, but with the pending retirement of the then Permanent 
Head, Driscoll, 
"The new coordinating ad professional office of 
Director General of Medical Services was created 
as both permanent head of the Department and chief 
of its Hospital and Medical Services Division." 34 
Other changes which formed the Departmental structure of today occurred 
when in order to indicate the diversity and extent of the services provided, 
the department was renamed 'Health Services' and the title of the Director 
General became 'Health', and not 'Medical',Services in 1956. In 1960, the 
major discretionary authority contained in some of the legislation administered 
by the department, especially the Public Health Act 1935, was relocated in 
the minister by the Health Services Act. These moves emphasised the shift 
from preventive activities to curative in a way nothing else could have done. 
No longer was the Division of Public Health at the centre of the department, 
permeating the whole with its purposes. Not only was the Permanent Head 
hospital oriented, but the expenditure of the department gradually reflected 
the change. Table 2 shows the relative expenditures in three five year 
periods, 1950-55; 1960-65; 1970-75. It illustrates the apparently self 
generating demands that curative services make upon the public purse, even 
dealing with the recurrent expenditure alone. One important facet of this 
problem is the fact that 65.49% in 1960-61, rising to 76.55% in 1973-74 
of this expenditure is on salaries and wages of hospital employees. 35 
The Director-General expressed his concern at this escalating cost 
factor in 1972, 
"It becomes more and more apparent that the means of providing 
health care to the public must become less hospital oriented. 
.. 	. 
34Wettenhall, The Guide, p 279. The story of the intrigues and 
peculiarly Tasmanian machiavellianisms which took place during this time 
is unfolded in Mathews, but is irrelevant to this thesis. 
35Since 1968 the Mental Health Services Commission has existed outside 
the Health Services Department, and it is interesting to compare their 
• expenditure. Most of their operations take place within the hospital 
confines and yet they do not seem to have the same exponential growth. 
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Community Health services as a whole (based where 
necessary on major hospitals) could increase con-
siderably the component of health care provided 
outside hospitals by means of community health centres 
and domiciliary care, as far as it is safe for the 
patient to use them." 36 
Later in the same report there is a reference to "diversifying the means 
of providing health care to the community" and identifying the problem as 
one of resources. The method to be adopted according to the report is to 
accept the "new approach to the essential totality of properly balanced 
health care services for the future." This involves 
"a complete marriage of the preventive and curative services 
and those component parts of social welfare services which 
are concerned with the patient and the patient's family 
both in health and sickness." 37 
This direction was given impetus by the intervention of the Federal 
Government and provision of special funds for community health centres in 
1974-75. 38 But by far the greatest emphasis was still on hospital building 
and services, 
"The National Hospitals and Health Services Commission staff 
at the Joint Works Council made it clear to us that they were 
very anxious for the State to prepare Works Programs as 
expeditiously as possible so that the Commission could be 
provided with an anticipated cash-flow program over the next 
few years in order that they may make recommendations to 
their Government for funding the large sums of money which 
would be required to be contributed by the Australian 
Government... /for the construction of public institutional 
health facilities.j." 39 
A recent publication has outlined in some detail the current public and 
private provision of health care services in Tasmania and set out below 
36 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1972 
37ibid. 
38A start was made on two centres: one as a result of the Tasman 
Bridge disaster in.Hobart in the Municipality of Clarence and the other 
at Kings Meadows, Launceston. 
39Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 79 of 1975, p 8 
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are the relevant extracts: 
"2.2.1. Private practitioners 
In most urban areas of Tasmania, primary care in the medical 
and dental fields is dominated by private practitioners. This 
is also true of SOME medical and dental specialities. ... 
The overall provision of doctors in Tasmania ... would appear to 
be one of Australia's best. ... 
The rural 'shortfall' of medical practitioners is possibly more 
serious when difficulties of access due to distance and terrain 
are considered, although the close proximity of many rural areas 
to urban centres may tend to offset this problem. 
Dentists 
...the number of dentists practising in Tasmania made the State 
the most poorly provided within Australia. 
Allied Health Professionals 
Whilst exact numbers of actually practising physiotherapists, 
occupational therapists, speech therapists, chiropodists., etc. 
are difficult to obtain, present information would seem to 
confirm /that they are concentrated in certain centres/... 
However, since a larger proportion of allied services are 
provided under the auspices of public bodies such as government 
agencies and hospitals, a somewhat better distribution of 
services may occur than appears to be the case. 
2.2.2. Private Hospitals 
...Most private hospitals provide a basic range of diagnostic 
and nursing services to treat acute (short term) cases only. 
Patients requiring very specialised treatment would require 
the resources available only in large public hospitals and long 
term patients, e.g. invalid aged, are usually referred to a 
nursing home. ... Private hospitals are licensed by the Tasmanian 
Department of Health Services. 
2.3 The Voluntary Sector 
Volunta -2y agencies provide a wide range of health and welfare 
services, often using a more "whole person" approach to clients 
than is possible with departmentally or privately administered 
services. •.. The provision of services for the handicapped tends 
to be dominated by voluntary agencies. ... 
The importance of the volunteer effort is being recognised in the 
health field; particularly in public, hospitals, which have • 
organised volunteer services to assist general staff in many duties... 
2.4 Public Hospitals 
The 18 public hospitals of Tasmania ( 4 general, 14 district) and 
two maternity hospitals are all controlled by independent Boards 
of Management. Unlike private hospitals they are financed, 
not only by patients' fees, and Australian Government benefits, 
but by subsidies of their deficit expenditure by the Tasmanian 
Government. ... In comparison with other states, Tasmania appears 
to have an average supply of hospital beds in relation to its 
population ... Compared with the general Auralian standard, the 
urban areas-appear to be markedly oversupplied (particularly.in 
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the Northern and Mersey-Lyell Regions) and rural areas 
greatly undersupplied. 
The provision of 'super speciality' services in Tasmanian 
hospitals is a difficult problem due to the small size of 
population. ... many Tasmanian patients are transferred to 
Melbourne hospitals ... The provision of many specialised 
services in Tasmania sometimes means that these services may 
be inefficient, partLcularly if they are duplicated in several 
hospitals around the State, e.g. in Launceston and Hobart. 
2.5 Aged Persons Accommodation 
There are three public hospitals for the aged in Tasmania... 
ft.roviding7 public nursing home accommodation for their regions 
to the extent of 25 (Northwest) 134 (North) and 458 (South). .. 
the Southern region appears to be largely oversupplied whereas 
other regions are less well supplied.u40 
The Working Paper also discusses the changing trends in the delivery of 
health care, noting the "shift in the need for services from the corrective 
treatment of infectious diseases ... to the 'new epidemics', non-infectious 
chronic disorders often associated with social factors and ageing." They 
point to the world-wide trend to provide such services via community health 
centres, such as were suggested in the Director-General's 1972 Report. This 
leads to an assessment that the most important areas of concern for Tasmania 
in the future are: 
1. coordination of health services, 
2. redressing the balance between oversupply of services in urban 
areas and undersupply in rural areas, 
3. increased services for the aged, the chronically ill and for 
mental health, 
4. attracting and retaining sufficient experienced staff which would 
be necessary for these increased services. 
These considerations merely echo those already stressed in the Annual 
Reports of the Director-General and indicate the possible direction that 
will occur in the future. This may well create another pressure for 
P 	organisational change such as has occurred in the past in similar situations. 
The history of the provision of health services in Tasmania is punctuated 
40Tasmanian State Strategy Plan, Health and Welfare Services in  
Tasmania, Working Paper No. 8, Hobart 1975 
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by these organisational changes to reflect different emphases in the 
provision of services. The initial reliance on local Boards of Health arose 
out of the nature of settlement, the difficulty of communications, and the 
British traditions. 41 The reaction against the creation of the Central 
Board of Health was on the grounds that it would be an appointed body with • 
authority over an elected one, unthinkable for the 'popular libertarians' 
of the 1880s. But in the very creation of the Central Board the government 
of the day seemed less than committed to strong action. They neither pro- 
vided it with sufficient staff noradequate funds, so the local Boards remained 
in control. Similarly, when the smallpox epidemic scared sufficient people 
into expecting strong action, a Department was created, but this was not 
overwhelmed with resources. As late as 1934 there is evidence to indicate • 
that local authorities were still not complying with the directions of the 
department, nor providing appropriate staff. 
"More effectual work, however,remains to be accomplished 
particularly in combatting infectious diseases in districts 
where officers' duties are not confined solely to health 
work. It should be realised that recognised measures towards 
the prevention and control of infectious disease must be 
applied with the least possible delay if the people are to be 
afforded the protection to which they are entitled by those 
responsible for safeguarding their welfare in the field of 
preventive medicine." 42 
The Department also saw significant changes in the powers given to its 
officers over this time, with more direct authority vesting in the Director 
of Public Health under.the Public Health Act 1935. By s. 6 of this Act. 
authority was given to the Governor to appoint a "fit person to be Director . 
of Public Health,who shall 
(a) in every case be a medical practitioner with special 
knowledge of sanitary and bacteriological science; 
41Fr further discussion of these early Boards tee Wettenhall, 22: cit., 
and F.M.G. Willson,- "Ministries & Boards: Some Aspects of Administrative 
Development since 1832", Public Administration. (London) 33(1), 1955, 43-59 
42Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No..5 of 1934 
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(b) hold office during the Governor's pleasure; 
(c) not engage in private practice; and 
(d) have the functions and duties specified in the Act." 
The appointment of a specialist Director in place of the pc7evious lay 
Secretary, opened the way to provide for more direct authority to him. Some 
examples are contained in: 
S. 7 - appointment of Health Officers, Inspectors, and 
Medical Officers subject to Director's control; 
- a local Authority may appoint a Medical Officer 
only with the approval of the Director; 
s. 14(1) - Declaration of disease to be infectious by the 
Governor on the recommendation of the Director; 
s. 16(1) - Governor may make regulations for preventing 
the spread of disease upon recommendation of the 
Director. 43 
As a consequence of these changes in 1935 the staff increased from 23 at 
the time to 189 in 1952, when the long tenure of Dr. J. Edis began. 44 By 
the latter date the Department of Public Health had become only one of 
four Divisions within the Department of Health Services. This reorganisation 
began in 1945 with the creation of Divisions related to the main functional 
areas of the Department as a whole. Central to its activities was Public 
Health which had been the dominant element since its inception in 1903,... 
43These powers have been subsequently modified by the Health Services 
Act 1960 and the Public Health Act 1962 which are discussed in more detail 
later. 
44These figures for 1935 include the Government Analyst Branch, but 
not the Mental Hospitals which were then a separate department. Tasmanian  
Government Gazette Vol-. CLXVI No. 10, 100 (January 27, 1936) p 174. 
The figures for 1952 have omitted the Mental Hospitals, Chest Hospitals 
and St. John's Park, which were then under departmental control, for a 
proper comparison. The establishment of the Chest Hospitals was 143, 
but they were understaffed with a total of 285 established positions', 
of which over 100 were unfilled. St. John's Park and the Launceston 
Home for Invalids had .establishments of 139. Tasmanian Government Gazette 
Vol. CXCIV No. 12, 581 (December 19, 1952) pp 3695-3711 
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(1) Tuberculosis - separately identified in the year 1945 
as a specific and separate function, given added 
recognition in 1963 to organise the Commonwealth-
assisted anti-tuberculosis campaign; 
(2) Mental Hygiene - that part of the health care which had 
always been 'separately managed in the HospfAal for 
Insane, New Norfolk, under a Medical Superintendent, 
later reference is made to its chequered history; 
(3) Hospital and Medical Services - .a new division which was 
created in 1945 to control the departmental activities 
in connection with public hospitals, the licensing of 
private hospitals and nursing homes, and the District 
Medical and Tasmanian Nursing Services. 
As may be imagined, this diversity of tasks created a very diffused structure, 
with each segment almost wholly involved with its own function. This was 
especially so with Mental Hygiene and Tuberculosis, which had entirely se-
parate locations, the former some20 miles away at New Norfolk, the latter 
in both New Town Chest Hospital and the Northern Chest Hospital at Perth 
(Tasmania). Public Health carried out its major tasks as it had previously 
under the strong powers of the Director and was for that reason somewhat 
apart from the other divisions, even though it was located centrally. It 
was numerically superior to the Hospital and Medical Services Division 
which was initially a very small group whose main function was to act as a 
coordinating agent for the various public hospital services. All such 
hospitals had their own management boards under the Hospital Act 1918, but 
depended for much of their financial assistance, capital in particular, on 
State Government. 
However, for the period from 1952 to 1968 the Director-General of Health 
Services doubled as the Director of the Hospital & Medical Services Division, 
which produced considerable distortion in the organisation of the Department. 
Especially since the Director-General had to have administrative experience 
within hospitals to perform his duties properly. There was usually a Senior 
Medical Officer (Hospitals) to assist him and from 1966 a Deputy Director-
General of Health Services was appointed to oversee this area in particular. 
The first Director-General was Dr. Carruthers, Medical Superintendent, 
Lachlan Park Mental Hospital, until he became Director and permanent head 
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of the Department of Public Health until 1939. On his return from service 
in the Second World War he became the first Director of Hospital and Medical 
Services, which office was combined in the Director-Generalship in 1952. 
The next Director-General, Dr. Edis, originally an obstetrician, came from the 
Indian Medical Service via the superintendency of the Launceston G eneral Hospital. 
The subsequent Director-General, Dr. J.R.Macintyre, joined the Department in 
1956 and, after serving as district medical officer, New Norfolk, became 
Senior, and then Chief, Medical Officer before becoming Deputy Director-General 
from 1966 until his appointment as Director-General in 1968. Dr. Macintyre 
is the first Director-General to regard administrative training as an integral 
part of the background necessary for senior positions within the Department. 
He has, himself, attended the Australian Administrative Staff College at 
Mount Eliza, while his Deputy and the last two Directors of Hospital and 
Medical Services have had graduate Diplomas in Health Administration. 
This interest in the organisation of the Department has led to a number 
of internal re-arrangements which are reflected in the organisation charts. 45 
It is appropriate to refer to these charts individually here, since they 
impinge specifically on the operating methods of the department and have a 
direct bearing on the relationship with the minister. They also reflect 
changes under the Health Services Act 1960 which considerably strengthened 
the position of the minister. The authority contained in various statutes had 
previously been given to the officer rather than the minister, e.g. under the 
Food and Drugs Act 1910 the Director of Public Health controlled the activities . 
of Inspectors, but by the 1960 Act all such authority was deliberately made 
subject to ministerial consent and delegation. 
"A reference in any regulation made under an Act amended 
by this Act to the Director General of Health Services, 
Director of Public Health, Director of Mental Health or 
Director of Tuberculosis shall be construed as reference 
to the Minister for Health." 46 
45Tasmanian Health Services and Road Safety 'Department, Organisation  
Charts (Hobart, January 1971) prepared as a handbook for new staff, and to 
indicate the general. structures as. envisaged by the Director-General.
46S.4, Health Service Act 1960 
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The result of this simple change was to reinforce the ministerial control 
over his departmental officers and reduce the possibility of them acting 
c without his consent under statutes which released them from this obligation. 
Chart I - Tasmanian Health Services and Road Safety Organisation  
The organisation of the Department as at April 1969 is shown on the 
Chart opposite. The Road Safety Branch has been omitted and was in fact 
transferred to the Police Department in 1975. The relationship of the 
department to the two Commissions, who have direct accountability to the 
minister and whose members are appointed by the minister, must be noted. The 
portfolio of Health Services is now a single portfolio for one minister, but•
it has not always been so. As with most portfolios in the small Tasmanian 
ministries one man may have responsibility for a number of portfolios. Table 3 
shows the position over the years since the first holder of the portfolio was 
commissioned. 
TABLE 3 
Ministerial Holders of Office 
1885-1946 The Board of Health and later the Department of Public 
Health were the responsibility of the Chief Secretary 
until 1946, when the portfolio Health was commissioned 
1946-1948 Chief Secretary and Minister for Health 
1948-1956 Minister for Health 
1956-1958 Minister for Health & Treasurer 
1958-1959 Chief Secretary and Minister for Health 
1959-1969 Minister for Health (during this period a medical 
practitioner was minister until l61) 
1969-1972 Minister for 'Health and Road Safety (the minister was a 
medical practitioner) 
1972 to 	Minister for Health and Road Safety Minister for Social 
date Welfare (during this period the minister was a medical 
practitioner until 1974) 
Source: Walch's Almanacs, Hobart 
There is little doubt that the multiplicity of tasks now undertaken by 
the department and the increasing direct responsibility for hospitals makes 
it difficult for ministers to cope adequately with other portfolios. 
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Chart .2 - Department of Health Services  
It will be seen that the department has been subdivided into two main 
groups, the medical operational services and the general administrative 
services. The former comprise all the activities accumulated over the years 
from the time when the area of public health was its main concern. 	Two 
groups which have been given separate status in recent years in addition to 
, the general stream of activities are the School DentalHealth Services 
(including the School of Dental Nursing) and the Pharmaceutical Services 
Section. Its main purpose was to train dental nurses to perform routine 
dental investigation and repair work on children. Preventive dentistry on 
children was regarded as more useful in a state which had no University 
Dental School, and in which considerable concern about poor dental health 
was expressed. 47  The District Dental Service was expanded on similar lines 
to the District Medical Officer Service, with a specialist orthodontist 
available. 
Apart from the three main Divisions, Public Health, Hospital and Tuber-
culosis, the two specialist Laboratory services form the balance of the medical 
operational services. This area employs the bulk of the department staff 
and is the professional medical domain. Even here are many different specialisms 
between which there can be no transfer of staff or expertise. For example, 
the medical technologist (bacteriology) in the State Pathology Laboratory, 
is unlikely to be able to transfer to any section in the Division of Public 
Health, although one of the Health Inspectors from that Division is seconded 
to the Laboratory for specialist work. It does seem that there are very 
limited opportunities for promotion across the sectional boundaries within the 
department as a whole, unless it is in the area of administration at the 
48 senior level. 
47See the Report on the Fluoridation of water supplies: Royal Commission 
of Fluoridation of Water Supplies Report(Tasmania,.Parliamentary Paper No. 32 
of 1968) before which some 73 persons or groups appeared to give evidence. 
48Referred to later in the More detailed discussion of professional staff. 
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Chart 3 - - General Administrative Services  
This relatively small group of officers have two main tasks, both 
servicing the other sections of the department. The first is financial 
and concerns the recurrent atd capital funds expended by the department. 
The second is the record keeping, staffing, property and transport control 
for the whole department. It must be noted, however, that each Division 
and section has its own administrative group of executive officers, typists. 
and clerks. The role of what may be-termed the Headquarter's group is to 
provide an overview of the whole for the senior officers of the department 
and the minister. There is also the equally important function of internal 
control over staffing and finance which is maintained by close liaison with 
the Public Service Board and the Treasury. In some ways the group may be 
likened to a bridge which links the extremely professionally oriented 
department to the remainder of the Public Service in other 'departments. It 
is quite significant that, unlike the Department of Education, senior officers 
in this department are employed as public servants (note the letters P.S. in 
the charts) although in the Hospital Division for historical reasons there 
remain a number of specifically ministerial appointments. 
Chart 4 Hospital, medical and nursing services consultant and advisory  
branch 
There are a number of significant elements in this area which expends 
the major proportion of departmental funds. First, it combines supervisory, 
regulatory and direct service functions. The Hospital management advisory 
section is the most important segment involved in indirectly managing the 
fifty large and small institutions providing health care around the state. 
It has the task of supervising the Hospital boards of management and co- 
ordinating their demands for capital and recurrent expenditure. This includes • 
rationalising the planning of extensions to existing services or new services 
and . the standardisation of equipment. Regulatory functions are related to 
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HOSPITAL, MEDICAL AIM NURSING SERVICES CONSULTANI AND ADVISORY BRANCH 
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• 
The mein reaponsibilities and functions 
of the 5.0.0.5. are responeibility on 
behalf of the D.C.N.S. for managing the 
hoepltal, medical and nursing mervices. 
' Including 
Imp rrrrrr the management efficiency of the ormnieetions concerned, in ell aaaaa of hospital management. 
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District Nursing Hospitals 	 11 
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end Medical Centre.   7 
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Superintendent. and Matrons. 
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by 'rants from the Minister from the Appropri•tion 
Act. 
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Hospitals Act. 
MOTE 	'M.A. 	Ministerial Appointment. 
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private hospitals, nursing homes and voluntary services of all kinds as well 
as nurses certification. Direct services are provided for aged persons at 
St. John's Hospital, where a Superintendent and staff have an average of  
500 patients to care for annually. They also administer an outpatients' 
clinic and provide domiciliary care for aged persons. This operation is 
as self-contained as that of the other two institutions for aged persons in 
the State at Cosgrove Park, Launceston and the Spencer Homes for the Aged, 
Wynyard. However, these latter institutions are managed by the Boards of the 
public hospitals at Launceston and Wynyard. Another direct service is that 
of the District Medical Officers who are appointed in conjunction with local 
municipal councils, but administered by the Division. 
Second, the miscellany of activities under the control of this Division 
does not indicate the dominance of the one main function of hospital management. 
The regulatory functions are not ones which cause much political difficulty, 
as do the similarly regulatory activities of the Division of Public Health. 
The direct services operate more or less autonomously and rarely involve the 
Director-General in person. Indeed, the situation has been that the last 
two Directors-General have been employed because of their experience in 
hospital administration. 
Third, a similar phenomenon to that of the department as a whole in terms 
of promotional opportunities, occurs within this Division. The various tasks 
are so disparate that professional officers in, say, St. John's Park Hospital 
could not really transfer in promotional terms to any other section. This 
may not apply equally to the few clerical and executive officers employed, 
but their promotional ceiling within the department is relatively low anyway. 
It is harder to visualise a district medical officer, becoming a senior officer 
within the department today, than to expect appointments to senior positions from 
major public hospital administrators. 
261 
Fourth, there is no administrative support staff for this Division as 
a whole, and it therefore utilises that of the Department to a quite 
extensive degree, whereas neither the TB Division nor Public Health have 
any need to do so. 
Chart 5 - Division of Tuberculosis  
There is one treatment centre, the 19-bed Tuberculosis Ward at the 
Royal Hobart Hospital, which has increasingly light use, having an average 
bed occupancy of 13 during 1973-74. The following Table of incidence over the 
last sixteen years indicates the trend in Tasmania which for many years was 
the only State having compulsory X-Rays. 49 The main function of the Division 
TABLE 4 
Incidence of Tuberculosis in Tasmania 
1958-1974 
1958-1959 	 160 
1959-1960  128 
1960-1961  117 
1961-1962  118 
1962-1963 	 111 
1963-1964  105 
1964-1965  81 
1965-1966  66 
1966-1967 	 58 
1967-1968  48 
1968-1969  57 
1969-1970  46 
1970-1971 	 45 
1971-1972  42 
1972-1973  49 
1973-1974  49 
Source: Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 14 
is preventive and it accomplishes this task through its mass miniature X-ray 
section conducted at the two clinics in Hobart and Devonport. 
Chart 6 - Division of Public Health  
The original core of the department, this Division still functions in 
a largely autonomous fashion, having its own legislative provisions to administer 
49 Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 14 
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and its own general administrative section to service its needs. It is 
similarly diffuse in the number of tasks it performs within itself, which 
is in part a legacy of the past, but also a function of its preventive 
orientation. The dominant group in the division are the regulatory inspecto-
rate concerned with hygiene and sanitation, pure food, infectious diseases 
and preventive medicine generally. In addition however, there are three 
elements directly derived from the old Maternal and Child Health Directorate - 
Child Health Service, Child Guidance Clinic and Mothercraft Home, and Child 
Health Sisters'training school. There is also the School Medical Service 
which carries on where the Child Health Service leaves off in terms of the 
child's age, providing medical checks for children from birth to the time 
they leave school. Health education has expanded considerably with recent 
Australian Government funding, especially in the area of drug use and abuse 
and smoking. A residue of the previous concern of the Department of Public 
Health with factories legislation is the Occupational Health and Industrial 
Hygiene section, which maintains a close watch over matters suchas noise 
levels and contamination of workers by toxic substances. One recently 
identified area of concern is that of rehabilitation of those workers injured 
at their work; a Director of Rehabilitation has been appointed and will take 
over this area and probably others, such as alcoholism and drugs abuse leading 
to dismissal. National Fitness was another supervisory concern of the 
Division, again on the basis that it is a preventive activity. 50 
It must be stressed once again that even within this Division there 
are many disparate functions being performed by specialists of a non-trans-
ferable kind within the department as a whole. Also within this Division 
there are a number of areas where close co-operation with Child Welfare 
Officers of the Department of Social Welfare is necessary. 51 
50This function was transferred to the Department of Education in 1974 
and is no longer under the control of the Division. 
51 There are arguments for the combination of some elements of Social 
Welfare and Health Services, which are discussed somewhat superficially in 
the Tasmanian Strategy Plan Working Paper 8, p 59. 
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Federal-State partnership  
Health care is provided by the State government as a constitutional duty, 
but there are a number 3f areas in which the Federal government has become 
involved. In general terms the State provides direct personal services, 
whereas the Federal responsibility lies more in payment of various benefits, 
such as Pharmaceutical. 52 The Federal government does run the Repatriation 
Hospitals for veterans and their dependents, including medical services and 
an artificial limb- and appliance Centre. However, the main thrust of 
Federal activity which warrants discussing it in terms of 'partnership' is 
the enormous influence federal bodies have on State decisions in the health 
and hospital services. This activity is largely centred now on the Hospitals 
and Health Services Commission and the Health Insurance Commission, although 
these two bodies have only recently been created. Prior to this the Common-
wealth Department of Health performed the main initiating role in the health 
field from the federal level. 
The forms of initiative varied considerably, from assistance with 
pathology services and acoustic laboratories to the provision of a forum 
for discussion through the National Health and Medical Council. Some of the 
programmes initiated by the Federal government have been in areas such as 
home nursing, family medicine and - more recently - Community Health. In 
each case State governments have been persuaded, by the provision of finance, 
to undertake these activities, which, although very desirable in themselves, 
were not given very high priority at the State level'. Another example of 
such persuasion is the drug education programme, referred to in the Director-
General's Report for the year 19707 1971. 53 
52 Since 1975, medical under Medibank (but outside the time limitation 
of this thesis) 
53Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 83 of 1971, p 20: "In the past year 
a marked increase in work load has been placed on staff of the Public Health 
Department. Certain main causes have contributed to this. Among them were - 
1. The CommonwealthSponsored and financed drug education 
programme. A health educator was appointed very early 
in 1971, but he had to be sent to Sydney immediately - 
after appointment to attend a six months training course 
provided by the Commonwealth..." 
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Similarly, the annual meetings of the Commonwealth and State Ministers 
of Health act as a catalyst for common efforts in specific . fields such as 
drugs. Most often. the results are embodied in common legislation, as in 
the case of Cigarettes (Labelling) Act 1972 which provided for the prohibition 
of the sale of cigarettes except in packages marked with the appropriate 
health hazard warning. Another area of joint,concern in which the National 
• ■■ 
Health and Medical Research Council are involved as an expert advising body 
is poisons and drugs. The Dangerous Drugs Act 1971 and the Alcohol and Drug 
Dependency Act 1968 are examples of legislation of this kind. 54 
The work of the National Health and Medical Research Council deserves 
some further clarification, since it does seem to play a very important role 
in the kind of health care provided at state level. The Council is comprised 
of: 
Director-General Commonwealth Department of Health - Chairman 
Two members of the Department in addition 
Director Commonwealth Serum Laboratories 
Directors and Directors-General of all State Departments of Health 
Director of Department of Health Papua New Guinea 
Representatives of: Federal Council of Australian Medical Association 
Royal Australasian College of Surgeons 
Physicians 
General Practitioners 
Australian University Medical Schools 
Australian Council of Royal College of Obstetricians 
• and Gynaecologists 
• Royal College of Pathologists of Australia 
Australian Dental As:iociation 
Royal College of Radiologists of Australia 
An eminent layman and an eminent laywoman appointed by the Minister, 
and is organised into various specialist sub-committees. It is through these 
various sub-committees that matters Of scientific or technical public health 
54See for example Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 60'of 1969, p 9 
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interest are raised and discussed in full Council. Officers from the 
State Departments then pursue such matters, either in concert through to 
their Ministers and perhaps the annual Ministers of Health Conference, or 
through the Hospital and Allied Services Advisory Council until more research 
initiated by the National Health and Medical Research Council is available. 
Examples of the influence of these bodies. may be seen from the following 
extracts from the Annual Reports of the Director-General: 
(a)radiation 
"A preliminary investigation into microwave ovens in the 
Hobart area was performed by the inspectors, with a view 
to wider control of these potentially dangerous machines. 
The National Health and Medical Research Council's 
Radiation Standing Committee is currently preparing a Code 
of Practice on Microwave devices which will provide a basis 
for control and possible future legislation." 55 
"The Radiological Advisory Council met three times during 
the year, twice for ordinary meetings and once for a special 
meeting to discuss the draft of the proposed Radiation 
Control Bill." 56 
"Instruction sheets have been distributed to the retail 
firms for issue to purchasers of microwave ovens. "57 
(b)food standards 
"The National Health and Medical Research Council referred 
the following matters to the State Food Advisory Committee 
for comment - 
(1) Preservative; 
(2) Propylene glycol alginate in sausage casings;... 
(8) 	Self-adhesive labels for use on foods. 
The May 1975 meeting was devoted entirely to the examination 
and discussion of Standards that had been considered at the 
Seventy-eighth and Seventy-ninth Sessions of the National 
Health and Medical Research Council." 58 
It may thus be sE:eia that, although constitutionally the State is responsible 
for health care, there are many external pressures upon it which force it to 
respond in quite - specific ways. In most such cases the Federal government 
55Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 83 of 1971, p 32 
5 6Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 20 
57Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 79 of 1975, p 23 
58 22. cit., p 22 
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does assist through provision of funds for such activities. However, 
sometimes State initiatives without Federal support are subsequently adopted 
and supported Commonwealth wide. 
One such example is the school Dental Health Scheme, started in 1966. 
This was the only such scheme operating within Australia until recently, 
providing school children up to the age of 15 years with complete, free dental 
care. There are two elements in the Scheme, a District Dental Service and 
the School of Dental Nursing. The former provides field Dental Officers, 
Specialist Orthodontists, and graduate Dental Nurses from the School to rural 
centres in which no private dentists operate. These offer dental services to 
school children only, in three centres a comprehensive service to school 
children regardless of age, in eight other centres comprehensive service to 
all primary children and emergency service to all children regardless •of age. 
The service operates parallel with School Medical Services, giving a compre-
hensive preventative health care to school children, especially in the areas 
outside the two main conurbations of Hobart and Launceston. In addition, 
the School of Dental Nursing provides a service of similar kind to the school 
children in Hobart. Senior students, i.e. those in their second year of 
training at the School, treat these children under supervision as part of 
their practical training. For example, in the year 1974-75 they examined 
5,054 children, completed 4,630 simple and 2,962 compound fillings and 
extracted 171 permanent teeth, among many other operative dental treatments. 59 
Such has been the success of the work done by the graduates of the 
School - in particular in rural centres - both in educating children about 
dental care as well as treatment, that the Federal government has proposed 
providing assistance throughout other States for the setting up of similar 
schools. 
59Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No 79 of 1975, p 24 
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"As far as the School Dental Nursing Service is concerned 
the offer by the Commonwealth to all States was that they 
would finance to the extent of 100% of capital costs and 
100% of annual running costs, the establishment of dental 
nurses (therapists) training schools to an extent which would 
permit each State, by 1980 at the latest, to be in a position 
to be training an adequate number of dental nurses in 
sufficient numbers (sic) to be able to provide a field service 
to attain the objects of caring for all the primary school 
children." 6° 
No State Health Department operates in isolation from trends in the 
Commonwealth as a whole, far more than in any other functional area, health 
care is affected by external activities and discussions. 
With this general background to the work of the Department of Health 
Services in mind, it is now necessary to deal with each of the previously 
identified forces which affect the interactions between the minister and his 
department. These interactions, more especially between the minister and 
his senior officers, take place in the context of the matters already dis-
cussed, but are better clarified if dealt with in a more ordered way. The 
remainder of the chapter will therefore evaluate the effect on the minister's 
accountability and control of the forces already discussed earlier. Each 
will be dealt with under a separate heading and a final summary given as to 
the nature of the effect of circumjacent groups, legislative provisions, 
professional staff, financial arrangements and departmental tradition, on 
political leadership and executive authority. 
A. 	Circumjacent groups  
In systems terms the Department of Health Services is the most 'open 
system' of the three departments in this study. For this reason the relation-
ship with circumjacent groups is probably the most important of all the forces 
which affect the minister. The wide range of activities involved in some 
way or another with health care which fall to the department to perform, 
60Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 88 of 1973, p 14 
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increases the interaction with such groups. 61 
As has already been mentioned, the Commonwealth-wide membership of 
various Councils, such as National Health and Medical Research Council or 
Hospital and Allied Services Advisory Council, allows departmental officers 
to be in constant contact with their counterparts in other States and also 
with world trends in research. At the same time state ministers meet 
separately at least once a year with the Federal minister to discuss matters 
raised by their officials through HASAC or NHMRC, or such matters as they 
may wish to discuss from their own policies. 
But it is not only as representatives on these bodies that officers 
become involved outside their departments, they are also members of numerous 
special professional and learned bodies. Apart from the Australian Medical 
Association, these may include. Hospital Administrators, Geriatrics, Radiologists, 
Cancer Society, or any one of the various Colleges. In this way officers are 
informed abut specialisms which they may no longer practice due to their 
administrative duties, but in which they still maintain an interest. The 
enormous interchange of information possible through these contacts has th9 
effect of reinforcing internal divisions within the department and creating 
competing centres of special interest. This was stressed by one minister 
who discussed his task as "ministerial mediation between interest clusters". 
He pointed out, however, that such interests were not always grouped around 
specialism of a professional kind. He gave an example from the Hospital 
context where he had to arbitrate between the expectations of the University 
Faculty of Medicine, honorary private consultants and salaried hospital staff. 
The major circumjacent involvement occurs at the state level rather 
than federal, although the importance of the latter cannot be underestimated. 
61 In this sense the Health Department differs from the other two 
departments studied. The situation is somewhat similar to that described 
by Brown, "The habit of consultation is very strong in British administration"; 
but not for the reason he attributes to the British system, because of 
subject specialisation in the Departments; R.G. Brown, 22. cit., p 165 
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It is at this level that the consumers Of the services provided by the 
department gain prominence rather than the professionals within the department. 
For every activity separately defined within the department there is a different 
clientele interested in that part of the service only. This inevitably leads 
to the emergence of areas of common concern between the officer, whose 
professional orientation is specific in one area and the client, whose demands 
are for service in the same area. Because of the enormously wide range of 
these services it is convenient to consider these in three sections, professional, 
regulatory, and personal service. 
(a) Professional - this section relates to those groups for which the 
department acts as registration agency by providing secretarial services or 
of which the Director-General is statutory Chairman, and those other autonomous 
registration boards on which the department has representation. The former are 
the Dental Mechanics Registration Board, established in 1957 to allow only 
those dental mechanics registered by the Board to deal directly with the public; 
the Nurses Registration Board; the Radiological Advisory Council, which advises 
the Minister on all applications to use, sell, supply, purchase or store radio-
active substances; and the Poisons Advisory Committee of which the Director of 
Public Health is Deputy Chairman. There are six autonomous registration boards 
under the general supervision of the Minister, although such supervision is 
minimal. These are Board of Optical Registration; Dental Board of Tasmania; 
Medical Council of Tasmania; Pharmacy Board of Tasmania; the Radiographers 
Registration Board; and Physiotherapists Registration Board. In only the 
last named has the minister any direct representation, all other Boards may 
have departmental members, but not in any expressly representative capacity. 
Those Boards on which the minister is directly represented must require 
his attention more than the others, which only have a call on his time if 
changes to the appropriate legislation is demanded. 62 One of the most recent 
examples of thisis in connection with the dental profession, where the 
62Detailed accounts of some of these Boards are contained in Wettenhall, 
Guide, pp 300-304. 
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government of the day forced the Board to accept registration of dental 
mechanics who could then deal directly with the public from their own 
establishments. The pressure from the public for more dental services 
than could be provided by practising dentists, persuaded the government to 
amend the Dentists' Act 1919 to allow this to occur. Under the 1957 amend-
ment the Dental Mechanics Registration Board was created with two dentists 
nominated by the Dental Board and two dental mechanics under the chairmanship 
of the Director-General of Health Services. 
Later, for somewhat similar reasons, the government again intervened 
by passing the School Nursing Service Act 1965. As mentioned above, the 
School of Dental Nursing was created to train practitioners having limited 
scope, but able to deal particularly with children's treatments. Again, the 
Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Dental Association is represented by three 
members of a seven member Dental Health Service Advisory Committee, of which 
the Minister's nominee is chairman. In each of these cases the initiative for 
such changes came from the executive area and were brought to fruition by 
consultation with an advisory group which included the Dental Board and the 
Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Dental Association. 
Finally, a further indication of the relationship between these groups 
and the government is the recent Podiatrists' (Chiropodists) Registration 
Act 1974. In this case the chiropodists were anxious to protest their 
professional integrity, by restricting the entry of relatively unqualified 
persons into the field. Their Association persuaded the government of the 
need for such protection, and the Act provided for the constitution of a 
Registration Board and registration of chiropodists. The Board comprises 
the Director-General as Chairman and four others - two of whom are represen-
tatives of the Australian Association of Chiropodists, the other two medical 
practitioners nominated by the minister, One of whom must be an orthopaedic 
surgeon. 
No minister or official indicated that this particular group of clientele 
caused them any great concern, much more time was consumed by the other two 
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groups. 
(b) The regulatory clientele are those over whom the department exercises 
some form of direct control. Such control may be in the form of licensing, 
as in the case of work done firough the Health Inspectoran under the Public 
Health Act 1962 and regulations. Alternatively, it may comprise supervision 
of activities for the purpose of ensuring compliance with departmental de-
cisions or statutes, e.g. the Food Standards Committee which attempts to 
ensure uniform standards with the rest of the Commonwealth. 
This is by far the largest group and covers a wide range of activities, 
and much of the work involved in direct relationships is with officers of 
the department in whose special area the activity falls. There is a strong 
emphasis on delegation within the department due to the necessity of main- 
taining links with so many diverse functions. This reduces the direct involve-
ment of either the minister or senior officers. However, there is more 
likelihood that interests of department and clientele may clash in regulatory 
activities and many of the Parliamentary questions are concerned with these 
areas which consequently involve ministers. 
More than one minister noted a peculiarity of the Tasmanian situation, 
which causes many matters of detail to land on his desk. Because of its 
relatively small population and land mass, the Tasmanian public servant tends 
to 'dive for cover' more frequently than those in larger states. 63 The 
minister is therefore frequently presented with minor problems which could 
have properly been dealt with at a much lower level in the system. One 
minister went so far as to say that, if he were minister again, he would force 
the officers to make their minds up and take responsibility. However, this 
63 This is a feature of small political systems, a similar phenomenon 
has been noted in Eire. B. Farrell, "Dail Deputies: The 1969 Generation", 
Economic & Social Review 11(3) 1971, pp_309-327, and in Tasmania: R.A.Herr 
with W.J. Hemmings and friends, 'Accountability and Proportional Representation: 
The Tasmanian Case',Politics X(2) November 1975, pp 216-220 
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may not be a fair commentary, since the public have such ready access to 
ministers that; what may be normal4 regarded as an exercise of administrative 
discretion through delegation, becomes politically significant. For this 
reason, amongst others, many committees have been set up on which officers 
and interested persons combine to provide advice and information to the 
minister. Examples of such committees in the regulatory area are those which 
the statutes themselves have set up, such as the Food Standards Committee and 
Pesticides Advisory, in addition to those already mentioned. 
(c) The group of clientele with whom the Department has most to do in a 
direct way is that to whom it provides personal services. However, this 
particular group is not very large, comprising in the main St. John's Park 
Hospital; the District Medical Service; the School Medical and Child Health 
Services; School Dental Health Services; and the Tuberculosis Division. Part 
of the group, but one with which it has less direct contact, is the hospital 
patient through the Hospital, Medical and Nursing Services Consultant and 
Advisory Branch which deals with the Hospital Boards of Management and Community 
Health Services. 
Apart from officers who have responsibility for the provision of these 
services within the departmental structure, there are no specific committees 
of a formal nature by which clientele can express their expectations. There 
is a St. John's Park Hospital Advisory Board which operates as an advisory 
committee without executive authority and includes the Deputy Director-General. 
Nonetheless, there are many links with such clientele through voluntary bodies 
which operate side by side with departmental officers in many of these areas. 
Some examples of this situation from the past are given by Wettenhall: 
"Many such links exist between official departmental 
activity and promotional and continuing welfare work 
performed by voluntary organisations...in the training 
and certification of nurses and in the conduct of district 
nursing centres and hospitals, the New Town Chest 
Hospital and the New Town Mothercraft Home, for 
example, the department took over and expanded 
services pioneered by voluntary bodies. An 
association of a different kind began in 1966 with 
the improvement by the department of kitchen 
facilities at the Now Town Chest Hospital for the 
"specific purpose Of preparing meals for delivery to 
the aged and sick in their own homes by the 
voluntary Meals-on-Wheels Associations of Hobart 
and Glenorchy." 64 
Apart from these voluntary bodies operating in close contact with officers 
of the department, parliamentarians in questions and direct contact with the 
minister become the substitute in the absence of formal relationships in 
committees. Ministers indicated that they spent considerable time on 
preparing answers to parliamentary questions, one minister suggested a time 
of one hour each. They also met with many deputations, both at their office 
and out in various centres visited on special occasions. In this way they 
kept in touch with what the clientele thought were their needs. All agreed 
that these cntacts helped in some degree to shape priorities and departmental 
thinking. 
Added to these various kinds of external involvement the officers, 
and especially the senior officers of the department, belong to numerous 
committees only indirectly affecting their functions. Many are members 
because of their particular expertise, rather than departmental represen- 
tatives. These committees include Building Regulations Board, Child Welfare 
Advisory Council, Fertilisers Board, and Stock Medicines Board. At the same 
time, departmental officers are intimately involved with many voluntary 
organisations to whom the department furnishes financial aid, for example, 
the Red Cross blood transfusion service, Tasmanian Section of the Royal 
Flying Doctor Service, and the first aid work of the St. John Council. 
64 Wettenhall, 	Guide, pp 280-81. (New Town Chest Hospital is now 
known as John Edis Hospital for Drug & Alcohol Dependency) 
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Finally, there are the relatively autonomous bodies ever which the 
department has some supervisory role on behalf of the minister. The 
involvement depends to a large extent on the financial aid provided, as 
in the case of hospitals, wheru the aid is substantial and the department 
involvement through the Hospital Management Advisory Section has reduced 
the autonomy of the Hospital Boards considerably. The Ambulance Commission 
is a different case, because it operates with a separate government grant 
outside the control of the department. Although the Minister for Health is 
responsible under the Ambulance Act for the service and he appoints one of 
his officers to the seven man commission, there is no direct threat to the 
autonomy of the Commission. 
Summation  
The departmental activities cover such a variety of functional areas 
that no one person could hope to keep involved in them all directly. Histori-
cally specialist functions have been added which have already an identifiable 
clientele and with whom contacts have been cemented. These factors have led 
to a permeable structure in which both officer and circumjacent groups interact 
continually. This is enhanced by the considerable delegation practised 
within the department. Reinforcing the extensive delegation is the specialist 
nature of much of the work and the qualifications of the officers themselves. 
Membership of officers in Australia-wide professional associations stimulate 
considerable interchange of ideas and information which can be absorbed into . 
the departmental thinking. All agreed that the involvement of officers in 
their professional associations did assist the work of the department. It 
was also pointed out by senior officers, that with so many professionals 
involved with their own specialisms, the best that can be expected is co-
ordinative control and consultative mechanisms. One example of this was the 
rationalisation of the supply and use of drugs in hospitals through an ad hoc 
departmental Committee, comprised primarily of major users of the drugs in 
private practice and such officers as the Director-General and the Director of 
Supply and Tender Board. 
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Similarly, the fact that so many of the senior officers are involved in 
both Federal and State level committees of various kinds was seen to be 
beneficial. One officerpointed to the greater integration of professional 
knowledge and the cross-fertinsation that occurs at all levels because of 
this. I4inisters also participate in many of these committees which allowed 
for increased understanding of the expert opinions on which advice was often 
- 
given. Another aspect of interaction with circumjacent groups regarded as 
extremely fruitful was the cooptation and representation which occurred at 
the State level in the many committees and boards. 65 Not only were officers 
involved in this process, but the minister often had direct access to the 
various bodies and attended when required. 
The activities of the department internalised the demands such circum-
jacent relationships produced, which caused a serious weakening of ministerial 
control. The minister can no longer obtain any comprehensive view of the 
whole, consequently, his capacity for political leadership is severely limited. 
Not only are his officers in a position to compromise him seriously without 
his knowledge until it is too late, but many other relatively autonomous 
bodies may take action without his direct approval. The extent to which 
executive authority is thus transferred by default is considerable, thus 
enhancing administrative capacity to act beyond control. 
However, restraint is exercised by senior officers in the manner by 
which they operate. One minister felt disconcerted at their unwillingness 
to accept responsibility by making their own decisions. Yet all officers 
stressed the need to understand the minister's thinking and not to operate 
beyond perceived limits. The most extreme statement of administrative capacity 
came from one officer who thought that, in the health field, achievement was 
. 65The concepts of cooptation and representation are derived from 
P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, (Berkeley: University of California Press 
in which he identified the involvement of TVA officers in the community and 1949)  
the extent to which their actions were legitimated by this process. The 
process seems to be much less deliberate in the case of the Department of 
Health, but it might be suggested that the results are similar. 
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the result ofinternational trends, not politics. There was no evidence 
' that the minister is ignored in making decisions, even in regard to what 
may be thought to be purely professional matters. 
The Director-General occupies a key role, since it is within his 
discretion to decide which matters are for the minister and which for officers. 
The structure of the department is such, that he has deliberately and properly 
placed himself in this co-ordinative position. Thus it is upon his perception 
of the balance between ministerial responsibility and administrative capacity 
that reliance must be placed and professional centrifugal forces kept in 
check. (The present Director-General has a very strong commitment to the 
Westminster system of government, feeling that as permanent head to the 
department it is his duty to act as chief adviser to the minister and 
co-ordinate the activities of the department). 
B. 	Legislative provisions  
The statutes administered by the department number some 60, (a list 
appears at the end of this Chapter) of which at least half contain substantive 
provisions, placing a duty on the department or its officers. Many of the earlier 
statutes give direct authority for such action to Division Directors, especially 
the Tuberculosis Acts or the Public Health Acts. By the Health Services 
Act 1960 these powers were made subject to the consent of the minister, and 
although effectively Directors still exercise authority, it is delegated 
by the minister and not statutorily from Parliament. This change was insisted 
upon by one particular minister whose understanding of the Westminster 
system Was respected by all. (This particular minister was highly respected 
by all senior officers who had worked with him, his motives for the amendment 
were accepted and there was some relief that the total burden of decision 
had been taken from their shoulders). The complexity of the departmental 
activities is such, that no minister could hope to become directly 
involved in every area, but the statutory change was seen as more properly 
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expressing the relationship between minister and public servant. Subsequent 
amendments orconsolidations of the Statutes have included this limitation, 
for example the Public Health Act 1962. Many of the statutes vest an already 
functioning service in the Department or Ministry and provide them with 
management authority,-e.g. Lady Clark Geriatric Act 1968, Cosgrove Park Act 
1962, New Town Mothercraft Home Agreement Act 1949, War Veterans Home (Management) 
Act 1962. These transfer responsibility for what had been a voluntary arrangement 
to the department, or provide for departmental involvement in management in 
exchange for financial assistance. 
Other statutes are concerned with hospitals of various kinds, the most 
important and comprehensive being the Hospitals Act 1918. This charges 
the minister quite categorically with the duty of administering the statute. 
(S.5(1)). His main tasks are to determine which hospitals are to be subsi-
dised, on what terms and conditions, or whether two hospitals should be 
amalgamated. To carry out this task, he may appoint some officer to investigate 
needs, recommend annual subsidies and generally see the provisions of the Act 
are carried out. One provision of relevance to the earlier history of 
the department is s. 6A, which allows the Governor to appoint a medical 
practitioner to be Director-General of Health Services. It was this statute 
which was used as a vehicle for accommodating the appointment of Dr. Edis as 
the first Director-General in 1952. 
Hospital Boards are to be constituted under the Act for the management 
of hospitals, including staffing and financial management, but the minister 
has to approve the appointments of "any medical officer, Secretary, manager 
or matron of any public hospital". 66 
The Hospitals Act provides for two kinds of hospital, public and 
private, the former being more directly under the supervision of the depart-
ment. Private hospitals may be given a subsidy and must be licensed by the 
66Hospital Act, 1918, s. 33, which section also limits the authority 
of the Board in relation to land dealing, mortgaging and capital works. 
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Minister, but operate relatively free of supervision compared to public 
hospitals. There are 18 public hospitals (4 general, 14 district) and two 
maternity hospitals controlled by Boards of Management. 67 There are five 
redium sized and three small private hospitals, none of which provide more 
than the basic range of dia ostic and nursing services for acute cases. 
The remaining statutes are concerned with regulating certain kinds of 
activity in health and allied fields. Some relate to the general management 
of professional bodies, for control of entry into the profession and professio-
nal standards. The most obvious example is that regulating the medical pro-
fession in the state, the Medical Act 1959. Others include Dentists Act 1919, 
Opticians Act 1913, Pharmacy Act 1908 and the latest, referred to previously, 
the Podiatrists Registration Act 1974. 
A different regulatory purpose Underlines the Anatomy Act 1964, or the 
Sale of Blood Act 1964. In both cases the department are empowered to prevent 
the improper use of the human body. Another statute, the Cremation Act 1934, 
relates to the regulation of infectious disease, and similar reasons produced 
the Quarantine Act 1881, although many of the provisions under this latter 
statute have been superseded by the Federal quarantine powers. 
The majority of statutes mentioned are relatively mechanical in their 
effect, producing administrative and routine activities, occupying many 
departmental officers, but not directly affecting the major policy of the 
department. Most of these statutes have remained unchanged with no call for 
amendment coming from any source. Their main function has been to provide 
statutory authority for the ongoing activities of the department. However, 
some have been amended to a considerable degree and these, it mustbe assumed, 
involve the most sensitive areas of the departmental business. The Food and 
67 For a more detailed account of the current situation see Tasmanian 
State Strategy Plan, Health and Welfare Services in Tasmania, Hobart 1975, 
Working Paper No. 8, pp 21 et seq. 
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Drugs Act 1910 has been amended some 11 times; the Hospitals Act 1918 
amended 20 times; and the Public Health Act amended 15.times, before the 
1935 Act was repealed and substituted by the 1962 Act, which itself has been 
substantially amended. In 1966 some 35 of its 142 Sections were amended, and 
in 1973 the Public Health Act 1962 was again amended in some 40 of its 142 
Sections. The Act was also subjected to amendments in 1968, 1970 and 1974. 
Other legislation, such as the Medical Act 1959 and the Poisons Act 1971 
have been amended from time to time to allow for particular changes. 68 
The majority of current legislation for which the department has 
responsibility places strong emphasis on ministerial control This is a 
deliberate change from the past when the initial statutory authority was 
given direct to the professionals within the department, particularly the 
Director of Public Health under the old Public Health Acts. Much of this 
colonial legislation remained in force in 1960, and it has been the aim of 
the Department to bring these into line •.41h contemporary needs by amendment._ 
The present Director-General has been deeply involved in this activity, 
insisting on providing for authority to be delegated by the Minister to 
officials. 
Widely divergent views about changing legislation by substitution or 
amendment were held by ministers and senior officials. One minister saw the 
process as a fuss and rather unnecessary, "things went well without it". 
This view was supported by some of the officials with a professional per-
spective, although most officers agreed that there was a need to keep legis-
lation up to date and vital, especially some of the old regulatory statutes, 
such as the Dentists Act 1919. The Director-General had begun re•drafts of 
such statutes, including the Dentists and Hospitals Acts, as well as completing 
the major re-draft of the Medital Act in 1971. 
68The latest amendment to the Poisons Act related to increased police 
powers of search for narcotics and caused considerable debate. Mercury, 22/11/73. 
This was done on the recommendation of the National Standing Committee on Drugs 
to the Ministers' Conference on Drug Abuse. 
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The case of the Hospitals Act 1918 provides a good example of the 
differing points of view about legislation. The Act was passed as a conse-
quence of the report of the Royal Commission into General Hospitals 1914, 
which considered allegations a:pout mismanagement in hospitals. The Commissioner 
reported, inter alia, 
"I find that in general hospitals in Tasmania the systems 
adopted in regard to administration differ somewhat widely 
and that no one system as adopted in any general hospital 
is quite satisfactory." 69 
His recommendations for a changed form of hospital management was partially 
implemented in the 1918 Act. 
Since that time, there have been many changes, but the scheme of general 
and district, or cottage, hospitals has remained. The Board system of manage-
ment has recently become the concern of the Department,"because of financial 
problems. The changing ideas about the provision of health care and community 
health services may provide an appropriate stimulus to reconsider the pro-
visions of the Act. 70 There has been ministerial approval in principle to 
some aspects of a new bill. However, it is an enormously time-consuming process 
and, since there is no one within the department able to work full time in 
addition to their daily activities, redrafting had not yet been completed. 
But since it was the opinion of this minister that such a narrative should be 
detailed enough to serve as the Second Reading speech there was little progress, 
69Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No 21 of 1914-15. This Commission was 
followed by another, specifically to enquire into the Hobart Hospital of that 
day; that Commission was much more scathing and gave impetus to produce the 
legislation. Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 10 of 1915-16. An interesting 
element of the Commission's recommendations was the suggestion, that all 
hospitals other than private should be 'nationalised' - p xii. 
70For a discussion of these matters see: R.J.K.Chapman, "Health Policy 
in Tasmania", Public Policy Seminar Paper, Tasmanian Development Series, 
.University of Tasmania, 1976. The present Director-General has been concerned 
with re-drafting this Actfor some considerable time and currently has an - 
initial Bill under discussion with interested bodies such as the Hospital Boards. 
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(This same minister also noted that in his opinion public servants did not 
have sufficient knowledge of drafting and clause writing, leaving all this 
to the Parliamentary Draftsman. There may be some truth in this as many 
Bills, when presented to the Legislative Council in Tasmania, have to be 
returned for amendments of detail, which should have been unnecessary.) 
The Director-General was directly involved in any statutory amendments 
or rewriting and suggested, that it was very complex and occupied a great 
deal of time. He was the person mainly concerned in the department with 
preparation of a brief to the draftsman for such changes. Most of this work 
had to be done outside normal office hours, as there was no opportunity in 
the press for everyday business. 
It was suggested, that public servants were ambivalent about such 
activity and that they would rather not 'stir the pot'. 71 The functions of the 
department are complex enough without having to make them more difficult through 
opening wide the door to discussion and debate. According to this line of 
thought, most of the argument about statutory changes would be irrelevant 
because it would be 'political' rather than 'professional'. Indeed, this 
seems to sum up the basis for leaving the legislation alone and merely amending 
'at the margin' when particular matters need attention. 
There are two resulting consequences which seem to be contradictory. On 
the one hand it provides the public servants with accumulated precedent for 
any of their activities and permits them to increase their scope for acting 
within their discretion. In this way the delegated authority is accumulated 
almost by default, rather than by powers directly given by the minister. 
71A similar suggestion was made in Education, where a senior official 
pointed to the problems that would result from the clause about religious 
education, even though no change was proposed. All the old arguments would 
be revived with no benefit to anyone - "best leave well alone". (see p 226 
supra). 
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Legislative review would mean that ministers become aware of the detail of 
departmental functions because these matters are forced on their attention. 
It is a natural occurrence in all large organisations, for normal activities 
to be carried out according to precedent, especially in the Health Services 
Department which carries out such diverse functions. 72 
Despite the obvious possibilities that officials had for reducing the 
minister's leadership role, there seemed to be a deliberate reluctance to 
go that far. They were punctilious about assisting the minister to answer 
Parliamentary questions, going to extraordinary lengths to obtain information 
which they knew the questioner wanted, even though the question was not pro-
perly phrased. However, officials expected the minister to "put it into 
political language" once he had the facts. 73 
Summation 
Legislative changes of a major kind du not emerge quickly from the 
normal daily activities of the department. Ministers rarely initiate such 
changes, although they are interested in proposals which officials may put 
forward. Such a situation is likely to promote the centrifugal forces, since 
long followed precedents are difficult to overthrow and decisions based on 
them are easily justified as proper exercises of discretion. Officers are 
strengthened in their actions against any criticisms from outside and ministers 
have to support them in the legislature. Parliamentary questions are relatively 
a-political in the specialised health fields, and it is easier to state the 
facts about such matters as mortality rates, availability of acute beds, or 
the basis for prohibiting the sale of unhygienic foodstuffs. So long as 
72Organisation theorists refer to this phenomenon with approval as 
'the exception principle'. See L.Urwick, The Elements of Administration  
(London: Pitman, 1943). 
73A list of questions asked during the Second Session of 35th 
Parliament, 11 March 1970 - 17 February 1971 is contained in Appendix IV 
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Parliament does not become involved in probing enquiries, such as Royal 
Commissions, the public servant has little to fear. Almost all such 
enquiries have been directed as the (supposed) malfunctions of the public 
hospital system in which the department is only indirectly involved. It is 
the minister who is directly responsible for such matters and for this 
reason he spends quite a proportion of his time on hospital affairs. 
Ministers, too, expect to operate within the 'established procedures' 
when they come to office. At first there is little incentive to make changes, 
unless to follow a particular policy line espoused in party policy. Their 
incumbency may be such that they only have time to deal with the routine 
matters, having little option but to accept the decisions of their officials. 
Unless these decisions have adverse political consequences, the minister would 
find no advantage in allowing Parliament to become too involved in department 
activities. 
Since the minister is made statutorily responsible for all operatior5 of 
the department, no matter of how specialist a nature, his main concern is to 
insist on the professional capacity of his advisors. Priorities of action and 
expenditure must also be his decision, and in this way he may be able to main-
tain a close control over the broad direction of departmental policy. What-
ever mechanism is adopted, and the ministers have dealt with these matters in 
a varied manner, his control is augmented. Ministers gain support for the 
inherent preeminence of their position by legislative provisions, such as the 
Health Services Act 1960, especially where it can be seen as a deliberate 
means of reversing statutory authority previously given to particular officers. 
The fact that subsequent legislation has followed this pattern, reinforces 
the minister's central role and provides him with increased prestige. 
On balance, the potential centrifugal forces inherent in the unchanging 
statutes, augmented by the specialist nature of Much of the work Performed under 
those statutes, must seem to be strong. However, the manifestations of this 
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potential are muted at the present time, due to the way in which senior 
officers see their roles. There is also the important factor of explicit 
statutory authority which re-inforces ministerial executive authority against 
any restraints imposed by sen:;.or officers. • 
C. Professional staff 
In describing the whole department structure previously, it has been 
pointed out that there are six main areas of operational service supported 
by a central administrative staff. The fragmentation thus created is aggra-
vated by the diverse professional basis of the operational divisions. Each 
division has its own particular specialism, although the majority of these 
are derived from a medical core and employees are therefore mostly doctors. 
While a medical qualification or a paramedical education is required for most 
of the operations of the department, once within the specialist field there is 
little interc,hange possible. So, for example, the district dental officer 
would be unlikely to be able to transfer to the Division ofPublic Health in 
any capacity. Similarly, the Chief Health Inspector in the Health Inspectorate 
Section of the Division of Public Health would not have any opportunity to use 
his expertise in either the School Medical Service or the Child Health Service, 
even though they are within the same Division as his own Section. 
Professionalism within the department must therefore be seen as vertical 
rather than horizontal. That is to say, professional officers look within 
their own small segment of the department for various advantages and disadvan- 
tages of service. Cross fertilisation of ideas, information on their expertise, 
common membership of professional associations, and often a common jargon for 
the particular function they perform, all draw them together. These same 
factors tend to separate them from other professionals within the department 
and institutionalise the differences into formal barriers. While departmental 
social occasions may lead to informal interaction, there are few other situations 
which would assist this trend. 
285 
Another factor is consequential restricted promotional opportunities. 
Where relatively distinct specialisms are performed, those who wish to pursue 
their interests cannot expect promotion outside that field. Only those who 
show some aptitude for adminis'xative duties may climb out of their specialism 
to upper echelons of the hierarchy. It is at these levels that their erst-
while professional specialism is of relatively little benefit. Yet it is 
this marginally useful expertise which gives the senior officers their legi-
timacy within the department. To have a non-professional in senior positions 
would be regarded as a reduction of the authority of senior people. One 
senior officer commented that doctors accept the decisions of people with whom 
they have worked on a professional basis. They accept more readily their 
authority, if only because they are 'professional'. 
This professional fragmentation has reduced organisational coherence. 
There is little feeling of belonging to a corporate whole within the various 
segments of the department. Each division operates both physically and men-
tally apart, only relating to one another with regard to staffing, finance and 
other co-ordinated needs. There is considerable professional competition 
therefore within the department for resources of all kinds. But most of this 
is contained by the close centralisation of control exercised by the Director-
General. 
While there is considerable decentralisation of function within the de-
partmental structure, as has been previously emphasised, the financial, staffing 
and equipment needs of the various Divisions make demands which only the per-
manent head is in a position to satisfy. The Public Service Board and the 
Treasury deal only through the Director-General, and this gives him a major 
opportunity through which to exercise departmental co-ordination. The 
emergence of a central administrative group to support this co-ordinative work 
by the permanent head is essential to his task, which causes tension, arising 
from professional attitudes in the Divisions. Officers feel any decision 
should be their own, since they have the qualification to do the job and to 
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know whatis required for it to be accomplished. Exercise of control from 
the centre, therefore, does not quite accurately describe the kind of consul-
tation that must take place, either directly from Division head to Permanent 
head or his deputy, or through internal committees. The limited authority 
74 of the Director-General 	over minor staffing changes or equipment purchases 
is made more flexible by the use of the Hospital services and this enhances 
his co-ordinative control. 
However, most Division heads accept the necessity of dealing with their 
needs on a departmental basis. One senior officer pointed out, that all he 
could do, was to present his case for funds and staff to the Director-General 
as best he could and leave it to him to negotiate with Treasury and the Public 
Service Board. 
The relations with the Treasury seem to be mutually beneficial, and no 
great difficulties occur in obtaining financial support from a number of 
external sours. There is little interference in the ordinary functioning 
of the Department by Treasury once the budget has been passed. However, there 
has been considerable tension between the department and the Public Service 
Board. The Board find some difficulty in accommodating the enormously large 
range of differing professional needs of the department within their normal 
classification system. This frequently meant, that positions within the de-
partment were not filled because the salary range set by the Board was too 
low to Attract properly qualified personnel. Frustration with this aspect 
of the department's activities was one of the reasons for creating the Mental 
Health Commission in 1968. In this way the particular needs of the mental 
health area would be reflected in the more flexible appointment procedures, 
provided by the removal of the Board's staffing control. Other areas outside 
the Public Service Board jurisdiction within the department are the general 
and district hospital staffs, the Pathology and Analysts sections of the 
Department. The remaining Divisions are not numerically larger, but have the 
wider range of professional needs referred to above. 
74For example, he is only permitted to authorize expenditure up to $1000 
without ministerial consent. 
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Any permanent head, who had to deal with such a group of professionally 
qualified personnel would find it difficult to do so. The differing per-
spectives that are brought to bear on him, e.g. general practitioners, 
psychiatrists, surgeons, dentists, sanitary inspectors, make his task an - 
unenviable one. There seems to be little doubt that this has been one of 
the reasons for the appointment of a medically qualified person to the position. 
Since 1945, there have been professionals in all the key positions in the 
Department, and there has not been any attempt to appoint a lay co-ordinator, 
as had been the case when Mr. Tudor was Secretary to the Department of Public 
Health. 
It has been argued, that the change to a hospital administrator as 
Director-General in 1952 heralded the increasing dominance of the curative 
aspects of departmental tasks. Hospitals grew and so did the involvement of 
the department in their activities. As the costs of these services increased, 
the desire to maintain some control manifested itself in co-ordinative structures 
within the department. The Hospital Medical Service is part of that movement, 
reinforcing the need for professionals in senior positions. The appointment 
of a Deputy Director-General in 1972 - after a lapse of three years - continued 
this trend of hospital-based senior officers. The previous Deputy Director-
General was a physician Geriatrician until his appointment, and the new Deputy 
in 1972 had previously been Superintendent of the Royal Hobart Hospital. 75 
There can be little doubt, that these professional appointments have met 
with the approval of the Department. To have non-professionals in positions 
of authority would cause some resentment, although one senior officer admitted 
• that having all medical men at the top influenced decisions to an unfair degree. 
The existence of qualified officers in senior positions has been offset 
75Whether these appointments have distorted the priorities of the 
departmental expenditure and commitment; or whether they have been in response 
to the already perceived needs, is a matter for argument. For an earlier 
discussion see E.H.G.Matthews,loc. cit. 
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by the appointment of ministers who are medical men, especially in recent 
years. 76 But it was generally agreed.that, to be most effective, the minister 
need not be medically qualified. Differences of opinion can occur as fre-
quently amongst qualified persons as any other, and it is quite clear that 
having medical doctors in all senior positions and as minister as well does 
not mean unanimity and harmony. What it does apparently mean, is that there is 
some reduction of individual dissatisfaction when decisions favour one or the 
other. The respect for the other professional makes unfavourable decisions 
more palatable than if a non professional authority decides. A minister 
qualified in the area of his portfolio does have a more onerous task, because 
he is also politically committed. His own professional judgement may sometimes 
conflict with his own political sensitivity. This is especially so in a rela-
tively small community. In these situations the collective responsibility of 
the Cabinet must be accepted as greater than the individual responsibility of 
the minister, so that he must allow political considerations to override his 
professional desires. 
There is no doubt, that in his dealings with his department and especially 
his senior officers, he has little chance to allow his own professional pre-
delictions to dominate. 
Summation 
- There are two opposed forces operating as a result of the large concentra-
tion of professionalism within the department. One is fragmentation, the other 
is information control. 
Where there is such a wide range of different professional interests, even 
though it is within the generic area of health, the consequence is differentiation. 
The six Divisions under which the department operates does not exhaust this 
trend, even within each Division there are many identifiable groups. So, for 
76See Table 3, p 257 supra. 
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example, in the Hospital Medical and Nursing Services Consultant and Advisory 
Branch there are Nursing Service Inspecting Sisters, Hospital Catering Super-
visors, District medical officers (G.P.), and Geriatric services. Similar 
internal partitions occur within Public Health and Tuberculosis, although tc a 
lesser extent in the latter. 
Any common view there might be within the department, because of a commitment 
to health Care of various kinds, is soon dissipated in day to day conflicting 
needs. It is even arguable that the concept of health care is a unifying force 
which would promote centrifugal tendencies. Divergent opinions about the meaning 
of health care derive in part from the different perspectives of professional 
elements in the department. Some see it as absence of disease, some as pre-
vention of disease, yet others as treatment. Attention has already been drawn 
to the generally recognized division between those who espouse preventive views 
and others with curative concerns, often discussed in terms of public health 
versus hospitals. There are signs of the growth of a more integrated view 
as a consequence of the pressures of the Australian Government over conunity 
health and long-term hospital planning. 
Even the close professional relationships that derive from all concerned 
having qualified in a common medical degree initially,does not reduce the 
tensions inherent in these alternative perspectives. This is overlaid at the 
same time by two other elements which further reduce the potential centrifugal 
forces, the central authority group and the need for co-ordination. 
The central authority group within the department has emerged from the 
originally separable units created in 1945 for specific areas of concern. In 
those days, each unit had its own statutes, empowering a Director to perform the 
necessary functions. The result was a loosely knit grouping, which was combined 
in a ministerial portfolio. The occupant of that portfolio was accessible to 
all Directors, and his time was utilised according to political necessity or 
professional pressure. After the Health Services Act 1960 there was an emphasis 
on co-ordinating activities under the control of the minister and thus through 
the permanent head. 
There had traditionally been a very small staff concerned with those 
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essential co-ordinative activities: finance and equipment. The demand for 
co-ordination increased to provide much greater pressure on the central group. 
Before 1969, less and less of the Director-General's time had been available 
to deal with the detail, and an officer had been appointed as Senior Medical 
Officer (Hospitals) to assist the Chief Medical Officer. It is significant 
that in 1969 the Director-General found it necessary to divest himself of the 
direction of the Hospital Service Branch and appoint a full-time Director. 
The channelling of all major decisions through the central authority group, 
however professionally qualified that group may be, is bound to increase the 
control of the minister. As a vital member of that group, the minister, can 
maintain a very real 'presence' in all activities of the department. He does 
not have to become directly involved in day to day problems, but senior officers 
become sensitive to what may be regarded as important by the minister of the 
day. 
The outcome has been to reduce considerably the previous autonomy of the 
separate units and to increase the influence of the senior officers in the 
central authority group at the expense of individual Directors, even though 
these Directors may still have access to the minister. The existence of 
professionalism within the department in such a concentrated form does not, 
therefore, necessarily lead to the increase of centrifugal forces. Because of 
the fragmented nature of the professionals and of the increasing importance 
of those professionals in central authority groups, the minister is able to 
maintain a.considerable degree of control. 
A countervailing force to that mentioned above is derived from the rapid 
growth of specialised information. The capacity of any individual to comprehend 
fully the technically detailed functions of all health care services is negligible. 
There is much more mutual exchange within areas of expertise external to the 
department, than between different areas internally. It is.only when attempts 
to innovate or to change priorities occur, that separate groups within the 
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department have to justify what their own professional judgement accepts. 
In this situation the permanent head has to act as arbitrator himself or 
pass it on to the minister for his final decision. However, neither would 
have the detailed knowledge on whi ,-;11 to make any particular judgement, it 
must always be a general consideration derived from largely non-specialist 
factors. Considerable possibility exists therefore for the specialist within - 
the department to influence departmental actions. Many of the initial stimuli 
for the specialist come from his contacts within other similar departments in 
other states, membership of professional associations, or specialist groups 
set up under some federal arrangement. When the information on which to gauge 
the validity of suggested changes depends upon the judgement of the specialist 
proposing such changes, those whose task it is to make decisions, are placed 
in a delicate position. When such proposals receive support from federal 
associations or inter-state committees, strong reasons must be advanced for 
failing to take any action. The Minister must be able to allay fears that 
purely political considerations are dominating what should be a relatively 
non-political area. He gains assistance sometimes - as has been suggested - 
from his own professional competence, because he does not appear to act out 
of ignorance. If professionals feel that their knowledge is not utilised, 
then they become frustrated and lose their commitment to the task. To this 
extent, therefore, information must reduce the capacity of the minister to 
control and increase the centrifugal forces. 
These two contradictory forces, fragmentation and information control, 
• are at work all the time within the department and make the task of the central 
authority group and the minister more closely allied than would appear to be 
the case at first sight. In cases where professionals dominate decisions, as 
would undoubtedly apply in the Health Services Department, it is usual to 
explain the process as a reduction of ministerial control. However, because 
of the relatively large number of different professionals there is little 
conceptual unity. Only rarely will all-groups come together to place a combined 
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point of view to the minister. Even then, those professionals who are in 
the central authority group will not be in the same relationship to the 
minister as the combined group, they will have to act as advirs to the 
m§nister on the merits of the case. For this reason the ministEr will have 
considerably more control than otherwise, as one minister said: "When a 
professional becomes a public servant he loses some of his professional commitment." 
The consequence will always be that political leadership and executive authority 
are reinforced. There were few occasions on which the minister's executive 
authority was transferred to the officers because of their undoubtedly superior 
capacity. The minister's political leadership does tend to be very limited 
however, in the specialist areas of health care. Initiative must always be 
with the professional, because of his greater knowledge of the potential in his 
specialism. As long as this is not used by the specialist to undermine the 
executive authority of the minister, e.g. by pre-empting options in particular 
situations before he has had a chance to decide, then the centrifugal forces 
of professionalism will be contained. 
D. Finance 
Expenditure on health care has been considerable over the years. 77  Both 
health and education are essentially State functions for which the Commonwealth 
Government offers financial assistance from time to time_ The bulk of the funds 
have to come from State Treasury, • even though the ultimate source of funds is 
Commonwealth Income Tax. This means the State Government have to commit the 
resources they have available to specific priorities worked out at a political 
level. 
There is little doubt that the area of health has received funds beyond 
the requirement to maintain equilibrium through the inflationary curve. In the 
77See Table 2, p 291 supra 
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five years from 1970-75 total Consolidated Revenue Fund expenditure has 
almost trebled,from $15.75 million to $53.4 million, an increasing percentage 
in terms of the total State budget expenditure from 21.4% to 31.8%, 78 By far 
the largest proportion of these funds would have to be obtained through the 
ordinary process of estimate and justification through Parliament, as there are 
no areas of dedicated funding in the sense of long term specific funding from 
outside sources. 
However, there is a strong presumption, that funds for all health care will 
remain at a similar level in terms of percentage of State government expenditure. 
For example, finance for hospitals is unlikely to be reduced below the real 
expenditure level of the previous year without very strong reasons, even allowing 
for marginal changes for inflation. Such view is reinforced by one minister,. 
who suggested that the need for health care is a need perceived by everyone, 
whether it is in fact real or only imaginary. Any expenditure is, therefore, 
easier to sell to Cabinet than for many other areas, e.g. transport. 
The problem is that it is an area in which unexpected increases occur, 
as shown by referring to hospital expenses detailed in numerous Annual Reports 
by the Director-General, especially since 1969. The following extract, relating 
to the cost of public hospitals expressed as a percentage of all health expen-
diture, shows the enormous difficulty of forecasting in the current situation. 
"It will be noted that the expotential curve of predicted 
expenditure last year revealed an under-estimate of between 
3.9% and 5.5% of the actual expenditure and therefore it can 
be assumed that the new table might well err on the conser-
vative side. ... The following small table shows how the 
predicted expenditure per annum up to the year 1977-78 has 
had to be amended each year based on known and predictable 
. factors. The upward trend in predictions is almost 
entirely due to unforeseen salary rises. 
78 -This makes an interesting comparison with .expenditure of 7% . 
of C.R.F. on health and 5% on education in 1876. See my paper: Health  
Policy in Tasmania, (9.1• cit.) 
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Financial Year 	Predicted Ex- 	ditto 	ditto 
penditure 1970-71 	1971-72 1972-73 
Report, 
1971-72 19.9 (21.0)* • • 	• • • • • • 
1972-73 22.1 23.1 (24.0)* • • • • 
1973-74 24.6 25.9 27.3 
1974-75 27.2 28.9 30.9 
1975-76 30.0 32.1 34.8 
1976-77 • • 	• • 35.5 39.0 
1977-78 • • 	• • • • 43.5 
* Actual expenditure 79 
By far the most important area of expenditure from the public point 
of view and therefore politically, is in the hospital services. The State 
makes a grant to public hospitals through the department, based on the 
Hospital Board's own estimate of their requirement. Recently much greater 
control has been exercised over the hospital expenditure and estimates by 
the Hospital Management Advisory Section, and from 1970 this Section haa 
worked in conjunction with Treasury to overcome some of the difficulties 
caused by rapidly escalating costs. 
The department is also deeply involved in the control of capital expenditure 
in hospitals, as it is concerned with the planning processes throughout. This 
is especially so in relation to the four General Hospitals. For example, there 
are long-term planning Committees for both the Royal Hobart Hospital extensions, 
which are currently under consideration, and the Launceston General Hospital 
where Phase 1 of a redevelopment plan has begun. 
"It is envisaged in future, that similar over-all planning 
. committees will be established for all major hospital 
projects, as it is quite clear that by this means adequate 
communication can be maintained during all phases of 
planning between the Department, the hospital architects 
and the hospital boards concerned." 80 
79Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 88 of 1973, p 7 . 
802E. cit . , p 16. 
295 
In addition to the above matters post expenditure audit controls and overall 
planning controls operating on capital works, make hospital boards more than 
previously subject to restrictions imposed by the department. 
In a similar way, the department is the channel through which funds are 
transferred by the government to the Tuberculosis Division, St. John's Park, 
the Ambulance Commission, and earlier the Road Safety Section. Each of these 
sections of the department is more or less autonomous in terms of the extent 
to which funds have to be provided from State Government sources, 81 
The Tuberculosis Division receives almost 90% of its revenue from 
Commonwealth grants direct. It is thus far less subject to changes in 
expenditure priorities at State level than other parts of the department, 
although this does not protect it from ministerial action to reduce expenditure, 
as occurred in relation to the closing of the Northern Chest Hospital, Evandale. 
"The number of tuberculosis patients treated in hospital 
continues to fall, and the bed occupancy rate is 
uneconomically low. Over the years, the former Northern 
Chest Hospital was handed over to the Launceston General 
Hospital, a ten-bed unit being retained for the treatment 
of tuberculosis; old chalets of the - Tasmanian Chest 
Hospital have been pulled down or used for stores; and one 
Tasmanian Chest Hospital ward has been transferred to the 
Mental Health Services Commission." 8. 2 
St.. John's Park Hospital is not quite so self-supporting financially, but, 
apart from having staff appointed by the Public Service Board and general 
supervision by the Director of Hospital and Medical Services, there are no 
direct restrictions. Approximately half their revenue is derived from fees 
and hospital benefits from the Commonwealth government, the other half is a 
State'grant, and some garden produce is also sold to defray expenses. - 
The Ambulance Commission is a completely autonomous body set up under the 
Ambulance Act 1959 to act as co-ordinator for all ambulance services throughout 
the State. It prepares estimates for all the service with the assistance 
of the various district boards and distributes the funds received through the 
81For detail see Table 2, p 247 supra. 
82Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 83 of 1971, p 20. 
296 
department. None of its personnel are public servants and it deals directly 
. with the minister. 
Finally, in this group is the Road Safety Branch which was created in 
1970 as a consequence of the concern with this problem of the Minister for 
Health Services at that time. By the Traffic Act 1970 the portfolio of 
Minister of Road Transport was commissioned and given to the Minister for 
Health Services. The staff was extremely small and could not be made a 
substantive department, so it was included in Health Services as a Branch. 
All funds were again channelled through the department but were wholly ex-
pended by the Branch itself, .although its boas were kept by officers within 
the department. Its Director had access to the minister', but was subject 
to the control of the Director-General for such matters as accommodation, pay, 
personnel and other support services. The Public Service Board regarded the 
Branch as a part of the department. The estimates were worked out by the 
Branch and rkt subject in any way to interference, so long as the major common 
items were not involved. 
Since 80% of the expenditure of the department is accounted for by these 
various bodies,there is little scope for radical change by the officers within. 
the departmental central authority group. 83 The main concern is to keep the 
proposed increases within bounds, rather than seeking ways of cutting costs 
in real terms. However, in more recent times there have been strong moves 
to reduce directly costs in the Hospital area. Apart from the enlargement 
of the Hospital advisory section, management consultants have been used. 84 
The provision of finance is not a matter over which the minister is able 
to exercise a great control, but major decisions can be taken by him in regard 
to the appropriate priority to be given to expenditure in one project rather 
than another. There seems little scope for affecting the general direction of 
'83For example in 1972-73 the total departmental. expenditure was $20.67 million 
and the sum expended on thesevarious bodies was $19,2 million in 1973-74 
$26 million and $22 million (see Table 2, p 247 	supra). 
84Tasmania, ParliaMentary Paper No. 88 of 1973, p 10; Annual Report of the 
Director-General in which the activities of management consultants generally 
and the Royal Hobart Hospital in particular are discussed. 
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health care services as a whole. Even where the minister was doubtful of 
the real benefits to be obtained by proposals he was often obliged to proceed, 
due to the pressure of public and professional expectations. An example was 
given of the Maternity wing, planned for the Royal Hobart Hospital. This would 
extend the obstetrics and gynaecology services already provided under the 
auspices of the Royal and replace the older Queen Alexandra Maternity Hospital. 
It will cost a large capital sum, which will form part of the Capital Works 
programme accepted for funding the National Hospitals and Health Services 
Commission. 85 The benefits of this new provision will be marginal, according 
to one minister, because currently maternal mortality is reduced to 1/4 of 1% - 
even given the present facilities. The only major beneficiary will be the 
University Medical School, who will have modern teaching and research facilities 
not currently available. 
The budgetary process is not always the same and changes can affect the 
extent to which the minister has an opportunity to order the priorities_ During 
the period 1964-69 under a Labor Government, the estimates were prepared by 
the department and discussed by the minister and permanent head, who then 
both attended a meeting with other ministers and their permanent heads, 
which the whole of the expenditure was discussed. This forced a minister into 
a position where negotiation at the political level had to be seen to be 
justified to his professional permanent head. Here the minister had much less 
room to impose his own views on priorities, unless he had agreed them with the 
permanent head before the meeting. This method of discussing estimates was 
not adopted again when the Labor Party returned to power in 1972. The 
previous procedure of ministers only, meeting in Cabinet, was revised. It 
meant much less time was spent by all parties on the estimates, the larger 
meeting often took up to a week to complete its work. At the same time it 
85See Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 79 of 1975, p 8, where the 
Director-General discusses the Commission's Five Year Plan. Despite the 
minister's comment recorded here, the proposal was approved by Cabinet as part 
of a long-term plan to provide additional accommodation in the Royal Hobart 
Hospital and to centralize maternity care. 
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permitted the minister to make changes in priorities after discussions with 
his permanent head and thus impose his own imprint on them. Such changes in 
priorities would not affect the total recurrent expenditure significantly, 
however, for the reasons mentioned above. 
Sometimes it is possible for political reasons to switch the order of 
capital works which have been proposed, but not started. In this way, there may 
be distortion of an ongoing programme. , but such differences do indicate the 
existence of ministerial leadership and executive authority. However, capital 
works have another constraint attached which limits this potential for increased 
ministerial control. 
The intervention of the Commonwealth in the funding of capital works 
during the 1972-75 period through the National Hospitals and Health Services 
Commission forced the department to deal in long-term planning in a way not 
previously attempted. Not only hospitals were affected, •but the existing pattern 
of service by a departure to community health service, including centres, imposed 
by the provision of earmarked funds. 86  The way in which such changes placed 
severe limitations on the work of the department may be seen in the comments 
by the Director-General: 
"There was little time to prepare precise estimates 
of funds which were considered to be required for the 
various schemes, and at the same time, in the beginning, 
there was no guarantee available that if schemes were 
started with the assistance of funds from Canberra, the 
funds would continue indefinitely and take into account 
increasing costs. As our Government had to agree to pay 
10% of the Cost of approved schemes then the possibility 
of the State being committed to completely financing the 
projects had to be taken into consideration. There was 
." initially some reluctance to accept an 'open ended' agreement."87 
This kind of uncertainty about commitment and the consequences of accepting 
federal government assistance is proper in a public servant, but it becomes 
politically very difficult to refuse such funds. Often the public has its 
• .86Tasmania, Parliamentary. Paper No. 88 of 1973, pp 14-15, where the 
Director-General reports on the introduction of three new major health • 
service projects through the Interim Committee on Health and Hospital Services. 
87 Tasmania; Parliamentary Paper No. 82- of 1974, p 7; most of the problems 
arose from the emphasis on Community dealth Services by the Australian 
Government. 
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expectations aroused and lack of State government enthusiasm may have 
electoral consequences. 
The dilemma for the public servant in this situation is that his normal 
channel of communication and information with his colleagues at federal level 
is limited because he cannot be sure of his minister's mind. This is reflected 
in the previously quoted Report, where subsequently the Director-General 
stated: 
"We therefore decided to proceed by seeking Cabinet 
approval in the first instance to submitting various 
projects and then wait until we knew whether they had 
been approved or not, before proceeding further." 88 
It may be suggested that in those areas of the department, which would benefit 
from the infusion of such funds, the officers would use this possibility as a 
strong lever to press the minister to adopt such policies. No doubt, other 
parts of the department not so affected would react with caution against too 
. great a commitment in a situation of uncertainty. 
There is evidence that competition for funds between the various Divisions 
of the department was not very great - presumably, in part, because of the 
large proportion of committed funds. The greater the competition in this 
situation, the greater the forces operating to reinforce the minister, since 
he must act as arbitrator and make final decisions. Otherwise his task is 
merely to place his seal of approval on what has already been estimated and 
recommended. Any changes that he might wish to make in the latter circumstances 
would have to be justified to professional officers, who would expect some 
strong argument based on professional grounds rather than merely political. 
Nonetheless, there are ministers who feel strongly enough to make such changes, 
usually based on the expectation of short term gains. 
Summation 
There are two main financial factors which drastically limit the way in 
88Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No. 82 of 1974, p 7 
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which the Minister can exercise political leadership in the department. 
First, the extent of funds already committed to ongoing institutions and 
programmes is very great, almost 80% in the last few years. Second, the 
way in.which the department is used as a channel for funds :Tent by relatively 
autonomous bodies over which the department has very little control. 
The committed funds are not 'dedicated', for example, in the sense used 
for those received under the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement, other than 
in the case of the Tuberculosis Division. All funds are derived from State 
Consolidated Revenue and would normally be open to revision at Estimate time. 
Reference to Table 2 supra will show that prior to 1972 	the general 
shape of the departmental policy had not changed. By . far the greatest pro-
portion of its funding goes to institutions which have an ongoing demand and 
this has left little opportunity for the minister to make any marked impression 
on the direction the department is taking. 
The most significant area for ministers to show political leadership is 
in capital expenditure, but, since planning for most capital works of any .size - 
takes about five years, the electoral advantage to be gained is limited. The 
newly elected government may have a commitment to certain capital priorities 
when it first comes to office and may direct the officials to work towards 
this end, but apart from stating that its aims are being pursued, there is 
little physical evidence to show for a number of years. 
The other factor referred to As a limitation on the minister's control 
over finance, is the way the department is used as a channel for funds. Those 
bodies mentioned previously as in receipt of the major proportion of funds, 
only use the facilities of the central authority-graup.to provide support 
service for their activities. The accountant keeps the ledgers for some of 
these Divisions in the appropriate form for audit, and to some extent has day 
. to day controlling functions in respect of the money already allocated. He 
operates as Treasury would for a small department. The same coordinating 
control occurs in respect of department expenditure on furniture and equipment, 
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although not over the kind of equipment purchased, only to ensure that prior 
authority for the expenditure of funds has been received from the minister, 
i.e. through the approved estimates. 
The only time the minister may attempt to exercise direct control in the 
financial sphere is therefore estimate time. Any revision he may wish to 
make must be argued through between himself and senior officers at that time. 
• As has been suggested, his room for manoeuvre even here is extremely limited 
due to Commonwealth government initiatives on the one hand and prior commit-
ments,which cannot be.easily altered, on the other. His position in this 
context is strengthened by the fact that he must fight for departmental funds 
in Cabinet. The department supports him by providing a satisfaCtory justifi-
cation for the increases they propose. Vindicating marginal increases may not 
be so difficult, but is more problematic for significant changes, which must 
reinforce the position of the minister. 
On balance it does appear that there a e centrifugal forces at work to 
reduce ministerial political leadership and executive authority. There are 
too few areas where the minister can really exercise sufficient political 
leadership in the provision of finances. Capital works is one possible area, 
but this must relate to long term matters and traditionally political leader-
ship is most often exercised for short term benefits. This is not to say, 
that the centrifugal forces remove the executive authority of the minister. 
In fact, this seems to remain unimparied, because of the structure of the 
department in which there is a central authority group and support service 
group for the department as a whole. 
The question of acesire to exercise political leadership may also be 
considered in this context. There is some evidence to suggest that it is not 
in the area of finance that this desire is noticeable, in some ways finance 
is always available for health care, arguments are about the best means of 
providing care and the extent of its provision. 
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E. Tradition of autonomy  
Many of the elements that make up the functions of the department have 
had an extremely long history. The Royal Hobart Hospital and the Launceston 
Gmeral Hospital have both been in existence over one hundred years. There 
were Homes for the Insane at New Norfolk in the 1830s and some of the buildings 
used by St. John's Park Hospital today were used for indigent persons and 
elderly paupers a hundred years ago. All these were institutions managed by 
appointed or elected Boards and paid for, or assisted, by the government of 
the day. 
An attempt was made to bring these various bodies concerned with health 
care under some central supervision as far back as 1885 when the Central Board 
of Health was created by the Public Health Act of that year. Most of the central 
Board's functions were initially concerned with the prevention of the spread 
of infectious diseases. The sanitary and hygienic conditions in which people 
lived were in constant need of control and improvement. It was later, through 
the 1903 Public Health Act which changed the Central Board into a Department 
of Public Health; that these other matters became important. 
The extent of the Departmental activities, once the Hospital Act 1918 had 
been passed, has remained much the same. Apart from differing emphases due 
to changing technology and health care specialisation, the statement referred 
to on p 287 . supra satisfactorily describes the current situation. As one 
minister noted, the area of health tare is one in which politics is an intrusion, 
everyone has an expectation that the state will provide them witha professional 
service. This view is reflected in the way the departmental officers see 
their role, especially with increasing specialisation. Each professional has a 
personal commitment to providing the best service in his area of concern and 
this is seen as essential to a proper health care service. The public strongly 
supports these expectations, largely on the grounds that it will benefit 
everyone at some time.. The concept of health care is dominant and every element 
of the department subscribes to this aim. Yet two particular actions of govern- 
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ment have reduced this potential for building up a tradition of departmental 
unity supported by public demand, which would have ‘been a very strong centri-
fugal force. •The first was the re-organisation which took place in 1945, the 
second the Health Services Act 1960. 
The changes which took place in 1945 did not seem to reflect any deliberate 
attempt at structuring the department for a purpose, although one commentator 
has credited them with having an ideal in mind. 
"In implementing the re-organisation of 1945, the government 
was nearer than at any other time to the ideal of providing 
specialised health and medical services both preventive and 
curative within the functional limits of one department." 89 
However, as has been suggested earlier in this Chapter, there was an element 
of patronage involved and problems of personnel returning after wartime service 
to changed conditions. 90 Whatever, the logic of the changes were, the 1945 
reorganisation brought into a loose formal relationship the four main areas - 
Hospital and Medical, Public Health, Tuberculosis, and Mental. These consti-
tuted the basic structure Of the department ever since. Mental Health was 
given a separate status outside direct departmental control in 1968 and the two 
laboratories, State Pathology and Government Analyst, the School Dental Health 
Services and the Pharmaceutical Services Section became differentiated organisationa: 
groups within the department over the years. 
To provide the necessary support services there was a small clerical 
accounting staff, as previously mentioned. The permanent head of the department 
was also the responsible person for the Hospital and Nursing Services until 1968 
and spent the major part of his time in that role. Most Divisional Directors. 
dealt directly with the minister on matters of importance to them, and with 
other external .bodies without having to channel their actions through any 
89 E.H.G.Matthews, op: cit., p 17 
901t is interesting to note that all those in 1945 appointed Directors 
of the separate Divisions resigned or retired within six years of their 
appointment. 
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co-ordinative mechanism. 
The 'federal' nature of the department precluded emergence of any 
coherent departmental unity, each separate entity growing through increasingly 
narrow expertise, making the individual Divisions difficult to contain in 
one unit. It became impossible to unite under one concept of health care the 
larger differences betw-en dentists and hospital nurses, or preventive and 
curative. Any existing traditions supported individual units in their autonomy, 
e.g. the Director of Public Health operated under the statutes with specific 
authority outside ministerial control. That autonomy was eroded in 1960 by 
the Health Services Act under which the minister became wholly responsible 
for all actions by Directors whether stated in the original statute or not. 
When this occured, there again arose the opportunity to bring all the fragmented 
units into one whole. However, the tenuous links remained and no immediate 
attempt was made to make the organisation structure reflect the authority 
structure with its apex in the minister. 
Prior to 1968 there was therefore little change in the loose confederation 
of activities with which the department was concerned. The main links between 
them were a common commitment to health care, responsibility to the same 
minister, and common support services for accounting and staffing. The current 
Director-General was appointed in 1968 and immediately set about making the 
departmental organisation reflect what he saw as the conventional ministerial 
department with himself as the permanent head, controlling all the work of the 
department on behalf of the minister. This vision he expressed in the 
Organisation Charts issued by the department in 1971, where he noted one of 
his statutory functions' as "Permanent Head of Department (Public Service 
Act)" and his major 'management functions' as 
"Chief Advisor to the Minister in the Affairs of the Department; 
Co-ordination of the Functions of the Components of the Depart-
ment and their .general direction; 
91Tasmania Health Services & Road Safety, op? cit., p  6. 
9 1 The General efficiency and Progress of Departmental Affairs;..." 
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The charts similarly showed the Divisional Directors as under the general 
supervision of the permanent head and through him to the minister. 
• 	The organisational moves to formalize the loose arrangement occurred 
concurrently with an increasing demand for finance from the hospital sector 
and growing Commonwealth intervention within the health area. All these 
elements acted together to give impetus to the otherwise natural growth in 
the administrative support group at the centre. It also allowed the Director-
General to appoint, for the first time since 1952, a separate Director of 
Hospital and Medical Services, thus relieving him of that increasingly onerous 
task. At the same time the Mental Health Service Commission was created, thus 
removing one of the major 'problem' areas from the department. 
A central authority group emerged, comprising the Director-General, the 
Deputy Director-General and the Minister, which had the use of the support 
services group now called the 'Departmental General. Administrative Service, 
General Administrative Division'. While the day-to-day activities of the 
departmental Divisions were left to them, overall guidance was in the hands 
of the central authority group. The group may be said to act as a co-ordinator 
of departmental work, rather than a controller, attempting to rationalize 
wherever possible in the search for economy and efficiency. There are some 
key functions it performs, however, which may allow the group to direct and 
contribute to decisions rather than only to co-ordinate. Three of these can 
be identified as central personnel authority for the department; operational 
services equipment purchasing, and finance. 
At the present time, these changes have not yet been in operation 
sufficiently long to promote a departmental tradition. The position of the 
minister is not subject to strong total departmental pressure, rather separate 
parts of the department deal direct with him still. This allows him to retain 
much of his control which might be reduced were the department to have a 
unified purpose. The Director-General and the central group could give it 
that sense of unity and purpose if they were to control rather than co-ordinate. 
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- There are signs that this change will probably not occur rapidly, the separate 
Divisions have so little in common that it is hard to see how they could 
become a unified whole. Apart from the factors mentioned above, the physical 
reality is that they are scattered around many locations, cnly Public Health, 
the General Administrative Services and the Hospital Management Advisory 
Section with their Senior staff are together in one building. Even here they 
occupy clearly delineated space on separate floors. 
Summation  
Apart from an early period, when the department was fairly small and 
concentrated on public health, i.e. prevention, there has been no growth of . 
any departmental tradition. There still remains within the Public Health 
Division a feeling of autonomy, even though the Director has been subordinated 
to the minister in the exercise of his once autonomous authority. Continuity 
in many of the other units within the department makes them inward looking, 
but despite their long existence, they have not been forced into a 'separatist' 
position. The major public general hospitals do maintain some tradition, but 
the changes have been so great that they have lost interest in this aspect in the 
struggle for financial survival. 
The general 'federal' structure of the department has entrenched these 
differences rather than.reduced them, although there are possibilities that 
this trend may change over the next few years. The growth of a central authority 
group with support services has become a co-ordinating force for the department 
as a whole. However, none of these events has led to anything which could be 
seen as a centrifugal force derived from a departmental tradition of autonomy. 
The minister is free from any kind of departmentally inspired pressure,- whether 
based upon any common professional interests or any other common concern. There 
is pressure, certainly, from differing groups within the department, but these 
are usually channelled through the Director-General, plating him in a key 
position. 
The minister has more to fear from the increased authority of the 
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Director-General than the department as a whole. The new organisational 
arrangements have allowed for much of the delegated authority to remain in 
Divisions, but at the same time placed them in the position of having to 
approach the minister through the Director-General on most natters. Where 
convention has resulted in the Divisional DirectOr having access to the 
minister it has become standard practise to let the Director-General know 
what went on. While it may be thought that this does not alter the situation 
in which each Director has considerable autonomy, the realities of public 
service make it likely that no one will make decisions, unless they have cleared 
the matter with the Director-General first. He is the one who has most 
knowledge of the minister's thoughts and what decisions are likely to require 
his personal approval. 
Thus, inadvertently, the new organisational arrangements may reduce the 
executive authority of the minister, although it is unlikely to act as a 
deterrent to his political leadership. There was certainly no evidence that 
the slight centrifugal forces, which had emerged in the last few years as a 
result of the organisation changes, were the forerunner of a situation which 
posed a threat to the currently strong forces to support ministerial control 
as a result of there being no tradition of departmental autonomy.• 
Conclusions  
The purpose of this chapter has been to discern what centrifugal forces 
are operating in the Department of Health Services. Any forces, which have a 
persistent and cumulative effect on the way the minister can exercise political 
.leadership and his executive authority, must be identified. These constraints 
on the minister, irrespective of his personal attributes, must alter his ability 
to control his department and to be accountable for its actions to Parliament. 
At the same time centrifugal forces will operate to enhance the administrative 
capacity of the, agency by transferring some of the minister's executive authority 
to the agency. 
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A significant force in respect of this department is interaction that 
takes place between departmental officers at all levels and circumjacent 
groups. The extremely high percentage of professional and pard-professional 
officers working in the department, means that membership of their professional 
associations brings direct benefit to the department. These associations provide 
information sources and pools of specialist knowledge on a world-wide basis, 
into which the department has access. Not only does this access provide officers 
with criteria against which to measure their own activity and therefore increase 
their capacity to evaluate and recommend, it also involves quite frequently 
personal interaction. Officers belong to many colleges, semi-statutory bodies, 
and ad hoc committees at all levels of government and in all areas of expertise. 
These can be extremely influential bodies, such as the National Health and 
Medical Research Council or Hospital and Allied Services Advisory Council. 
These latter bodies are used by State and Commonwealth governments for expert 
and specialzed advice on matters relating, to common action. An example was 
given in relation to radiation standards and the microwave ovens, considered 
by the Radiation Sub-Committee of the National Health and Medical Research 
Council. There are - other similar groups which meet on a regular basis, giving 
support to the administrative capacity of the department. One such example 
is meetings of state officials to discuss the topics and papers presented to 
the Annual meeting of State Ministers of Health. 
At the State level - there is also a wide variety of association with other 
professionals and the clientele of the numerous activities carried on by 
departmental officers. Three - groups of clientele were identified, each having 
a different kind of relationship with department officers: 
(1) The professional group for whom the department acted as registration 
and certification -service, either as agent or directly. Amongst 
these were nurses, physiotherapists and pharmacists. 
(2) Those, over whom the department- exercised some regulatory powers, 
such as food vendors, users of pesticides and chemists.' 
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(3) Those, who received some personal service through departmental 
officers. In.this category were geriatrics in St. John's Park 
Hospital, dental and medical services in schools, and hospital 
patients generally. 
Representatives of these varicus groups were coopted in some way on committees, 
set up by the department to operate in their area. Alternatively, the depart-
ment had representation on such committees as were set up by statute for the 
particular group concerned. There was, therefore, major involvement of 
departmental officers with clientele at all levels within the department, 
not just the more senior officers, as was the case with the federal committees 
mentioned above. 
Relationships with circumjacent groups form an intertwined and complex 
matrix, in which large numbers of departmental officers become involved. The 
extent of these affiliations is so great, that it must have very significant 
consequences for the way in which these officers view their task. It becomes 
even more crucial when related to the inevitably institutionalised differen-
tiation within the department. The ever narrowing specialisms that the depart- 
. ment incorporates into its structure through the appointment of experts, to 
perform the wide range of functions now involved in health care, make intra-
department discussion increasingly necessary, and there have been more of 
such meetings recently. 
This fragmentation of professional staff within the department was noted 
as operating against the potential centrifugal force of professionalism. It is 
normal to assume that, the more professional departmental officers are, the 
more difficult it is for the minister to maintain his control. The natural 
course of events will, it is argued, allow officers to control information, 
have a monopoly of knowledge. The consequence would be to create a very strong 
centrifugal force against which the, minister has little defence. There was 
certainly much to indicate this kind of monopoly within the department,- many 
of the officers were experts in fields where no one had equal knowledge 
other than those in the same section; It was suggested that this caused a 
vertical perspective rather than a horizontal one, that is to say, within 
the department there was'more interaction within a speciality, rather than 
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across boundaries at the samelevel. This process was enhanced by the 
fragmentation noted above, which resulted from many specialisms and fostered by 
pressure from clientele. 
The department is not the nonolithic entity that may have been expected. 
.Despite the fact that the generally accepted.object of the department is to 
provide health care, there is little agreement about what that means. There 
is no unified concept around which departmental loyalties may be fostered. 
Individuals and groups within the department may have particular loyalty to 
their section as a part of the whole, but there seems to be no feeling of 
'solidarity'. In part this may have had its origins in the emergence of the 
department as it now is from the re-organisation of 1945: By grouping a 
number of related activities, Tuberculosis, Hospital and Medical Services 
.supervision, and Mental Hygiene, around the core of Public Health, a kind of 
'confederation' occurred. Even when the four different entities were brought 
under one per- anent head there were still significant differences. Their 
major activities were carried out under several statutes containing direct 
authority to the Directors of each part. By convention and tradition therefore, 
the department has really only had the most tenuous of ties through the common 
need for finance, personnel and equipment. 
These needs have been met by the central support service group under the 
direct control of the Director-General. Until 1968, this group was not seen 
as very vitalto the ongoing functions of the department,it was there to react 
to demands and to liaise with those, whose responsibility it was to provide 
the finance, personnel or equipment. This support group had more direct ties 
with Treasury, Public Service Board and the Supply and Tender Board, than perhaps 
it had with the other elements within the department. However, since 1968 the 
Director-General has been moving to create a central authcrity group, which 
would include this support service group,as a means of meeting the demands 
placed upon the department. These demands come mainly as a result of the 
enormous increase in the expenditure of the department, especially in relation 
to hospitals. By increasing the capacity of the central authority group to 
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co-ordinate the activities of the department as a whole, measures for economy 
and efficiency can be introduced. The benefit of these actions may be that 
the department will become moulded into a single unified whole, but this has 
not occurred yet. Until it does, there is little danger of centrifugal fortes 
operating by reason of the high level of professional staffing in the department. 
Nor is there any likelihood of the potentially centrifugal force derived from 
the variety of interaction with circumjacent groups. D. 
Major co-optation and representation should provide a very strong base for 
any department to build up support if it wishes to oppose the minister. There 
is little doubt that this situation does exist, but not for the department as 
a whole, rather for the separate sections. Because of this, there is no single 
body to whom the minister must listen, it is always possible to balance one 
against the other. So, while the evidence clearly shows that most of the 
initiative for new activity comes from departmental officers or other external 
profesional bodies, the minister remains in control and able to exerc.lse 
political leadership through his capacity to decide priorities. 
The large body of substantive law which the department has to administer 
is fairly old, having been passed in the first two decades of this century. 
Much of it has been amended quite severely since then, although in a number 
of cases the statutes have been rewritten. There has also been some new legis-
lation, such as the Poison Act 1971 and the Alcohol & Drug Dependency Act 1968, 
but generally, lack of legislative change provides a strong centrifugal force, 
especially where the older legislation contained direct authority to officers 
to act. 
Even the Health Services Act 1960 which tookaway much of that authority, 
did not prevent a now Public Health Act 3962, containing specific authority 
for the Director of Public Health to take certain action on his own responsibility 
The extent to which political leadership is curtailed by such legislation is 
negligible, provided other factor's do not impinge. It is in the area of executive 
authority that such statutes have an effect. Any authority to act given to 
a departmental officer, which is not made subject to the approval of the minister, 
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must have the effect of reducing the minister's executive authority and therefore 
.make it more difficult to control and be accountable for that action. The 
Health Services Act 1960 was an attempt to retrieve much of that lost authority. 
Vestiges of past practice linger in the actions of some senior officers who 
have been in their positions )7or many years. Nevertheless, most understand 
the need to act, bearing in mind the political consequences. 
One of the minister's major concerns, causing most difficulty in Parliament, 
are hospitals. The Hospitals Act 1918 created a system of management boards 
which were more or less autonomous at that time, the department having a 
supervisory role only for the purpose of advising on the appropriate level of 
grants from State funds. The changes that have taken place in the provision of 
health care, have placed greater emphasis on hospital services. There have 
been more Royal Commissions into hospitals than any other aspect of the health 
service area. For this reason, much of the time of the permanent head is spent 
on work related to hospitals, and the minister must be involved in his department': 
activities in this area. Contact with hospital staff and patients is through 
the ministers or by the Hospital Management Advisory Section, who are the only 
officers to have direct contact, which means that the minister is in a very 
strong position in relation to the central authority group within the department. 
It is often the minister who raises a matter for comment and justification rather 
than it emerging through internal departmental communication. Similar situations 
occur, where the minister must deal directly with the Ambulance Commission and 
the Mental Health Services Commission. None of these bodies is directly under 
the departmental umbrella, although, because or? their overlapping interests, 
there is interchange of information through common membership of committees. All 
of these forces reduce any centrifugal tendencies there may be through other 
factors. 
The department consistently expends almost the largest proportion of 
government funds of a recurrent nature. No other department seems to have had 
so little difficulty in obtaining funds. Yet, there are no sources of 
'dedicated' funding of the kind suggested,. whereby the approval of Parliament 
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• is not needed. The only major area of funding from outside state control 
is the Tuberculosis Division, which obtains the majority of its funds from 
the Commonwealth. The majority of expenditure was seen to be different from 
many other departments. An average of 80% in the last few years may be said 
to fall into a 'committed' category. It is committed, because it is used 
to maintain ongoing instituteionalised programmes, without the funds the 
institutions would have to close. Examples of these were hospital grants, 
St. John's Park Geriatric Hospital, and district medical officer service. 
The base level of service has already been set, so that marginal increases 
in cost occur every year merely to maintain the service. Replacement costs 
are incurred to provide buildings and equipment at this base level. Any 
addition to the base must generate its own recurrent expenditure to add to the 
previous cost. In this sense, therefore, unless a strong case is made out for 
• eliminating an institutional service, the minister cannot alter the financial 
commitment already undertaken. This reduces his capacity to strike out in 
new directions, since there is only a very small proportion of the remaining 
funds with which to operate. There is a chance that the minister could enlarge 
this proportion by persuading his Cabinet colleagues to increase the size of 
his funds as a whole, but the likelihood of this occurring is remote. An 
excessive amount is already committed in terms of institution, even when 
compared with other large spenders, such as Education. Therefore, no room for 
flexibility is left. In addition to these commitments the department has 
historically acted as a channel for the provision of funds to autonomous bodies, 
such as the Ambulance Commission, and still does. It has no control over these 
funds, but it means that as a lump sum they decrease the possibility of making 
a case for a larger share of available resources at budget time. 	• 
• For all of these reasons, the minister has little chance to exercise 
•political leadership or executive authority in this area, and finance must be 
seen as a very crucial centrifugal force. Two further matters must be taken 
into account here, both having a possible mitigating effect on this force. 
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Expenditure, such as mentioned above, is unlikely to be refused by any govern-
ment, yet the possibility is there and the minister must make his case to 
every budget session. The fact, that the funds still have to be appropriated 
every year, must place the minister in quite a strong position even in this 
case. As has been mentioned before, the most effective control the minister 
can exercise in this situation is that of veto and the decision about priorities. 
The same applies to capital expenditure, over which the minister has much more 
control. The department must become involved in proposals for capital ex-
penditure, either by way of addition to existing building, new or replacement 
works. He can influence the priorities to a much greater degree before the 
matter arrives at the Cabinet level. Both these factors do help to reduce 
the otherwise extremely strong centrifugal forces represented by finance. 
One of the noticeable features of the departmental activity was the 
similarity of the functions it undertakes today with those of 50 years ago. 
There is no doubt that there have been changed emphases, one suggested was 
from preventive to curative. Many of the techniques, and much of the 
technology is new and has changed the operational methods of that time. 
However, the changes which have taken place have done so within an already 
existing structure of the department, such as the School Dental Nursing Service, 
and more recently an emphasis on community health services and health education. 
These latter changes have occurred very recently as a result of Australian 
Government initiatives to provide community health centres. Something similar 
was foreshadowed in the Director-General's Annual Report in 1972, where he 
discussed the need for decentralising service provision. But there was little 
response from within the State at that time. 
It may be asked therefore, whether the minister does play any great role 
in the Department of Health Services. If he rarely initiates any new activities, 
if his hands are strongly tied by committed finance, if he is surrounded by 
professionals, whose concerns are more with their expertise than with the 
department as a whole, what can he do? The centrifugal forces seem to be too 
strong for him to counteract. Yet, it is clear that the minister is able to 
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exercise his political leadership in quite important ways, for example in the 
allocation of priorities in capital works. His executive authority is hardly 
impaired, one minister going so far as tocomplain, the officials in the 
department overwhelmed him by asking for decisions they should have taken 
themselves. There seem to be two vital reasons for this situation whereby 
otherwise dominant centrifugal forces seem to have little effect. The minister 
is placed in a mediating or arbitral position by the fragmented nature of the 
work of the department. His position has been given added importance by the 
way in which the department has now been structured to co-ordinate and 
centralize all departmental functions. At the same time the officials, 
especially the senior officers, have a strong commitment to ministerial govern-
ment. One senior man saw his task as carrying out government policy, and 
viewed with equanimity the possibility that his recommendations may be overruled 
by the minister. 
The lack of unified aim for the department as a whole, consequent upon 
the large variety of specialised tasks and the number of different professional 
interests involved, makes it very difficult to produce unity. Intra departmental 
meetings may eventually produce a centrifugal force with which a minister may 
have to contend. However, by the very nature of the situation, divisions must 
occur, even though in most situations differences may be settled through the 
involvement of the Director-General before the matter reaches ministerial level. 
The actions of the Director-General as co-ordinator and 'buffer' between the 
minister and the department are also assisting the process by which the minister 
gains prestige as a 'last resort'. The minister must also have his arbitral 
role enhanced by his own direct links out into the community. The relatively 
small population of Tasmania makes it easy to obtain access to the minister, 
and there is evidence to suggest that some ministers are able to maintain 
their executive authority in the department by 'crisis management'. These 
crises erupt as a result of pressures placed directly upon the minister rather 
•than by any actions within the department. For example, a complaint to the 
minister by one of his constituents about the demands of a health inspector 
314 
for alterations to comply with health regulations. But at least one minister, 
who felt he could leave the 'professionals' in the department to get on with 
the job while he concentrated on other matters that he thought more important, 
found himself continually involved against his will in the arbitral role. 
In summary form the effect of the centrifugal forces seems to be: 
Centrifugal force 	 Effect  
(a) circumjacent groups 
(b) legislative provisions 
(c) professional staffing 
(d) finance 
major cooptation and representation 
with clientele, professional groups 
and various community advisory 
committees produces strong support 
outside the department which reduces 
a minister's capacity for political 
leadership. The department has not 
been able or willing to make use of 
this support and while it may have 
some effect on the innovatory processes 
in the department it has no effect on 
the executive authority of the minister. 
a large number of the statutes ad-
ministered by the department are old, 
some have been amended many times. 
Earlier preference for direct authority 
to selected officers has been replaced 
by ministerial control through the 
Health Services Act. Precedents set 
by earlier legislation linger and 
some officers still operate with 
executive authority reducing that of 
the minister. Most actions are taken, 
however, with the consent of the 
minister, since officers remain alert 
to the political climate. 
• a very high proportion of the staff 
have some professional qualification. 
Their affiliations with their own 
associations make for forces which 
will reduce the political leadership 
of the minister and undermine his 
executive authority. The weight of 
administrative capacity created by 
this large professional group is 
dissipated by its fragmentation within 
the department. The result is that 
it has little effect on the minister. 
by far the most potent force to reduce 
the minister to a figurehead having 
no political leadership nor executive 
authority. Because of the large 
proportion of committed funds and the 
way the department acts as a channel 
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(d) finance (contd.) 
(e) departmental tradition 
for earmarked grants to bodies 
• outside its control there is little 
flexibility. Funds do come from,State 
sources in the main, so there is some 
dependence on the minister to keep the 
flow. Also, in respect of capital 
funds the minister is in a position to 
dictate priorities. These factors 
mitigate the very strong effect on 
political leadership and executive 
control. 
apart from an early period before 
1945 when there was the Department 
of Public Health, no growth of a common 
departmental identity has been experienced. 
There is little discussion of, nor reason 
to desire, a unified aim for the whole 
department. There has been none in the 
past and so this poses no threat to 
the political leadership and executive 
authority of the minister. 
There are forces here which appear to make the minister a far less 
important figure than expected under the Westminster form of government. Many 
forces operating are potentially capable of reducing his political leadership 
and executive authority. However, there operate some crucial countervailing 
forces which prevent what would otherwise be a difficult situation for the 
minister. 92 Implicit in these countervailing forces is the need of all 
sections of the department to survive. While they are not overtly competing 
with one another, the wide variety of service and professional activity 
combined within the department make it difficult for them to work together; 
without some co-ordinative force. This is provided by the office of Director-
General which makes the position of the minister very strong. The cautious 
approach of the officials themselves to:taking action on their own responsibility 
and their sensitivity to the political quality of their acts also take for 
an increase in the dominance of the minister. 
92Without these forces which support the position of the minister, the 
arguments for a Health Commission are very strong. They appear to have 
accepted these arguments in 'New South Wales. See R. McEwin and P.F.Gross, 
The Reorganisation of Health Services in Australia (Sydney: Health Commission / of New South Wales, 1974) Whether the practical consequences of the creation of a Health Commission actually reduce ministerial control remains uncertain. 
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Appendix 	(Chapter V) 
Statutes Administered in the Department of Health Services: 
Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act (Part), 1968 
Ambulance Act, 1959 . 
Ambulance Board of Southern Tasmania (Lands) Act, 1968 
Anatomy Act, 1964 
Cancer Committee Act, 1937 
Cecilia Button Medical Centre Agreement Act, 1966 
Charitable Institutions (Repeal) Act, 1970 
Cosgrove Park Act, 1962 
Cremation Act, 1934 
Crippled Children's Hospital (Agreements) Act, 1942 
Dangerous Drugs Act, 1959 
Dentists Act, 1919 
Emmerton Bequest Act, 1965 
Fluoridation Act, 1968 
Guide Dogs Act, 1969 
Health Services Act, 1960 
Hospitals Act, 1918 
Lady Clark Geriatric Act, 1968 
Launceston Public Hospitals Board Act, 1971 . 
Local Government Act (Part), 1962 
JMedical Act, 1959 
Meercroft Home (Application of Moneys) Act, 1963 
Meercroft Home for the Aged Act, 1958 
Meercroft Hospital Agreement Act, 1947 
Mothercraft Nurses Registration Act, 1947 
Munnew Bequest (Application of Moneys) Act, 1958 
New Town Mothercraft Home Agreement Act, 1949 
Notification of Births Act,. 1966 
Nurses Registration Act, 1952 
Opticians Act, 1913 
Pesticides Act, 1968 
Pharmacy Act, 1908 
Physiotherapists' Registration Act, 1951 
Podiatrists Registration Act, 1974 
Poisons Act, 1971 
Public Health Act, 1962 
Appendix 1 (Chapter V) contd. 
Public Welfare Institutions Act, 1935 
Quarantine Act, 1881 
Queen Victoria Hospital Act, 1952 
Queen Victoria Maternity Hospital Act, 1964 
Radioactive Substances Act, 1954 
Radiographers Registration Act, 1971 
Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 19-66 
St. John's Hospital Loan Guanrantee Act, 1968 
St. John's Park Improvement Act, 1961 
St. Vincent's Hospital Loan Act, 1959 
St. Vincent's Hospital Loan - Guarantee Act, 1966 
Sale of Blood Act, 1964 
School Dental Nursing Service Act, 1965 
Statutory Authorities (Municipal Appointments) Act, 1962 
Tasmanian Auxiliary Nursing Service Act, 1949 
Tasmanian Sanitorium Act, 1950 
Traffic Act, 1970 
Tuberculosis Act, 1963 - 
Tuberculosis (Campaign Arrangements) Act, 1950 
Vaucluse Hospital Act, 1966 
War Veterans Home Act, 1937 
War Veterans Home (Management) Act, 1962 
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VI 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY 
In discussing the purpose of this thesis a number of assertions were 
made: 
(a) that all ministers and senior public servants have common 
appreciation of the parliamentary system of government within 
which they operate, but that it is largely intuitive and their 
daily actions and interactions must be analysed to verify 
whether or not these support the basic assumptions of that 
system of government; 
(b) that re-interpretation of the politics/administration dichotomy 
in terms of processes and actions rather than institutions and 
positions is a more satisfactory method to explain the current 
system; 
(c) that the key to such re-interpretation is to be found in 
understanding the balance between the exercise of political 
leadership by the minister and the administrative capacity 
of the officials. 
This chapter will attempt to discuss these assertions as they relate to 
Australian State Government in the light of the empirical studies of the 
three Tasmanian ministerial departments. The familiar politics/administration 
dichotomy has already been modified to take account of the more complex nature 
of government processes. The two aspects of this dichotomy traditionally refer 
to either the necessary difference in the positions of politician and offiCial - 
one elected, the other appointed - and the organisational consequences of this, 
or the differences in political or administrative activity in terms of 
processes. By differentiating activities in this way three crucial inherent 
qualities emerge: political leadership, executive authority and administrative 
capacity. Relating these qualities to Self's arch by means of the analytical 
techniques used in this thesis, the above assertions are tested and reveal. 
alternative ways of assessing the support given to the basic assumptions 
about the Westminster system of government. 
The preceding chapters clearly indicate that politicians and officials 
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believe their work to be different. Ministers 'leave administration to the 
officials' and officials 'make no decisions on political matters'. However,- 
such statements fail to identify what politicians think officials do, or how 
officials see politicians, or what the different activities actually entail. 
There is little difficulty in accepting that the routine matters of day to day 
, departmental affairs, e.g. collating data from records provided, are properly 
described as the work of officials. That is what occurs at the end of Self's 
administrative arc. The politicians in pursuit and maintenance of power and 
the authority to govern must be acting at the end of the opposite arc, per-
forming purely political acts. Party politics, elections, influence and 
power are the legitimate activities occurring at that end of the arc. 
As one moves further up each arc, however, it becomes more difficult to 
.distinguish the tasks readily. It was noted earlier that the same activity 
could, at two different points in time, be administrative or political. 1 
The classical version of the Westminster model, nonetheless, relies on main-
taining a clear distinction between these two activities, because the politician 
must always be responsible for the official. The simple and fundamental doctrine 
of ministerial responsibility demands compliance with a stark distinction 
between politicians and officials. Once this breaks down the whole validity 
of that form of government begins to crumble. An alternative analytical 
framework which does not imply these assumptions has been used to explain the 
processes in this thesis. 2  The framework has distinguished between the office 
and the activity, between politician and policy-making, between official and 
administration, in order to ensure that organisational alternatives thought 
to support the conventions may be discovered. To divest the minister of some 
of his executive authority might be of benefit to that support, by permitting 
1Chapter 2 p 50. 
2Self's arch is an example of such an alternative 
result in anything more than a redefinition of the two 
an area of change and indeterminacy, administration is 
routine." Self, on: cit., p 151. A similar discussion 
R.S. Parker, "Policy and Administration", Public Admin 
(2), June 1960, pp 113-120. 
framework, but it does not 
words "...politics is 
one of stability and 
may also be found in 
istration (Sydney) XIX 
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him greater concentration on his responsibility for leadership. He could 
in this way become more responsive to parliament, which should enhance his 
role as a politician. It is unlikely that an increase in the executive 
authority of some officials would cause them to become more politicians than 
administrators. 
There are many examples in earlier chapters of directors of departments 
having strong executive authority in the legislation, but using it only 
sparingly and seldom without informing the minister. It is true that the 
executive authority that such persons are given may sometimes be used to the 
detriment of a minister. But ministers concerned, for example, with the 
Director of Housing did not suggest that he had overstepped the boundaries 
of propriety in the exercise of his statutory authority. Indeed, to the 
contrary, the Homes Act 1973 increased the authority of the Director rather 
than reduced it. The evidence seems to be that officials feel their functions 
to be administrative and wish to operate within the conventions. 3 
By concentrating on defining the activities in terms of statements about 
ministerial responsibility and control, it emphasises that ministers are 
members of the legislature to ensure a continuous line of control from the 
public through parliament into the executive. Their major activities are 
executive rather than political, maintaining authority over their functional 
areas and responsibility for actions and decisions in those areas. 
"Each minister is held to be responsible and accountable for 
anything done within the segment of the public business under 
his control and direction.... 
The general principle underlying the control of the executive 
branch by the legislature is therefore that every segment of 
the public service should be under the direction and control 
of a minister who can be called to account by and in the 
legislature. The •ower of control of his de artment conferred 
on a minister is the foundation of his responsibility." 
3 Such evidence is not limited to the Tasmanian context. Sir Edward 
Boyle says "....departments make up or compensate for deficiencies of their 
ministers remarkably well, but, oh dear, some ministers really can lower 
morale very quickly and easily." Kogan, op .: - cit., p 80, 
4Candda, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report Number 1, 
Vol. 1, (Ontario: Queens Printer, 1968) p 44 (author's underlining). 
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However, controlling must involve political decisions and be subjected to 
political influences, because the controller is a politician. It is part 
of the Westminster system of .parliamentary government that this should be so, 
as Self points out, 
"Politicians are the ultimate controllers of administrative 
systems, and one of their chief problems is to maintain and 
demonstrate the reality of their control." 5 
There are a number of ways by which the politician can ensure this reality - 
leadership, exercise of authority, taking responsibility - and each of these 
may be achieved by arbitrary ministerial decisions to make any matter one of • 
policy. Self suggests, 
"gontroll means also establishing an atmosphere in which 
administrators will continually be aware of political 
guidelines and constraints." 6 
The highly professionalised departments of Education and Health Services with 
senior officers having professional' qualifications in .the functional area 
are the antithesis of a department having Self's general administrator in 
top positions. They are more like those proposed by the Fulton Committee, 
yet they accept the constraints imposed by political guidelines. Their ex-
pertise and that of the department was at the disposal of the minister, they 
perceived their role as administering rather than as policymaking. They may 
feel some disappcintment at the way the minister uses their advice and may 
even attempt to influence him directly to their own view. But in the end 
the authority and responsibility rests with the minister and he makes policy, 
not the officials, who are prepared to accept that position. 
5Self, 92. cit., p 161. 
6 • ' ibid.; . 	: Michael R. Gordon, discussing the problem of 
imposiprty government on an unresponsive bureaucracy, nctes: "...the 
bureaucratic ethos is as indispensible to good pOlicymaking as is the .elan, 
moral tone, and forward thrust of the partisan enthusiast. Any institution-
alised policy process needs to achieve a balance between the two creeds." 
(p 55) M.R.Gordon, "Civil Servants, Politicians and Parties", Comparative  
Politics IV (1971), 29-58. 
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The Australian State Context  
Because of the nature of early military settlement and the slow growth 
of sufficient numbers of free settlers to form an electorate, there was 
no parliamentary government until some fifty years had elapsed, and then 
only a restricted franchise. 
Military officials and others appointed by the Colonial Office in London 
carried out the major functions under delegated authority from the Crown. 
No politician was elected to office, and therefore leadership and executive 
authority were vested in an administrator, who was directly controlled by the 
Governor in the name of the Crown] 	Even with the emergence of a parliamentary 
system of government, based on the Westminster model, ministers on occasion 
had to share their authority with officials. Both the Education Department 
and Health Services Department existed as Boards long before any responsible 
. minister was commissioned to their portfolios. The consequences were that a 
department in Tasmania came from a different historical mould from that in 
Britain. From the very beginning executive authority has been subject to 
some administrative constraint and had little relationship to political leader- 
. 	8 	. ship. 	Wettenhall suggests that, 
"...only three or four policy making departments in Tasmania 
really conform to the orthodox British view of the traditional 
ministerial department...fotherwisei they are highly 
professionalised executive organisations,. often with statutory 
powers vested in officials..." 9 
These-latter characteristics were certainly noticed in two of the three 
departments studied, Education and Health Services. They remained strongly 
committed to professional senior officials and vested quite specific executive 
7A more detailed description of the situation may be found in 
W,A.Townsley, The Struggle for Self-Government in Tasmania, 1842-1856,1oc. cit. 
and Wettenhall, "Evolution of a Departmental System"loc. cit. 
.8 The Australian variations at both the Commonwealth and State levels of 
government are discussed in R.L.Wettenhall, "The Ministerial Department: 
British Origins and Australian Adaptations", Public Administration (Sydney) 
XXXII(3), (September 1973), pp 233-250 and also in "Concepts of Ministry" 
Public Administration (Sydney) XXIX(4), (December 1970), pp 319-329. 
9Wettenhall, "The Ministerial Department" op cit., p 244. 
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authority in their permanent head. To this extent, therefore, the concept of 
executive authority has never been quite the same in Australia 10. 	When 
discussing the question of the administrative capacity of pLblic servants in 
Tasmania, the traditional overlap into the executive authority of the minister 
must be taken into account, and too great an emphasis must not be placed on 
the statutory powers vested in the official. 11 
Centrifugal forces and the Australian State Adaptation of the Westminster Model - 
This thesis suggests that the politics/administration dichotomy should 
be reinterpreted by concentrating on activities and relationships for the 
better explanation of the governmental processes. The method best suited to 
analyse these matters has been judged to be interaction analysis, based on a 
formal framework of role expectation and obligation related to positions. By 
comparing these formal patterns of action with the actual regular patte-ms 
which individuals in those positions undertake, explanation will be enhanced. 
As discussed in Chapter II, an attempt at the same kind of analysis in the 
Washington State Executive provided a foundation from which similar analyses 
of the Tasmanian State Executive could be made. 
Central to this technique was the idea of variable forces at work within 
the activities and relationships which would cause changes to the formal role 
expectations - and obligations. Expectations of this kind would be especially 
10 Butler drew attention to the flatness at the top of the pyramidal 
structure in the Commonwealth government, which he said suggested that 
"in the smaller department the top Civil Servant is in a peculiarly dominant 
position." - The Canberra Model, 222 cit., p 29-30 , 
1IWettenhal1 notes that the considerations do not apply with the same 
force at Commonwealth level, where "the designers of the administrative 
structure came to their tasks rather later, when Britain could be observed 
basking in its heyday of ministerial administration". "The Ministerial . 
Department", op. cit., p 19: 
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useful to understand the crucial role of the minister, and it was argued 
that political leadership, executive authority and administrative capacity 
would be the key variables. This argument was derived from analogy with 
the concept of centrifugal forces which Simmons uses to denote reductions 
in the governor's ability to lead his appointed officers. Similar forces 
would operate in the Tasmanian State Executive to lessen ministerial control 
and accountability, which depended on the ministers' leadership and authority. 
Such centrifugal forces favour the official at the expense of the politician 
and change the fine balance that is necessary for the proper functioning 
of the Westminster system of government. The diagram below uses the 
politico-administrative arch to illustrate these forces at work. 
The Pclitical-Adn-linistrati\:fe ,Arch . 
t \A\ POLY 	MAkERS  
/ 6 ,co 
e, _ 
\)' 
\ 
\\ 	FVcAL.- 
Fog. c-S 
PoliticalArc 	 Administrat!ve 
The weight of po]itical leadership and executive authority must be sufficient 
to balance the administrative capacity of the official. Explanation becomes 
much more acceptable if it is possible to discuss politics, and administration 
as zones of activity in which both politicians and officials operate. In this 
way it is recognised that they overlap, but by avoiding the use of a dichotomy, 
it is Possible to concentrate on the extent of their overlap in the area of 
executive authority, which is the critical point. 
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III 	The Tasmanian State Executive  
Amongst the centrifugal forces the one least likely to reduce political 
leadership and executive authority was seen to be legislative authority. The 
effect of this force would be to constrain the minister by statutes formalising 
relationships between the minister and his department. Such arrangements as 
stating the functions of the permanent head, or providing him with some 
executive authority, are the kind to be identified. Very few of the statutes 
currently in force within the departments investigated seem to be of this type. 
None draw any explicit distinction between the authority of the minister and 
that of the senior officers, although the Homes Act 1973 does go some way 
towards this, as will be mentioned later. 
Earlier statutes on which many of the current services were based, gave 
the directing officers executive authority. The reasons for this have already 
been adverted to in discussing the use of boards in the nineteenth century as 
an organisatiynal mechanism for providing services. The Contrast between Health 
Services and Education is quite instructive in this regard, because they were 
both under Boards in their initial stages. In the 1870s the degree of inter-
vention by the elected body of ministers in the operations of the boards was 
minimal, being largely concerned with controlling expenditure. The officers were 
left to run the service and to make their own decisions without reference to a 
minister - their immediate superior was a board of voluntary part-time laymen 
who may also have had a professional interest in the function. However, there 
was a difference between the two, reflected in the statutes, which gave much 
more executive authority to the Director of Public Health than to the Director of 
Education. Health was at that time concerned with prevention and therefore was 
based on a regulative approach. The Director was given specific authority by 
statute to take certain actions without reference to anyone. Education,on the 
other hand, was a service for those who needed it,and apart from some authority 
to take parents to court for not ensuring their child attended school, there 
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was no . need for a similar kind of executive authority. The fundamentally 
clerical nature of the Director of Education's task has already been alluded 
to in reference to the Royal Commission Report.12 
These different qualities, built in to the departmental structure from 
the earliest time of their formation, remained to constrain the Health Minister 
in a way that was not apparent in Education. - This led eventually to the 
Health Services Act 1960, which redressed the imbalance by legislating for a 
return of executive authority to the minister. Senior officers in both 
Education and Health Services are now on an equal footing statutorily, although 
it may still be noted that within certain sections of the Health Services Depart-
ment there are lingering attitudes which do not sit easily with ministerial 
authority. This is noticeably so in the areas where regulations have to be 
enforced, such as public health, an&where the Director maintains a cautious 
balance between the exercise of ministerial authority and his officers' sta-
tutory authority which has now been inhibited. • It is also interesting to note 
that in the Education Department certain senior officials complained about the 
lack of executive authority, but they were loath to attempt any changes to legis-
lation. 
Another aspect of the uneasy alliance within departments of a fettered 
authority and the demands of the task is the age of the legislation. Many of 
the statutes have been passed in the previous century or early this century 
in conditions considerably different to. those current. While they have, in 
some cases, been consolidated as in the case of the Public Health Act 1962, 
the changes have been marginal. The majority of departmental needs have been 
met from time to time by merely amending .piecemeal, and this has not reduced 
the enduring basis of such Acts. 
An example is the Hospital Act 1918, the intention of which was to 
12 See p 152 Chapter IV. 
328 
formalise the management of hospitals under appointed Boards, controlled very 
loosely by the minister. The increased dependence by hospitals on government 
funds, and the changing emphasis on curative services has made much of this 
statute irrelevant to the nee6s of the time. 
One minister attempting to bring some statutes up to date, met with 
little success, and he implied that his officers were not interested. They 
preferred to operate under the existing restricted statutes rather than submit 
themselves to possibly unacceptable changes which a major rewrite could involve.. 
The possibility that Bills of this nature would provide an opportunity for 
parliament to inquire too closely into the operations of the department, is 
also a constraint on the minister. The reasoning behind this argument is not 
that there is anything to hide, but rather that the demands.placed upon ministers 
and senior officers in such situations do not allow them to pursue their 'real' 
work, which is a heavy load anyway. 
Despite the legacy of the past, therefore, officers would rather restrain 
their natural tendency to continue the exercise of statutory authority. The 
alternative is always open to the minister to press for consolidating or 
rewritten statutes, which will place even more unacceptable strains on their 
activities. Housing is in a rather different position from either Health. 
Services or Education. Apart from being a relatively new function of government 
compared with the others, 13 the Housing Department provides a significantly 
different kind of service, although its main purpose has been interpreted in a 
rather ambivalent manner. As discussed earlier, construction of homes for 
sale on cheap loans or homes for rental to low income earners has been its aim. 
In either case, building homes has been the demand placed upon the department 
which has-been met by legislation . giving much more direct authority to the 
permanent head than in any other case. 
1 3 'The Homes Act 1919 as compared with the Public Health Act 1885 and the 
Public Schools Act 1868. 
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The reasons for this may be traced to the context from which the statutes 
emerged, for example the Joint Committee had considered setting up a Housing 
Commission rather than a department prior to the reorganisation in 1953. While 
not accepting this proposition, some of the anticipated effects have been 
achieved by giving the Director executive authority in specified areas. The 
main thrust of this authority is to ensure continuity and the flow of depart-
mental work as a construction authority. The most effective operations could 
only be achieved, it was argued, if the legislation provided that kind of 
authority to the Director. Increases in the Director's authority in the 1973 
Act appear to support the acceptance by parliament of that argument. 
A similar reasoning underlies the statutory authority of the Director 
to employ labour outside the Public Service Act. The Director of Education 
also has this authority under the Education Act, whereby teachers and school 
service staff are directly under his control. Control over staff in this way 
does increase the executive authority of a Director, but it does not always 
allow him to extend that authority to any other part of his activities. The 
Director of Education, for example, was not able to make changes in school 
building programmes. Nor did it seem to enhance his authority within the 
department to the detriment of the minister, even in the case of the Housing 
Department, where there was a much clearer feeling of departmental identification 
and loyalty.14 
While there is a slight chance that such statutory authority as has been 
mentioned may provide the opportunity for senior officers to prejudice a 
minister, the evidence does not show that it frequently happens. No minister 
felt that he lacked support from his staff and none complained that his political 
14.,h  • Iis would invalidate at least one of the arguments against direct 
recruitment by departments. 
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leadership had in any way been hampered by actions of this kind. Nor did the 
officers show. anydesire to wrest executive authority from ministers. There 
were some expressions of frustration on occasions, but not strong enough to 
Iead to hopes for change. 
The Director of Housing did emphasize the importance of continuity in 
the work of the department, and that he endeavoured to prevent any interruption 
of the smooth flow. His concern was that new ministers, unaware of departmental 
forward plans, may attempt to force action which would dislocate such plans due to 
lack of information in the early stages. He implied that his executive authority 
• would be used in such situations to prevent this happening, and hoped that 
once the minister had become familiar with departmental operations, he would 
accept the logic of the action. There is no doubt, that, given the existing 
statutory provisions, the Director is in a very strong position and this, 
combined with the relative freedom from financial control, could radically 
reduce the minister's control. Any strong Director without commitment t the 
'proper order', could remove both executive authority and political leadership 
from the minister. 
Because Housing does not need very extensive legislative authority it is 
more readily contained within a single statute, which may itself be amended 
from time to time. There is much more certainty about the general aims of 
such a statute, even given the tendency to ambivalence mentioned earlier. The 
'main task is to provide homes of one sort or another for those less able to 
obtain one on the open market. As a construction authority its operations 
require land, finance, materials and labour. Most of these needs are satisfied 
from sources outside ministerial control, although the evidence was that the 
minister was involved in setting priorities in these matters. 
Health and Education operate in a much more changeable climate, rapid 
technological and philosophical shifts have occurred, causing demands which 
require authority from parliament. The range of statutes passed in the last 
ten years, especially in Health Services, has increased enormously. In these 
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circumstances a minister who can pilot draft legislation through Cabinet, 
caucus and the parliament, is a vital requirement. Any tendency therefore 
towards reducing the minister's executive authority will be offset by the need 
for ministerial assistance in this area. Similarly, in relation to financial 
requirements, as in the Education Department, although funds are available, 
any new demand requires the support of the minister. These factors reduce the 
desire of senior officers to embark on any radical change in legislation; they 
would rather use the authority already within the statutes, occasionally 
interpreting them to accommodate their desires or promulgating regulations 
which do not receive so much attention from parliamentarians as the bills. 
In general, without some reinforcement from other sources, legislative 
provisions do not place the minister in jeopardy. There are too many other 
considerations that would prevent any senior officer from depending on his 
statutory authority to oppose ministerial action. Examples of occasions 
when the authority of the senior officer was overridden by the minister, were 
given in both Housing and Education. 15  The strong commitment to ministerial 
control in the legislation by frequent reference to authority 'subject to the .- 
consent of the minister', make legislative provisions more likely to assist 
the minister than act as a centrifugal force. 
Despite this a minister must actually. be seen to exercise political 
leadership in his functional area, because officers given executive authority 
will use it until they become aware that they are beyond the proper limits. 
This will most often occur where the minister makes no clear indication of 
his intentions. The change of ministers in Housing provided an example of 
the different ministerial styles to which officials have to accommodate, and 
in doing so,,recognize 
15. The Axton case in Education, supra, p 219, and the case, where the 
Director was directed by Cabinet not to sell land. (Footnote 43, Chapter 3). 
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the changed boundaries of their unchallenged action. Statutory provisions 
which define executive authority to be exercised by officials may be a 
centrifugal force, but that force is mitigated by the extent to which the 
ninister exercises political leadership. In the three departments, even where 
substantive laws provided for some formal separation of authority, ministers 
mostly exercised this leadership. Where they did not, the officers themselves - 
out of their own sense of what was proper - made no attempt to usurp additional 
authority. 
The commonly. held view is that professionally qualified officers are most 
likely to misinterpret the proprieties. It is argued that they have a commit-
ment to the values of their chosen specialism and have a belief in their ex-
pertise. Direction from non-experts or laymen,.. such as politicians, is regarded 
as incompatibl.e with the professional ethos into which they have been trained. 
A strong tradition of autonomy within departments based on such expertise 
may also be expected to emerge over time,and Health Services and Educat!ln 
seem the most likely of the three departments to meet these criteria. Both 
operate services which wholly depend upon professionals, some extremely 
specialised in their particular field. They are also fairly well established 
departments with a continuous existence long enough to promote some kind of 
internal loyalty and independence of spirit. 
Professional educators seem to have more freedom to exercise their 
skills than those in Health Services. Teachers in the classroom are less 
constrained than health inspectors and hospital administrators; Teachers 
operate at one remove from the structure in a very real sense; they are 
physically distanced from it in a way that their counterparts in Health Services 
are not. Their day to day activities must be far harder to control, the con-
sequences of their activities more difficult to measure. In many ways there 
is not such clear-cut accountability to any particular individual as there is 
in Health Services. The pupil in the classroom, or even his parent, is not 
so able to measure his dissatisfaction with the service as is a patient in 
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hospital or a dental patient. Education should therefore exhibit strong 
centrifugal forces derived from these elements. As we have seen, it does not. 
Nor do the apparent centrifugal forces in Health Services derived from 
professionalism reduce the minster's control. There are stronger grounds 
for the professional basis in the medical areas than teaching, which has only 
recently become accepted as a profession. Medicine is one of the oldest 
professions, its practitioners are high on the list of community esteem, and 
it is a common qualification of those 	who are in the employ of the Health 
Services Department. Despite these factors, this department seems even less 
homogeneous in its outlook and loyalties than Education. 
There seem to be four fundamental reasons why neither of these units 
support the argument from professionalism and tradition of autonomy: lack of 
commonly held objectives, fragmentation of structure, no integration of the 
interests of professional associations and officials, and a historical legacy 
of dissatisfaction with professional services. 
1. There is a lack of commonly held objectives between the professionals 
who are in senior positions in the department - permanent head and directors - 
and those who are rendering services direct. In both departments, although 
more evident in Education than Health Services, senior officials are promoted 
from within the department. The direct promotion ladder within the Education 
Department from classroom teaching, school principal, and subject supervisor 
to senior official, has been demonstrated.. It is only rarely that external 
appointments are made to those positions, whereas in Health Services the pathway 
is not quite so smooth. 
Nevertheless, in both areas a rift has emerged between these out in the 
field and the central administration. Perhaps it has arisen from the physical 
separation in both cases, or from the fact that in both cases the core of the 
central administrative group are not professionals but clerical and accounting 
officers, who are more public service oriented. Whatever the reason, as one 
senior professional officer put it, the situation is signified by a 'them and. 
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us' attitude. There is no doubt that this also springs from the fact that this 
central group has to work in closely with the minister, and is physically in 
close contact with him. The officers involved rapidly lose what contact they 
had with many of their erstwhile colleagues, and they do se o problems from a 
different perspective. These factors, coupled with the problem of providing 
easily defineable objectives to which all can subscribe, militates against 
building departmental loyalties based upon a common profession. 
2. At the same time, it must be understood that the common profession is 
only the lowest common denominator, the rapid evolution of specialisms within 
a profession has removed any real identity of interest. To meet these specialist 
needs the organisational structure has become fragmented - in the case of 
Health Services to an alarming degree bordering on disintegration. The 
organisation charts show how unreal some of the broad Divisional structure is 
in bringing together such disparate activities as geriatric care, district 
medical officers and hospital advisory services under the control of one Director. 
Even the more homogeneous Public Health Division has within it a wide range of 
expertise, and of course it was a department on its own prior to 1945. 
Teachers, too, are trained in special areas, of which the most obvious 
are kindergarten, primary, secondary and technical. Each of these areas has 
its own specific 	needs and must define its objectives in terms of these needs. 
As the services grow in size, each area becomes self contained, separated from 
the others, having as its focus a Divisional Director, part of the central group. 
It is not surprising, that such fragmented structures fail to provide any 
support for growth of a strong, professional identity with departmental ob-
jectives. 
3. The same reasons that caused departmental structures to become frag-
mented have played their part in reducing the potential for the interests of 
• officials to be integrated with the department through their professional 
organisations. There are certain differences between the Education Department 
and Health Services, because the former has a single professional association 
335 
concerned with teachers. The Teachers Federation managed to maintain its 
hegemony over the teaching profession in Tasmania from the turn of the century 
until recently. It was only in 1969 that the first specialist group dis-
affiliated from the Federation and formed the Tasmanian Technical Teachers 
Association. Yet, even with such a long history, the Federation has not been 
a truly professional body, rather more a trade union concerned with pay and 
conditions of service. This is not surprising,, since teachers only began to 
think of themselves as professional a decade ago. So there has grown up a 
relationship between the Federation and the Department which some would consider 
too close, based on agreement between them about personnel matters. Outside 
this relationship are all other considerations of educational direction and 
objectives, which are rarely regarded as the business of the Federation. 
The opposite situation exists in Health Services, the range of membership 
of professional bodies represented is so great as to make integration impossible. 
Most of the bodies concerned are of the kind which concentrate on ethic.:1 and 
philosophical matters related to a particular body of knowledge, many are . 
examining for entry into the particular specialist area. The way in which they 
operate nationally, and their broad concerns prevent them from having the 
interests of their members within the department as their prime concern. In 
both cases,therefore, the membership of professional bodies does nothing to 
strengthen the potentially strong centrifugal forces. 
4. Citizens frequently express dissatisfaction about the provision of 
professional services - and Tasmanians are no exception. A number of inquiries 
and commissions have been referred to already, which have spent their time 
investigating the level and effectiveness of the services provided in health 
and education. The most maligned have been hospitals, not so Much because of 
the actual professional care provided there, but more as a result of alleged 
management deficiencies. One unanticipated result of these constant investigations 
has been a disillusionment with. professionals in general amongst the public at 
large. .Persistent questioning of the activities of both education and health 
experts has not allowed an aura of knowledge or immunity from criticism to 
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emerge. Officials cannot remain insensitive to such accumulated criticism, 
and it makes them doubly cautious of relying on their professional status. At 
the same time, it has prevented any specific departmental loyalty to a tradition 
of professional action which is frequently found in these agencies. 
The interaction of these four factors has made closely knit, professionally 
based 'aristocratic' agencies impossible, even though in these two departments 
the elements needed for the growth of such agencies are present. The Housing 
Department is quite different in a number of ways, not least, because it 
contains no core of recognized professions and yet exhibits all the symptoms of 
a professional department. That is not to say there are not a number of pro- 
fessions represented in the department - accountancy, social work and architecture 
amongst them, and also many trade skills of a high order. Nonetheless, there 
is no such common denominator as teaching or medicine. The real force, which 
makes Housing more like a professional department, is that derived from depart-
mental loyalty and a- tradition of autonomy. The two main foundations on which 
the loyalty and autonomy are based, are the single objective of the agency as 
a housing construction authority and the physical isolation of the offices. 
Home building, whether for sale or rental, is the focus of attention in 
the department, and this is combined with estate planning and management. A 
consequence has been that officials have served with the department over many 
years, building up an identity between the directly employed day labour force 
and the public servants in central office, a fact not duplicated in either 
Education or Health Services. It must also be emphasized, that the operations 
of Housing are on a smaller scale with less people involved and therefore more 
easily controlled. There is also the lingering 'feeling' in the departmental 
offices - which are some 20 minutes drive from the State departmental head-
quarters - that their isolation is prized in a way which brings all officers 
closer together. There is no doubt. that the centrifugal forces of tradition  
of autonomy and a. kind of professionalism are strong enough to challenge 
seriously ministerial control in the Housing Department. Only a strong minister 
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• providing clear political leadership, would be able to counter this force. 
Political leadership of this kind is even more essential if those 
centrifugal forces are supported by financial independence. Funds for State 
departments are rarely wholly derived from any one single scurce in the sense 
that they may be regarded as 'dedicated funds'. But resources are derived 
from different origins, and the degree to which the minister is directly 
responsible for their acquisition, relates to the strength of this force. 
There have been significant differences between the three departments 
along a spectrum of relative independence (Housing), through to almost total 
dependence (Education), when dependence is taken to mean reliance on the minister's 
capacity to obtain funds. 
The Housing Department, for an almost unbroken period of twenty years, 
was directly funded from loans made under the Commonwealth State Housing Agree-
ment. The only constraint on allocations was that the agreement required the 
State government to take into account thei:: capacity to service the loan funds 
available. In Tasmania that capacity was calculated on the basis of rentals 
received and monies paid under house purchase agreements. At no time had the 
State government to provide supplementary funds from Consolidated Revenue funds 
for this purpose. One major item that was paid out of State funds and which 
was a persistently contentious matter, was rental rebate. For this the Minister 
had to bargain with other Cabinet members at Estimate time, but in almost every 
year of its operation the Department had a surplus which was paid into revenue, 
and his position was therefore better secured. 
Since 1971, many changes have brought uncertainty to the previously steady 
Commonwealth funding, with the consequent strengthening of the minister's position. 
There is greater dependence now on the bargaining capacity of the minister at 
both federal and State levels. In additibn, funds are now allocated on an 
annual basis, whereas the earlier agreements had been for five or three years 
and this requires much more involvement of the minister in departmental affairs. 
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Education, on the other hand, has no major source of funds from 
outside the State similar t6 that of Housing. Some minor funds were 
available from Commonwealth sources, although in 1971 there were marginal 
changes having the effect of emphasising Commonwealth funding for Education. 
The annual budget round has had to be followed, with its almost total 
dependence on the minister to fight for the expected allocation from 
Consolidated Revenue and Loan funds. There does not seem to have been any 
great reluctance on the part of State Cabinet to maintain a high level of 
expenditure in education. The increase in the percentage of total State 
revenue allocated.to education from 18% in the 1950s to 34% in the 1970s 
indicates a commitment by both parties to education. There is a sense in 
which last year's expenditure becomes this year's dedicated revenue. 
However, that is not necessarily the case, and the minister must be prepared 
to defend his departmental estimates in Cabinet. 
A minister may be called upon to exercise his authority to settle the 
internal wrangles for resources between sections of the department. The 
Education Department have minimized this possibility by a system of intra-
departmental committees and only rarely does the minister have to mediate. 
The funding situation changed in 1971, with more monies being offered from 
the Commonwealth government. The Schools Commission forced officers into 
direct negotiations with federal officials, and this had the effect of 
making their activities less directly under ministerial control. However, 
at no stage did they take the opportunity to make decisions on their own, 
and the minister still retained the political initiative, even though 
reduced. . 
Health Services, as the Education Department, obtains funds for its 
own activities. However, it is also the channel through which funds are 
provided for many other facilities. These funds constitute about 80% of 
its revenue and they are expended on such institutions as hospitals, which 
take the largest portion, geriatric hospitals, and dental and medical 
services. The Department has no direct control over these funds, other 
than as accountants for the Treasury and as supervisors on behalf of the 
minister. Any new initiatives are therefore curtailed by the demands of 
existing services. While the minister may not have much _room for nego-
tiation, and the totalamount is unlikely to be significantly reduced, 
the officials still require his support within the Cabinet. For this reason 
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there are good grounds for suggesting that the scope for political 
leadership in both Education and Health Services is very great. Any 
centrifugal forces in either Jepartment derived from a commitment to the 
service or because the funds must support ongoing institutional demands, 
may be regarded as marginal. The contrary force which reinforces the 
minister's position comes from the necessity for his support in Cabinet 
discussions during budget time, and subsequently when expenditure matters 
are raised there. 
Finally, the most variable centrifugal force, operating in the 
departments, was that derived from officers' relations with circumjacent  
groups .  The strongest centrifugal force was seen to Operate in Health 
Services, the weakest in Housing. 
Health care of both the preventive and curative kind is a complex 
function, using a multiplicity of experts and specialisms. The common 
concern of these various officials may be thought to increase integration 
of their activities and commitment to the department. However, it does 
appear that there is more interaction with other specialists in the same 
field, or with clientele than with other sections of the department. The 
consequent interlaced network of communications beyond the department to 
professional bodies or colleagues, to national committees with similar 
concerns and to other state and commonwealth officials in the same field, 
forms an extremely potent force to reduce political leadership. There is 
also little doubt that this force has similar effects on executive authority. 
Bodies such as the National Health and Medical Research Council form 
a prestigious body upon which to rely in providing advice to the minister. 
No minister could easily shrug aside such advice on merely political 
grounds, and few would have access to any advisers of greater weight. These 
affiliations are supplemented by a great deal of cooptive activity in bringing 
expertise into the departmental structure through the large number of committees - 
regulatory, advisory and boards of management. In all these matters the minister 
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is removed from the initiating position, although all these 'bodies may be 
subject to his appointment and their decisions subject to his approval, without 
his direct involvement his executive authority may well be effectively usurped. 
When these bodies are federally based and initiatives :for common action 
within states derived from them, the pressure is even greater. It was, in fact, 
suggested that many of the newer policies and activities undertaken by the 
department had their source in circumjacent groups such as these, rather than 
the minister in consultation with his top advisers. Countervailing forces were 
derived from the gradual emergence of a support group for the minister in the 
central service section, directly under the control of the Director General, 
and the fact that the minister is also a member of federal committees and 
receives many deputations from clients. The minister also frequently pays 
personal visits to hospitals throughout the State. 
A client group, even more clearly defined than hospital patients, on which 
a department could base a solid clientele affiliation, are tenants. Wh:le Health 
Services have a multiplicity of clients with disparate interests and may therefore 
be less likely to provide such a common front to ministerial initiatives, Housing 
differs considerably. Yet, for some reason unknown, the clients of the 
Housing Department have neither banded together to form a pressure group on 
the department, nor have the officials ever used them as support for their 
activities in altercations with their minister. Since most of the building is 
undertaken by a day labour force, with a very minor proportion on contract to 
private firms, there is not any significant interaction with outside bodies. 
It may be that other centrifugal forces operating within the agency give it 
sufficient autonomy without the need to seek external aid. The physical 
isolation, the professional commitment and departmental loyalty previously 
referred to, provide these forces and presumably have not led to a need to. 
build up alternative sources of support. That may also be the reason why 
greater stress was placed in the Housing Department on the 'interference' of 
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the Public Service Board and its committees, such as Mechanical Aids and 
Public Offices. 
Education, on the other hand, provides a complete contrast to both of 
these departments. It is the minister who has the direct involvement with 
clientele groups and other bodies. The officials have not apparently sought 
nor gained any basis for affiliation with these groups. Parents and Friends 
Associations connected with the schools seek and obtain audience with the 
minister, their contact with officers is only through the minister. 
The profession, who are employed by the department direct, regard the 
senior officers as their employer and do not differentiate them from the 
minister in this regard. The Teachers Federation is involved in many of the 
departmental activities through cooptation on joint committees, but these 
are used as legitimizing or feedback groups and rarely take the initiative 
away from the minister. The example was given of the way in which one of these 
committees W7S used to legitimize the reclassification scheme in 1955. 
Another factor, which militates against the use of external support, is 
the system of internal committees of senior officers, who arrive at mediated 
settlement of disputes within those committees before involving the minister. 
There did not appear to be any significant circumjacent groups on which the 
officials could depend for support against the minister. Rather, it was the 
minister who had more contact with such groups through direct contact, and who 
gained any advantage there may have been from that. In this way, the political 
leadership of the minister was protected, and his executive authority was not 
undermined. Any action taken by the department was seen to be the result of 
direction from the minister by the deputations who saw him as a figure of 
authority. 
One of the striking features of the.Tasmanian Executive System is the 
extent to which senior officials are committed to restraint in their activities. 
Whilst the most innovative would be what Gordon describes as 'activis t q they 
161A.R.Gordon, op. cit., p 40. "They can entertain ideas (though these 
should not be too passionately held, for that would imply partiality), and they 
not only can, but indeed are supposed to, express them (for that is the whole 
Doint of their anonvmitv)." 
would rarely deliberately compromise the minister. In the privacy of the 
ministerial office they may stress the inadvisability of acting in ways proposed 
by the minister, but once the minister's mind is made up the official co-operates 
to the best of his capacity!-7 Nevertheless, a minister is very vulnerable, 
no matter how restrained the senior officials, and this is particularly so in 
the area of executive authority. Even where the statute expressly makes the 
decisions of the official subject to the consent of the minister, it is not 
possible for a minister to deal personally with every matter in the department. 
Senior officials must be allowed to make decisions and some of these will 
necessarily encroach on the executive authority of the minister. 
This situation was most evident in Health Services, where the diversity 
of activities and the range of specialist needs were so great as to cause one 
minister to suggest that his working day of 15 or 16 hours was too short to 
deal with all decisions that requited his attention. Additional support for 
the executive activities of the senior offf:zers in Health Services was received 
from the relations with circumjacent groups, partly due to their common pro-
fessionalism. Not all forces within the department operated centrifugally, 
because the fragmentation of interests increased the dependence of the minister 
for funds which were largely forthcoming from the State budget, At the same 
time, despite the professional core of officers within the department, there had 
never grown up a tradition of departmental loyalty which would provide a basis 
for autonomy. At the very most it could be Said that the senior officials in 
Health Services operated on the verge of enveloping the executive authority of 
17 'One permanent head told the story of his MiniSter'demanding a:brief 
to be taken to Cabinet, supporting the repeal of a regulation, which the minister 
had not long previously accepted. Apparently a group of his constituents had 
pointed to . the unanticipated effects it was having on them. The permanent 
head, knowing that the effects were exactly the reason for the regulation, • 
suggested that he would provide the Cabinet with the detailed reasons why the 
regulation was necessary, and Cabinet could. then repeal the regulation if it 
was felt appropriate. The minister agreed and the permanent head prepared his 
Cabinet submission to such good effect that the matter was never heard of again, 
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the minister. The potential for undermining the political leader3hip is 
always present in these circumstances, because once executive authority is 
transferred from the minister, there is little left on which to exert his 
leadership. However, in the c?:se of Health Services, so long as the diffuseness 
of services remains and the lack of common identity of interest and purpose, 
there is little danger of the minister's political leadership being totally 
eroded. 
A similar, but not wholly identical, situation exists in Housing. However, 
the centrifugal forces are not derived from the same sources. In Housing the 
dedicated nature of the funding has, in the past, helped to create a tradition of 
autonomy. It has also 'helped to clarify the nature of the activities for the 
officials and their day labour force, creating an identity to which all can be 
loyal. The lack of any identifiable core of staff, which may be described as 
professional in the normal sense, has not reduced this autonomy and there remains 
a very strong base of support for the exercise of executive authority by the 
senior officials. The legislation provides further assistance to officials, 
because it is the most explicit in its allocation of functions to the Director. 
While relations with circumjacent groups are not at all strong, there is little 
need to build up such support when officials are able to utilise their minister's 
executive authority by other means. Despite declarations to the contrary, there 
was fairly strong evidence that it required a deliberate exercise of political 
leadership and executive authority by the minister to obtain a change of policy 
on the matter of terminating the. tenancyof occupiers in arrears with rent payments. 
Both Health Services and Education may be thought to provide a similar 
context in which centrifugal forces could gain an increasing hold. The dominant 
. professional content of officers, and similar legislation should permit the 
senior officers the same exercise of executive authority. There is not the 
same combination of forces in Education to permit this to emerge. Education 
is much more like a normal ministerial department, with the minister very much 
in control, exercising executive authority and political leadership without 
too much interference. The only significant force was that of professional 
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staff, but it was seen how this was too newly emerged to be of any great 
support. At the same time there were too many internal competing forces for 
the officers to act as a group to undermine the minister's authority. Individual 
'officers may produce conflict situations from time to time, but generally with-
out the senior officers and others in the department acting as one. More often 
than not the senior officers were seen by the teaching staff as synonymous with 
the minister,- and their association did little to foster any spirit of pro-
fessional identity. Funds were almost wholly obtained from the State budget 
which forced dependence on ministerial 'support, even though there appeaisto 
have been a strong commitment to spending in that field. Another factor, .which 
may have had a strong influence on the way the Education Department evolved in 
the more recent past, was the long term one particular minister spent in the 
portfolio. It is possible that his familiarity.with the department was suffi-
cient to make him more like one of his own officials. For example, he had. 
outlasted a number of the senior departmental officers who were in office when 
he was first appointed. Of the three departments Education seems to be the 
one in which officers have least executive authority and are most observant 
of the boundary between their administrative capacity and the exercise of 
authority. 
Conclusion  
The relationship between the minister and the senior official in the 
Tasmanian State E:,-.ecutive has been observed in three agencies. The analytical 
techniques used have provided a profile of the way this relationship affects 
the activities of the minister, and by extension, the effect this has on the 
operation of the Westminster model of government at the Australian State level. 
Previously, attention has been drawn to the particular historical and 
cultural differences in Australian States in colonial times. The implantation 
into the colonies of a set of institutions, which had evolved in the unique 
British conditions of the nineteenth century, could not occur without some 
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adaptation. The most significant adjustment had to be made as a consequence of 
the military and penal nature of the early settlements. The Governor was in 
charge, reporting directly to the Colonial Office in London, there was no 
elected politician taking on ministerial portfolios, but seLior officials 
appointed by the Governor. These officials were suddenly transformed in 1856, 
almost overnight, into ministers in charge of departments.18 There was no 
gradual evolution through 'ministerialisation ,19 and the States have been left 
with what Wettenhall calls the "duality" of some departments, operating like 
their British counterparts and others as 'public officer departments'. 
Such adaptations have been little understood, based as they were on 
assumptions about the operations of the parliamentary system of government. It 
was taken for granted that ministers would be in control, of their departments, 
that their activities would be supervised by a vigilant Parliament to whom 
they were accountable, and that public servants would operate as impartial 
implementors. The State minister, however individually and collectively 
responsible, cannot operate quite as in the original British system. Whilst 
the institutional ritual and symbols are the same, with the same observance 
of title and formality, the activities of ministers in State parliaments and 
governments have been adapted to the needs of that context. 
It has been the purpose of this thesis to attempt an assessment of the 
extent to which these adaptations have changed the Westminster model in one State. 
One of the common manifestations of that model has been an overt adherence to 
the politics/administration dichotomy, within the formal constitutional. framework. 
Both politician and official believed that they were keeping to their side of 
the boundary in whatever activity they undertook. They were certain in their 
own minds, and the institutional ritual reinforced their certainty, that what . 
- 18 Nettenhall, Ministerial Departments, op. cit., where he describes the 
changeover in some detail, p 242. 
.19'1Vettenhall's word to indicate the gradual philosophical support for 
a ministerial department that emerged in Britain in the early 1830s. 
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they did followed the British precedents. Yet the processes in which they 
are involved causes the emerging reality to appear differently. Public servants 
are thought to be usurping the prerogatives reserved for politicians, parti-
cularly in the area of policy making. They are thought to be doing this in 
a number of ways: control of information, continuity of service and expertise, 
but more particularly by taking decisions in matters for which they held no 
ultimate responsibility. In this way executive authority and even perhaps 
political leadership are being whittled away from the politician/minister. 
The extent to which a minister loses his capacity to be a political leader 
in his department through the effects of senior officials, may only be a tempo-
rary phenomenon. It may be the consequence of the interaction of a strong 
official and weak minister, or the minister may only see his task as marginal 
to his main interests becausehe has other more challenging portfolios. However, 
if this loss of political leadership is more permanent,where it persists despite 
a change of minister, then it may be said that there is a significant lss 
with important consequences. Differentiating between political leadership, 
executive authority and administrative capacity helps to indicate such permanent 
changes. However, loss of executive authority, not political leadership, was 
found more likely to be crucial in any-diStUssion about the position of the 
'minister. 
There is little doubt from the analysis as it has been applied to the three 
departments, that the Tasmanian State Executive has moved some way from the 
Westminster model. While the ministers may still exercise political leaderFhip 
to a marked degree, their executive authority is, and has for some time been, 
considerably diminished. This situation is rarely admitted, because ministers 
do make many decisions, they have the right to veto any proposal put forward by 
officers, and their officers make every effort to assist them maintain the 
pretence. 20 However, the centrifugal forces of professionalism and tradition 
20 -ffiat it is a pretence in contemporary Britain is the view of many writers, 
see the references given in Gordon, 22 cit., p 45,and earlier discussions in 
chapters I & II. 
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of autonomy, when combined with dedicated funding, such as occurred in Housing 
over a period of many years, place ministers in a strait jacket. Officials 
can be the only beneficiaries of the forces at work in this situation, their 
executive authority increases at the expense of the minister. The kind of 
problems that have to be solved daily in Health Services are incapable of 
solution without the expertise of the officials. No one other than the minister 
has access to their expertise, but on the other hand.he must accept their 
recommendations because he has no alternative source to use. Teachers make 
decisions in the school situation which preclude the minister from certain 
future actions and his executive authority is thereby compromised. 
Even though some executive authority has been transferred, it does not 
necessarily mean that the minister is left with only the hollow shell of his 
traditional responsibility. This view appears to be supported in the Tasmanian 
State Executive, where senior officials are strongly committed to maintaining 
the parliame7-tary conventions of the Westminster system, seeing, themselves as 
placing their knowledge at the minister's disposal. They make every effort, 
it seems, to provide the minister with opportunities to exercise both executive 
authority and political leadership. The direct links individual citizens have 
with the minister also provide a foundation on which the minister can build 
his authority and leadership. Officials' own circumjacent relationships are 
less strong thanthose of the minister, who, while in office, spends a large 
proportion of the daily routine, dealing with deputations and meeting people 
in the work place. In this way the range of departmental activities, that could 
suddenly become a matter for ministerial concern, is greatly increased. Knowing 
the mind of the minister makes senior officials more administratively capable, 
but also more cautious. They are less likely to transgress the bounds of 
convention if the minister shows his grasp of departmental affairs through 
political leadership. 
The Health Services and Housing Department were examples of how potential 
dominance by officials is controlled and ministerial responsibility is maintained 
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.a fine balance which relies mainly on the honesty and competence of the 
official. Centrifugal forces are working in the system all the time - with 
or without the will of official or minister. The change from the nightwatchman 
state to the interventionist state has increased the potential of these - forces, 
especially those derived from expertise, centralised financial dependence, and 
the demand for long-term planning. Where the officials are careless of the 
effects of such forces, where they do not deliberately take action to avoid the 
consequences, then the conventions will be flouted. 
In Tasmania - as mentioned above - the majority of officials make the 
Westminster system function,-sometimes despite the minister. On the other hand, 
there are some officials who despise the politician as difficult and interfering, 
preventing rational decisions based on expert knowledge. Officials who think 
like that are more likely to be in the middle levels rather than at the top of 
the hierarchy, but it does not augur well for the future of parliamentary 
government if these men take control without changing their view. 
Ministers also should perhaps take more trouble to make their political 
leadership and executive authority clear, and to prevent the potential of these. 
centrifugal forces from being realised. In sob far as the minister acts according 
to the convention's, it inhibits any other actions which may occur to hinder the 
operation of the Westminster system. Role playing is an important part of the 
maintenance of such boundaries, where ministers and officials have certain 
expectations and obligations. More often than not it is the minister rather 
than the official who is unaware of the danger involved in ignoring these forces, 
they want to make their mark in some way which will reinforce their political 
position. This leads them to concentrate on activities that- will give them the 
greatest electoral return, rather than provide their officials with political 
leadership. Often such leadership is left to the Premier or Cabinet and officials 
complain about the number of matters decided outside the department. 
At the State level Cabinet certainly plays a very important role, which 
increases the crucial position of Premier to the detriment of the ministers. 
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Since the Premier is frequently the Treasurer, this also involves Treasury 
officials in almost every aspect of departmental activity. Such involvement is 
a countervailing force for senior officials who have to maintain the confidence 
and authority of their minister to defend their actions in Cabinet and to the 
Treasury. 
At the present time, the responsibility of the minister is consistent 
with a modified Westminster model. He remains answerable for the departmental 
activities to Parliament, he can exercise political leadership and he has some 
limited form of executive authority. Some ministers and most officials understand 
their roles through training and experience and as a consequence try to operate 
as if they existed in practice. No official would set out deliberately to 
undermine the minister's control and responsibility. Any actions that had 
this result would arise from the daily press of business over a long period 
of time, in particular from the kind of forces referred to as centrifugal. 
The complex, multifaceted interactions that occur within the deparments 
between ministers and senior officials, and between various horizontal and 
vertical levels of officials, are too labyrinthine for any common pattern. 
Generalisations cannot be made which relate to a particular kind of structure. 
Only through the identification of similar forces at work within the processes 
is it possible to suggest trends over time. These forces form a mosaic in 
which compatible patterns emerge for certain purposes, such as executive activity, 
or for ministerial responsibility. Incompatible patterns have been identified 
from time to time due to the laxity of ministers or unprofessional conduct of 
public servants. The consequences have always been to move away from that 
central feature of the Westminster model - ministerial responsibility. Without 
that vital element representative and responsible parliamentary government 
according to the Westminster model no longer exists. 
The pattern most appropriate to describe the Westminster system is political 
leadership exercised by a strong party-political figure, who also has 
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executive authority of which a high proportion is statutorily delegated to 
officials who themselves have potent, but self-controlled, administrative 
capacity. The Tasmanian State Executive may be said to conform to such a 
pattern despite some minor abey:rations identified in the analysis. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES OF THE 
TASMANIAN GOVERNMENT 
CATEGORISED BY 
MINISTRY AND TYPE 
*********************f******************** 
PREMIER., TREASURER AND MINISTER FOR MINES 
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Ministerial Departments 
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Offices  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Corporations  
Public Corporations 
Regulatory Bodies  
Satellite Bodies 
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept. 
Treasury Department 
Mines Department 
Directorate of Industrial Development 
and Trade 
Agent-General's Office 
*Board of Mine Examiners 
Civil Defence and Emergency Services 
Consumers Protection Council 
*Court of Mines 
His Excellency the Governor's 
Establishment 
Mine Managers' Board 
Mt. Cameron Water Race Board 
Public Offices Committee 
Public Offices Sub-committee 
Retirement Benefits Fund Board 
Retirement Benefits Investment Trust 
Ringarooma & Cascade Water Board 
Shipping Liaison Committee 
State Sinking Fund Commissioners 
Superannuation Fund Board 
Transport Advisory Committee 
Water Safety Council 
*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities . , 
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart,November 1972 
DEPUTY PREMIER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, MINISTER FOR 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND MINISTER ADMINISTERING THE 
RACING AND GAMING ACT 
Ministerial Departments  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Offices  
(a) Gazetted 
Attorney General's Dept. 
*Directorate of Environmental Control . 
Parliamentary Counsel 's Department 
Prisons Department 
Registrar-General's Dept. (inc. Lands Titles 
Solicitor General's Dept. & Reg. B,D, & M) 
Supreme Court and Sheriff's Dept. 
(b) Not gazetted Magistracy branch 
Departmental Corporations  
Public Trust Office (gazetted) 
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Public Corporations  
Regulatory Bodies Auctioneers' & Estate Agents Council 
Publications Board of Review 
State Licensing Court 
Tasmanian Racing Commission 
*Board of Examiners under the Legal Practitioners Act 
Board of Legal Education . 
*Bookmakers Appeal Board 
Companies Auditors' Board 
Indeterminate SentencesBoard 
*Lands Titles Commissioners 
*Public Trust Office Investment Board 
*Rules Publication Committee 
*Solicitors' Remuneration Committee 
- Solicitors' Trust 
Satellite Bodies - 
* Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities, 
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept, Hobart,November 1972 
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MINISTER FOR EDUCATION  
Ministerial Departments  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Offices 
(a) Gazetted 
.(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Corporations  
•Education Dept 
Adult Education Board (not gazetted) 
Public Corporations  
Regulatory Bodies  
Schools Board of Tasmania 
Satellite Bodies 
Advisory Committee on IRterest Subsidies to 
Independent Schools 
Board of Technical Education 
Bursaries Board 
*Education Dept. Appeal Board 
*Education Dept. Promotions Committees 
Science Centre Advisory Committee 
*Secondary Schools Board 
*State Teachers' Superannuation Fund Board 
*Student Hostels Boards of Management 
Teachers and Schools Registration Board 
Other Bodies 
College of Advanced Education 
University cf Tasmania 
* Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities, 
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept, Hobart,November 1972 
CHIEF SECRETARY AND MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT 
356 
Ministerial Departments  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Offices  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted  
Dept. of Labour and Industry 
Audit Department 
Electoral Department 
Public Service Commissioner's Dept. 
Public Service Tribunal 
Departmental Corporations  
State Library of Tasmania (gazetted) 
Tasmanian Library Board 
Public Corporations  
Fire Brigades Commission 
Metropolitan Transport Trust 
Royal Botanical Gardens Board of 
, Trustees . 
Tasmanian Grain Elevators Board 
Transport Commission 
Trustees of Tasmanian Museum :Aid 
Art Gallery 
Regulatory Bodies  
Miners' Pensions Board 
Workers (Occupational Diseases) 
Relief Fund Board 
Ladies' Hairdressers & Chiropodists 
Advisory Board 
Plumbers' Registration Board 
Public Service Appeal Board 
Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal 
Tribunal 
Railway Reward Fund Commissioners 
Railway Service Appeal Board 
Railway Service Promotions Appeal Board 
Rental Committee 
Royal Tasmanian Society for the 
Blind and Deaf 
Rural Fires Board 
Scholarship and Assisted Study Course 
Committee 
Third Party Insurance Premiums Board 
Wages Boards (various) 
Satellite Bodies 
Administrative Services of 
Parliament 
Advisory Committee on Mechanical 
Aids 
Anzac Day Trust 
Apprenticeship Commission 
Board - of Reference (under 
. Inspection of Machinery Act 
1960) 
Coal Mining Industry -Long 
Service Leave Trust 
Cinema Board 
Consumers Protection Council 
*Factories Appeal Tribunal 
Factory Welfare Board 
Industrial Advisory Council 
*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities, 
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November 197 
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• MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES . 
Ministerial Departments  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted • 
Departmental Offices  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Department of Agriculture 
National Parks 8 Wildlife Service 
*Sea Fisheries Division 
Departmental Corporations  
Agricultural Bank of Tasmania 
(gazetted) 
Public Corporations  
Artificial Breeding Board 
Regulatory Bodies  
Inland Fisheries Commission 
Primary Produce Board 
- Dairy Products Marketing Board 
- Egg Marketing Board 
-- Milk Board of Tasmania 
- Potato Marketing Board 
- State Fruit Board 
- Tasmanian Ryegrass Marketing Board 
Satellite Bodies  
Beauty Point Landslip Advisory 
Committee 
Closer Settelment Appeal Board 
Closer Settlement Board 
Dairy Factories Registration 
Board 
*Farmers' Debt Adjustment Board 
Filled Milk Advisory Committee 
King Island Abattoir Board 
Lawrence Vale Landslip Advisory 
Committee 
National Parks 8, Wildlife Advisory 
Council 
*Noxious Weeds Appeal Board 
Registry of Co-operative Housing 
Societies 
Rural Reconstruction Board 
Sea Fisheries Advisory Board 
Stanley Cool Stores Board 
Stock Medicines and Fertilizers Board 
Vermin Destruction Appeals Board 
Veterinary Board 
*War Service Land Settlement Appeal 
, Board 
Weeds Advisory Committees 
*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities,  
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November 1972 
MINISTER FOR LANDS AND WORKS AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
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Ministerial Departments  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Offices  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) . Not gazetted 
Departmental Corporations  
Public Corporations  
Regulatory Bodies  
Lands Dept. (incl. Surveyor General 
. and Valuation Branch) 
Public Works Department 
- 
• Department of Film Production 
Local Government Office 
Rivers and Water Supply Commission 
(gazetted) 
Launceston Flood Protection Board 
Metropolitan Water Board 
Town and Country Planning Commission 
Satellite Bodies 
Board of Tenders for Public Works 
Building Appeals Board 
Building Regulations Board 
Council Clerks Board 
Land Valuation Court 
Municipal Commission 
Nomenclature Board 
*Public Service Standing Committee 
on Workers' Compensation 
Surveyors Board 
Valuers Examination Board 
*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities, 
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart, November i972 
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MINISTER FOR HEALTH, MINISTER FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 
AND MINISTER FOR ROAD SAFETY 
Ministerial Departments  
(a) Gazetted 
 
Dept. of Health Services 
Social Welfare Dept. 
(b) Not gazetted 
Department Of  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Corporations - 
Public Corporations  
Regulatory Bodies  
. *Road Safety Branch 
Mental Health Services Commission 
(not gazetted) 
.Ambulance Service Commission 
Hospital Boards 
Alcohol and Drug Dependency Board 
Dental Board 
Medical Council 
Nurses Registration Board 
Pharmacy Board 
Physiotherapists Registration Board 
Radiographers' Registration Board 
Tasmanian Board of Optical Registration 
Satellite Bodies  
*Child Welfare Advisory Council 
Dental Health Services Advisory Committee 
Dental Mechanics Registration Board 
Fluoridation Advisory Committee 
Food Standards Committee 
*Gellibrand House Board . 
Guardianship Board 
*Health Education Council 
'Medical Advisory Committee 
*Medical Boards (Tuberculosis) 
Mental Health Review Tribunal 
*Millbrook Home Board 
*National Fitness Council of Tasmania 
Pesticides Advisory Committee 
Poisons Advisory Committee 
Radiological Advisory Committee 
Royal Derwent Hospital Board -- 
*Tasmanian Cancer Committee 
*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities, • 
.Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept. Hobart,November 1972 
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THE MINISTER FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
MINISTER FOR FORESTS, MINISTER ADMINISTERING 
THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC COMMISSION ACT 1944 , AND 
MINISTER ASSISTING THE TREASURER 
Ministerial Departments  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Offices  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Corporations 
Supply and Tender Department 
Public Corporations  
Regulatory Bodies  
Government Printing Office (gazetted) 
Forestry Commission (gazetted) 
Hydro-Electric Commission 
Tasmanian Government Insurance Office 
. Satellite Bodies 
Apple and Pear Crop Insurance Board 
*Tasmanian Industrial Advisory Committee 
*Not mentioned in Directory of Government Departments and Authorities; 
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart,November 1972 
MINISTER FOR HOUSING 
Ministerial Departments  
Ca) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Offices  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Corporations  
Public Corporations 
Regulatory Bodies  
Satellite odies 
Housing Dept. (gazetted) 
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THE MINISTER FOR TOURISM AND IMMIGRATION, 
AND MINISTER FOR POLICE AND LICENSING 
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Dept. of Tourism and Immigration 
Tourism Development Authority 
Police Department 
Accommodation Houses Registration 
• Committee 
Finance Committee 
*Guest House Board 
Indicative, Informative and Directional 
Signs Committee 
(Police) Board of Selectors 
Police Disciplinary Board 
Police Promotions Appeal Board 
Police Promotion Examination Board 
Police Provident Fund Board 
*Tourist Accommodation Loans Committee 
Ministerial Departments  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Offices  
(a) Gazetted 
(b) Not gazetted 
Departmental Corporations  
Public Corporations  
Regulatory Bodies 
Satellite Bodies 
*Not mentioned in Directory of Government  Departments and Authorities, 
Premier's and Chief Secretary's Dept., Hobart,November 1972 
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Appendix II 
METHODOLOGICAL DIGRESSION 
Scientism and Concepts in explanation  
Much of the literature on methodological problems in the political 
and, especially, the social sciences is based upon refutation of the charge 
of 'scientism'. The search for a set of immutable laws of political and 
social behaviour has reputable ancestry. 1 Nonetheless, today there is 
less certainty about the affinity of the social sciences with the natural 
sciences 2 although the demand for rigour still remains. Generalisation and 
prediction derived from an interpretation of poorly collected data may be 
just as misleading as those derived from poor explanation of very good data. 
The suggestion has been made 3 that the 'normal science' of politics is the 
actual political arrangements of a society at a given time, whilst political 
science itself is "a special form of paradigm inspired research." 4 However, 
acceptance of this formulation does not avoid the problems in trying to 
explain those actual arrangements. Wolin points out that new facts are 
unlikely "but a different interpretation based on new cognitive and normative 
standards" is quite normal expectation. 
This Is true, of course, but it begs the question about what 'facts' are. 
In describing activities in political and social systems there are many' 
potential 'facts', which of them are selected for explanatory purposes is 
often the unwitting judgement of the researcher. This evaluation will be made 
1A short discussion of the reasons for, and some of the history of, 
this search may be found in M.R. Davies and V.A.Lewis, Models of Political  
Systems, (London: Pall_Mall Press, 1971), Chapters 1 and 2: See also . 
J. Charlesworth (ed.), A-Design for Political Science: Scope Objectives . 
and Methods, (Philadelphia: AmeriCan Academy of Political and Social Science, 
1966 . 
2See the recent debate carried Anthe British Journal of Political - 
Science', C. Ake, 'The Scientific Status of Political Science' and Two Comments, 
January 1972,(2), pp 109-132 and' July 1972, 383-388. 
3S.S. Wolin, 'Paradigms and Political Theories' in P. King and 
B.O. Parekh, Politics and Experience (London: C.U.P., 1968) p 130. 
Wolin, 24.cit. , p 139 . 
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unwittingly because the implicit value system of that person will prevent 
him from recognising the whole range of potential facts. Any choice of 
theoretical framework involves implicit evaluation; but an adequate basis 
fcr an explanation which is "not just analytically true, ')ut empirically 
true", may be achieved through neutrality. The distinction is important 
since empirical truth seems to imply achievement of the kind of scientific 
validity which has largely been rejected. As is pointed out by Mclean 6 
to be scientific, any laws about political behaviour "must predict with 
certainty how each individual will behave given a choice of actions." If 
such laws merely predict that a given proportion of men will behave in a 
similar way, nothing can be validly inferred since there is no way of 
predicting from past behaviour which particular proportion of individuals • 
will in the future behave in this way. The most that can be hoped. foris 
that in explaining a given aspect of social reality we can utilise implicit 
and explicit theories as to which are th ,a most crucial factors to observe 
and interpret. 
'Facts' observed through this neutrality would then be subject to 
specification in a language which itself must be free of dispute. The 
Concepts utilised to describe individual behaviour patterns and the structures 
in which they occur have also been subject to onSlaught. 7 Whatever language 
is used by the participants in the political and social situation observed 
must form the basis of interpretation. In this way the concepts available 
to the observer are limited, except that he may be epistomologically privi-
leged,.since he may operate 'within' that language and be aware of connotations 
not otherwise clear. The mere observation of activities within a certain 
sB. Crick, 'The Elementary types of Government', Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 3, 1968, p 14. 
6Comment British Journal of Political Science, July 1972, p 384, 
7H. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics, (London: Penguin Books, 1953), 
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social situation does not of itself, therefore, provide the facts: Nor. 
will the conceptual tools of the observer supplement those facts to find 
explanation in any empirically true form. In one sense all concepts 
utilised in political and sccial explanation have a value context. This 
is bound to occur when their formulation has been based upon metaphysical or 
philosophical grounds and is culture bound. Weldon points out, 
"It was, and still is, comforting to believe that these 
/devastating conflicts between associations of human beings] 
could all be overcome if only the intrinsic or essential 
nature of associations were properly understood. When this is 
accepted it is easy to proceed further and to say that enlighten- 
ment will be achieved when we discover the true meaning of 
the words 'State'., 'authority', 'right' and the rest. To avoid 
apparent logical troubles it is often held that enquiry should 
be directed to discovering the concepts or ideas for which these words stand.. ."8 
This describes the concept formulation process which 'scientism' has 
endeavoured to break, only to become involved in other problems of •its 
own referred to above. 
How then is any observer of a political or social situation to fulfil 
the demands of his discipline and provide theories of political and social 
behaviour? Is there to be no theory, no generalised description even? Are 
only the most elementary facts about the actions of individuals in given 
situations to be recorded without hope of generalisations being deduced, ex-
plaining those actions in terms of similar actions at other times and in 
other situations? Must all description rely for its language on that of 
the participants, is it not possible to use properly constructed concepts 
as a kind of shorthand with which to convert specific behaviour into 
meaningful patterns relevant to more than one instant in time? 
Stretton discussed these problems, 
... all explanation is eclectic, even if what it chooses 
to do is to relate facts by class or law; no explanation 
can achieve neutrality by sufficiently including all the 
remotely related facts; the best that any can do is justice 
8Weldon, Op.. cit., p 12, 
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to most of the interests of the audience. .... The 
choices /by the explainer bearing in mind the audience 
and which of their disagreed interests he will serve] 
should be criticised, not only for their technical 
qualities, but also for their 'fairness' or 'justice' 
to interested parties for the quality, not merely 
the inevitable presence, of their values." 9 
The inference supported by much of what Stretton writes is that 
Crick's perception of an observer's neutrality which may eventually lead 
him to empirically true explanation is unjustified. All that may be 
achieved is the observer's own view of social reality expressed in a 
language using concepts which he regards as universally acceptable, bearing 
his audience in mind. Stretton suggests that no single conceptual framework 
can provide the unanimity which seems to be the goal of most social and 
political scientists. The search for this goal leads them to identify 
phenomenological similarities about which they conceptualise to provide 
them with this unanimity. For example, 
"...by substituting, what are often, technically crude 
and unperceptive selectors like 'contributions to the 
system', 'integration', and 'persistence'. These were 
meant to be justified by a yield of law; by the discovery 
of identical functional performance in whole classes of 
systems." 10 
In this way it was hoped to promote a satisfactory classification of social 
facts and causal mechanisms, 'which should terminate enquiries into all 
systems, when their classifiable parts were identified and correctly boxed." 11 
This search again leading back to 'scientism' avoids a fundamental 
paradox of social reality which 'expresses the quintessential difference 
between the nature of social and physical reality". 12 This paradox is that 
"The most fundamental idea concerning the nature of social 
reality is that the properties of the elements of social 
phenomena obtain many of their characteristics from the 
larger phenomena of which they are part, while the larger 
9H. Stretton; The Political Sciences,(London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 
1969) p 71. 
1 
0Stretton, 22: cit., p 195. 
11 Stretton, 92. cit., p 194. 
12 P.S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory, London: Heinemann, 1968). 
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entities obtain their characteristics mostly from the 
relation between the parts of which they are composed." 13 
Cohea goes on to explain that in the physical world entities may be 
described as being more than the mere sum of all their parts. 
"This means that the entities have properties which are 
not found in the parts taken separately but which are 
found when the parts are related. But these parts do  
have characteristics which exist independently of the  
entities in which they participate."I4 
However, in the relationships between elements of which social entities are 
comprised, the elements themselves may well not exist at all if it were not 
for their participation in the whole. 
"Families consist of spouses, parents, children and siblings, 
but the characteristics of spouse, parent, children and 
sibling cannot exist outside of families. Economics consist 
of producers, consumers, arbitrage brokers, advertisers and 
so on: but the characteristics of producer s, consumers, etc. 
cannot exist outside of an economy. Political systems 
consist of leaders, followers, factions, parties, legislatures 
and so on, but none of the characteristics of these things can 
exist outside of their systems." 15 
Once this realisation is accepted it provides a basis for future explanation 
in the political and social sciences. Lukes makes the point that "to 
identify a pier.e of behaviour, a set of beliefs, etc., is sometimes to 
explain it. This may involve seeing it in a new way, picking out hidden 
structural features." 16 
In this way explanations in the political and social sciences are 
always concerned with explicating relationships within and between social 
entities and their elements. But since the characteristics of each depend 
upon the existence of the other, the explanations must always contain 
evaluation. Explanation never stops short of judgement, since it is 
comprised of selections and descriptions of pieces of behaviour sorted out 
13Cohen, Ea . cit., pp 11/12. 
14' op: cit., p 12. 
15 ibid.' 
16S. Lukes, 'Methodological Individualism Reconsidered' in D. Emmett 
and A. Macintyre (eds), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, 
(London: Macmillan, 1970) p 83. 
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by the observer. The totality of activity in the entity with all its 
complexity is rarely Capable of comprehension by a single observer. 
Selection must be based on the observer's own perceptions of the whole; 
albeit informed by a heightened awareness of characteristics and data most 
likely to be important for any particular explanation. Such sensitivity 
is increased by familiarity in handling the subject matter and a capacity 
to provide a consistent, internally co-ordinated set of explanations about 
that particular social phenomenon. 17 
Selectivity may take a number of forms:- 
1) through limitation by conceptual approach; (e.g. behavioural, 
institutional, or systems); 
by data collection which rejects certain kinds of information as 
irrelevant for explanations of the kind envisaged; (e.g. constitutional, 
psychological or legal); or 
3) by the level of abstraction or generality attempted in the explanation. 
Three levels are generally agreed: 
a) direct observation and description of conduct differing 
only in methodological accuracy from the laymen's descriptions; 
deliberate grouping concepts, classification by some common 
quality or system of internal connections discerned in them all; 
c) 'higher' levels of abstraction, classification and relation 
at which the functions common to social systems can be identified 18 but their ways of performing those functions can be differentiated. 
Of these levels of abstraction the latter subsumes the first two 
because the generality of the research is dictated by the methodological 
'kit' available to the observer. Thus it might be postulated that one whose 
'kit' is limited to the institutional or historical would today offer a set 
17The use of "appreciative systems" mentioned in G. Vickers, The Art  
of Judgement, (London: University Press, 1970) is relevant here. 
18Weldon, 92. cit.,pp 149-150. This may be compared with the typology 
of research into 'operational', 'basic objective' and 'pure basic'. 
A Cherns, 'Social Sciences & Policy' in A.D.Cherns, R. Sinclair and W.I. 
Jenkins (eds), Social Science & - Government (Tavistock, 1972) p 29. 
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explanations nearest to the first level. This was not always so, but as 
the sophistication of research methods increases so does the potential level 
of abstraction. The dangers of this increased abstraction in political and 
social science is noted by Stretton, who draws attention to it greater 
'manipulative possibilites'. However, for him there are benefits, since 
'knowledge ordered in this way may offer more opportunities for contemplation 
than for social intervention and control". 19 Certainly the higher the levels 
of abstraction the farther one gets from methodological individualism or the 
atomistic approach favoured by some researchers. Identification of social 
entities at this high level of abstraction has led to the holistic approach, 
noting the separate elements whilst focusing on the organic nature of the 
whole. Structural functionalism or functionalism of this kind also has its 
pitfalls as I shall discuss later. On the other hand, atomism resulted in a 
view of social entities as wholes made up of identical or replaceable parts 
which could 13e assembled in different ways. 20 None of these methodological 
perspectives is entirely satisfactory as a basis for explanation, especially 
in the political sphere. As previously mentioned, unless methods take account 
•of the fundamental paradox that the parts are shaped by the wholes, yet at 
the same time the wholes would not exist other than as arelationship between 
the parts, the explanation of social reality will always be inadequate. 
To overcome this methodological problem is extremely difficult, but there 
are a number of more recent techniques which, if used with awareness and 
sensitivity, would assist. They would certainly fulfil Crick's requirement 
•of :neutrality, although the result may not reach his expectation of empirical 
reality. The choice of technique must necessarily be that of the individual, 
19Weldon, op: cit., p 150. 
20Note the mechanistic overtones here and the use of the term 'machinery' 
of government prevalent in the literature since Haldane, 1918. 
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but its description and that of the explanation must be. limited by the 
availability of a language for that purpose. One of the main dangers is 
to be trapped by that limitation. The implications of adopting a particular 
stance or methodological techLique may be accepted by the aserver, but not by 
his audience. His substantive work is ignored and his method attacked. On 
the other hand the method may come to dominate the substantive research to 
the extent that method becomes the substantive part by default. 
Language and Concepts in Explanation  
Any explanations derived from observation and investigation must be 
rooted in concepts drawn from the language of the participants. In the first 
instance an understanding of the norms and values, rules, laws and conventions 
which support individual behaviour within the structures of the political 
sphere must be obtained. It is hardly disputable that the actor's definition 
of his own situation is a critical factor for his own behaviour and must be 
taken into account in analysis. Yet it is not unusual for the actor's 
definition to be based on false premisses or on a faulty interpretation of 
perfectly legitimate concepts from which the norms are derived. In either 
case these factors must be identified, otherwise interpretation will not be 
based on valid data. It is therefore essential for the observer to make a 
clear distinction between the material and formal element of the concept 
concerned. 21 Equally, there are certain concepts whose formulations are not 
universally accepted, the kind of concept which may be defined in different 
ways with competing theoretical implications, i.e. an essentially contested 
concept. 22 Whilst concepts supply frameworks of understanding, they also 
provide guidelines for action, thus informing and giving meaning to social 
21For a discussion of this distinction see J. Kovesi, Moral Notions, 
(London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1967) pp 4-8. 
22W.13, Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1964) chapter 8. 
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activity. The observer, therefore, has to consider and accept or reject 
the theoretical implications of the conceptual frameworks of his subjects, 
in the knowledge that his capacity to evaluate them is automatically limited 
by the social, cultural and intellectual acclimatisation he has himself 
experienced. 23 One way to avoid these difficulties is to accept Weldon's 
approach to concepts, as 'words which simply have uses': 
"There is nothing divine or magical about 'justice' 
or 'freedom', they are only part of the verbal apparatus 
we make use of for describing and criticising certain 
types of human conduct. They are not the names of Ideas 
or archetypes ... they are not the names of anything. 
To know their meaning is to know how to use them correctly, 
that is, in such a way as to be generally intelligible in 
an ordinary and technical discourse ... This radical 
misunderstanding as to the meanings of words has given rise 
to a whole family of philosophical illusions which make up 
the greater part of what is known as 'metaphysics'. 
Three of these are especially pervasive in discussions on 
politics ... they may be called (1) the illusion of real 
essences, (2) the illusion of absolute standards, and 
(3) the illusion of geometrical method." 2 4 
These illusions are the result of acceptance by social scientists of t' -.e 
scientific method as described by Boulding: 
"By measurement, careful observation, controlled experiment, 
and statistical method, science explores the relational 
world with much the same kind of feedbacks as the mapmaker. 
He is in danger of being put to shame by anyone who cannot 
find the relation he has announced. Science, however, buys 
its success at a price; indeed a high price. The price is 
the severe limitation of its field of inquiry and a value 
system which is as ruthless in its own way in the censoring 
of messages as the value system of primitive man. ...Furthermore 
the world of the scientist is the world of the repeatable, the 
world of the probable. The rare occurrence, the non-repeatable 
event, the unanswereable question elude him". 25 
23i am grateful to Dr. D.J. Clifford for his help in formulating the 
above statement of the problem and in particular in discussing Chapter 
1 of his unpublished Ph.D. thesis, An investigation into some basic 
. methodological assumptions of current political theory, Manchester University, 
July 1972, included in which is his discussion of concept formation as . 
messages filtered through a value system. 
24Weldon, 22: cit., pp 19-20. 
25K. Boulding, The Image(Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of Michigan 
Press, 1961) pp 70-71. See also Chapman, R.J.K., "Machinery of Government: 
a field of academic study and public enquiry", New Zealand Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 35(1), 1972, pp 17-33, 
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By such arguments the bogey of subjectivism may be placed in some kind of 
perspective, but the stigma attached to research without an overt attempt 
at scientific neutrality will remain. Little can be done to escape this 
stigma in the social sciences for the reasons mentioned previously. However, 
it is possible to attempt an objectivity although it is not rational in the 
sense that it can meet scientific criteria such as 
"....to grade people and institutions with the sort 
of Certainty and confidence as that within which, with 
very minor qualifications, we can grade physical bodies 
in terms of their size or weight." 6 
This objectivity is well defined by Hyneman as a 
...conscientious, careful, systematic effort to find 
out what actually exists and goes on and reports findings 
in a way that enables other students to evaluate the 
sufficiency of evidence for conclusions". 27 
The observer collecting data in these circumstances and with this sensitivity 
must reduce the problem of subjectivity to a reasonable degree. This is 
especially so if one accepts that all exp:I.anation in the social sciences is 
relative; since it is based on an empirical appraisal. The observer who 
endeavours to investigate as many aspects of his subject as he can encompass 
with the methodological tools at his disposal is unlikely to miss too many 
crucial factors. His explanation will be relatively better than one which 
uses fewer of these tools and does not attempt to identify concepts, clarify 
the use of terms and explicate the values involved. 
The use of models in current explanations of government institutions  
The term 'model' has been subjected to abuse in much of the recent 
literature. Here it is used to mean an analytical representation of what 
actually happens. Such a model has sometimes been prescriptive in the sense 
26Weldon, 22: cit., p 150. 
27C.S. Hyneman, The Study of Politics, University of Illinois Press, 1959, 
p 78 • 
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that it can describe how theexisting system must work if different 
contributions are combined effectively. The usefulness of any model therefore 
depends on its capacity to explain what actually happens and prescribe for 
anticipated results. 28 
Bagehot provided one kind of model, but he did not attempt the objectivity 
which we expect today, nor had he available any methodology other than 
closeness to his subject matter. What he produced therefore was impressionistic, 
relying on his subjective evaluation of actors within the system. This model 
is largely irrelevant today, although it has immense historical value. It 
probably was valid only for the very point in time that he wrote it - it had 
no capacity to prescribe or predict. 29 
New forms of analysis have been evolved in the social sciences which 
can be useful techniques for the study of government, and politics. The basis 
of many of these is functionalism, which appeared in two main forms. On the 
one hand expLanations were concerned with 'how things come to be as they are'., 
on the other, explanations concentrate on the persistence or continuity cf 
certain social forms or patterns of activity. Argument continually ranges 
within the social sciences about these two approaches and the problem of 
'holism', but the language of functionalism has become pervasive throughout. 
Political scientists, including those particularly concerned with public 
administration, adopted the Parsonian terminology with great determination, 
scarcely aware of the pitfalls. 30 
28As will be evident from the previous discussien i this is less than law 
like statements on which it is possible to create such models as are suggested 
by Davies and Lewis, a: cit. 
29 M.R. Davies and V.A.Lewis (op. cit.,) make the same point: "But even 
Bagehot, ... found himself up against the problem with which modern political 
theory still attempts to grapple: how, if one is to go beyond the study of 
mere institutions, are processes - continually changing relationships - to be 
depicted and yet . made to seem more than merely a snapshot of a particular 
political system at one particular period of time?" p 9. 
30 For a discussion on systems for example see I.R.Hoos, Systems Analysis 
in Public Policy, Berkeley University of California Press, 1972: on social 
science methodology generally see Bertrand de Jouvenal, 'The Functions - and Roles 
of.the Social Sciences' in Cherns et. al. (a. cit.) pp 3-11= 
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The 'holist' approach was based on the concept of a social system 
comprising numerous subsystems all of which interrelated, the key to the 
interrelationship being an equilibrium which maintained the 'balance' of the 
system. The 'mechanisms' by which this equilibrium was maintained were termed 
the functional prerequisites of the system - that is to say, necessary 
conditions for its operation in equilibrium. Explanations based on this 
approach led to normative criteria for the selection of these necessary 
conditions, often implicitly derived from the value system of the researcher 
himself. There was also a concentration on persistence and continuity as 
if to support a belief that the total system operated as a timeless reality 
in which each part is dependent on the other. The basis of this formulation 
is well summarised by Radcliffe-Brown who held that 
"The functional method of interpretation rests on the 
assumption that a culture is an integrated system. 
In the life of a given community each element of the 
culture plays a specific part, has a specific function... 
The postulate on which the methoe, depends is that there are 
certain 'physiological' laws, or laws of function, that are 
true for all human societies, for all cultures. The n 31 functional method aims at discovering these general laws... 
In this way social phenomena are thought to be a timeless pattern of 
inter-related components, sometimes adapting, but persistently operating to 
maintain equilibrium. These persistent phenomena can therefore be isolated 
and identified (in analytical not concrete terms) and related to the structures 
of society. The similarity of this view of society to organisms in the physical 
sciences, rapidly led to the use of systems as mentioned above. At the macro 
level, if one takes a system and identifies the component parts (subsystems) 
these may then be analysed in terms of their input and output functions. 
Outputs of one subsystem become inputs for another. 32 The relevance of those 
31 A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Historical and Functional interpretation of 
Culture in relation to the practical application of anthropology to the control 
of native peoples" in M.N. Srinavas (ed.), Method in Social Anthropology, 
Selected Essays of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1958') pp 39-41. Social scientists have been more influenced by the writing 
of Talcott Parsons, than the anthropological studies of Radcliffe-Brown, who 
was quoted because he represents the most extreme 'functionalist position. 
- 32 For an example of the structural functional approach see the writings 
of G.A. Almond, in which he discusses four input functions and three output 
functions: 
(contd.) 
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inputs for the other subsystem may be high or low, in the former case it • 
may be said that one subsystem was being functional in relation to the other, 
that its activity had positive systems' relevant consequences. Where the 
relevance was low or so doubtfilly useful as to cause tensi .m between the 
subsystems it may be said to have negative systems' relevant consequences. 
The more amenable the subsystem to the values and norms of the total system, 
the more likely it is to act in accordance with the expectation of other 
subsystems and the less likelihood of producing outputs having negative systems' 
relevant consequences. 33 In Parsonian terms negative systems' relevant 
consequences result in less integration indicating that the subsystems 
(structures)are not acting functionally for one another. 
This kind of analysis based on Parsonian functionalism when utilised for 
political systems at the macro level, cannot avoid inherent orientation 
towards what Stretton calls 'technically crude and unperceptive selectors' 34 
32 (contd.) 
Input functions 
1. Political socialisation and recruitment 
2. IntPrest articulation 
3. Interest aggregation 
4. Political communication 
Output functions 
5. Rule making 
6. Rule application • 
7. Rule adjudication 
G.A. Almond & G.B..Powell, Comparative Politics: A developmeatimaLmEL 
(Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1966) 
G.A. Almond & J. .Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas, 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960) 
G.A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, 
1956 
G.A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems",  World Politics, 
Vol. XVII(2), 1965 
G.A. Almond & S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy 
in Five Nations, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 
For an example of this kind of analysis outside America, see 
E. Suleiman, "Sur les limites de la mentalite bureaucratique: conflits des 
roles entre cabinets ministerials et directeurs" .; Sociologie du Travail, 
14(4), 1972, pp 338-409. 
34See footnote 10. 
33 
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e.g. integration and adaptation. Integration emphasises the mobilisation 
and coordination of behaviour of individuals within structures which are 
oriented to achieving mutually agreed goals. 35 At the very lowest level of 
integration in which a subsystem acts - to prevent its own destruction - 
it is bound to make the minimum contribution of activity, which may be 
functional to the integration of the system. It is conceivable, for example, 
that the norms of the total system merely set certain ground rules for the 
control of conflict and that a system is little more than an arena for 
competition or for reconciliation of competing subsystem goals. Here, there 
is little that can be isolated as total system goals for which all subsystems 
are aiming. In a political-administrative system there are a large number of 
component structures (subsystems) and their goals are rarely clearly stated in 
a total sense, although their own individual goals may be better understood. 36 
The functional relationships between the subsystems are therefore rarely 
unidirectional and the concept of integration is merely a euphemism for 
survival of the subsystems. 
To overcome these problems of analysis and interpretation of data and 
to avoid terminological problems referred to earlier, Kaplan's suggestions 
may be adopted. 37 He uses the word 'contribution' rather than function for 
positive systems'relative consequences, whilst calling system or subsystem goals 
'tasks'. A subsystem output may therefore be equal to, exceed or fall short 
of its tasks and make such contributions or inputs to other subsystems which 
promote, negate or maintain the total system tasks. If contributions by a 
subsystem exceed its assigned tasks resulting in unanticipated consequences 
35 Recall here that Parsons' definition of a 'system' is a collection of 
individuals agreed, on certain values.- 
36Whilst it is admitted that in the most general sense such a systemh 
may be geared to achieve the 'general will' this is hardly what Parsons 
would have accepted as a system goal. 
37H. Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A functional analysis of Metro  
Toronto, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). 
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which over time become acceptable, such contributions become absorbed into 
the tasks of the subsystem which institutionalises them. Thus regularity of 
activity by the subsystem in question may produce acceptance of its output 
over time. Similarly, the subsystem could mobilise support for acceptance 
of its activity as output. These alternatives indicate, however, the need 
for a careful analysis of the interaction that takes place within the total 
system, rather than placing reliance on a structural description of the 
total system as being valid throughout time. 
One further theoretical contribution to this set of constructs which 
throws light on the problems-of analysis of the political-administrative 
system in particular is provided by Riggs. 38 He delineates the potential 
relationships between subsystems in this kind of macro system which demands 
certain outputs from subsystems because of their role-set. In this system 
certain relationships are expected by convention or through institutionalisation, 
as indicated by the delineation of the Westminster model. The political is 
assumed to dominate the purely administrative, just as the institutions 
which represent these concepts, Parliament and the Civil Service, are supposed 
to reflect this relationship. As a consequence it is possible to indicate 
diagramatically the potential interactions between subsystems. 39 
This realisation indicates the likely complexity of trying to trace 
the interactions and describe them satisfactorily without initially prescribing 
the bounds of the system. Riggs makes the point that it is only when sub-
systems' activity produces outputs which have system relevant consequences, 
i.e. they are contributing to the total system tasks, that we may define them 
as part of a system. Where subsystems bargain and negotiate from positions of 
autonomy then they cannot be included in the same system but must be seen as 
external to the system. being analysed as systems on their own or part of 
another- system. - It is therefore essential to recognise that there is more than 
38F. Riggs, "Professionalism, political science and scope" in 
J. Charlesworth (ed.), The Theory & Practice of Public  Administration, 
Philadelphia American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1968, pp 32-62, 
39 
.92• cit•, pp 51 & 53, 
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FIGURE 2. FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN COMPONENTS 
Fig. 1 A prescribes norms for B, which B accepts as authoritative premises 
for action. A is performing a political function for B and B an 
administrative function for A. (Or in Kaplan's terms A is. making a 
contribution to B in that he is performing his tasks appropriately) 
'Similar relationships and functions operate between Band C and B and D. 
Fig. 2 	In this more .complex diagram the.structures A B. and C are shown in 
more detail to illustrate that political and administrative functions 
occur both within structures and between them. If .A's activities 
. result from interactions between A-1, A-2 and A-3, and other 
components of A, these may be examined at a different level of analysis 
from the political and administrative functions which A exercises 
with respect to structures B and C. 
Source: Riggs, op. cit. 
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one level of analysis 
(a) at the total system level, e.g the macro political level, 
the polity in Easton's terms, 40 where research deals with that 
'system' and its roles in relation to other systems, e.g. 
economic acting functionally for the society as a whole; 41 
(b) at the subsystem level where research isolates the component 
parts of the larger system, e.g. the micro political, and 
deals with the role and function of those component parts in 
terms of i) the total system; and ii) the subsystem's own 
system. 
The delineation of the boundaries in this way is very seldom clearly 
made and much difficulty is caused by the use of the same analytical language 
for both levels. 42 
Much of the changing focus of analysis has been dictated by these 
considerations, overtly expressed or implicit, in the interpretation of the 
data. The emphasis has been on the activities which occur within and between 
institutions,and the form the institution has adopted is regarded as derived 
from these activities. The institutionalisation of activities within the 
political system was to be judged by criteria which characterised the concept 
of equilibrium. A representative example occurs in Emmette Redford, where 
he discussed the part administration should play within the political system: 
"Administration then has two aspects. On the one hand, it 
is an extension of the process of social adjustment. 
Adjustments and choices among interests, initiated in the 
macropolitical system, are carried over into subsystems where 
interests are adjusted and choices made through the interaction 
of persons in strategic positions. ... Administration in this 
aspect of its performance is political. 
But there is something unique about administration. It is at 
every successive level subject to some direction from a higher 
authority. There is a difference between the wide-open 
adjustment of interests in the macropolitical arena and the 
activity which follows the decision in that arena to set up 
40D. Easton, Framework of Political Analysis,(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1965), 
41Examples of this kind of analysis occur in Parsons and Levy, 
42Parsonian terminology, especially the AGIL*syndrome, has been utilised 
for every conceivable kind of system relationship, e.g. W.C. Mitchell, 
"Structural Characteristics of Policy making" in F. Lyden, G.A. Shipman and 
M. Kroll (eds.), Policies, Decisions and Organisation (New York: Appleton 
Century Crofts, 1969); see also W.J.M. Mackenzie, Politics & Social Science, 
( London: 	Penguin, 1967) esp. pp 87-110,.. 
*Adaptation; Goal . attainment; Integration; Pattern maintenance and tension 
.management. 
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a program for continuous implementation by administrative 
action. ...Administration begins when the initial direction 
is given and it never escapes from that subordinate role." 43 
In similar ways the functionalist views power as a facility for operating 
a political system. 44 
The existence of power in society can be explained in terms of the 
.function it performs for the social system as a whole, or in terms of the use 
made of it by individuals and its results for them or persons close to them. 
In the former case power is seen as 'functional' for the social system if it 
. allows certain people to makedecisions and initiate action which permits 
things to get done. Power can therefore be one kind of reward system which 
induces men to perform certain system maintenance tasks. It is a necessary 
condition for the achievement of goals activated from within the system to 
maintain equilibrium. Even if the view is that power is a means for certain 
individuals to dominate others in society, it is still seen as 'functional' 
for that society if it leads to persistence or continuity of those inter-
relations. Only the ideological questions remain to be answered in terms of 
the perspective taken by any one observer in order to interpret and explain 
the social phenomena. In both cases the functionalist approach to describing 
phenomena - 'administratiOn' and 'power' - place them in the context of the 
total social system and explain them by reference to their capacity for 
maintaining that system. 
43E.S. Redford, - DemOctacy'in - the'Administrative State (Op. cit.), 
pp 194-195. See also for similar approaches to the political 
D.J. Devine, The - Attentive Public: Polyarchal Democracy,(4. cit.), 	or 
R. Dahl, Polyarchy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Note the use 
of the words 'adjustment' and 'choice' and the attempts to draw boundaries 
between what is administrative and what is political. 
44This discussion is derived from P.S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory  
(2p.. cit.), pp 63 et seq. For another useful discussion of power in the 
same mould see P. Mott, 'The structure of power'. in P. Mott & M. Aiken (eds), 
The Structure of Community Power (New York: Random House, 1970), 
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This kind of 'dominant social conservatism' (Cohen's phrase) ignores 
the problems of unanticipated consequences of individual actions. Whilst 
all behaviour is purposive, not all results of individual activity fulfil 
intentions. The sum of all individual behaviour is not, therefore, merely 
the deduced total of its parts and explanations of social phenomena are not 
apposite if they fail to take account of this greater complexity. 
'Functionalism, based as it is on a holistic approach, can only be a part 
of, but never the whole of, sociological explanation. 	The 'holism' by 
which boundaries of systems within the total system are demarcated merely 
constructs totalities where none properly exist. These constructed totalities 
emerge from the researcher's need to demonstrate the interrlatedness of the 
social phenomena observed. They do not identify qualities which are the 
timeless reality, or inherent in the systems themselves. It is as though 
similar qualities to those of living systems: integration, regularity, 
wholeness, organisation, coherence, connectedness or interdependence of the 
parts, are only waiting to be classified in the social sciences, so that the 
principles or laws they express may be codified as suggested by Radcliffe-
Brown. 
Functional analysis does not replace the investigator's personal values 
as organiser of functional knowledge. Nor does it provide the criteria by 
which functions are to be measured as significant or insignificant for a 
system, or determine the only possible destination of reportable causal 
. chains. 46  Provided that its limitations are recognized and its focus is not 
merely to identify operationally acceptable facilities for persistence or 
continuity, functional analysis may be a very useful method for systemati-
sing observations about social phenomena. Justification and support for this 
455ee Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of functional analysis as a special 
method in Sociology and Anthropology", American Sociological Review, Vol. 24, 
1959, pp 757-773, 
46Stretton, a. cit., p 177; 
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limited use of functional analysis in relation to the social system may 
be found. For example it is suggested that 
"...items for comparison and generalisation are not 
items of social structure and culture, but functional 
processes themselves - processes necessary to serve 
certain needs of socaety and individuals." 47 
The various processes that operate within the total system must therefore be 
identified and compared so that generalisations may be made about them. In 
this way actions of individuals, groups and organisations may be observed 
and interpreted to discover regularity - patterns of action which may be 
termed structural qualities. Social structures evolving out of these social 
processes are not judged by criteria which measure their support of continuity 
and persistence in the system as a whole. Their description and interpretation, 
however, assist an understanding of their functions for society, and why some 
seem to serve the needs of society or individuals better than others. in this 
way it may be possible to examine why, at certain points in time, structures 
existed which were soon changed and adapted; whilst others remained in the 
same patterns. From this some general conclusions may be drawn about these 
structures and their relationship within the context of the social phenomena 
from which they derived their existence. This emphasis on relationships and 
processes may be termed interaction analysis, using the phrase applied to 
small group analyses by Bales. 48 
Analysis and explanation in the government system 
The preceding discussion is intended to convey an awareness of the 
problems involved in explaining political phenomena and to place the methods 
adopted for research into perspective. In dealing with individuals within the 
47W. Goldschmidt,'Comparative - functionalism, An essay in Anthropological 
Theory, (University of California Press, 1960). 
48R.F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison 
. Wesley Press Inc., 1951) . 
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institutional structure and in standing inside that structure an attempt 
may be made to avoid methodological individualism. The emphasis on the 
systemic nature of the relationship between elements and their social or 
political entities does not mean that an holistic approach need be dominant. 
The use of role theory as a means of explanation does not presuppose a 
dedication to quasi-mechanical, psychological influences as the sole causal 
factors in these relationships. 
Those who seek to explain individual and institutional behaviour in 
the field of government (a word deliberately used to distinguish from the 
'political' which is the concern of more philosophical and economic discussion) 
are faced with a twofold problem of explanation. First, the study must deal 
with social entities and their elements in 4 social setting to which cultural. 
norms and behavioural patterns are relevant. Second, explanation of activities 
within this environment must be sensitive to customs, laws and conventions 
which mould and remould those activities. Institutions which are elements 
of the social entities under study, or even forming the entity itself, comprise 
individuals plus rules and roles. It is impossible to understand and analyse 
and thus to explain such entities if only individual behaviour is investigated. 
The individual roles operate at two levels, one within the person's own 
perceived framework of social norms and values, the other within the rules, 
laws and conventions operating within the institution of which he is a part. 
One level cannot be separated from the other, they are inextricably inter-
twined. The rules may formulate expected patterns of individual activities - 
patterns of action that comprise regular and recognisable institutional forms, 
i.e. a structure or formal organisation. 49  Within this structure individuals 
operate, carrying out their activities in the manner prescribed. In the 
absence of any apparent tension between individual and institution it may be 
assumed that explanations would assert the stability and appropriateness of 
49F. Riggs, "Professionalism" (22. cit), p 51. 
384 
such an entity. Where tension exists further investigation would be necessary 
to establish the cause, which would range over, similar institutions to observe 
whether this phenomenon existed there too. Explanations would then be made 
about the tensions from which generalisations may be derived, leading to an 
evaluation of that particular entity in terms of the government system as a 
whole. 
The observer of government will therefore first be aware of one individual 
dealing.with another in ordinary social intercourse noting the social regulari-
ties. But at the same time he must place those regularities into a specific 
situational framework, possibly itself restrictive of relationships which 
otherwise may eventuate. Individual behaviour in these situations may only 
become meaningful when a specific substantive environment is provided. The 
context in which the behaviour occurs is of much more consequence in the study 
of government than it is in the study of society as a whole. In the latter 
situation the individual has more choice in his behaviour patterns and in the' 
norms he follows. The observer must therefore be more cautious in his 
collection of data and in his methodological considerations. 
Interaction Analysis explained and justified  
Interaction analysis is differentiated from structural functionalism 
because it attempts to avoid the terminological connotations of the latter, 
while utilising its systematising concepts, Interaction analysis is best 
described, therefore, as a research strategy with the primary task of suggesting 
the more relevant questions to ask and selecting the more illuminating concepts 
to employ. It is an attempt to organise data into a coherent whole in an 
efficient and non-normative manner, in order that it may be accounted for, 
explained or clarified. 
Its functionalism is based on the premiss that an area of human behaviour 
can be described as the interrelated operation of one or more social systems, 
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These systems may be of the macro type, e.g., nation, state, political, 
religious, or economic; or. the micro type, e.g., local government unit, 
separate agency, department or office, interest group or political party. 
The systems which operate may be identifiable either as patterns of action, 
i.e. regular behaviour patterns; or as collections of individuals who interact 
on a regular basis and who agree on certain values (norms) which give rise to 
or result from such interaction; or relatively self contained networks of 
human interaction. The choice of description does not alter the basic 
characteristics of the structure described, which are the interrelations of 
individual roles and activities within that system. As suggested by Parsons, 
these roles may be derived from the particular normative expectations of 
either the system or the individual. Where the norms are set by the system 
they are usually said to emerge from an institutionalisation of the individual 
norms over time. 50 
Role is a central feature of such analysis. However, it must be 
recognised that it is a dynamic concept that can only be clearly stated after 
clarification of the activities of any individual or individuals within the 
system. The concept of role is still subject to much discussion and has been 
defined in many ways. In one sense it is what an individual does as opposed 
to what he is surposed to do - as when one says; "What role did he play?", or 
is expected to perform - as when one says, "He is a baker". Without wishing 
to enter into the merits of one usage or another, but at the same time denying 
that it has no merit at all, the term role may be defined as a structural 
network of expectation's indicated by a set of behavioural rules, patterns 
and sequences of action or conduct, and/or behavioural values, which can be 
thought of as jointly regulating behaviour which can be learned and which as 
a set possess a distinctive name. 51 
50s. Eisenstadt., "Change, Differentiation and Evolution", American 
• Sociological Review, 1964, p 375, 
51As does Coulson, M. in J.A. Jackson (ed.), Role, (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1972) pp l077428/, 
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Thus a role may be given a specialised or distinctive name to indicate 
the institutionalised or routinised set of behaviours expected of the person 
. who undertakes activity connected with that role, e.g. baker. It may be said 
that such a definition will aslist in identifying the structural network of 
expectations in terms of behavioural regulations which represent to some 
degreea set of persistent institutional and individual values, as when we 
describe a person as being a Minister of the Crown, or Permanent Head of a 
Department of State. 52 
Where the individual's behaviour acts out the expectations of the system, 
or where the behaviour is controlled by norms and role prescriptions so 
internalised by the individual that he is motivated to activity in the manner 
expected of him, then it may be said that his actual performance is integrated 
with the expectations. 53 Such behaviour may be regarded as a function of the 
structure in which it takes place, i.e. it facilitates its operation in a 
regular pattern of activity. This leads to a concern with the way such 
structures are interrelated and interact one with the other in terms of the 
macrosystem expectations, i.e. how far activities of these structures have 
systems-relevant consequences; how the values and norms underlying the 
interactions are functions for the total system. 
Summary  
The continuing search for acceptable explanation of social phenomena 
demands that the researcher becomes self-conscious about his methodology. 
The volume of literature in the political and social sciences has not produced 
52For a much longer and more precise discussion of the concept ending 
in a series of conceptual terms which form part of this definition see 
N. Cross, W.S. Mason & A.W. McEarchen, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: 
J. Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958) esp. pp 48-67. See also M. Banton, Roles:  An  
Introduction to the Study of Social Relations (London: 1965) for a general dis-
cussion of the concept. 
53 In some literature this is the 'role-set', e.g. R. Merton,"The role set" 
British Journal of Sociology, June 1957, p 108, and Banton, 91. cit., p 28 
However, in Gross, et al. (op. cit.), it is referred to as a position, making no 
reference to expectations until it is called a rolesector, when it is related 
to other positions. 
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any agreed theoretical basis combined with analytical techniques. Each 
analysis must therefore start anew, searching for an appropriate model and 
selecting a satisfactory technique. Many different interpretations of the 
3ame social phenomenon are possibie, confusion results unless some attempt 
is made to combine and generalise. The language of description and inter-
pretation frequently becomes 'technique-specific', little attention being 
.paid to its ordinary use or previous literature. Derivative and analogous 
methodologies have been used in the social sciences, the natural sciences 
being the most common source. This has led to aggregating techniques which 
suggested that there were some laws or principles of social behaviour of 
the same kind as those found in nature. Relationships between these pseudo-
aggregations were regarded as the dynamic on which a theory of society could 
be created. Systems, organisms, and functions were thus used as analogies, 
and the related terminology began to dominate the analyses: The concepts 
with which commentators described and interpreted their data emerged fr::m this 
domination - integration; aggregation; socialisation; adaptation and so on. 
Yet these concepts were ill-defined and open to abuse. The words were repeated 
throughout the literature, but their meaning. was essentially contested. It 
is now generally accepted that these concepts were normative, i n the sense that 
they postulate an equilibrium, the components of which are already stipulated. 
Such theoretical models of social behaviour and political systems attempted 
to do too much, too quickly., The desire for a 'scientific' base created a 
false link between social and physical sciences. The anticipation that social 
laws would emerge as. more data was collated and aggregated, became an end in 
itself, creating repetitive models which failed to stand up to empirical valida-
tion. 
Objective neutrality, distancing the analyst from his material, has 
replaced social activism in the search for a general theory. Some of the 
techniques of analysis which have been utilised in systems theorising, or 
structural functionalism, can be salvaged. These methods must, however, be 
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cleansed of their implicit value content before use. There is a need to 
unravel the intricacies of methodologies, which selected concepts. for their 
contribution to the ultimate identification of a set of principles. 
Functionalism, structural functionalism and systems therefore have been 
briefly discussed, indicating their positive contributions and some of their 
defects. The numerous potential analytical constructs derived from these 
methodologies need sorting and a selection made by the researcher. His 
methodological 'kit' will result from this selection, but he will have to 
explain exactly how these constructs are to work together and the purposes 
they are intended to serve. 
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Appendix III  
Outline of Interview Technique and list of Interviewees  
The basis of the methodology is interaction analysis which demands an 
understanding of the relationships, in this case between the minister and 
public servant. one major source about such interaction is information 
given by the individuals themselves in an interview situation. 
In order to obtain the maximum out of each interview they were 
structured around the five variable centrifugal forces referred to on p 79. 
A separate questionnaire was prepared for each interviewee, taking into 
account his position, role and activity. This information was already 
gained from other written sources, as well as his departmental situation. 
The questions were not direct, multiple choice or capable of being 
computerised. They were all based on a dialogue between interviewer and 
interviewee around the core area to which the question was directed. Each 
question was prefaced by some statement or statements about the variable 
force which set parameters for the exchange. Each variable force had a 
number of questions and statements of this kind about various facets of the 
area under discussion. 
An example of such a question is set out below. It was addressed as 
one of many others .to the Deputy Director of Education, whose major 
activities included teacher recruitment and professional activities. 
"The Department employs some 4000 full-time and part-time staff 
outside the Public Service Act, 
(a)do you consider that the Minister should accept responsibility 
in Parliament for the professional work of the Department? 
(b)would you see the task of 'educating' as being divorced from 
that of funding and organising those doing the job of educating? 
(c)are you under less ministerial control in the areas of curriculum 
construction and research and teacher training than other senior 
officers in their particular areas?" 
On average each questionnaire contained 15 such questions and took about 
111 - 2 hours to complete. 	In a number of cases two or three visits 
were necessary to complete the interview, but there was no one who did not 
cooperate fully. One senior public servant took a total of six hours in 
his interview and reviewing what had been written about his Department. 
• Several ministers were no less eager to cooperate in this way. 
The interviews were carried out over a period of two years in two 
separate time blocks due to other commitments. The procedure was to forward 
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questionnaire when the date and time of the interview was confimed, giving 
the interviewee at least a week to prepare himself. In most cases con-
siderable thought had been given to the matter.before.the interview took 
place and many suggested that it had forced themto think about.mitters of 
which they had been vaguely aware but on which they had not had time to 
concentrate. Few, if any, interviewees had discussed the questionnaires 
with others prior to the interview. In no case were written answers 
prepared and handed out instead of an interview. Every interviewee readily 
accepted the supplementary questions that emerged from their answers to the 
original questions. This was a crucial part of the interview, since the 
background material from which the questions had been originally formulated 
was available to the interviewer. 
A list of those formally interviewed in this manner is set out below. It 
does not include many who were subjected to questions and were the source of 
information over the course of the study. Without their advice and 
assistance the interviews would not have been so valuable. 
HOUSING 	Ministers 	Mr. D. Clark 	Liberal 
Mr. D. Lowe 	Labor 
Public Servants 	Mr. L.F. Allwinton 
Mr. T.L. Lockhart 
Mr. K. Nicholls 
Mr. R. Annels 
Director 
Deputy 
Administrative Assist. 
-do- 
Chief Financial 
Officer 
EDUCATION 	Ministers 	Mr. A. Mather Liberal 
Mr. W. Neilson Labor 
Public Servants 	Mr. B. Tribolet 
Mr. A.V. Gough 
Mr. B. Mitchell 
Mr. C. Purves 
Mr. D. Howe 
Mr.,C.D. Brown 
Mr. J. Scott 
Mr. A. Brown 
Miss E.M.Backhouse 
Director 	( Director- 
General) 
Director-General 
Deputy 	- 
Chief Administrative 
Officer 
.Administrative Assist. 
Superintendant 
-do-
-do- 
Teachers Federation. 
HEALTH SERVICES Ministers 	Dr. N. Abbott Liberal 
Dr. A. Foster 	Labor 
Mr. M. Everett Labor 
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HEALTH SERVICES Public Servants Dr. J.R. Macintyre 	Director General 
Dr. G. Mackay Smith Deputy and 
Superintendant of 
Royal Hobart Hosp. 
Dr. D. Ross , 	Director 
Dr. J. Lawson -do- 
Dr. J. Curran 	-do- 
Mr. L. Baillie Chief Administra- 
tive Officer 
Mr.L. Shea 	Administrative 
Assistant 
Also interviewed: Mr. M. Bingham, Leader of the 
Opposition and Attorney General 	Liberal 
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Appendix TV 
Subject matter of questions asked in the House of Assembly, Sessions 
I and II of the 35th Parliament 1969-1971. (a) Housing 
Session I 
17 June 1969 - 24 February 1970 
Waratah Land for 3 dwellings 
Housing Department Factory and its continuance 
Currie-site development plans 
Carbide Plant, Electrona - assistance to unemployed in Government housing 
. accommodation 
Pensioner type homes to be built - programme for 1969,70 
Shopping centres in housing subdivisions 
Water and sewage reticulation in Housing subdivisions - contributions to cost 
correspondence with the Commonwealth 
Home construction in West and North West 
Zeehan Teachers Hostel 
Rates - exc]usion from Housing Rentals undertaking 
Survey of Housing needs questionnaire and purpose 
Rentals on Government Housing - extent of assurance that increases will 
not occur 
Seymour Mine supply of coking coal 
Repainting Housing Department houses, time in between 
Valves in hot water systems in Housing Department homes 
Housing Department homes on vacant land Goodwood 
Allocation of homes on North West Coast 
Housing Department homes - increases in weekly rentals or purchase 
payment charges 
Housing Department homes - sold privately to purchasers 
Housing Department tenants - notification of increases in weekly rentals 
Housing Department houses - rentals and weekly repayment charges 
- conditions under which may sell homes privately 
Major harbour facilities at Bicheno - availability of funds 
Housing Department - construction of houses by tender 
—building blocks available for Departmental development 
in Glenorchy and Northern suburbs 
Berriedale land purchase from Hobart Savings Bank 
Group Housing 
Temporary reduction in Housing payments 
Glenorchy housing blocks for private sale 
Rates reduction for Housing Department tenants 
Session II  
11 March 1970 - 17 February 1971 
Pensioner applicants for Housing in Hobart area 
Benjamin Court flats allotment - question of individual allotment 
Housing Department new factory 
Land for sale in Departmental subdivisions 
Benjamin Court flat allotment - re individual allotment 
Tenders for housing construction 
Wage as criteria for allotment of housing 
Payment of commission by Municipalities for collection of rates by 
Housing Department 
Pensioner housing application dates 
Elderly persons housing - minimum age for applications 
Pensioner applicants for housing in Hobart 
Elderly persons homes - ages of occupiers 
Home constructicn in the North - tenders 
Housing - cancellation of applications 
Wire fence boundaries around Departmental homes - replacement 
Recreation areas reserved in Housing subdivisions 
Deposits paid by housing applicants 
Goodwood and Mornington Housing purchase instalments 
Launceston housing - vacations and evictions 
Two-bedroom housing policy 
Elderly persons homes - applicants and availability 
Deposit on homes completed by Housing Department 
Cape Barren Islanders - money provided by Commonwealth for resettlement 
on Tasmanian mainland 
Housing - tenders and completion 
Burnie Houses unoccupied 
Glenorchy housing applications and. construction 
Southern applications for flats 
Housing Department - dwellings to be built in 1970-71 
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Housing applicants - waiting period 
Latrobe flooding - housing for displaced families 
Rental arrears owing to Housing Department 
Payment components for housing purchasers 
Fibro-cement sheeting - use in Housing Department homes. 
Questions asked in Session 	• • . 	. 	. 411 
Housing only 	• • . 	. 	. 30 
Questions asked in Session II . 	. 	. 	. 661 
Housing only 33 
Source: Journals and Paper's of House of Assembly Vols. 178,180 and 182 
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Subject matter of questions asked in the House of Assembly, Sessions I and II  
of the 35th Parliament 1969-1971 (b) Education 
Session I 
17 June 1969 - 24 February 1970 
Upper Burnie Primary School: Tenders for Kindergarten and sick room 
Parklands High School Burnie: Tenders for library etc. 
Isolation allowances for school children 
King Island District School: Tenders for assembly hall 
Wynyard Residential High School 
Devonport Matriculation College: Possibility of construction 
Educational decisions definition - made by educationalists 
King Island High School: Home Arts facilities 
Education of young children 
Ogilvie High School hostel 
Miandetta School Devonport: Tenders for 
Bursars and clerks for schools 
Blind persons: vocational courses 
Assembly Hall: Priority order 
Brooks High School Technical block 
Special school on Eastern shore 
Milk prices for school supplies 
Devonport Central Primary School playground development 
Graduate teachers comparable training and responsibility 
Primary education - visit of Sir Alan Clegg 
Beaconsfield Area School Home Arts block 
Arts and music blocks in State schools 
Social Science programme for State schools 
Burnie Technical College proposal 
Burnie Matriculation College 
Montumana - Rocky Cape Road - school bus difficulties 
Riverside Pre-School 
Overtime payment for teachers 
Medical rooms and First Aid officers in schools 
Book hiring service staff in schools 
Education Department employees classification list 
Slow learners specialist teachers promotions 
Independent schools subsidies 
School milk freight charges 
Wynyard Hostel for high school students 
Nixon Street School Devonport 
Tertiary Education election promise 
Holiday system in schools 
Teachers Federation membership 
Hilton Road School Claremont 
Teachers university fees 
Milk delivery to schools 
Matriculation colleges: Changes in schools of transfer 
Lecturers' conditions at Hobart's Technical College 
Teachers College staff: Promotion opportunities 
Handicapped children's teachers: Training course 
Special school on Eastern shore 
Assembly halls: Priority list 
Senior Master appointment 
Area School teaching staff 
Promotion to Senior Master 
School for handicapped on Northwest Coast 
Penguin Municipality High School 
Parklands High School library block 
Technical Colleges staff society: Recognition by government 
Country students at university: Disadvantages 
School libraries:Survey of needs 
Teenagers'conduct: Code of standards 
West Somerset Primary school: Second stage 
Thinking course at matriculation level 
Teachers' advancement and transfers to isolated parts of the State 
Technical Colleges staff society: Promotion positions of members 
Encyclopaedia purchase applications: Circulation by school staff
• Pre-school construction priority 
Photographs of children: Permission through schools 
Teachers Training College Launceston: Cost 
Technical, musical and physical Education Diplomas: Further study 
Telephones provided for teachers 
School bus operators' health requirements 
Independent schools: Survey of needs 
Zeehan teachers hostel 
Pharmacy degree course 
Education expenditure origin - State or Commonwealth 
Claremont High School storage space 
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Country children's educational disadvantages 
Claremont High School assembly hall 
Pre-school teachers without employment 
Maintenance work by teachers 
Education expenditure share for State schools 
Educational needs survey 
Education money from State government 
Pre-school teacher for Brighton 
Qualification for driving teachers 
Special school for Eastern shore: Commencement 
Glen Dhu Primary school: Pedestrian overpass 
Penguin Municipality: New Primary school 
Rosetta Kindergarten class 
Commonwealth finance for Launceston Teachers College appointments 
Financial allocation: Launceston Teachers College library 
University courses: Launceston Teachers College 
Applications for lecturers: Launceston Teachers College 
Bursaries to Primary school children 
Education officers: Non-teaching responsibilities 
Military training in government schools 
Unfavourable performance of State schools: Science talent quest 
Teacher students: Hobart Teachers College 
Hobart Technical College: Offer from Fler Co. (Tas.) to make workshops available 
Proposed new Primary school East Wynyard: Expected schedule 
Cygnet Area School: Refusal to use old trade block as child minding centre 
Teacher at Conara school: Notice of termination of services 
Launceston Teachers College: Submission to Commonwealth for funds to allow 
completion 
Degree courses in Pharmacy in Tasmania: Outcome of meeting of Joint Consultative 
Council 
Tasmania University fees: Increase of 12% necessary next year 
Warrane High School: Delay in completion of new library 
Teaching staff required to perform duties normally carried out by clerical staff 
Teachers services and transfers 
Matriculation girls hostel 
Capitation grant to Independent schools at first year Primary level 
Lauderdale Primary school:. Additional class rooms 
University fees 
Accommodation for Northern university students -
Uncertificated or technical teachers' salaries 
- Session II 
11 March 1970-17 February 1971 
Salaries - retrospectivity poyments 
University courses undertaken by teachers - reimbursement of cost3 
Compulsory payments by parents of State School children 
Teaching duties of Headmasters in Primary Schools 
School Clerical Staff 
Capitation grants to Independent schools extended to primary level 
Wilmot School bus service 
Qualifications for science and mathematics teachers 
Needs of rural areas for secondary education 
Launceston Primary schools' kindergartens 
Teachers' salaries retrospectivity payments 
Education of Children 3-8 Report 
Assembly Hall construction - priority lists 
Teachers' salary increase - delay 
Cost of reimbursement of University fees to teachers 
Commonwealth Secondary Scholarship holders - reimbursement 
Technical Colleges - increased fees 
Library rooms in primary schools 
Library in primary schools - Commonwealth funds 
Teachers supervising trainees - payments 
Status of two-year trained teachers 
Religious education Committee 
Pedestrian overpass - Glen Dhu School 
Mathematics training for Physical Education teachers 
Compulsory levies at State Schools 
Shortage of chairs at New Norfolk High School 
Shortage of typewriters at Ogilvie High School 
Resignations in Education Department 
Goulburn State School - entertainment 
Future needs for teachers 
Australian Education Council meeting 
New Norfolk High School staff members 
Launceston Teacher Training College - recommendation by Tender Board 
Maths and Science teachers - present shortage and qualification 
Teaching Service - new regulations 
Teachers Classification lists 
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College of Advanced Education teacher training 
Hobart Teachers.College as part of College of Advanced Education 
Geeveston Convent School - non provision of school bus transport 
Accommodation problems at . Launcestor Matriculation College 
Northern High Schools teacher shortage 
Prospect High School - class members 
Launceston second Matriculation College 
Technical Education Colleges - responsible authorities 
Taroona High School Assembly Hall - heating 
Launceston Matriculation College - accommodation for extra students 
- Burnie Matriculation College - progress 
Burnie Technical College - design consultants 
Technical Colleges, Burnie, Devonport - Construction 
Deaf pre-school children in North - visiting teacher service 
Deaf, mentally retarded Children - separate classroom at Lady Rowallan 
House School 
Burnie Technical College - cost of model 
Education Department loan funds spent 
Taroona High School Science Laboratory fire exit 
Burnie Technical College.proposal - investigation by Public Works Committee 
State Schools - funds from non government sources 
Parklands High School, Burnie - Damage to courtyard as a result of construction 
work 
Smoking - education on dangers in schools 
Rosny Matriculation College model costs 
Teaching service resignations in 1970 
New Town High School - students proceeding to Matriculation 
Rivulet through Kings Meadows High School - piping 
Queechy High School - provision of music/arts block 
Brooks High School.- staff shortage 
Delays in reply to teachers questions re qualifications 
Bottled gas supplied to Queechy High School 
Book hiring service in schools 
Launceston Matriculation College - additional laboratory space 
Burnie Matriculation College - delays in submitting plans 
Unionist preference in Education Department - Tasmanian Teachers Federation 
Railton Primary School - additional accommodation 
College of Advanced Education - delay in building 
,Superintendent of In-Service-Training - duties,responsibilitts and allowances 
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School classes over forty 
Launceston Matriculation College - construction of classrooms and walkway 
Technical College Staff Society - approach to Director 
New Town High School Staff deficiency 
Woodwork classes at Clarence High School - recommencement 
Brooks High School overcrowding 
Northern Schools closing 
Deaf children - high school accommodation 
Physically handicapped teachers employed by Education Department 
Cosgrove High School Library/ Art Block heating 
Handicapped persons facilities at the College of Advanced Education 
Cosgrove School Library/ Art Block 
Reconstruction work of Parklands High School 
Education Department Studentships - restrictions and choice of University 
faculties and. subjects imposed on holders 
Studentship at College and University - numbers taken up 
Cosgrove High School - tenders for heating cable 
Consolidation of Education Department Regulations 
Bellerive Primary School fire - ministerial statement 
Pre-schools - withdrawal of subsidy when linked with primary schools 
Travelling allowances for full time University students 
Fire fighting equipment in schools 
Bonded teachers - service in other states. 
Insurance of State owned schools 
Taroona High School - overcrowding on buses 
Part time school crossings 
Education programme - priority 
Deaf children at Warrane High School - secondary education 
- Young Town State School conditions 
Teachers College graduates - value of qualifications 
Launcestion Teachers College students - - travel allowance for practice teaching 
Pioneer School - contract 
Teacher training studentships at Canberra 
Chigwell Primary School - heaters 
Colleges of Advanced Education - relationship with other bodies 
- transfer of staff from other Colleges 
East Wynyard Primary School - occupation 
Burnie Matriculation College - referral to Public Works Committee 
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Geilston Bay High School - provision for deaf children 
Launceston Teachers College - future status 
King Island High School - classroom block, science accommodEtion and library 
Plans for use of vacated School of Art and Teachers College buildings 
in Hobart 
Bonding system - amounts payable by teacher students 
Advertising for positions in the College of Advanced Education 
Myrtle Park State School - conditions 
Rosny Matriculation College - completion date 
Launceston Teachers College - committee on future status 
Questions asked in Session I 	 411 
	
Education only   119 
Questions asked in Session II 	 661 
Education only   120 
Source: Journals & Papers of House of Assembly, Vol. 178, 180 & 182 
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Subject matter of questions asked in the House of Assembly, Sessions I and II  
of the 35th Parliament 1969-1971 (c) Health Services 
Session I 
17 June 1969 - 24 February 1970 
Private and intermediate beds in Hospitals 
• Intermediate beds Policy: Establishment of Committee 
Hepatitis outbreak in Burnie area 
George Town ambulance 
Zeehan Hospital Proposal 
King Island District Hospital: Commencement of work 
Oral Contraceptives: side effects 
Health Ministers' Conference Agenda; Ministers' non attendance 
Home care and paramedical grants 
Private and Intermediate beds in Hospitals 
Recommendations of National Health and Medical Research Council 
Launceston General Hospital: Tender prices for operating theatre block 
Pesticide Act regulations 
Hospital patients'comfort: Inquiry: Implementation of Report 
Nursing pre-requisite qualifications 
Launceston General Hospital works expenditure 
Launceston General Hospital: Contract for works 
Hospitals Budget estimates 
Patients' comfort in Hospitals 
Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies 
Fluoridation of major Water Supplies 
Examination of Soft Drink sweetener: Cyclamate 
Outpatients centre on the Eastern shore 
Sulphuric Acid Plant, Burnie: Emission of sulphur dioxide 
Zeehan: Programme for construction of proposed new hospital 
Pesticide Act 1968: Tabling of regulations relating to permissible tolerance 
sprays 
Municipality of . Oatlands: Without services of doctor as from November 
Public Statement: Future of District Medical Officer Service at New Norfolk 
and Maydena 
Public Hospitals in Tasmania: Disciplining staff 
Nursing Homes: Role of governments 
Deloraine District Hospital and Westbury District Nursing Centre: Extensions 
Royal Hobart Hospital: Occupation of North-eastern corner building. 
403 
Public statement: District Hospitals at Nubeena and Swansea 
Session II 
11 March 1970 - 17 February 1971 
Biodegradable detergents 
Hospital finance Inquiry 
Outpatients charges 
Royal Derwent Hospital: public statement by medical staff 
Vitanova Sobering. powder 
Trial leave for Royal Derwent Hospital patients 
'Intensive care unit: Beds occupied by road accident cases 
Snorkel as cause of swimming death 
Hospital patients' comfort: Implementation of the Report 
Royal Derwent Hospital': In-patients applying for trial leave 
Pesticide levels in eggs 
Insecticide content of milk 
Launceston General Hospital: progress payments 
Nursing staff deficiencies in General Hospitals 
Eggs: pesticide content 
Nubeena District Nursing Centre: progress 
Herbicide 245T: Contaminants in 
Geriatric patients in Royal Hobart Hospital 
Alcoholic and Dependency Act: Patients referred 
Swansea District Nursing Centre: Tenders for construction 
Launceston General Hospital works: Estimated costs 
Appropriation Act: Distribution of vote 
Fluoridation at Burnie, Devonport and Southern Metropolitan Water supply 
• Austin Hospital Melbourne: Accommodation for persons . travelling with patients 
Geriatrics from Burnie and Wynyard areas: Need for additional accommodation 
Zeehan Hospital: Closing of 
• Nursing shortage: Investigation Committee 
Barbiturates: Nature of present control 
Ulverstone District Hospital: Geriatric ward tenders 
Sewage treatment plant: Tamar River 
Measles immunisation campaign 
General Hospitals staff deficiencies 
Children's ward, Launceston General Hospital: Occupation of 
Nursing sister: Appointment of,Cape Barren Island 
Hydatids Eradication: Information for members 
Penguir. District Medical Residence and Surgery 
DDT residue in Northern Tasmanian eggs 
Raw milk samples analyses 
Peacock Convalescent Hospital: Patient numbers 
Committee Rooms at the Royal Hobart Hospital 
Queenstown Hospital: Appointment of resident surgeon 
Dental Officer vacancies 
Eastern Shore Ambulance substation 
Geriatric accommodation programme, North West General. Hospital 
Radioactive substances: Control by hospitals and other bodies 
Bromureide drugs: Intention to schedule for prescription only 
Sulphur Oxide monitors at Burnie: Results obtained 
Gynaecological patients, Launceston General Hospital 
St. Johns Park waiting list 
Operating theatres at Launceston General Hospital 
Penguin District Medical Officer: Withdrawal 
Beaches Polluted notices 
Handicapped Persons Advisory Council: Disb -,nding 
Spencer Park, Wynyard: Annex for Handicapped children 
Riverview Homes for Aged People, Devonport: Complaints of conduct 
Mentally ill patients in ordinary wards at Launceston General Hospital 
Geriatric Accommodation at Wynyard: Tenders - 
Shelltox Pest Strip: Investigation of toxicity 
Burnie Fluoridation Plant 
Quarantine inspection: Japanese fishing crews 
Diesel oil spillage from vehicles: Case for vertical exhaust 
Questions asked in Session I 	 411 
Health Services only 33 
Questions asked in Session II  661 
Health Services only 61 
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Source: Journals and Papers of the House of Assembly, Vols 178, 180 and 182 
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